Training Materials on negotiation, planning, deployment, sustainment of national contingents

For Senior National Planners of Troop and Police Contributing Countries to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

April 2019 Draft Version
The training materials for the United Nation Senior National Planners Programme has been developed by the Integrated Training Service (ITS) of the UN Department of Peace Operations.

This version has been released for use at the United Nations Senior National Planners Course, conducted by ITS and reference materials for Member States on negotiation, planning, deployment, sustainment of their national contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations.

This programme will be regularly updated so that it is fully responsive to the needs of both the T/PCC and the United Nations Secretariat. Therefore, we strongly suggest checking for updated versions.

The latest version of this programme can be found online at the Peacekeeping Resource Hub: http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community. A link to receive your comments and suggestions for improvement can be found in the resource hub at the same location.

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UNSNPP DRAFT V4.0

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Integrated Training Service

Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support

United Nations

New York, NY, 10017, USA
Preface

Background

The aim of this programme is to expose the participants to the UN administrative and technical procedures and the intricacies and challenges of the negotiation, planning, preparation, deployment, support, sustainment, and termination process of national contingents deploying to UN Peacekeeping Operations.

Target Audience

Senior officials/uniformed officers appointed or to be appointed to lead or direct national processes regarding negotiation, planning, preparation, deployment, sustainment, rotation and termination of their Government’s participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations.

Structure of the training materials

The package is constructed in eight modules, several interactive training activities and three Scenario Based Exercises (SBE) on the negotiation of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between a T/PCC and the UN, Reimbursement of Contingent Owned Equipment and Transport of Contingents.
Acknowledgements

ITS would like to thank the subject matter experts from the Department of Peace Operations and Department of Operational Support for their collaboration with the development and delivery of this programme and Member States personnel who provided feedback during the delivery of the courses.

Contact person

For any proposal of update or improvement of this package, or any questions pertaining to the programme, please contact the project leader Mr. Rafael Barbieri (barbieri@un.org) or write to peacekeeping-training@un.org.

Any relevant update will be posted and explained on the Peacekeeping Resource Hub website (http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community). Instructors are encouraged to check this site regularly.
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### Glossary of UN Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACABQ</td>
<td>Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>Assessment of Operational Capability (Police)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area Of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APOE</td>
<td>Airport Of Embarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATS</td>
<td>Air Transport Service (DOS/LD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOI</td>
<td>Board Of Inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C34</td>
<td>Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMMRB</td>
<td>COE and MOU Management Review Board (MOU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Contingent Owned Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Chief Of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRD</td>
<td>Cargo Readiness Date (MOVCON)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSD</td>
<td>Chief Service Delivery (Logistics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMS</td>
<td>Director Mission Support (Mission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPTM</td>
<td>Core Pre-deployment Training Material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D&amp;D</td>
<td>Death &amp; Disability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>Deputy Force Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUF</td>
<td>Directive on the Use of Force (Police)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG Load List</td>
<td>Dangerous Goods Load List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Department of Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMSPC</td>
<td>Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOCO</td>
<td>United Nations Development Operations Coordination Office (UNHQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of Operational Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPC</td>
<td>Deputy Police Commissioner (Mission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPET</td>
<td>Division of Policies, Evaluation &amp; Training (DPO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>Department of Peace Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPPA</td>
<td>Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA</td>
<td>Division for Special Activities (DOS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSRSG RC/HC</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General - Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
<td>Department of Safety &amp; Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Called C34 because it was initially composed of 34 members states (144 nowadays)
2. Replaced by DOS / Department of Operational Support as of 1st January 2019
3. Replaced by DMSPC / Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance as of 1st January 2019
4. Replaces DM / Department of Management as of 1st January 2019
5. Replaces DFS / Department of Field Support as of 1st January 2019
6. Replaced by DPPA / Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs as of 1st January 2019
7. Replaced by DPO / Department of Peace Operations as of 1st January 2019
8. Replaces DPKO / Department of Peacekeeping Operations as of 1st January 2019
9. Replaces DPA / Department of Political Affairs as of 1st January 2019
10. Created on 1st January 2019
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM</td>
<td>European Union Training Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization (of the United Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBFD</td>
<td>Field Budget &amp; Finance Division (DFS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>Force Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOC</td>
<td>Full Operational capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPAT</td>
<td>Formed Police Assessment Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPD</td>
<td>Field Personnel Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed Police Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFMV</td>
<td>Generic Fair Market Value (COE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFSS</td>
<td>Global Field Support Strategy (DOS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSC</td>
<td>Global Service Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCC</td>
<td>Headquarters Committee on Contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPPO</td>
<td>High-level Independent Panel on [UN] Peace Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMOSH</td>
<td>Health Management &amp; Occupational Safety &amp; Health (Division) (DOS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAP</td>
<td>Integrated Assessment Planning (Process)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IATA</td>
<td>International Air Transport Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICI</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information &amp; Communication Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization / In Lieu Of (COE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMC</td>
<td>Inter-Mission Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMDG</td>
<td>International Maritime Dangerous Goods (code)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMTC</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOT</td>
<td>Integrated Operational Team (DPO/Office of Operations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPO</td>
<td>Individual Police Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>Integrated Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITU</td>
<td>International Telecommunication Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Justice &amp; Correction Service (OROLSI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Joint Mission Analysis Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KJSO</td>
<td>Kuwait Joint Support Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI</td>
<td>Key Performance Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOA</td>
<td>Letter Of Assist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LD</td>
<td>Logistics Division (DOS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>Logistics Support Division (DFS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCMS</td>
<td>MOU &amp; Claims Management Section (DFS/FBFD)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 Dissolved as of 1st January 2019
12 Dissolved as of 1st January 2019
13 Replaced the Logistic Support Division as of 1st January 2019
14 Replaced by the Logistics Division as of 1st January 2019
15 Replaced by the Reimbursement Claims Management & Performance Section (RCMPS) on 01/01/2019
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ME</th>
<th>Major Equipment (COE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEAP</td>
<td>Mission-wide Environmental Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHE</td>
<td>Material Handling Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMSS</td>
<td>Mission Management &amp; Support Section (OROLSI/PD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum Of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dry lease (MOU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wet lease (MOU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troop costs (MOU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troop allowances (MOU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOVCON</td>
<td>Movement Control Section (DOS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dangerous Cargo List (MOVCON)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPAC</td>
<td>Military and Police Advisers Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPET</td>
<td>Military Performance Enhancement Task Force (OMA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>Military Planning Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRPS(^{16})</td>
<td>MOU &amp; Reimbursement Policy Section (DOS/UCSD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Member State (of the UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSA</td>
<td>Mission Subsistence Allowance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Mission Support Center (Logistics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSD(^{17})</td>
<td>Medical Support Division (DM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDS</td>
<td>Material Safety Data Sheet (Dangerous goods transportation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSS</td>
<td>Medical Support Section (DOS/LD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MST</td>
<td>Mission Support Team (DOS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTF</td>
<td>Maritime Task Force (UNIFIL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTT</td>
<td>Mobile Training Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Government Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMA</td>
<td>Not In Mission Area (COE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIO</td>
<td>National Investigation Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTICAS</td>
<td>Notification of Casualty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE</td>
<td>National Support Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFB(^{18})</td>
<td>Office of Finance and Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHRM</td>
<td>Office of Human Resources Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>OICT(^{20})</td>
<td>Office of Information and Communications Technology (DOS / DMSPC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIOS</td>
<td>Office of Internal Oversight Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLA</td>
<td>Office of Legal Affairs (Secretariat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>Office of Military Affairs (DPO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OO</td>
<td>Office of Operations (DPO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPPBA(^{21})</td>
<td>Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPSP</td>
<td>Office for the Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership (DPO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORAPI</td>
<td>Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement (Policy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OROLSI</td>
<td>Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (DPO)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{16}\) Replaced Reimbursement & Policy Liaison Section on 1\(^{st}\) January 2019  
\(^{17}\) Transferred to DOS and merged with HMOSH on 1\(^{st}\) January 2019  
\(^{18}\) Replaced OPPBA on 1\(^{st}\) January 2019  
\(^{19}\) Dissolved as of 1\(^{st}\) January 2019  
\(^{20}\) Created on 1\(^{st}\) January 2019  
\(^{21}\) Replaced by OFB on 01 January 2019
OSCM\textsuperscript{22} - Office of the Supply Chain Management (DOS)
OSO\textsuperscript{23} – Office of Support Operations (DOS)
PBSO - Peacebuilding Support Office
PC - Police Commissioner (Mission)
PCRS – Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System
PD – Police Division (DPO)
PD – Procurement Division (DOS)
PDV – Pre-Deployment Visit
PIP - Pre-deployment Information Package
PKO – Peacekeeping Operation
PMCA - Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority
RBB - Results-Based Budgeting
RCMPS\textsuperscript{24} - Reimbursement Claims Management & Performance Section (DOS/UCSD)
RDL – Rapid Deployment Level (PCRS)
RDT - Rapid Deployment Team (DOS)
RFP - Request for Proposal (Commercial)
ROE – Rules Of Engagement (Military)
RPLS\textsuperscript{25} – Reimbursements Policy & Liaison Section (DFS/FBD)
RSC-E – Regional Service Center - Entebbe
SAAT – Selection Assistance and Assessment Team (Police)
SAG – Senior Advisory Group
SAOC – Strategic Air Operations Center (Brindisi)
SCM - Supply Chain Management
SCR – Security Council Resolution
SDS – Strategic Deployment Stock (Logistics)
SEA – Sexual Exploitation & Abuse
SFGGPC - Strategic Force Generation & Capabilities Planning Cell
SG – (UN) Secretary General
SGB – Secretary General Bulletin
SOFA – Status Of Force Agreement
SOMA – Status Of Mission Agreement
SOP – Standard Operating Procedure
SOW - Scope of Work
SPC – Standing Police Capacity
SPDS - Strategic Policy and Development Section (Police Division)
SPOE - Seaport Of Embarkation
SRPOS\textsuperscript{26} – Single Regional-Political Operational Structure
SRS - Selection & Recruitment Section (OROLSI/Police Division)
SRSG – Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Head Of Mission)
SS – Self Sustainment
STM – Specialized Training Material
SUR – Statement of Unit Requirements
SWAT - Special Weapons And Tactics (Team)
TMICC - Transportation and Movement Integrated Control Center (Regional)

\textsuperscript{22} Created 1\textsuperscript{st} January 2019
\textsuperscript{23} Created on 1\textsuperscript{st} January 2019
\textsuperscript{24} Replaced MOU & Claims Management Section as of 1\textsuperscript{st} January 2019
\textsuperscript{25} Replaced by MOU & Reimbursement Policy Section (DOS/UCSD) as of 1\textsuperscript{st} January 2019
\textsuperscript{26} Created on 1\textsuperscript{st} January 2019
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOE</td>
<td>Table of Organization and Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOT</td>
<td>Training Of the Trainers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/PCC</td>
<td>Troop/Police Contributing Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSR</td>
<td>Troop Strength Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCSD²²</td>
<td>Uniformed Capabilities Support Division (DOS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGSC</td>
<td>United Nations Global Service Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHQ</td>
<td>United Nations Headquarters (New York)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIBAM</td>
<td>United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNLB</td>
<td>United Nations Logistic Base (Brindisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMO</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCC</td>
<td>United Nations Operations and Crisis Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>UN Office on Drugs and Crime (Vienna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOE</td>
<td>United Nations Owned Material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNWTO</td>
<td>World Tourism Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPU</td>
<td>Universal Postal Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>Under Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USV</td>
<td>Unserviceable (COE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unarmed, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VR</td>
<td>Verification Report (COE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIPO</td>
<td>World Intellectual Property Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMO</td>
<td>World Meteorological Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²² Created on 1st January 2019
Notes:

As National Planners your primary role is to plan for the participation of your national contingents or individual personnel (Observers for example), in UN peace operations. For some MS planners, you will also be responsible for the detailed on-going management of your nation’s contributions. Both will require you to have an in-depth knowledge of how UN peace operations are mounted, conducted and, eventually, concluded. This will require you to provide advice not only to your national military and police senior authorities, but also, because almost all ‘peace operations’ are essentially civilian and ‘political’ in nature involving a civilian component supported as required by military and police components; advice to your civilian authorities as well; including your Governments. This whole programme and this Module are intended to provide you with the necessary basic knowledge to help you do that.
Module Content

- Peacekeeping facts and figures
- The UN charter
- Traditional principles of peacekeeping & other success factors
- The evolution of peacekeeping

Notes:

The presenter should briefly outline the reasons each of the above are included in the Module content.

- Peacekeeping facts and figures – to understand the magnitude of current global UN peace operations in terms of the personnel and other resources involved, the geographic diversity of operations and the challenges that these impose, i.e.
  - Time zones as they effect individual MS and the UN, including impacts on coordination,
  - Difficulties faced by MS and the UN in mounting and sustaining operations across often huge distances both internally in some missions, and between missions.
  - Climatic and terrain differences between Missions and the challenges these impose on most MS (and the UN) in providing appropriate equipment and trained personnel, i.e. Nordic countries ability to provide, from current resources, equipment and personnel suitable for operations in hot, dry desert environments. Medical considerations, underdeveloped support infrastructure

- The UN Charter – to understand how the UN is organized and why it and MS are involved in peace operations at all, the context in which these operations take place, the legal authority to conduct such operations.

- Traditional principles of peacekeeping – to understand the 3 core principles that guide the mounting and conduct of peace operations.

- Other Success Factors – to understand the 3 additional factors that lead to success.
• Models of UN Missions – to understand why different missions are organized differently in terms of their components.

• The Evolution of Peacekeeping – to understand how and why the UN conduct of peace operations has changed over time and what changes might occur in the future.
Learning Outcomes

- Gain a greater knowledge of the global scope of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.
Lecture Content

- Peacekeeping facts sheet
- Current peacekeeping operations
- Current political and peacebuilding operations
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 1 of Module A of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).

**Notes:**

The facts and figures in the following slides for this Topic require review and up-dating by UNHQ prior to the conduct of each National Planners course edition.
Peacekeeping Facts Sheet

- Peacekeeping operations since 1948: 71
- Current operations: 14 PKO + 12 Political and Peace building Missions.
- Military and Police personnel: 89,409 *
- Countries contributing uniformed personnel: 124 *
- Civilian Personnel
  - 4,539 International staff **
  - 8,393 National staff **
  - 1,345 UN Volunteers ***
- Financial Resources: $ 6.7 billion for 2018-19
- Fatalities since 1948: 3,818 ****

Notes:

- * Figure as at 31 January 2019
- ** Figures 30 June 2018 UN website
- *** Figures 31 January 2019
- **** Total number of fatalities in all UN peace operations since 1948, as of 31 January 2019.

- The 2018-19 budget represents an average of 1.47% reduction on the approved budget for 2016-17
- The presenter should remind participants of the difference between what are known as peacekeeping operations and special political missions.
- Value would be added by providing the numbers in formed units and individuals; i.e. military observers, individual civilian police. Numbers and types of military units.
- Value would be added by providing the numbers by countries who provide military and police personnel and both.
- Value would be added by mentioning that the international and national staff numbers do not include personnel who are civilian contractors or those (UN and MS personnel including civilians) who work ‘outside’ the missions in direct support of missions, i.e. aviation carriers’ staff, national HQ staff.
- The status and source of UN Volunteers should be explained.
- Value would be added by providing data on the growth in financial resources required.
- Value would be added if data was provided on the broad causes of casualties, i.e. hostile action, road and other accidents, disease/illness (contracted in mission/pre-existing conditions). As such global data may be very difficult or impossible to obtain, figures relating to several on-going missions may suffice.
Key Message: since 2000 the number of peacekeepers deployed on the ground has steadily increased, from about 12,000 at the end of 1999 to 88,633 (December 2018). Since 2016 this number has been on a steady decline.

Notes:

The purpose of this slide is to illustrate the peaks and troughs in the numbers of peacekeepers over a historic time line; linking them to the start-up and closure of peacekeeping operations. The presenter should use a laser pointer or similar, to indicate the years/time periods when the peaks and troughs occurred and explain that it takes time for the Demand for peacekeepers, to fill missions, is matched by the Supply of peacekeepers. The presenter should also explain the possible implications of peaks and troughs on the UN and T/PCC – last bullet point below refers and invite participants to share national experiences.

In terms of the evolution of the number of uniformed peacekeepers over time:

- After passing temporarily under the 100,000-mark due to DPKO’s efforts to downsize missions, numbers rose again over the 100,000 mark in summer 2014 due to approval of deployment of MINUSMA (2013) and MINUSCA (2014).
- Maximum deployed strength reached in January 2016 with the almost complete deployment of MINUSCA + MINUSMA
- Numbers decreased again with the closure or diminution in strength of MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNMIL...
• Note the steep increase in the period 1992-1994 (UNPROFOR, UNOSOM, UNTAC), followed by the steep decrease in 1995 when those operations closed. Then a gradual decline until 2000, and after that a more or less steady increase.

• Steep increases in required numbers often means that the UN and T/PCC have difficulty ramping up capabilities quickly as there is a lack of experienced personnel, military and civilian, and other resources. Steep decreases cause a loss of experienced personnel and a sudden surplus of old, but still usable equipment. The UN’s concept of a ‘reserve’ of peacekeeping related equipment, the Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) held in Italy at the UN Logistic Base in Brindisi, was developed after UNPROFOR, UNTAC and UNOSOM ended. There is still not a real ‘reserve’ of UN personnel to start new operations.

• CLICK shows current figures (December 2018) (Peacekeeping facts sheet December 2018 @ https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/pk_factsheet_12_18_eng_v2.pdf)
  • Total: uniformed personnel: 88,633
  • Contingent: 75,033
  • Staff Officers: 1,982
  • Experts on Mission: 1,247
  • Police: 10,371
Current Peacekeeping Operations

Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 1 of Module A of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
**Key Message:** there are currently 14 peacekeeping operations deployed over a span of 11 time zones (UNMIL mandate was completed on 30 March 2018).

**Notes:**

- This slide requires review and up-dating by UNHQ prior to the conduct of National Planners courses.

- There are currently 15 Peacekeeping operations – meaning led by DPO.
- The two most recent operations are MINUSCA (Central African Republic, April 2014) and MINUSMA (Mali, March 2013), created by re-hatting of African Union-led operations. The concept of ‘rehatting’ should be briefly described.
- The two oldest PK Missions are UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization) created in May 1948 and UNMOGIP created in January 1949.
- The presenter should use this slide to reinforce the points made in the Module Content slide i.e.

- Peacekeeping facts and figures – to understand the magnitude of current global UN peace operations in terms of the personnel and other resources involved, the geographic diversity of operations and the challenges that these impose, i.e.
• Time zones as they effect individual MS, who may contribute to Missions with a large time difference from their own countries, including impacts on coordination with UNHQ, where MS Permanent Missions are based.
• Difficulties faced by MS and the UN in mounting and sustaining operations across often huge distances both internally in some missions, and between missions.
• Climatic and terrain differences between Missions and the challenges these impose on most MS (and the UN) in providing appropriate equipment and trained personnel, i.e. Nordic countries ability to provide, from current resources, equipment and personnel suitable for operations in hot, dry desert environments. Medical considerations, underdeveloped support infrastructure
Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 1 of Module A of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
**Key Message:** there are currently 12 political and peacebuilding missions deployed over a span of 10 time zones.

**Notes:**

- This slide requires review and up-dating by UNHQ prior to the conduct of National Planners courses.
- Checking done 19 February 2019. Added UNMHA / Yemen (Maps available on un.org not updated to the present day).
- The presenter should mention that ‘political missions’ sometimes include military and/or police advisors/liaison officers.
Lecture Take Away

- Close to 90,000 uniformed peacekeepers are currently deployed in 14 peacekeeping operations.
- The 2018-2019 peacekeeping budget amounts to about US$ 6.7 billions.
- 3,818 UN personnel have lost their lives in all UN operations since 1948 (as of 31 Jan. 2019).
- The challenges of mounting and sustaining such a large number and diversity of operations are immense.

- The UN Peacekeeping budget is less than half of one per cent of world military expenditures (estimated at $1,747 billion in 2013)

- Data updated 19 FEB 2019 - GHY
Peacekeeping Facts & Figures

Questions

Notes:

The presenter should review the several websites available giving general information on the United Nations including its Charter, history, membership, etc. to be able to answer questions from or pose questions to, participants. These websites include:


The presenter should invite participants to state what they understand the UN Charter to be, what it includes, what rights and responsibilities does it give the UN. What impact does or might the Charter have on Member States.

The following dictionary definition of ‘Charter’ may be useful to generate discussion.

Charter (as a noun) – A document, issued by a sovereign or state, outlining the conditions under which a corporation, colony, city, or other corporate body is organized, and defining its rights and privileges.
Learning Outcomes

• Understand the basics of the UN charter, its purposes and principles.
• Understand the basic functions of the main UN organs established by the Charter.
Lecture Content

• Creation of the UN Charter
• Purposes of the UN
• Principles of the UN Charter
• Organization of the UN
• Main Organs of the UN
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 2 of Module A of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Creation of UN Charter

- The term “United Nations” was coined in 1942 by Winston Churchill (then Prime Minister of the UK) and Franklin D. Roosevelt (then President of the USA).
- The Charter was drafted, and signed on June 26, 1945 at the ‘UN Conference on International Organization’ held in San Francisco, USA. The conference was attended by 50 nations and several non governmental organizations.
- The Charter came into effect, and the UN thus founded, on October 24, 1945.

Key Message: The UN Charter was drafted, and signed on June 26, 1945, and came into effect on October 24, 1945.
Creation of UN Charter

- The Charter, signed by 50 of the 51 original member countries, is the treaty that forms and establishes the international organization called the United Nations.
- The Charter entered into force after being ratified by the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States) and a majority of other signatories.

Key Message: The Charter entered into force after being ratified by the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States) along with other signatories.

Notes:

- Poland, the other original member, which was not represented at the conference, signed the charter later.
- The Charter is a constituent treaty and all members are bound by its Articles. Furthermore, Article 103 states that obligations to the United Nations prevail over all other treaty obligations. (*Constituent* – one of the parts that form something – an essential part of something).
- United Nations Day is celebrated on October 24.
- The International Day of United Nations Peacekeepers (or Peacekeepers Day as it is commonly known) is May 29. The first Peacekeeping Operation, UNTSO, was established by the Security Council by its Resolution 50 (1948) on May 29, 1948.
The UN Charter

Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 2 of Module A of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).

Notes:

The presenter should invite participants to state what they understand by the term “Charter”.
Charter Preamble

• Save future generations from the scourge of war.
• Reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.
• Establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.
• Promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.

Key Message: The Charter preamble states the main general goals of the United Nations Organization.

Notes:

The Preamble to the Charter states

We the peoples of the United Nations determined
• to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
• to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
• to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
• to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

And for these ends
• to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and
• to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
• to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
• to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

Have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims
Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 2 of Module A of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Purposes of the UN

- To maintain international peace and security
- To develop friendly relations among world nations
- To solve international problems of any nature (economic, cultural, social, humanitarian...)
- To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Key Message: the purposes of the UN meet its goals as stated in the Charter’s preamble.

- To maintain international peace and security
- To develop friendly relations among world nations
- To solve international problems of any nature (economic, cultural, social, humanitarian...)
- To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.
Key Message: The principles of the UN are the means to realize its purposes.

These are the 7 UN principles summarized.
Principles applicable to UN Member States (1 to 5) and to the Organization itself (6,7).

We have seen the purposes of the UN in the previous slide, this is how we reach the purposes, under these guiding principles.

Hereafter is the complete text of the 7 UN principles contained in the UN Charter:

1. **The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.**
2. **All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter**
3. **All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered**
4. **All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations**
5. **All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action**
6. **The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security**
• Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII
UN Charter and Peacekeeping

Of note

- There is no mention of “Peacekeeping” or “Peace Enforcement” in the Charter.
- **Chapter VI** is based on **consent** in order to settle disputes between states - “Pacific settlement of disputes”
- **Chapter VII** does not necessitate **consent** to settle disputes. The Security Council may take any suitable measure, including military action - “Actions in Response to Breaches of the Peace”.

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**Key Message**: actions based on Chapter VI require consent of the states involved, whereas actions based on Chapter VII do not require consent.

**Notes**:

- The word consent is not mentioned in the Charter either.
- Also, worth noting that article 45 mentions:
  - ‘In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee’

- Actions in Response to Breaches of the Peace (Chapter VII) include embargos, disruptive communications, military demonstrations, military/air strikes to be decided on by the SC.
- The practical differences between Chapter VI and Chapter VII, (and the fact that the UN no longer refers to peacekeeping operations as being Chapter 6 or Chapter 7 Missions), in terms of the use of force and ‘robust’ peacekeeping actions should be explained in detail.
Chapter II: UN Membership

- The UN is open to all peace-loving States who agree to follow the Charter.
- New members must be recommended by the Security Council and approved by the General Assembly.
- The rights of the Member States can be suspended by the GA upon recommendation of the SC and can be restored by the SC.
- Members who persistently violate the Charter can be expelled by the GA on recommendation of the SC.
- There are currently 193 UN Member States (South Sudan, was the last to join in 2011).

Key Message: New UN members must be recommended by the Security Council and approved by the General Assembly.

Notes:

- Membership in the Organization, in accordance with the Charter, “is open to all peace-loving States that accept the obligations contained in the United Nations Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able to carry out these obligations”. States are admitted to membership in the United Nations by decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

- The recognition of a new State or Government is an act that only other States and Governments may grant or withhold. It generally implies readiness to assume diplomatic relations. The United Nations is neither a State nor a Government, and therefore does not possess any authority to recognize either a State or a Government. As an organization of independent States, it may admit a new State to its membership or accept the credentials of the representatives of a new Government.
Development of Topic 4 of Lecture 2 of Module A of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Principal Organs of the UN

- General Assembly
- Secretariat
- Security Council
- International Court of Justice
- Economic and Social Council
- Trusteeship Council

Notes:

- The UN Charter establishes a number of Organs that together form the United Nations Organization.
Chapter IV: The General Assembly

- Main functions: policy making and approval of budgets.
- The GA is the only organ where every Member State is represented.
- The GA mainly functions by committees, which meet throughout the year and report to the GA.
- It convenes annually in September in New York, although special sessions can also be held.

Key Message: The General Assembly is the only UN body with universal representation.

Notes:

- The General Assembly is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the UN. All 193 Member States of the UN are represented in the General Assembly, making it the only UN body with universal representation. Each year in September, the full UN membership meets in the General Assembly Hall in New York for the annual session, which includes a general debate, which many Heads of State attend and address. Decisions on important questions, such as those on peace and security, admission of new members and budgetary matters, require approvable by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. Decisions on other questions are by simple majority. The General Assembly elects a President each year to serve a one-year term of office.
The General Assembly

Basic principles
• Each member state gets one vote.
• The GA can discuss any topic within the scope of the UN.
• The GA can refer matters/nations to the Security Council.
• The GA can’t make recommendations on matters of peace and security to the Security Council, unless requested to do so by the Security Council.

Key Message: The General Assembly cannot make recommendations on matters of peace and security to the Security Council, unless requested to do so by the Security Council.

Basic principles
• Each member state gets one vote.
• The GA can discuss any topic within the scope of the UN.
• The GA can refer matters/nations to the Security Council.
• The GA can’t make recommendations on matters of peace and security to the Security Council, unless requested to do so by the Security Council.
The Secretariat

- The Secretariat includes the Secretary General and the Secretariat staff
- It has primarily an administrative function
- There is an unwritten rule that the Secretary General holds office for five years per term, for a total of 2 terms.

Key Message: The Secretariat includes the Secretary General and the Secretariat staff; It has primarily an administrative function.

Notes:

- The Secretariat comprises the Secretary General and thousands of UN staff members who carry out the day-to-day work of the UN as mandated by the General Assembly and the Organization’s other principal organs. The Secretary-General is the Chief Administrative Officer of the Organization, appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council for a five-year, renewable term. UN staff members are recruited internationally and locally, and work in duty stations and on peacekeeping missions all around the world. Serving the cause of peace in a violent world is a dangerous occupation. Since the founding of the United Nations, hundreds of brave men and women have given their lives in its service.

- The Secretariat will be described in more details in Module B
The Security Council

- The UN’s most powerful organ deals with threats to international peace and security.
- Composed of 15 members, **5 of which are permanent**: the USA, China, Russia, Britain and France.
- Permanent members have a **veto power** when the Council decides on important issues.
- **Non-permanent members**: 10 rotating members elected by the GA for 2-year terms.
- All Member States are required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council.

**Key Message**: the UN Security Council is composed of 5 permanent members (USA, China, Russia, Britain, France) and 10 rotating members elected for 2-year terms.

**Notes**:

- **Role**.

  - The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as accepting new Members to the UN and approving any changes to the UN Charter. The SC takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security Council can resort, through Security Council Resolutions (SCR) to imposing sanctions or authorize the use of force, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

  - Under the Charter, it is the only UN body with the authority to issue binding resolutions to Member States. The SC held its first session on 17 January 1946, in London, United Kingdom.

2. **Establishment**.

  - Like the UN as a whole, the SC was created after WW II, to address the failings of a previous international organization, the League of Nations, in maintaining world peace. The SC held its first session on 17 January 1946, in London, United Kingdom. For details on the League of Nations, in particular opinions on its weaknesses and reasons for ultimate failure, the presenter should refer participants to [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/League_of_Nations#General_weaknesses](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/League_of_Nations#General_weaknesses)
In its early decades, the SC was largely paralyzed by the Cold War division between the USA and USSR and their respective allies, though it authorized interventions in the Korean War and the Congo Crisis and peacekeeping missions in the Suez Crisis, Cyprus and West New Guinea.

Following the collapse of the USSR, UN peacekeeping efforts increased dramatically in scale, and the SC authorized major military and peacekeeping missions in Kuwait, Namibia, Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

3. SC Membership

- The SC consists of fifteen members. The ‘victors’ of WW II, - the USSR, (now represented by Russia), the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Republic of China (now represented by the Peoples Republic of China) serve as the body’s five permanent members (the P5). These permanent members can veto any substantive SC resolution, including those on the admission of new Member States or candidates for Secretary-General. Each member of the SC has one vote.

- The SC also has 10 non-permanent members, elected on a regional basis to serve two-year terms. The Presidency of the SC rotates monthly among its members. Some critics of the SC often describe it as an undemocratic international body, and argue it often fails in its principal task, mainly because of the veto power of the permanent members.

- SCR are typically enforced by UN peacekeepers, military and police forces voluntarily provided by member states, and funded independently of the main UN budget. Evaluations of the SC’s effectiveness are mixed, and calls for its reform predate the body’s first meeting; however, little consensus exists on how its structure should be changed.

4. P5 Veto power

- Under Article 27 of the Charter, SC decisions on all substantive matters require the affirmative votes of 9 members. However, a negative vote or "veto" by a permanent member prevents adoption of a proposal, even if it has received the required 9 affirmative votes. Abstention is not regarded as a veto in most cases, though all five permanent members must actively concur to amend the UN Charter or to recommend the admission of a new UN Member State. Procedural matters are not subject to a veto, so the veto cannot be used to avoid discussion of an issue. The same holds for certain decisions that directly regard permanent members. A majority of vetoes are used not in critical international security situations, but for purposes such as blocking a candidate for Secretary-General or the admission of a new Member State (i.e. Taiwan).

- During negotiations leading to the creation of the UN, the veto power was resented by many small countries, and some critics consider that it in fact was forced on them by the veto nations—through a threat that without the veto there would be no UN. An advisor to the US delegation to the 1945 San Francisco conference recorded; “At San Francisco, the issue was made crystal clear by the leaders of the Big Five: it was either the Charter with the veto or no Charter at all. A senior member of the US delegation reportedly dramatically tore up a copy of the Charter during one of his speeches and reminded the small states that they would be guilty of that same act if they opposed the unanimity principle. "You may, if you wish," he said, "go home from this Conference and say that you have defeated the veto. But what will be your answer when you are asked: ‘Where is the Charter?’"
• As of 2012, 269 vetoes had been cast since the Security Council's inception. In this period, China (ROC/PRC) used the veto 9 times, France 18, USSR/Russia 128, the UK 32, and the US 89. Roughly two-thirds of Soviet/Russian vetoes were in the first ten years of the Security Council's existence. Between 1996 and 2012, China vetoed 5 resolutions, Russia 7, and the US 13, while France and the UK did not use the veto.

• An early veto by the USSR blocked a resolution on the withdrawal of French forces from the then-colonies of Syria and Lebanon in February 1946; this veto established the precedent that permanent members could use the veto on matters outside of immediate concerns of war and peace. The USSR went on to veto matters including the admission of Austria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Laos, Libya, Portugal, South Vietnam, and Transjordan as UN member states, delaying their joining by several years. Britain and France used the veto to avoid Security Council condemnation of their actions in the 1956 Suez Crisis. The first veto by the US came in 1970, blocking General Assembly action in Southern Rhodesia. From 1985–90, the US vetoed 27 resolutions, primarily to block resolutions it perceived as anti-Israel but also to protect its interests in Panama and Korea. The USSR, US, and China have all vetoed candidates for Secretary-General, with the US using the veto to block the re-election of Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1996.
Key Message: The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, whose main mission is to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States.

Notes:

International Court of Justice (ICJ)
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Its seat is at the Peace Palace in the Hague (Netherlands). It is the only one of the six principal organs of the United Nations not located in New York. The Court’s role is to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies. Note the potential for peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations to arise as a consequence of unresolved legal disputes between Member States before the Court; requiring SC action if the issue involves peace and security.

Although of less relevance to peacekeeping and National Planners the presenter should mention the following for completeness;

Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
- The ECOSOC is the principal body for coordination, policy review, policy dialogue and recommendations on economic, social and environmental issues, as well as implementation of internationally agreed development goals. It serves as the central mechanism for activities of the UN system and its specialized agencies in the economic, social and environmental fields, supervising subsidiary and expert bodies. It has 54 Members elected by the General Assembly for overlapping three-year terms. It is the United Nations’ central platform for reflection, debate, and innovative thinking on sustainable development.
The Trusteeship Council was established under Chapter XIII to provide international supervision for 11 Trust Territories that had been placed under the administration of seven Member States, and ensure that adequate steps were taken to prepare the Territories for self-government and independence. By 1994, all Trust Territories had attained self-government or independence. The Trusteeship Council suspended operations on 1 November 1994. The Council amended its rules of procedure to drop the obligation to meet annually and agreed to meet as occasion required -- by its decision or the decision of its President, or at the request of a majority of its members or the General Assembly or the Security Council.
Lecture Take Away

- The UN Charter was signed on 26 June 1945 and came into force on 24 October 1945.
- The 15-member Security Council, of which 5 are permanent and 10 rotating, deals with and makes decisions on all matters related to maintenance of international peace.
- Mandates approved under Chapter VI of the Charter call for pacific settlement of disputes (consent).
- Mandates approved under Chapter VII may see military action as decided by the Security Council (enforcement).
- UN Members States are required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council.
The UN Charter

Questions

Notes:

Lecture 3 requires 1x 45-minute instructional session which should include 1-2 scenario based participant activities.

• Presenter should reemphasis reasons that participants need a sound understanding of the 3 core Principles;

• i.e. As National Planners your primary role is to plan for the participation of your national contingents or individual personnel (Observers for example), in UN peace operations. For some MS planners, you will also be responsible for the detailed on-going management of your nation’s contributions. Both will require you to have an in-depth knowledge of how UN peace operations are mounted, conducted and, eventually, concluded. This will require you to provide advice not only to your national military and police senior authorities, but also, because almost all ‘peace operations’ are essentially civilian and ‘political’ in nature involving a civilian component supported as required by military and police components; advice to your civilian authorities as well; including your Governments.
Learning Outcomes

• Understand the three basic principles of traditional peacekeeping.
• Explain how three additional factors have a decisive influence over the success of peacekeeping operations.

Notes:

• Presenter should invite participants to identify and explain their understanding of the three basic principles.
Lecture Content

- Consent of the Parties to the dispute.
- Impartiality
- Non-use of force except in self-defense.
- Legitimacy
- Credibility
- Local and National Ownership.

Notes:

Three basic principles continue to set UN peacekeeping operations apart as a tool for maintaining international peace and security. These three principles are inter-related and mutually reinforcing:

- Consent of the Parties.
- Impartiality
- Non-use of force except in self-defense.

Experience shows that there are several factors that are essential for a successful peacekeeping operation. It must:

- Be guided by the principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate;
- But it must also be perceived as legitimate and credible, particularly in the eyes of the local population;
- And promotion of national and local ownership of the peace process in the host country is another essential factor of success.

- The presenter should invite participants to explain, in the context of UN peacekeeping operations, what they understand by the terms ‘Legitimacy’, ‘Credibility’ and ‘Local and National Ownership’

- Legitimacy: Legitimacy is commonly defined in political science and sociology as the belief that a rule, institution, or leader has the right to govern. Legitimacy is a belief, held by individuals, about the
rightfulness of a rule or ruler. It has collective effects when it is widely shared in a society. In domestic political life, these effects may include a stable social order that appears consensual. This is what we mean when we speak of a ‘legitimate regime’ and ‘legitimate authority,’ and it is what we strive for in post-conflict societies. In international political life, the effects of collectively held legitimated rules include social order but also perhaps the end of international anarchy.

- **Credibility:** the quality of being trusted and believed in. "the government's loss of credibility “

- **Ownership:** FORMAL an attitude of accepting responsibility for something and taking control of how it develops. “Employees began to feel a sense of ownership of the work and enjoy its challenges”. (MACMILLAN Dictionary).
Consent of the Parties

Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 3 of Module A of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Consent of the Parties

• UN peacekeeping operations are deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict.
• This requires a commitment by the parties to a political process.
• Their acceptance of a peacekeeping operation provides the UN with the necessary freedom of action, both political and physical, to carry out its mandated tasks.

Key Message: The acceptance of a peacekeeping operation by the parties involved provides the UN with the necessary freedom of action to carry out its mandated tasks.

Notes:

• The identification of ‘main parties’ to a conflict can be relatively simple, for example, a conflict over the exact border between two UN Member States, apparently involving no others, which results in occasional exchanges of small arms and artillery fire and sometimes minor, short duration territorial incursions. The ‘main parties’ might only be the respective Governments of the two Member States. The UN peacekeeping operation would need the ‘consent’ of both ‘Host Governments’ to deploy perhaps an observer mission operating along a conventional ceasefire line, with elements of the UN operation located in each Member States territory.

• Equally, identification of the main parties can be more complex, for example who are the ‘main parties’ involved in the continuing ‘dispute’ on the Korean Peninsula?

• Further, identification can be very complex, i.e. who are the ‘main parties’ when the conflict is apparently only an ‘internal’ problem within a Member State. Perhaps the situation in Cambodia in the early 1990s or that in Sierra Leone in the early 2000s are examples.

• Deciding who is a ‘main party’ to a conflict is a political process; at the strategic level. In theory, so long as the UN has the consent of the ‘host’ governments involved and any other main parties, the UN is being invited to keep the peace between parties committed to a political process and acceptance of a UN presence gives the UN the freedom of action to carry out it’s mandated tasks.
Consent of the Parties

- In the absence of such consent, a peacekeeping force risks becoming a party to the conflict and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its fundamental role of keeping the peace.

Key Message: enforcement action may be the result of the absence of consent by the parties.

Notes:

- However, in the absence of consent the UN risks becoming a party to the conflict and drawn into enforcement action, which the Charter allows for, but it isn’t ‘peacekeeping’.

- But consent is dynamic and operates differently at different levels (strategic/national/local).

- Universality of consent becomes even less probable in volatile settings, characterized by the presence of armed groups not under the control of any of the main parties who have ‘consented’, or by the presence of other spoilers.

- Where the potential for armed opposition to the conduct of peacekeeping operations exists military/police components must be resourced, equipped and trained to deal with it ‘robustly’.
Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 3 of Module A of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).

Notes:

• The presenter should invite participants to explain their understanding of the term ‘Impartiality’ as it applies to peacekeeping operations and explain the difference between ‘impartial’ and ‘neutral’, in the context of the statement, ‘The UN is not neutral’.
Impartiality

• The Mandate must be applied even-handedly.
• This does not mean inactivity or neutrality.
• Violations of the peace must not be ignored under the guise of impartiality. The UN must take action, sometimes involving armed force, if elements are working against the peace process.
• Impartial action must be accompanied by transparency and good communication strategies.

Key Message: Impartiality does not mean inactivity or neutrality.

Notes:

• Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties but should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity. United Nations peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate.

• Just as a good football referee is impartial, but will penalize infractions, so a peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation upholds.

• Notwithstanding the need to establish and maintain good relations with the parties, a peacekeeping operation must scrupulously avoid activities that might compromise its image of impartiality. A mission should not shy away from a rigorous application of the principle of impartiality for fear of misinterpretation or retaliation.

• Impartial action must be accompanied by transparency and good communication strategies.

• Failure to do so may undermine the peacekeeping operation’s credibility and legitimacy and may lead to a withdrawal of consent for its presence by one or more of the parties.
Non-use of Force except in Self-defense

Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 3 of Module A of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).

Notes.

• The presenter should emphasize to participants that the ‘use of force’ in the context of ‘self-defense’, (and in the ‘protection of civilians’, and ‘defense of the mandate’), is likely to be a key concern of national governments and their military/police senior authorities prior to making a PKO contribution, and during its conduct.

• The presenter should invite participants to state their understanding of what is meant, in the context of UN peacekeeping operations, “Non-Use of Force, except in Self Defense”.
Non-use of Force except in Self-defense

- UN peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool.
- However, they may use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if **acting in self-defense and defense of the mandate**.
- In certain volatile situations, the Security Council has given UN peacekeeping operations “**robust**” mandates authorizing them to “**use all necessary means**” to:
  - **Deter** forceful attempts to disrupt the political process,
  - **Protect** civilians under imminent threat of physical attack,
  - and/or **assist** the national authorities in maintaining law and order.

**Key Message:** use of force is allowed if acting in self-defense and defense of the mandate, with authorization of the Security Council.

**Notes:**

- Although on the ground they may sometimes appear similar, robust peacekeeping operations should not be confused with peace enforcement operations as envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter.
  - Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict.
  - By contrast, peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level.
Non-use of Force except in Self-defense

- A UN peacekeeping operation should only use force as a measure of last resort.
- It should always be calibrated in a precise, proportional and appropriate manner, within the principle of the minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while sustaining consent for the mission and its mandate.
- Use of force is governed by the Rules Of Engagement specific to each mandate and international humanitarian law.

Key Message: Use of force is governed by Rules Of Engagement specific to each mandate.

Notes:

- The use of force by a UN peacekeeping operation always has political implications and can often give rise to unforeseen circumstances
Development of Topic 4 of Lecture 3 of the Module A of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Legitimacy

- At the strategic level, legitimacy is based on a Security Council Resolution and on the will of the International Community.
- The will of the International Community materializes with a broad contribution base of funding, equipment and personnel.
- To be successful the deployment of a UN Force must be perceived as just.

**Key Message:** the legitimacy of a peacekeeping operation is based on a Security Council Resolution and on the will of the International Community.

**Notes:**

- UN peacekeeping is a unique global partnership. It brings together the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Secretariat, troop and police contributors and the host governments in a combined effort to maintain international peace and security. Its strength lies in the legitimacy of the UN Charter and in the wide range of contributing countries that participate and provide precious resources.
Legitimacy

At Mission level, legitimacy is directly impacted, for better or worse, by,

- collective and individual behavior,
- collective and individual discipline,
- Activity,
- Impartiality of the Mission.

- The Mission needs to be seen as fair and decent.
- Loss of perceived legitimacy leads to erosion of consent.

Key Message: The loss of perceived legitimacy leads to erosion of consent.

Notes:

- Behavior and Discipline. The ‘behavior’ and ‘discipline’ of groups of individuals, be they formed military/police units, military observers, civilian police or elements or personnel within the civilian or other components, can have a major impact on the perceptions by others of the ‘legitimacy’ of the peacekeeping Mission. The same is also true for the behavior of individuals, particularly if ‘bad’ behavior appears to be tolerated by the Mission (and UN ) leadership. This also applies to collective and individual discipline. All peacekeepers, military, police and civilian, need to be conscious that what might be acceptable behavior or ‘discipline’ in their home countries and other duty stations or Missions, might be unacceptable in their current Mission; especially in the eyes of local populations but also in the yes of other contributors to the mission. Loss of perceived legitimacy leads not only to erosion of consent but can also lead to erosion of support from the international community and individual contributors, who might even choose to withdraw their contributions.

- The presenter should invite participants to offer examples from their experience of behavior, collective and individual, which might be ‘acceptable’ in their home country or other countries but which might cause offence in some other countries/missions; leading to a loss of perceived legitimacy of a peacekeeping operation.

- Activity. The Mission and its personnel need to be perceived as ‘contributing positively and actively to the peace process’ and not ‘doing nothing’. The presenter should invite participants to offer
examples from their experience of activity, or lack of it, in a peacekeeping mission which might lead to a loss of perceived legitimacy of the Mission.

Development of Topic 5 of Lecture 3 of Module A of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Credibility

- In volatile environments, peace operations will be tested for weakness especially early on when start-up missions are at their weakest.
- Establishing credibility demands a firm and professional posture based on a deliverable mandate with resources to match and a sound mission plan.

Key Message: credibility demands a firm and professional posture.

Notes:

- A firm and professional posture is only possible with:
  - Well trained and prepared personnel, both individually and collectively.
  - Well-equipped units that can carry out their mandated tasks.

- Once lost, credibility is usually hard to recover.

- The more credible the presence the less likely is the need to use force.
National and Local Ownership

Development of Topic 6 of Lecture 3 of Module A of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
National and Local Ownership

- This is a fundamental capacity building principle throughout the spectrum of UN Missions.
- Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding programs and activities must be geared towards assisting and building national and local capacity.
- This is a sovereignty issue.

Key Message: Peacekeeping programs and activities must be geared towards assisting and building national and local capacity.

Notes:

- Application will vary according to availability of local, credible, sustainable and legitimate partners, which can sometimes be a problem.

- Peacekeepers should avoid whenever possible displacing local capacity and try to keep their ‘footprint’ as light as possible. This can also be difficult, particularly when military/police contingents for example have an apparent abundance of available resources which could be used to replace or supplement meagre local resources and capacity.

- The presenter should invite participants to provide examples of when they consider peacekeeping operations have contributed positively to assisting and building national and local capacity; and when they have not.
National and Local Ownership

• Application will vary according to availability of local, credible, sustainable and legitimate partners. (Sometimes a problem).

• But peacekeepers should avoid displacing local capacity and try to keep as light as possible a footprint.

Key Message: peacekeepers should try to keep as light as possible a footprint.
Lecture Take Away (1)

• UN peacekeeping operations are deployed with the consent of the main parties, although consent is often viewed differently at local and national level.
• Mandates must be applied impartially, which does not mean inactivity or neutrality.
• The use of force in peacekeeping operations is restricted to self defense and defense of the mandate. It is governed by ROEs specific to each mandate.
Lecture Take Away (2)

- The **legitimacy** of peacekeeping operations is based on the UN Charter and the common will of the International Community.
- **Legitimacy** is materialized by a **broad base** of funding and contributions.
- **Credibility** of a force is best established by a firm and professional posture which is more likely to avoid the use of force.
- To assist in the **building of capacity** at national and local level, is a fundamental principle of peacekeeping and an essential factor for success.

Notes.

Lecture 4 requires 1 x 45 minute instructional session.
Learning Outcomes

• Show how peacekeeping has evolved and was transformed, between the first peacekeeping missions in the 1950’s and nowadays.
Lecture Content

• Traditional Peacekeeping
• Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping
• The Development of Peacekeeping
• Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations
• The Changing Context of Peacekeeping
• UN Realities / The Need for Performance
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 4 of Module A of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).

Notes.

• The presenter should explain that what is referred to as ‘Traditional Peacekeeping’ is the type of operations mounted in response to inter-state conflict, i.e. between nation states where few if any ‘non-State’ actors could be considered as ‘main parties’ to the conflict. That is not to say that no non-State actors, or ‘spoilers’ existed. This type of UN peacekeeping started in 1948 with the establishment of UNTSO.

Traditional Peacekeeping

• UN peacekeeping operations were initially conceived to contain and manage inter-state wars, which had the potential to become global conflicts. In a high-risk era marked by Cold War competition amid violent decolonization and self-determination struggles, it was imperative to at least, limit the involvement of the two dominant powers. A central, yet seldom officially acknowledged, objective was to stem escalation of smaller wars into a larger, possibly thermonuclear, war.

• The scope and range of related activity was relatively narrow. With one exception (ONUC, 1960-64) UN peacekeeping forces were used to monitor borders and establish buffer zones following cease-fire agreements. These missions were largely composed of lightly armed soldiers in national troop contingents provided by small, middle and neutral member states.
Traditional Peacekeeping

Characteristics
- Support ceasefires and buffer zones by inter-positioning; **observe, verify, report** missions;
- Principally **static military** (led) tasks.
- 3 traditional principles as doctrinal base.

**Key Message**: traditional peacekeeping consisted mainly of static military tasks to accomplish “observe, verify, report” missions.

- 3 traditional principles: refer to previous lecture on the subject, same module
Traditional Peacekeeping

Transition
- UN Nineties Nadir.
- End of cold war (SC impact).
- Shift from inter-state to intra-state conflict:
  - Little PK capacity
  - Little peace to keep.
  - Rwanda, Somalia, FRY led to doctrinal rethink
- Agenda for Peace – Brahimi Report.

**Key Message**: the end of traditional peacekeeping was marked by the transition from inter-state to intra-state conflicts.
Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping

Development of topic 2 of the Lecture 4 of the Module A of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping

Response to intra-state conflict

Characteristics:
• "Maneuverist" instead of static
• Dealing with whole state (protecting space not line)
• Support parties and comprehensive peace agreements;
• Complex lines of operation (political, security, humanitarian, developmental) and complex mandates; (Multifunctional)
• Integration of civilian and security tasks under one political command

Key Message: multi-dimensional peacekeeping is characterized by mobile operations, complex lines of operations and multifunctional mandates.

Depending on their mandate, complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions may now be required to:
• Deploy to prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spill-over of conflict across borders;
• Stabilize conflict situations after a cease fire, to create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement;
• Help to restore law and order and appropriate judicial processes;
• Monitor and advise on human rights and international humanitarian law;
• Liaise with host nations, internal and external parties, including regional organisations and NGOs;
• Monitor and report on developments within or in proximity to the area of operations;
• Protect civilians;
• Promote human security, confidence-building measures and power-sharing arrangements;
• Assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements;
• Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development.
Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping

- Concern about people means increasing use of Chapter VII by Security Council to mandate up to lethal force to protect civilians by “all necessary means”.
- Conflict paradigm changing again?

**Key Message**: multi-dimensional peacekeeping is more and more characterized by increasing use of Chapter VII mandates in order to protect civilians.
Development of topic 3 of the Lecture 4 of the Module A of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key Message: the evolution of peacekeeping led to complex multi-dimensional operations in the years 2000’s

Traditional Peacekeeping
UN peacekeeping operations were initially conceived to contain and manage inter-state wars, which had the potential to become global conflicts. In a high-risk era marked by Cold War competition amid violent decolonization and self-determination struggles, it was imperative to at least, limit the involvement of the two dominant powers. A central, yet seldom officially acknowledged, objective was to stem escalation of smaller wars into a larger, possibly thermonuclear, war.
The scope and range of related activity was relatively narrow. With one exception (ONUC, 1960-64) UN peacekeeping forces were used to monitor borders and establish buffer zones following cease-fire agreements. These missions were largely composed of lightly armed soldiers in national troop contingents provided by small, middle and neutral member states.

With the broader range of objectives, UN operations promptly became multifunctional. The multiplicity of tasks first expanded to include security, humanitarian and political objectives. Environmental developmental and socio-economic objectives were appended as the need for even more comprehensive responses became increasingly evident.

This broader range of objectives also demanded a new multidimensional approach that included civilians and police, as well as military participants. Given such diversity, it became critical to develop a unity of effort and purpose among various participants. A broader partnership is now reflected in the composition of all UN peacekeeping operations.

Further, a broader array of peacekeepers now undertake a wider variety of demanding tasks, from helping to maintain security, restoring law and order, monitoring human rights, building sustainable
institutions of governance, coordinating elections, reforming the security sector, to disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating former combatants. The UN Department of Peace Operations reports that, although the military remain the backbone of most peacekeeping operations, the many faces of peacekeeping now include administrators and economists, police officers and legal experts, de-miners and electoral observers, human rights monitors and specialists in civil affairs and governance, humanitarian workers and experts in communications and public information.
**Key Message:** Robust peacekeeping means neither imposing force nor yielding to force.

From observing a peace to keeping a peace and...
...while keeping a peace, on occasions, needing to enforce it.
(If so mandated and working within ROE)
= “robust peacekeeping”
(Neither imposing force nor yielding to force)
Development of topic 4 of the Lecture 4 of the Module A of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations

Response to shift from inter to intra-state conflict

- Complex mandates in volatile, polarized, distressed, dysfunctional environment.
- New mandates to protect civilians blurs concept of Chapter VI and Chapter VII missions.
- Multi-disciplinary (need joint planning).
- Many lines of operation to desired end state.

Key Message: contemporary peacekeeping operations are multi-disciplinary in nature which implies many lines of operation to the desired end state.
Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations

- Involves a wide range of internal and external actors.
- Attempts to gain coherence through integration.
- Primacy of political activity: Military & Police in supporting role.
- No purely military solutions.

Key Message: Contemporary peacekeeping operations see the primacy of political activities with the military and police components in a supporting role.
The Changing Context of Peacekeeping

Development of topic 5 of the Lecture 4 of the Module A of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
The Changing Context of Peacekeeping

- Effects of Global Financial Crisis –
  - Funding issues “do more with less”.
- Tension between Funds CCs and Troops CCs/Police CCs
  - Impact on delivery of robust peacekeeping and PoC
- Erosion of consent for wider peacekeeping
  - Focus on transition and peacebuilding (but insufficient expertise)
- Changing paradigm of conflict
  - Outpacing structures and doctrinal thinking in UN Secretariat and MS.
- All this puts increased pressure on senior mission leadership and increases need for partnerships.

**Key Message**: the changing context of peacekeeping increases the need for partnerships.

A number of factors have contributed to change the context for peacekeeping operations in the past 6/7 years:
The Need for Performance

**Key Message:** UN realities make peacekeeping more complicated to achieve with success.

- A number of inescapable facts make peacekeeping yet more complicated to achieve with success.

- Complexity of mandates and tasks call for better performing peacekeeping units.

- Units able to perform well in the field are built on a series of pillars:
  - Complete and adequate training, including in the use of force (mastering the rules of engagement).
  - Positive state of mind stemming from adequate training (conduct and discipline, positive attitude, will to act, absence of caveats).
  - Complete and adequate equipment, keeping the operational readiness of the unit at a high level.

- Quality preparation of the contingents will be tackled in Module G “Contingent preparation for deployment”, and in Module F2 as regards Formed Police Units (Lecture 2 “Generating a FPU”).
Key Message: the evaluation of the performance of formed units takes place in two stages, before the deployment and then in the mission area.

In order to help improve the overall performance of formed units, DPO has developed a two-stage system of evaluation: before and after deployment. The successful evaluation of police units before deployment by a UN team is a pre-requisite, without which the unit will have to go through another training cycle. The evaluation of military units before deployment is based on self-evaluation and self-certification.

In both cases the pre-deployment evaluation does not concern only the initial deployment of the unit but also the deployment of the relief contingents.
**Key Message:** the evaluation of the performance of police and military units is governed by specific SOPs.

- The evaluation of the formed units are based on Standard Operational Procedures that were developed by the Office of Military Affairs and the Police Division respectively.

- In the case of the military component the SOP deals with evaluating a unit after deployment, either by the Force HQ or the Sector HQ. The pre-deployment evaluation remains a national responsibility at this point. This will be evoked later in the course, in Module G “Pre-deployment Preparation of the Contingent”, with the lectures provided on the ORAPI Policy (Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement) and on the Pre-deployment Training.

- In the case of the Police units, the SOP deals with pre-deployment verification of operational readiness and will be explained in a dedicated lecture of Module F2. These verifications, however, should be done again in the course of the deployment of the unit. The lecture on Pre-deployment Training in Module G also concerns the Formed Police Units.
Performance Evaluation

Evaluation Domains
- Comprehension of the Mission mandate
- Support of the Mission mandate
- Command and Control
- Training
- Discipline
- POC
- Sustainability
- Health

**Key Message:** the domains of evaluation encompass all domains of activity of the units and concern the personnel as well as the materiel and procedures.

The evaluation of formed units concerns all domains of activity:
- **Personnel:** management, preparation, training, knowledge and comprehension of the mandate;
- **Situational awareness:** knowledge of the environment, knowledge of the local situation, knowledge of the population, information collection, etc.
- **Protection of Civilian:** procedures, alerts, measures put in place for rapid reaction;
- **Operations:** planning, procedures, SOPs, intelligence, command and control, accomplishment of mandated tasks, etc.;
- **Logistics:** sustainability of the unit, serviceability of major equipment, maintenance, availability of spare parts, stocks of food and water, health and medical support;
- **Communications:** level of equipment, maintenance, serviceability, procedures, etc.
**Key Message:** The performance evaluation of a formed unit covers the domains of training, COE performance, and conduct and discipline.

- Particularly for the military formed units, the evaluation of their performance is based on an integrated system including the previously mentioned SOP on sub-units evaluation, the training of the unit, its performance in terms of maintaining its Equipment (COE) and keeping it in an operational state, as well as the conduct and discipline performance of the contingent.
- It should be mentioned that, while the details of the operational evaluation of Formed Police Units are different and adapted to the specificities of the Police missions, the same domains are covered during the Assessment of Operational Readiness (AOR) of the unit.
- The evaluation of the unit’s performance is based on an integrated information management and analysis system that takes into account information from multiple sources: command evaluation, COE verification, discipline, etc.
Lecture Take Away

- In 60 years peacekeeping has gone from simple, mainly static military-led interposition operations to complex multi-dimensional operations covering the whole territory of a country and encompassing many functions concurring to re-building of state authority / wellness of population.

- The omnipresent threats, complexity of the missions and difficult environment call for robust military and police units, adequately trained and equipped, prepared to tackle a vast array of tasks like protection of civilians, concurring to state security, infrastructure building, supporting election process and more.

- For all this, peacekeeping needs units that are performing in the whole scope of their activities: pre-deployment preparation, in-mission training, accomplishment of dedicated tasks, sustainability, serviceability of major equipment, etc.
The Evolution of Peacekeeping

Questions
Module B:
UN SECRETARIAT
OVERVIEW

Find guidance inserted in the note section of each slide.
Module Content

- UN Secretariat overview
- DPO overview
- DOS overview
- Structure of an integrated peacekeeping mission
- Models of UN Missions
- Command and control functions
Lecture 1 in the Module B “UN Secretariat Overview” of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Learning Outcomes

• Know the general organization and role of the Secretariat
Lecture Content

- Origin of the Secretariat
- Role of the Secretariat
- Reorganization of the Secretariat (01 Jan. 2019)
- Organization chart
- OIOS & OLA
- The Departments: DPPA - DPO - DSS - DOS - DMSPC
- OCHA - UNOCT
- Overseas Offices – OHCHR
- Standing Principals’ Group
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 1 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: The Secretariat exists through Chapter XV of the UN Charter.

- The Secretariat comprises the secretary general and such other staff as the organization may require.
- It provides services to the other organs of the United Nations, such as the G.A, the S.C, the ECOSOC, and the trusteeship council, as well as their subsidiary bodies.
Key message: The Secretariat supports the UN legislative organs and provides meeting services to the GA and other organs, and administer the operations decided by the UN’s deliberative organs.

Function of Secretariat

• preparation of report and other documents containing information, analysis, historical background research finding, policy suggestions and so forth, to facilitate deliberations and decision making by other organs.
• to facilitate legislative organs and their subsidiary bodies.
• provision of meeting services for the G.A and other organs
• provision of editorial, translation and document reproduction services for the issuance of UN documents in different language.
• conduct of studies and provision of information to various member states in meeting challenge in various fields
• preparation of statistical publication, information bulletin and analytical work which the G.A. has decided
• organization of conferences experts group meetings and seminar on topics of concern to the international community
• provision of technical assistance to develop countries.
• administers operations initiated by UN’s deliberative organs, operates political missions, prepares assessments that precede Peace Operations,
Key message: on 01 January 2019 the Secretariat underwent a reform of its structure based on two pillars: political reform (peace and security pillar) and management reform.

There are two main pillars in the Secretariat reform:
- the Political reform (peace and security pillar) has seen a transformation of DPKO and DPA, with a view to place the political peace process at the heart of the action of the UN;
- The management reform has seen DFS and the Department of Management change names and exchange or regroup some of their functions in order to gain in coherence and diminish the bureaucracy.

The overarching goals of the reform and restructuring of the peace and security pillar are to prioritize prevention and sustaining peace; enhance the effectiveness and coherence of peacekeeping operations and special political missions; make the peace and security pillar more coherent, nimble and effective through a "whole-of-pillar" approach.

The Organization's preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding engagements and operations should be seen as belonging to the same "toolbox" and utilized and deployed with flexibility, in the most appropriate manner that each situation requires.

Formally started on 01 January 2019, the implementation of the Secretariat reform implementation and restructuring will continue through 2019.
Key message: the political reform has affected DPKO and DPA, while the management reform has affected both DFS and the DM.

- The Department of Political Affairs becomes the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, emphasis put on peacebuilding;
- The department of Peacekeeping Operations become the Department of Peace Operations.
- Both departments will share regional political and operational divisions, as well as a coordinator's office and various services.
- The Under-Secretaries-General of the two departments work as a team to ensure coherence and a “whole-of-pillar” approach (Peace and Security pillar). They consult closely with each other in providing advice to the Secretary-General and in giving coherent guidance and direction to the Assistant Secretaries-General leading the political-operational structure, particularly in relation to countries and regions where their respective responsibilities are closely interrelated.

- The Department of Management has become the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance;
- The Department of Field Support has become the Department of Operational Support.
Key message: The Secretariat is organized along departmental lines, with each department or office having a distinct area of action and responsibility.

- The Secretariat, one of the main organs of the UN, is organized along departmental lines, with each department or office having a distinct area of action and responsibility. Offices and departments coordinate with each other to ensure cohesion as they carry out the day to day work of the Organization in offices and duty stations around the world.
- The Secretariat is headed by a Secretary General designated by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council – Mr. Antonio Guterres from Portugal, elected in November 2016 to succeed Mr. Ban Ki Moon.
- It is composed of departments, offices and independent offices located in New York, while several other offices are established outside of the US territory.
- Before starting to detail some departments, we will note that in the margin of the reorganization, the Department of Public Information has been renamed “Department of Global Communication”.

[Diagram showing the organization of the UN Secretariat with the following departments and offices: Office of the Secretary-General, Office of Internal Oversight Services, Office of Legal Affairs, Department of Operational Support, Department of Safety & Security, Office of Disarmament Affairs, Dept. of Peace Operations, Dept. of Economic & Social Affairs, Dept. for General Assembly and Conference Management, Dept. of Management Strategy, Policy & Compliance, Dept. of Political & Peacebuilding Affairs, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Office of Counter Terrorism, UN Office at Geneva, UN Office at Vienna, UN Office at Nairobi, Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Office of Counter Terrorism].
Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 1 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: The Office of Internal Oversight Services is the internal oversight body of the United Nations. The Office of Legal Affairs provide a unified central legal service for the Secretariat and the principal and other organs of the United Nations

- The Office of Internal Oversight Services and the Office of Legal Affairs are directly attached to the Office of the Secretary General.
- The **Office of Internal Oversight Services** is the internal oversight body of the United Nations.
- It was established in 1994 by the General Assembly, to assist the Secretary-General in fulfilling his/her oversight responsibilities in respect to the staff and other resources of the Organization through the provision of audit, investigation, inspection, and evaluation services.
- The **Office of Legal Affairs** provide a unified central legal service for the Secretariat and the principal and other organs of the United Nations
Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 1 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) has global responsibility for political and peacebuilding issues including conflict prevention and resolution, electoral assistance, peacebuilding and sustaining peace.

In the new structure, (01 January 2019), the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) combines the strategic, political and operational responsibilities of the former Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the peacebuilding responsibilities of the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO).

DPPA has global responsibility for political and peacebuilding issues, and manages a spectrum of tools and engagements across the conflict continuum to ensure a more holistic approach to conflict prevention and resolution, electoral assistance, peacebuilding and sustaining peace. It provides strategic, political, operational and management advice, direction and backstopping to all special political missions.
Development of Topic 4 of Lecture 1 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key Message: In the new structure, (01 January 2019), the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) serves as an integrated “center of excellence” for United Nations Peace operations, responsible for preventing, responding to and managing conflict and sustaining peace.

Therefore the new DPO is composed of two offices (OMA and OROLSI) and one Division (DPET), with an Office of the USG regrouping the integrated planning capacity, the IOTs, the Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership and a gender unit.

The Office of Military Affairs, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions and Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training do not change, save for DPET integrating the Strategic Force Generation and Capabilities Planning Cell.

In the new structure, (01 January 2019), the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) serves as an integrated “center of excellence” for United Nations Peace operations, responsible for preventing, responding to and managing conflict and sustaining peace in the context of mandates in countries where peace operations under its purview are deployed.

This includes facilitating and implementing political agreements, providing integrated strategic, political, operational and management advice, direction and support to peace operations; developing political, security and integrated strategies, leading integrated analysis and planning of peace operations and backstopping those operations.
Development of Topic 5 of Lecture 1 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: The Department of Safety and Security is responsible for providing leadership, operational support and oversight of the security management system.

- **The Department of Safety and Security** is responsible for providing leadership, operational support and oversight of the security management system.
- It ensures security for staff and eligible dependents.
- UNDSS is also a network of security coordinators and advisors deployed wherever UN programs are implemented. UNDSS maintains offices in more than 100 countries.
Development of Topic 6 of Lecture 1 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: The Department of Operational Support provides dedicated support to peacekeeping field missions and political field missions in the areas of finance, logistics, Information, communication and technology, human resources and general administration.

The Department of Operational Support (DOS) was created on 01 January 2019 by reorganization of the former Departments of Field Support and of Management. It provides dedicated support to peacekeeping field missions and political field missions in the areas of finance, logistics, Information, communication and technology (ICT), human resources and general administration.

In the new management organization, the Department of Operational Support exists to support the objective of effective mandate delivery, and does so through the provision of operational advisory services to clients, support for the implementation of decisions and, in exceptional cases, exercise of delegated authority on behalf of clients across the Secretariat.

In addition, the Department provides dedicated operational support to departments and offices located at Headquarters in New York.
Development of Topic 7 of Lecture 1 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: The role of the Department of Management Strategy, Policy & Compliance is to facilitate the timely, effective, transparent and accountable delivery of mandates across the Secretariat.

The Department of Management Strategy, Policy & Compliance (DPPA) encompasses three pillars:

- a **finance and budget** pillar (Office of Programme Planning, Finance and Budget) responsible for policy and guidance on all strategic issues related to programme planning, budgeting, finance, and programme and financial performance;
- a **human resources** pillar (Office of Human Resources) providing strategic direction and policy leadership in the area of human resources; (Transfer in the Administrative Law Division / Office of Human Resources of most Conduct and Discipline functions that were once held by DFS)
- a **business transformation and accountability** pillar which will combine capacities for monitoring and evaluation, risk management, organizational performance measurement and support to business transformation and innovation.

The Department also manages the activities of the Office of Information and Communications Technology jointly with the Department of Operational Support.

Under the new paradigm, the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance facilitates the timelier, more effective, transparent and accountable delivery of mandates across the Secretariat. It provides policy leadership in all management areas through a clear, integrated global management strategy and policy framework and through strengthened monitoring, evaluation and accountability mechanisms that oversee the exercise of delegated authorities in a decentralized management paradigm.
Development of Topic 8 of Lecture 1 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies.

- Among the Independent offices, the **Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs** is the part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies.
- OCHA also ensures there is a framework within which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort.

**OCHA’s mission is to:**
- Mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies.
- Advocate the rights of people in need.
- Promote preparedness and prevention.
- Facilitate sustainable solutions.
Development of Topic 9 of Lecture 1 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the role of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism is to provide strategic leadership to United Nations counter-terrorism efforts.

The United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism was established on 15 June 2017 through the adoption of General Assembly resolution 71/291.

The UNOCT provides strategic leadership to United Nations counter-terrorism efforts, participates in the decision-making process of the United Nations and ensures that the cross-cutting origins and impact of terrorism are reflected in the work of the United Nations.

The Office of Counter-Terrorism has five main functions:

- provide leadership on the General Assembly counter-terrorism mandates entrusted to the Secretary-General from across the United Nations system;
- enhance coordination and coherence across the 38 Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact (former CTITF) Task Force entities to ensure the balanced implementation of the four pillars of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy;
- strengthen the delivery of United Nations counter-terrorism capacity-building assistance to Member States;
- improve visibility, advocacy and resource mobilization for United Nations counter-terrorism efforts; and
- ensure that due priority is given to counterterrorism across the United Nations system and that the important work on preventing violent extremism is firmly rooted in the Strategy.
Development of Topic 10 of Lecture 1 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the Office of High Commissioner for the Human Rights (OHCHR) located in Geneva is the principal UN organization mandated to promote and protect human rights for all

• Among the overseas offices, the **Office of High Commissioner for the Human Rights (OHCHR)** located in Geneva is the principal UN organization mandated to promote and protect human rights for all.

• To this end, it focuses on three main areas: **standard setting, monitoring and implementation on the ground**.

• OHCHR also acts as a secretariat for the three other components of the UN human rights system: the Human Rights Council; some 40 independent UN human rights experts; and the committees that monitor implementation of the core international human rights treaties.

• OHCHR is also the lead office for the Human Rights screening policy, allowing the various Secretariat Departments to obtain first hand information about possible human rights violations committed by candidates to high profile UN positions.

• Finally, the OHCHR and its antennas in the world conduct human rights violations inquiries in the framework of the HR screening for candidates to senior UN positions (SG Policy on HR screening of UN Personnel, December 2012).
Development of Topic 11 of Lecture 1 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the Standing Principals’ Group is an internal management and coordination forum which is not part of the Secretariat institutional structure.

The Standing Principals’ Group of the Under-Secretaries-General of the two departments (DPO and DPPA), together with the Under Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, the Under Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and other senior officials, under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General, provides unified leadership for strategic, political and operational responsibilities to facilitate the whole-of-pillar approach and cross-pillar coherence at Headquarters and in the field.

The Group serves as an internal management and coordination forum, which meets regularly, but is not be part of the institutional structure of the pillar.

- The establishment of a single regional political-operational structure shared by the two departments through the integration of the regional capacities from DPKO and DPA creates possibilities to:
  - strengthen the capacity and the “hinge” role of the Peacebuilding Support Office to provide a more holistic approach to prevention and sustaining peace;
  - increase synergies with other parts of the United Nations system;
  - draw together the expertise of the United Nations system to facilitate coherent system-wide action.

(See more on the single regional political-operational structure in the next lecture on DPO).
Lecture Take Away

- Created in 1945 through the UN Charter, the UN Secretariat is located in New York, with offices and agencies outside of the US (OHCHR in Geneva).
- The Secretariat supports the UN legislative bodies.
- Headed by a Secretary General appointed by the General Assembly, the Secretariat implements the decisions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly.
- As regards leading and supporting Peace Operations, the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and the Department of Operational Support (DOS) are the two most important departments the T/PCCs will have to deal with.
UN Secretariat

Questions

Lecture 1

33
Lecture 2 in the Module B “UN Secretariat Overview” of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Learning Outcomes

• Understand DPO’s role and responsibilities.
• Understand DPO’s organization.
• Understand the roles and responsibilities of DPO’s various offices and services
Lecture Content

- DPO role and responsibilities
- DPO organization chart
- DPO and DPPA shared components
- Policy, Evaluation and Training Division
- Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
- Office of Military Affairs
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 2 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
DPO Role and Responsibilities

- **Political and Executive direction**
  - To Peace Operations

- **Maintain contact**
  - Security Council
  - Troop/Police and financial contributors,
  - Parties to the conflict

- **Integrate the efforts**
  - United Nations
  - Governmental entities
  - Non-Governmental entities

- **Provide guidance and support**
  - Military issues
  - Police issues
  - Mine action issues
  - Other relevant issues

Key message: DPO’s main responsibility is to assume the political and executive direction of all Peace Operations and some Special Political Missions.
By delegation of the Secretary General, the Under-Secretary General DPO has administrative and executive authority over all DPO-led Missions. He is de facto the Chief of all Peacekeepers.

Key message: the Under-Secretary General DPO has administrative and executive authority over all DPO-led Missions.
Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 2 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key Message: DPO is organized in three main divisions respectively dealing with military affairs, rule of law and security institutions and policy evaluation and training.

The new DPO (01 January 2019) includes the OMA, OROLSI and DPET, with the USG’s office incorporating the IOTs, the peacekeeping strategic partnership entity and the Integrated assessment and planning entity.

Therefore the new DPO is composed of two offices (OMA and OROLSI) and one Division (DPET), with an Office of the USG regrouping the integrated planning capacity, the IOTs, the Office of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership and a gender unit.

[The role of the Office of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership is to assist in identifying gaps that have an impact on the delivery of mandates by uniformed personnel by making recommendations on systemic issues relating to United Nations peacekeeping operations.]

OMA, OROLSI and DPET do not change, save for DPET integrating the Strategic Force Generation and Capabilities Planning Cell.

The political component of the DPO is now shared with the new Department of Peacebuilding and Political Affairs (DPPA) – please refer to the next topic.
DPO and DPPA
Shared Components

Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 2 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the new Single Regional Political-Operational Structure merges the regional offices and responsibilities formerly belonging to DPKO and DPA. Both USGs DPO and DPPA will have guidance and surveillance responsibilities over its three Assistant Secretary-Generals and seven regional divisions.

The single shared political-operational structure was created through the merger of the regional divisions of DPA and DPKO and is headed by three ASGs with regional responsibilities. The regional structure and the three ASGs serve both Departments. The ASGs are responsible for all substantive aspects of peace and security work in their respective regions, including preventive diplomacy and mediation as well as all field presences and peace operations. This significantly enhances the Secretariat's substantive capacities, analytical capabilities, the formulation of regional strategies and engagement with partners.

Member States, partners and all interlocutors therefore have a single entry-point at the ASG level and below for all political and operational matters.

[As a reminder:
The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) combines the functions of the former Department of Political Affairs and Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), taking a more holistic and integrated approach to conflict prevention, electoral assistance, mediation, and peacebuilding.

The Department of Peace Operations (DPO) integrates peacekeeping operations and two large field-based Special Political Missions, UNAMI (Irak) and UNAMA (Afghanistan). It also includes the Office of Military Affairs, and specialized capacities that fall under the Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), as well as the Department of Policy, Evaluation and Training.]
Key message: in the new Secretariat organization the Director for Coordination and Shared Services will provide joint capabilities and functions to both DPO and DPPA.

The Services of the Director for Coordination and Shared Services are shared by DPO and DPPA. It regroups the functions of a COS office and of an Executive Office.

It also includes the Leadership Support Section, formerly called Senior Leadership Appointment Section and which used to be located in the former Department of Field Support, now DOS.
Key Message: the Policy Evaluation and Training (PET) Division provides an integrated capacity to develop and disseminate policy and doctrine and to develop, coordinate and deliver standardized training to all UN personnel, uniformed and civilians alike.
Key message: In the new organization of DPO (01 January 2019), the Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell is attached to DPET’s Partnerships Team.

- The Policy Evaluation and Training (PET) Division provides an integrated capacity:
  - to develop and disseminate policy and doctrine;
  - to develop, coordinate and deliver standardized training;
  - to evaluate mission progress towards mandate implementation;
  - to develop policies and operational frameworks for strategic cooperation with various UN and external partners.

In the new organization of DPO (01 January 2019), the Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell is attached to DPET’s Partnerships Team.

Role of the Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell:
- Plan and coordinate mid- to long-term DPO/DOS engagement with Member States to help meet current and future UN peacekeeping uniformed capability needs.
Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions

Development of Topic 5 of Lecture 2 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: The Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) was established in 2007 to catalyze peacekeeping and peace sustaining processes, protect civilians and assist in re-establishing national rule of law and security institutions.

The Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) is the largest provider of police, justice and corrections specialists in the world. It also has experts on hand in weapons and ammunition management, mine action, security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).

OROLSI was established in 2007 by the UN General Assembly to find innovative ways to catalyze peacekeeping and peace sustaining processes, protect civilians and assist in re-establishing national rule of law and security institutions.
Key message: OROLSI is made up of five components, including the UN Police Division and the UN Mine Action Service.

OROLSI is made up of 5 components:
- United Nations Police Division (PD),
- United Nations Mine Actions Service (UNMAS),
- Justice and Correction Service (JCS),
- Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Section (DDRS),
- and Security Sector Reform Unit (SSRU)

- For a total of 148 personnel in UNHQ
Key message: within OROLSI, the Police Division is in charge of generating and deploying all individual UN police officers as well as all Formed Police Units.

- United Nations Police provide critical support to national police services, so that they build trust with communities and provide public safety to their citizens. Police peacekeepers play an important role in protecting civilians - both by providing operational support in the face of imminent threats and by upholding law and order. UN Police work with national law enforcement agencies to help prevent sexual- and gender-based violence, strengthen police relationships with communities and address transnational organized crime.
- PD is in charge of generating and deploying all individual UN police officers as well as all Formed Police Units.
- PD is strengthening the deployment and recruitment modalities for UN police personnel and continuing efforts to increase the participation of female officers in PKOs.
Key message: beside the Police Division, OROLSI also includes the Justice and Correction Service, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section, the United Nations Mine Action Service and the Security Sector Reform Unit.

The Justice and Correction Service (JCS) addresses issues related to both judicial and penal systems in conflict and post-conflict environments. Its core responsibilities include:
• planning justice and corrections aspects of Peace Operations;
• providing advice on re-establishing the criminal justice chain;
• ensuring the timely deployment of personnel;
• developing guidance and delivering training;
• and strengthening partnerships and programme delivery with other rule of law actors.

The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section (DDRS) provides support to field practitioners by planning new DDR programs and providing operational advice and support:
• By encouraging armed groups to disarm and return to civilian life, DDR creates space for peace consolidation and transition to recovery and development.
• The DDR Section (DDRS) provides support to field practitioners by planning new DDR programs and providing operational advice and support.
• The Section also serves as an expert resource to the United Nations Secretariat, intergovernmental bodies and Member States on issues related to DDR.
• The DDR Section, together with the World Bank, has also entered into a strategic partnership with the African Union to support the latter’s specialized capacity in the area.
The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) leads, coordinates and carries out efforts to mitigate the threats of explosive hazards and is also developing a United Nations approach to IED threat mitigation:

- The UNMAS applies mine action expertise to an increasingly wide range of explosive hazards, from unexploded missiles, artillery shells, rockets, grenades and mortars to unsafe and unsecure weapons and ammunition, improvised explosive devices and cluster bombs.
- UNMAS leads, coordinates and carries out efforts to mitigate these threats when mandated by the United Nations Security Council or when requested by the Secretary-General or an affected country, often in response to a humanitarian emergency.
- UNMAS is also developing a United Nations approach to IED threat mitigation.

The primary objective of the Security Sector Reform Unit is to ensure that people are safer through the enhanced effectiveness and accountability of security institutions. The Security Sector Reform Unit (SSRU) is the focal point and technical resource capacity on SSR for the United Nations system, as well as for national and international partners. SSR officers in the field are responsible for a variety of core functions, including:

- ensuring that SSR support is integrated and coherent;
- supporting reforms in border security and management, defense and policing;
- strengthening oversight and management; articulating security sector legislation;
- mobilizing resources for SSR;
- and monitoring and evaluating programs.
Key message: The role of the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) is to deploy the most appropriate and effective military capability in peacekeeping missions.

The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) works to deploy the most appropriate and effective military capability in peacekeeping missions.

The core task of OMA is to provide military expertise to the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), the Department of Operational Support (DOS), and other parts of the Secretariat and the UN System when requested, Member States and Military components in the United Nations peacekeeping missions.
Key message: the three services of the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) works to plan, deploy and administratively manage the most appropriate military capabilities in UN missions. The Military Adviser provides military advice to the UN authorities and bodies as requested.

- The Office of Military Affairs is headed by the Military Adviser, a serving Lieutenant General at the level of Assistant Secretary-General, who is accountable to the Under-Secretary-General.
- The Military Adviser is responsible for providing military advice to the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations and, when requested, through him or her to the Under-Secretaries-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Operational Support, the Secretary-General and the Security Council. The Military Adviser also provides advice and support to heads of offices and divisions within the Department of Peace Operations, the Department of Operational Support, operations with military components led by the Department of Peace Operations and missions with military advisory functions led by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.
- His deputy is a Major General, also on secondment. The Deputy Military Adviser has tasking authority over the seconded officers embedded in the IOTs and in DOS.
- The Military Adviser is supported by a Chief of Staff, Brigadier General on secondment, who heads the MILAD’s office and is responsible for the smooth functioning of OMA.
- OMA’s three main services are:
  - MILITARY PLANNING SERVICE’s main functions are:
    - Providing military-strategic planning advice to the Military Adviser;
    - Conducting military-strategic planning for emerging and existing Department-led operations;
• Producing foundational military guidance documents, including the command directive, military rules of engagement, military-strategic concepts of operation, and Statement of Unit Requirements; these three last documents are essential to the TCCs
• Monitoring the military plans to reduce the time required to plan for major changes, including mission termination;
• Specifying the force or operational requirements for individual military personnel, military formed units and unit equipment in new or revised concepts of operation and contingency plans

FORCE GENERATION SERVICE’s main functions are:
• Acting as the principal military point of contact with troop-contributing countries conducting the force generation process, including the generation and rotation of all military contingents and individuals, and supporting the selection process for senior UN military appointments;
• Participating, in the contingent-owned equipment negotiation process, concluding memorandums of understanding for the timely deployment of troops and, when necessary, for the force adjustment, and providing technical advice on contingent-owned equipment claims by Member States, as required;
• Initiating and maintaining records of service and performance for individuals and statistics and country profiles for all UN military deployments;
• Developing, in collaboration with the Department of Operational Support, generic guidelines for troop-contributing countries and mission-specific military guidelines related to force requirements;
• Coordinating reconnaissance visits for troop-contributing countries providing contingents to Peace Operations;
• Maintaining and updating records of pledges made by Member States in the UN PCRS for the provision of troops, equipment and services to Peace Operations.

CURRENT MILITARY OPERATION’s main functions are:
• Providing advice to the heads of the military components of Department-led operations on technical aspects of military operations, such as contingency planning, force rotations and operational reporting, in coordination with the integrated operational teams, to ensure that military aspects are properly integrated or coordinated, and interacting with permanent missions of Member States on all military technical operational issues, significant incidents, accidents, injuries, deaths, repatriations and other current issues;
• Providing the Military Adviser and, through the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, senior leadership at UN Headquarters with military information and analysis related to current events;
• Coordinating visits by Member States, the military and police advisers, community and senior military staff from Headquarters to Peace Operations, briefing visiting military individuals, groups or delegations and coordinating the briefing and debriefing process for senior military officials in Peace Operations;
• Coordinating responses by the Office of Military Affairs to disciplinary issues involving military personnel

• Two additional teams provide support to the leadership and the services in the accomplishment of their tasks:
• **The Policy, Liaison and Doctrine Team** drafts military policy and doctrine capability development documents, and acts as a liaison team with various regional organizations; (the Liaison Team was recently incorporated in this team)

• **The Assessment Team**
  - Enhances force protection and senior decision making process,
  - Anticipates and responds to critical military and threat information requirements by providing operational and strategic level analytical products beyond the capacity of UN field missions

• **The Military Performance Enhancement Task Force (MPET)** is not part of the authorized permanent structure of OMA. MPET is a task force initially comprised of existing OMA personnel under the overall supervision of the Deputy Military Adviser. MPET synchronizes all performance-related tasks across all OMA Services and Teams and coordinates with other relevant UN Offices and Divisions in DPO and DOS to develop, implement and continuously refine and improve the military performance evaluation system for units, headquarters and individuals to gain the most objective and accurate understanding of the military component's field performance.

• OMA is manned by a total of 114 personnel, 103 of them are active duty officers seconded by their countries.
Lecture Take Away

- By delegation of the Secretary General, DPO assumes the political and executive direction of all Peace Operations.
- The newly created (01 Jan. 2019) Single Regional Political-Operational Structure merges the regional offices and responsibilities formerly belonging to DPKO and DPA. Both USGs DPO and DPPA have guidance and surveillance responsibilities over its seven divisions.
- In addition to the political domain, DPO also provides support in the military, police, judicial and mine action domains.
- In terms of crisis management, DPO coordinates the efforts of the United Nations and of the governmental and non-governmental players.
Department of Peace Operations

Questions

Lecture 2
Lecture 3 in the Module B “UN Secretariat Overview” of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Learning Outcomes

• Understand DOS’ role and responsibilities.
• Understand DOS organization.
• Understand the roles and responsibilities of DOS’ various divisions and services
Lecture Content

- DOS role and responsibilities
- DOS Organization chart
- DOS’ Strategic Support Team
- Office of Support Operations
- Office of Supply Chain Management
- Division for Special Activities
- Office of Information and Communication Technology
- Global Service Center
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 3 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: DOS is responsible for supporting United Nations field operations, in the areas of personnel, finance, field procurement, logistics communications, information technology, and other administrative and general management.

- At the United Nations Headquarters level, DOS is responsible for delivering dedicated support to United Nations field operations, including personnel, finance, field procurement, logistical, communications, information technology, and other administrative and general management issues.
DOS Role and Responsibilities

DOS is responsible for delivering dedicated support to United Nations field operations, including personnel, finance, field procurement, logistical, communications, information technology, and other administrative and general management issues.

Key message: DOS is responsible for supporting United Nations field operations, in the areas of personnel, finance, field procurement, logistics communications, information technology, and other administrative and general management.
DOS Organization

Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 3 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: The Department of Operational Support provides support in the areas of finance, logistics, Information, communication and technology, human resources and general administration to support the field operations.

This is the new organization of the Department of Operational Support, with the dual reporting line of the Office of Information and Communications Technology.
The office of the USG DOS includes three specific entities providing him with Strategic Support.

The Health-Care Management and Occupational Safety and Health Division regroups two medical entities that used to be split between DFS and the DM.
Likewise for the Procurement Division which merges capacities once split between DFS and the DM.

A single Office of Information and Communications Technology has been established through the consolidation of the former Office of Information and Communications Technology in the Department of Management and the Information and Communications Technology Division in the Department of Field Support.
As this Office both performs some policy- and standard-setting functions and delivers operational support to clients throughout the Secretariat, it retains reporting lines to both the Under-Secretary-General for Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance and the Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support.
Given that ICT is a cross-cutting function underpinning the Organization’s core mandates and activities, a single entity to cover the Organization’s operations and business processes from end to end under a single integrated structure with a holistic approach to the delivery of ICT services has been deemed to better meet client needs.
Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 3 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message:

Part of the front office of the USG DOS, the strategic support team comprises of three entities: a Performance and Analytics Section, an Audit Response and Boards of Inquiry Section and an Environment Section.

The **Performance and Analytics Section** oversees the operational performance of all units within the Department of Operational Support and supports decision-making by senior management using analytics products that track operational performance throughout the Secretariat. These include the annual global client satisfaction survey, regular reports on operational performance and analytics support to specific initiatives, such as peacekeeping reviews. In addition, the Section identifies opportunities for operational enhancement and capitalizes upon those opportunities, in collaboration with stakeholders, through continuous improvement of business processes and operational guidance.

The **Audit Response and Boards of Inquiry Section** is responsible for coordinating, developing and preparing responses to reports of United Nations oversight bodies for the Department of Operational Support, as well as the Department of Peacebuilding and Political Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations. It is also responsible for following up on the recommendations of boards of inquiry in the field and for providing administrative support to boards of inquiry convened at Headquarters. This section works not only for DOS but also for DPO and DPPA.

The **Environment Section**, which was originally established in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support pursuant to General Assembly resolution 71/295.
It is currently responsible for supporting the implementation of the environmental sustainability management framework in peace operations by providing operational support, guidance and technical assistance. With the management reform it has expanded its scope to **encompass the entire Secretariat**, drawing upon the extensive experience it has gained through its support to peacekeeping operations in the management of environmental impact and associated risks, while continuing to leverage the expertise of the United Nations Environment Programme.
Development of Topic 4 of Lecture 3 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: The Office of Support Operations support its clients in the domains of human resources, operational training and health-care management.

- The **Office of Support Operations** support clients through the provision of guidance and advisory services, direct assistance where capacity may be weak or non-existent, capacity-building, process improvements and optimization, and operational performance reviews.

- The Office of Support Operations consists of the **Capacity Development and Operational Training Service**, the **Human Resources Services Division** and the **Health-Care Management and Occupational Safety and Health Division**.

- The **Human Resources Services Division** has a Staffing services working on testing and examinations, organisational design, operational workforce planning, design of recruitment processes, management of recruitment rosters and young professional programme. It also provides Operational support and advice to managers & entities on policy, operational strategies and other HR issues, support to resolution of staffing conflict. Finally it advises on the use of Non-staff personnel.

- The **Capacity Development and Operational Training Service** focuses on Operational training: Training specific to operational support, coordination with global training centres; training on operational application of Inspira/Umoja and other business applications. It also develops processes and structures for consistent implementation of policies and services, including alignment of systems.
Key message: Among other responsibilities, the Health-Care Management and Occupational Safety and Health Division is in charge of the verification of the professional qualifications of the medical personnel deployed to the field by troop contributing countries.

The Health-Care Management and Occupational Safety and Health Division was created on 01 January 2019 through the consolidation of the Medical Services Division in the Office of Human Resources Management in the former Department of Management and related functions shared by the former Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and of Field Support, namely, the Field Occupational Safety and Risk Management Officer in the Office of the Chief of Staff and the HIV/AIDS Unit in the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division.

The Division consists of two main functional areas: occupational safety and health and health systems administration.

The occupational safety and health component is responsible for occupational safety; occupational health, including clinical services, travel medicine and health promotion; mental health and well-being; and medical emergency response.

The health systems administration component is responsible for clinical standards and oversight, including hospital assessments; health workforce management, including credentialing; and technical review of compensation claims from uniformed personnel.
In particular, the division deals with Medical Logistics. It deals with policies and SOPs applicable in the field (editor of the Medical Support Manual), and correcting deficiencies in the field. Finally, the division also looks at the professional qualifications of the medical personnel deploying with Level 1 and Level 2 Hospitals, to make sure that the qualifications of the personnel provided actually match the requirements of the COE manual / Medical Support manual for each position.
Division for Special Activities

Development of Topic 5 of Lecture 3 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: The Division for Special Activities supports UN entities during surge activities and in particular provides an operational logistic planning capability for starting missions.

The Division for Special Activities oversees a range of specialized and cross-cutting operational capacities. A key element of its responsibilities is the exercise of authority on behalf of clients that lack the capacity to do so accountably, including the offices of special advisers and envoys at Headquarters or in the field, start-up missions or those whose authorities have been withdrawn. The specific requirements, particularly for start-up and surge requirements, is met through the formation of temporary teams with subject matter experts drawn from the Office of Support Operations, the Office of Supply Chain Management and the Office of Information and Communications Technology.

The Division also includes the Operational Planning Service to help identify and plan for emerging support requirements.

- The Client Support and Special Situations Section advises and supports entities during surge activities, e.g. start-up / expansion, transition, downsizing / liquidation. It also provides other surge capacity management and constitutes the focal point for emergency situations.
- The Operational Planning Service provides operational planning support to operating entities for significant operations / activities, including coordination with DOS counterparts. It provides planning guidance to operating entities.
- The Support Partnerships Service manages the support relationships with regional organisations, UNCT, and other bilateral partners. It is the backstopping of UNSOS (Somalia)
• The Resource Planning and Analysis Section provides analysis and review of key operational support resourcing drivers and practices. It develops operational resourcing standards and advises on operational solutions.
Key message: The Office of Supply Chain management brings together the logistics and procurement capabilities of the Secretariat in a single entity managing the integrated end-to-end supply chain.

- The Office is responsible for implementing the supply chain management blueprint first promulgated by the Department of Field Support in October 2016 and updated in December 2017.
  - The blueprint includes integrated end-to-end supply chain management processes with clearly defined functions, roles and responsibilities; offers different supply chain solutions for different situations, requirements and challenges; provides infrastructure, technology and resource solutions, including human resources solutions and the skills necessary to support and enable the supply chain management processes; and includes a strong performance management framework to measure, monitor and manage the supply chain to ensure effectiveness and efficiency.

- The Office of Supply Chain Management encompasses the Logistics Division, the Procurement Division, the Uniformed Capabilities Support Division and the Enabling Section, which supports operations through the provision of operational reporting, business intelligence, vendor outreach and performance management, as well as through the establishment of baselines and the monitoring of key performance indicators.

- The Aviation Safety Team consists of aviation safety experts reporting directly to the Assistant Secretary-General. It oversees all matters related to United Nations aviation operations, including aircraft utilized for personnel and cargo movements and the official travel of staff. The Team sets standards, processes and procedures for aviation safety in line with international standards and United Nations requirements, monitors safety in operations, assesses safety risks and conducts safety.
assurance activities. The Team also provides technical oversight for aviation safety staff in field missions and is responsible for capacity-building through training and awareness-raising.

- The Enabling and Outreach Service reports directly to the Assistant Secretary-General and provides a single set of performance management metrics, reporting and guidance to serve the technical and commercial interests of the Office and its clients. It also deals with Vendor registration and outreach, focusing on developing countries, and provides Operational guidance and best practices.

- The Procurement Division performs a key role in the implementation of end-to-end supply chain management. It deals with the Acquisition of complex, high-value and/or strategic goods and services globally, including aviation, major commodities, real estate / construction, IT, and corporate service requirements. It provides a field-focused support, including standby resources and other solutions to provide support in special situations, and exerts oversight of regional procurement activities through the Regional Procurement Office in Entebbe. The Procurement Division works closely with the Logistics Division to ensure high-quality and timely services to all Secretariat clients.

- [Core procurement functions, such as solicitation exercises, commercial evaluations, recommendations of qualified offers and contract administration, remain independent of the requisitioners to ensure compliance with the Financial Regulations and Rules and associated internal controls].
Key message: The Logistics Division is responsible for the implementation of end-to-end supply chain management.

The Logistics Division performs a central role in the implementation of end-to-end supply chain management. It provides direction and advice on logistical matters, monitors and assesses the delivery of strategic transportation and support services and directs the delivery of transportation and specialist support services in the functional areas of air transport, ground transport, engineering, medical and supply, inclusive of fuel, rations and general supplies and security equipment.

The Division also performs and leads global integrated supply chain planning functions to facilitate global demand, source and delivery planning across all technical areas within its functional scope. The Logistics Division consists of an Air Transport Service and a Movement Control Section, a Supply Chain Planning Service and a Sourcing Support Service.

The Air Transport Service is particularly responsible for the respect of the technical requirements pertaining to military aircraft and flying crews contributed by member states.

The Air Transport Service is of special importance for TCCs contributing air assets to UN operations.

- Working with the Force Generation Service, ATS defines the technical requirements pertaining to the TCC-contributed aircraft as an input to the relevant Statements of Unit Requirements, provides the UN Team’s air specialists during the AAVs and PDVs and leads the negotiation of the Letter Of Assist with the TCC, along with the Procurement Department.
- The management of UN commercially contracted air assets, fixed or rotary wings, is also part of the ATS’ responsibilities.
The role of the **Movement Control Section** is to organize the transport of UN goods and personnel at the strategic level.

- The role of Movement Control Section is to ensure that effective logistic capabilities in terms of Air Support, Strategic Air and Sea Lift for movement of Military and that Civilian personnel and cargo, vehicles, and spare parts are provided at the required time and place, in the most effective and efficient manner, in order to support UN peacekeeping and other field operations.
- MOVCON organizes the strategic transport of the COE for the deploying or repatriating units. T/PCCs personnel are directly in touch with this service during the preparation phase of the transport.
- MOVCON also organizes the deployment and rotation of military/police personnel by air, using either contracted commercial assets or UN assets.
- In case of movement carried out by the T/PCC under Letter Of Assist, MOVCON again is the service receiving and processing the LOA requests.
- MOVCON’s role and responsibilities will be further detailed in Module H “Strategic Transport for Deployment”.

- The **Supply Chain Planning Service** is responsible for developing and managing a global plan for demand forecasting, source planning and delivery through the identification and assessment of the needs of all clients across all Secretariat entities.

- The **Sourcing Support Service** provides senior-level professional, technical and operational knowledge to all clients, with a focus on conducting a full range of activities in support of operations in the portfolio areas of medical support, engineering, rations, fuel, ground transportation, general supplies and security equipment.

- The **Engineering Support Section** provides specialist support for specific projects, including generation of specialized units: horizontal and vertical engineers construction unit, airfield engineer units, etc.
Key message: The Uniformed Capabilities Support Division is the single point of entry within the Secretariat for support and reimbursement issues related to military and police contingents.

The Division is the single point of entry within the Secretariat for support and reimbursement issues related to military and police contingents, for both Member States and counterparts within the Secretariat, including the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations.

All of the related functions formerly residing in the Memorandum of Understanding and Claims Management Section and the Reimbursement Policy and Liaison Section of the Field Budget and Finance Division, the Contingent-Owned Equipment Unit in the Logistics Support Division and the Financial Information Operations Service in the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts were consolidated into a single Uniformed Capabilities Support Division.

Within the UCSD:

- The Memorandum of Understanding and Reimbursement Policy Section is responsible for:
  - policies and procedures related to the reimbursement to troop- and police-contributing countries and the verification and control of contingent-owned equipment,
  - Supporting the triennial meetings of the Working Group on Contingent-Owned Equipment and updating the COE Manual
  - undertaking the quadrennial survey of personnel costs established by the General Assembly in its resolution 67/261
- leading the negotiations with troop- and police-contributing countries in preparing memorandums of understanding to support the deployment of formed military and police units;
- Act as the focal point to technical logistics experts on COE management and support to deploying T/PCCs.

- It serves as the primary focal point for communications between permanent missions of troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat on questions related to reimbursement and the memorandums of understanding and subsequent amendments.

• The **Reimbursement Claims Management and Performance Section** is responsible for:
  - the calculation, analysis and processing of reimbursement to troop- and police-contributing countries for contingent personnel, major equipment and self-sustainment (includes the automated calculation of the wet lease, dry lease and maintenance rates applicable for each formed unit);
  - The death and disability compensation for uniformed personnel, in addition to ad hoc claims (such as ammunition, loss and damage), and premiums (including the risk and key enabler premiums);
  - The preparation of estimates for the costs associated with reimbursement to troop- and police-contributing countries for inclusion in budget proposals;
  - Prepare reports on performance of military / police units, using standardized metrics related to equipment availability (NIMA) and serviceability (USV), with a primary focus on operational capability gaps, safety considerations, and financial inefficiencies.
Development of Topic 7 of Lecture 3 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the Office of Information and Communications Technology (OICT) is responsible for the management and administration of the Secretariat’s IT and communication systems on a global basis; it reports to the Under-Secretaries-General of both the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance and the Department of Operational Support.

The Office of Information and Communications Technology is a unified pillar led by the Assistant Secretary-General, Chief Information Technology Officer, reporting to the Under-Secretaries-General of both the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance and the Department of Operational Support.

The model for this Office comprises three interlinked but distinct levels, each with clearly defined roles and responsibilities:

- The first level encompasses the strategy, direction and global implementation of activities managed at United Nations Headquarters.
- The second level is focused on supporting local operations through the implementation of globalized technology solutions supported through the Global Service Centre at Brindisi, Italy, and Valencia, Spain.

The regional ICT framework and the regional technology centres represent and serve the interests and needs of local offices and field operations by geographical location. They are responsible to regional client boards, with additional reporting lines to Headquarters. The regional entities ensure that ICT is close to its clients and responsive to their needs, while at the same time local offices benefit from coordinated direction from Headquarters and the leveraging of regional initiatives.
• The third level, the tactical level, comprises the ICT teams within the local structures, which is focused on the effective delivery of technology solutions and the provision of support to the local community of end users; this third level is supported by the two first ones.

Slide 79

Global Service Center

Development of Topic 8 of Lecture 3 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: The United Nations Global Service Centre’s mandate is to ensure efficient and effective peace operations through the core logistics, geospatial, information and telecommunications technology services it provides.

The United Nations Global Service Center (UNGSC)
- As seen before, the UNGSC comprises the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi / Italy (UNLB); to this is added the United Nations Support Base in Valencia / Spain (UNSVB),
- The UNGSC provides critical Logistics, Geospatial, Information and Telecommunications Technologies services and support to more than 37 peacekeeping, special political and other missions around the world.

The UNGSC’s mandate is to ensure efficient and effective peace operations through the core logistics, geospatial, information and telecommunications technology services it provides.

UNGSC is comprised of three core Service areas:
- Logistics Service
- Service for Geospatial Information and Telecommunications Technologies
- Base Support Service

- DOS also includes the Global Service Center bases overseas in Italy and Spain. Finally, the United Nations Logistic Base (UNLB) is part of the Global Service Center and is located outside of the US, in Brindisi (Italy)
- In November 1994, the General Assembly endorsed the creation of a permanent logistics base in Brindisi, Italy.
- The United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) was initially a site for pack-up kits and general supplies.
• The role of the UNLB expanded in 2002 to include the creation of the **Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS)** Concept.
• The SDS is the United Nation’s Peacekeeping material reserve, which supports rapid deployment and the initial operational capability of a complex peacekeeping mission.
• The UNLB stores and maintains the SDS, provides airlift support to missions, and conducts UN logistics training.
Lecture Take Away

- The Department of Operational Support provides technical support to the field missions in the logistic, financial, communications, information technology and human resources domains.
- It also advises DPO and DPPA in the same domains in relation with the peacekeeping operations.
- Several of its services are the direct correspondents of the T/PCCs as regards MOU management, reimbursements claims, strategic transport of personnel and COE, and technical requirements applicable to air assets contributions.
Department of Operational Support

Questions

Lecture 3

82
Lecture 4 in the Module B “UN Secretariat Overview” of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Learning Outcomes

• Understand the composition and organization of a standard multidimensional integrated peacekeeping mission
• Understand the roles and responsibilities of the main mission leaders
• Understand the role of the main integrated entities of a complex UN mission.
Lecture Content

- Organization chart of an integrated peacekeeping mission
- Mission leadership
  - HOM
  - D/HOM
  - HOMC
  - HOPC
  - DMS/CMS
- Integrated functions
  - Service Delivery
  - MSC
  - JOC
  - JMAC
Organization chart of a multi-dimensional Mission

Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 4 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: in a Multidimensional Integrated UN Mission the various components – civilian, military, police – work together in a coordinated and integrated manner in order to fulfil the mandated tasks. Moreover the Mission will coordinate its actions with those of the other UN agencies and with governmental or non-governmental organizations present in the Mission area.

A standard Multidimensional Integrated UN Mission is generally composed as follows.

The SRSG has one or several deputy SRSGs.

The Mission Chief of Staff controls various advisers and mission offices (press, public info, human rights, etc.) under supervision of one of the D/SRSGs.

The Director or Chief Mission Support is responsible for the administrative and logistic support component. The CISS (Chief Integrated Service Support) is now called “Chief Service Delivery”. He directly manages the following functions in Mission Support: Transport, Aviation, Medical services, Engineering, Life support (rations, fuel, general supply).

The two other components of the Mission Support functions are not fully represented on this slide: Supply Chain Management and Operations and Resources Management. We will see in the next slide a more detailed organization of Mission Support.

Depending on the mandate, there is in general a police component alongside the military component. (The terms Head Of Military Component – HOMC – and Head Of Police Component - HOPC - are often used). Specialized police teams are deployed according to the specific needs of the mission.
Joint civilian/military mission structures depend on the Mission headquarters: Joint Mission Analysis Center, Joint Operations Center, Joint Logistic Operations Center, etc ...

When a body of Military Observers exist in the mission, the Chief Military Observers usually reports to the Force Commander. He exerts operational control over MO Sectors / Senior Military Observers and Military Observer Team Leaders.

Finally, the Mission coordinates its actions with other UN agencies and with governmental or non-governmental organizations present in the Mission area. The UN partners are all the UN agencies, funds and programs in a country. They make up the UN Country Team (UNCT). When there are several Deputy SRSGs, one of them is called DSRSG Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator (and sometimes RR = Resident Representative of the UNDP).

We will see in the next lecture what means OPCON, Tasking authority, etc.
Key message: the new mission support organization of complex missions is based on three pillars: Operations & Resources Management, Service Delivery Management and Supply Chain Management.

This is a simplified flowchart of the Mission Support structure in a complex mission.

This is an evolution of the former Mission Support organization. The new organization has been designed to match the principles of Supply Chain Management (SCM) in commercial companies. This new organization will be progressively implemented by the missions over the course of FY 2018/2019, starting in July 2018, - even though the mission support’s functions will remain unchanged, particularly as regards supporting the T/PCCs which remains the most important priority in any PKO.

Mission Support is based on three pillars under direct authority of the DMS/CMS:
• Operations & Resources Management
• Service Delivery Management
• Supply Chain Management

• Anyone of the three unit Chiefs is able to deputize for the DMS.
• Before going further, let’s note that the DMS/CMS keeps several offices directly under his control; only two of them are shown here, Aviation Safety and Environment, just to outline the importance of these domains in the mission.
Reporting directly to the D/CMS, the Chief of Operations and Resource Management (ORM) oversees, manages and directs the following strategic operations and resourcing functions of mission support components:

- **Mission Support Centre (MSC)** – Mission Support Center has been outlined because it has a special role vis-à-vis the contingents: formerly under the responsibility of the Chief Service Delivery, the MSC has the primary role at the mission Headquarters level to provide Mission Support Division (all components) with *timely, coordinated and efficient logistic support planning for operational priorities* and key project implementation. All logistic support requests must be addressed to MSC which will prioritize and coordinate the corresponding tasks. Mission Support Center is also responsible for the mission’s **COE Unit** which is performing the verification visits of the contingents and issues the verification reports (see Reimbursement module later on).

In integrated missions MSC should have seconded military and police personnel imbedded in the structure and operations to facilitate strong linkages and coordination with the Force and Police components in the mission.

- **Human Resources Section (HRS)**
- **Financial Resourcing and Performance Section (FRRS)**
- **Field Technology Section (FTS) [former Geospatial, Information Technology and Telecommunications Services (GITTS)]**
- **Coordination of Sector/ Regional Offices**

**Service Delivery Management (SDM)** is responsible for the provision of key logistics support services to all mission components and other clients of the Mission Support organization through technical sections to include:

- **Life Support Section** is responsible for the provision of services and management of contracts for food rations, catering, all types of fuel and other Petrol, Oil and Lubricant (POL) products, and general supply services and goods – **Life Support section** has been outlined due to its primary role vis-à-vis the contingents for delivery of fuel and rations. This is where the logistic officers of the contingents should go in case of problems with rations: quantity issue, quality issue, etc.

- **Aviation Section**, composed of Mission Air Operations Centre, Airfields Support Unit and Technical Compliance Unit

- **Transport Section** is responsible for the overall management and administration of the UNOE vehicle fleet (UN Owned Equipment)

- **Engineering and Facilities Maintenance Section** is responsible for: planning, construction and commissioning of the missions facilities and infrastructure as well as for facilities maintenance

- **Medical Services Section** is responsible for overall medical support operations within the framework of a mission integrated support concept and *encompass United Nations-owned, troop contributed and commercially-contracted medical facilities* to ensure optimal and cost-effective use of all medical assets to serve both civilian and uniformed personnel, and also maintain a single set of standards for the mission’s medical facilities.

**Supply Chain Management** is responsible for planning and execution, monitoring and control, guidance and coordination of all supply chain areas that are integrated on the basis of end-to-end processes, namely, Plan, Source, Deliver, Return and Enable and cover activities related to demand planning, acquisitions, procurement, warehousing, asset and inventory management, transportation and freight planning (air, land, sea), expediting movement and tracking distribution, business intelligence and performance management.

Supply Chain Management pillar consists of the following Sections/Units:
• **Movement Control Section (MOVCON)** has been outlined due to its role vis a vis the movements and transport of contingent personnel and COE. The **Movement Control Section** is responsible for the provision of efficient multi-modal transportation operations for delivery and distribution of goods; administration and control of all Movement Control activity in a mission; maintaining a structure capable of efficient multi-modal transportation means with a view to cost effective, efficient utilisation of transport resources, development of systems and infrastructure to **facilitate the movement of UNOE and COE and all personnel**

• **Acquisition Management Section** provides a supporting role to the acquisition process in terms of acquisition planning, requisitioning (i.e. creation of shopping carts) and contract performance evaluation.

• **Procurement Section** functions include the identification of potential vendors, solicitation of bids and proposals, commercial evaluation of bidders’ submissions, contract negotiations and award, contract administration, dispute handling and contract termination.

• **Centralised Warehousing Section** functions include receipt, storage location management, physical inventory management, putting away, order picking and packing for outbound distribution, key reporting functions, as well as property disposal function.
Mission Leadership

Key message: the Head of Mission of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation is generally a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). The HOM reports to the Secretary-General through the USG DPO and has overall authority over the activities of the United Nations in the mission area.

- The **Head of Mission** (HOM) of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation is generally a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG).
- The HOM reports to the Secretary-General through the USG DPO.
- The HOM is the senior UN Representative and has overall authority over the activities of the United Nations in the mission area. The HOM represents the Secretary-General, leads UN political engagement and speaks on behalf of the United Nations within the mission area.
- The HOM leads and directs the heads of all mission components and ensures unity of effort and coherence among all UN entities in the mission area, in accordance with the UN Integrated Strategic Framework for the mission.
- The HOM provides political guidance for mandate implementation and sets mission-wide operational direction including decisions on resource allocation in case of competing priorities.
- The HOM delegates the operational and technical aspects of mandate implementation to the heads of all components of the mission. The HOM provides direction to those components through the component heads.
Key message: Multidimensional Peace Operations generally have at least one Deputy SRSG to support the Head of Mission in executing the substantive civilian functions of the mission.

- Multidimensional Peace Operations generally have at least one Deputy SRSG to support the Head of Mission in executing the substantive civilian functions of the mission.
- Multidimensional peacekeeping missions also have a DSRSG “RC/HC” – meaning Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator who is often the heat of the UN Country team and who is in charge of the coordination of the Mission’s work with other UN agencies and NGOs operating in the mission area. This DSRSG is sometimes as well “RR”, meaning Resident Representative of the UNDP (United Nations Development Program).
- Deputy SRSGs report to the HOM and they exercise managerial authority over those mission components that have been assigned to them, while the other is in charge of coordinating the mission’s activities with UN agencies, funds, programme, etc. operating in the mission area.
Key message: the Head of Military Component (HOMC) reports to the HOM and exercises operational control over all military personnel, including Military Observers, in the mission (save when the Chief Military Observers reports directly to the HOM).

- The Head of Military Component (HOMC) reports to the HOM.
- The HOMC exercises operational control over all military personnel, including Military Observers, in the mission (save when the CMO reports directly to the HOM).
- The HOMC establishes the military operational chain of command in the field (although at mission startup the structure of the Force is more often established by DPO).
- The HOMC may establish subordinate Sector Commands, as appropriate (depending on HOM and DPO approval, if only for financial reasons).
- In doing so, the HOMC places military units under the Tactical Control of military commanders in the operational chain of command.
- The HOMC maintains a technical reporting and communication link with the DPO Military Adviser in UN Headquarters. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the command chain between the USG DPO and the HOM, nor should it interfere with decisions taken by the HOM in accordance with this policy directive – we will see this in the next lecture.
Key message: The Head of Police Component reports to the Head of Mission and exercises operational control and provides direction to all members of the police component of the mission.

- The Head of Police Component (HOPC) reports to the Head of Mission, exercises operational control and provides direction to all members of the police component of the mission.
- This includes all UN Police Officers (including all members of Formed Police Units) and relevant civilian staff serving in the Police Component. The HOPC, in consultation with DPO, shall establish the police chain of command in the mission.
- The HOPC maintains a technical reporting and communication link with the DPO Police Adviser at UN Headquarters. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the command chain between the USG DPO and the HOM, nor should it interfere with decisions taken by the HOM in accordance with this policy directive.
Key message: The Director of Mission Support / Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS) reports to the HOM and is accountable to the HOM for the efficient and effective provision of administrative and logistical support to all mission components. The DMS/CMS has sole UN authority in the field to commit UN financial resources for any purpose.

- The Director of Mission Support / Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS) reports to the HOM and is responsible and accountable to the HOM for the effective general management of the human, financial and physical resources allocated to a mission. He advises the HOM on the rules and regulations relating to the commitment of UN financial resources to ensure the provision of efficient and effective administrative and logistical support to all mission components.
- The DMS/CMS has sole UN authority in the field to commit UN financial resources for any purpose, including any contractual arrangements for the use of local resources.
- DMS/CMS will exercise his financial authority in consultation with the HOM. The DMS/CMS is responsible for the strict observance of, and compliance with, UN technical and administrative regulations related to the administration of the mission and logistics management.
- The DMS/CMS maintains a technical reporting and communication link with the Under Secretary-General, Department of Operational Support at UN HQ. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the formal decisions or tasking that must be formally communicated between the USG DPO and the HOM.
Integrated functions

Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 4 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: there are four main integrated functions / organizations in a complex multidimensional mission.

- Let’s see a few of the numerous integrated functions / organizations found in a complex multidimensional mission:
  - Service Delivery, formerly called Integrated Service Support (ISS)
  - Mission Support Center (MSC) formerly called JLOC - JOINT LOGISTICS OPERATIONS CENTER
  - JOC
  - JMAC
Key message: the Service Delivery is a joint uniformed/civilian organization under the supervision of the Chief Service Delivery, who has functional authority over all of a UN peacekeeping operation's civilian, commercial and military logistics support resources, excepting those committed solely to military operations.

- The Service Delivery is a joint uniformed/civilian organization under the management supervision of a civilian Chief Service Delivery (formerly called Chief of Integrated Support Services (CISS)).
- Under the direction of the DMS/CMS, the Chief Service Delivery (CSD) is responsible to meet as effectively and efficiently as possible all of the operational support requirements of the uniformed and civilian components of the mission, while ensuring fully accountable and optimal use of mission resources.
- The CSD provides management supervision over all of a UN peacekeeping operation's civilian, commercial and military logistics support resources, excepting those committed solely to military operations. The CSD is responsible for the overall management of technical and logistical support services to all Mission components through planning, coordinating and delivering integrated technical and logistical services, such as engineering, medical, fuel, rations, general supply, aviation, vehicle fleet management, including management of staff, assets and budgetary resources.
- Prioritization of resource allocation should be made based on decisions of the Mission Leadership Team and based on an agreed mission plan and logistics support plan.
Key message: the Mission Support Center (MSC) is a joint uniformed/civilian organization which oversees and manages the routine receipt, analysis, and tasking of all logistic support requests from within the mission, on behalf of the Chief Operations & Resources.

- The Mission Support Center (MSC) is a joint uniformed/civilian organization which provides functional interface for the Operations & Resources pillar with the rest of the mission. [Note: Before the reorganization, the MSC was operating under authority of the Chief Service Delivery].
- The MSC oversees and manages the routine receipt, analysis, and tasking of all logistic support requests from within the mission, on behalf of the Chief Operations & Resources Management. All logistics support requests must be submitted to the MSC for appropriate action. The MSC should be located adjacent to the JOC to enable optimum efficiency in mission planning and operations management.
- The DMS/CMS, CORM and Chief MSC, in consultation with the Mission Leadership Team, shall establish specific arrangements and mission policies to guide MSC tasking and will regularly review the prioritization of mission support effort.
- The Chief MSC shall exercise tasking authority over personnel (military, police and civilian) assigned to the MSC and acts as their day-to-day manager. The HOMC and HOPC retain operational control over military and police personnel assigned to MSC.
- The Chief MSC also manages the Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) Unit.
Key message: the Joint Operations Center (JOC) is a joint military, police and civilian entity which monitors situation reports and operational reports from all sources within a UN peacekeeping operation on behalf of the HOM.

- The Joint Operations Center (JOC) is a joint military, police and civilian entity which monitors situation reports and operational reports from all sources within a UN peacekeeping operation on behalf of the HOM. The JOC collates reports received from all possible sources and ensures these are disseminated in accordance with the guidance of the HOM. During crises, the JOC acts as the mission crisis management center and provides support to the Mission's Crisis Management Team.
- The Chief JOC shall establish specific arrangements and mission policies to guide JOC tasking and reporting in accordance with the *DPKO Policy on JOC and JMAC* (July 2006).
- Mission components contribute both uniformed and civilian personnel to the JOC and ensure that appropriate expertise is made available for the effective integration of operations.
- The Chief JOC shall exercise tasking authority over all personnel (military, police and civilian) assigned to the JOC and act as their day-to-day management.
- The HOMC and HOPC retain UN operational control over military and police personnel assigned to JOC.
• **Key message:** the Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC) is a joint uniformed/civilian entity that manages the collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of the mission’s operational information analysis.

• The Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC) is a joint uniformed/civilian entity that manages the collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of the mission’s operational information analysis.

• The Chief of JMAC ensures that the JMAC serves as a decision-support and planning-support tool for the HOM and Mission Leadership Team in safeguarding and implementation of the mission’s mandate. The HOMC and HOPC should also utilize the JMAC to support planning for any discrete component operations.

• The Chief JMAC, in consultation with the HOM and the Senior Management Team, shall establish mission information requirements to guide JMAC tasking, analysis and reporting, in accordance with the DPKO *Policy on JOG and JMAG (July 2006)*. Mission components contribute uniformed and civilian personnel to the JMAC, ensuring appropriate expertise is made available for the effective collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of intelligence.

• The Chief JMAC will exercise tasking authority over uniformed personnel assigned to the JMAC.

• The Chief JMAC shall exercise tasking authority over all personnel (military, police and civilian) assigned to the JMAC and act as their day-to-day manager. The HOMC and HOPC retain operational control over military and police personnel assigned to JMAC. Critical timely information of risk and threat must be passed to all mission components.

• JMAC is the natural correspondent of the Situation Center (SITCEN) in UNHQ.
Lecture Take Away

- The HOM / SRSG has overall authority over all uniformed and civilian UN personnel present in the mission area.
- The HOMC and the HOPC exert operational control over all military and police personnel respectively, in the mission area.
- The DMS/CMS is responsible for the provision of administrative and logistic support to all components of the mission. He is the sole UN authority in the field allowed to commit UN financial resources.
Integrated Peacekeeping Mission Structure

Questions

Lecture 4
Lecture 5 in the Module B “UN Secretariat Overview” of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).

Notes:

- **Lecture 5 requires 1 x 45 minute instructional session.**
- **GH: moved to Module B on 7 Nov. Renumbered accordingly.**

- the presenter should explain that ‘modern’ Peace Operations tend to be ‘multi-dimensional’ in nature and Mission structures are ‘integrated’ and explain these two concepts.

- The presenter should explain that the slides to follow illustrate and provide examples of the different structures in various missions and the factors influencing which mission structure, or model, is adopted for specific mission will be covered in greater detail in Modules B and C to come.
Learning Outcomes

- Understand that UN peacekeeping missions may be organized following different models, in coordination with various regional or military/police organizations.
Lecture Content

- UNIFIL and Middle-East model
- MINURSO model
- ONUCI, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA models
- UNAMA model
- UNMIK model (full integration).
Mission Models

Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 5 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: UNIFIL, UNDOF, UNTSO are examples of missions where the Head of Military Component is also the Head of Mission.

- The presenter should emphasize that these missions are ‘old’ and reflect the early days of peacekeeping operations when the intervention of the SC to establish missions arose from disputes between Member States, i.e. few in any, significant ‘non-State’ actors regarded as ‘main parties’ to the dispute.

- These missions have only a military component; the Head of Mission is also the Force Commander (UNIFIL) (or the COS, or CMO).

- The presenter should explain the concepts of “pillars” and “components” and describe the relationship between the Military pillar or component and how the other pillars of the international community, are the responsibility of other organizations.

- The presenter should explain the significant changes to the UNIFIL structure in later years.
Key message: MINURSO is an example of mission with two “pillars” – military and political – under the SRSG.

- In the MINURSO model, the mission is headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and has two components/pillars; military and political.

- Other functions outside of the UN mission are the responsibility of other organizations (pillars); in coordination with the UN mission.
Key message: complex, or multi-dimensional missions, usually have three pillars under the SRSG: political, military and police.

• In this model the SRSG heads a mission with three components, Political, Military and Police.

• It was also the model used in MINURCAT (Chad).
Key message: UNAMA was an example of mission with no military pillar – the military function being provided by a regional organization outside the UN.

- UNAMA has no military or police component.
- The military coalition provides the military component, in partnership with UNAMA.
- In UNAMA, the UN provides the civilian element of the mission, while a multinational force (now NATO-commanded) provides a military dimension, alongside US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (when it still existed).
Key message: UNMIK was an example of truly integrated mission, with a number of political and civilian functions being assumed by regional organizations integrated to the UN mission under authority of the SRSG.

- UNMIK is cited by specialists as the truly integrated peacekeeping mission model.

- In UNMIK the UN (along with the EU, the OSCE and UNHCR) provides the civilian and police dimensions of an operation, under single command, while NATO provides the military arm of the operation, under separate (but coordinated) command.
Lecture Take Away

• UN peacekeeping missions are usually headed by a SRSG having several components under his command, the mission’s actions being coordinated with outside organizations.

• In some cases (military-heavy missions) the Force Commander is also the head of mission.

• UNMIK is an example of a fully integrated mission where the SRSG has under his UN command components provided by other regional organizations (OSCE, EU).
Models of UN Missions

Questions
Lecture 6 in the Module B “UN Secretariat Overview” of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Learning Outcomes

• Understand the three levels of command presiding over UN Peace Operations
• Understand the chain of command in UN PKOs
• Understand what kind of control and authority can be exercised over military and police units.
Lecture Content

- Levels of command
- Chain of command
- Operational Control
- Tactical Control
- Administrative Control
- Tasking Authority
Levels of Command

Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 6 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: A UN peacekeeping or peacebuilding operation operates at three distinct levels: Strategic, Operational, Tactical. The heads of military and police components operate at the operational level, while the military and police units operate at the tactical level.

A UN peacekeeping or peacebuilding operation operates at three distinct levels:

- Strategic
- Operational
- Tactical.

At the strategic level we find on top the Security Council, which provides the legal authority, high-level strategic direction and political guidance for all UN Peace Operations.

- The Secretary General who is in charge of implementing the SC decisions. United Nations Operational authority over UN forces and personnel is vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. "United Nations Operational Authority' involves the full authority to issue operational directives within the limits of
  - (1) a specific mandate of the Security Council;
  - (2) an agreed period of time,
  - (3) a specific geographic area (the mission area as a whole).

To that end the SG is helped by the UN Secretariat of which the Under Secretary-General for Peace Operations (USG DPO) has been delegated responsibility from the Secretary-General for the administration of, and provision of executive direction for, all UN Peace Operations.
At the operational level (field-based level) the following senior officials hold operational level authority, command and control responsibilities at the Mission Headquarters level: Head of Mission (HOM) and components heads:

Head of Military Component (HOMC);
Head of Police Component (HOPC);
Deputy Special Representative(s) of the Secretary-General (DSRSG); and
Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS)

- The **Head of Mission** (HOM) of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation is generally a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). The HOM reports to the Secretary-General through the USG DPO. The HOM is the senior UN Representative and has overall authority over the activities of the United Nations in the mission area. The HOM represents the Secretary-General, leads UN political engagement and speaks on behalf of the United Nations within the mission area.
- The HOM provides political guidance for mandate implementation and sets mission-wide operational direction including decisions on resource allocation in case of competing priorities. The HOM delegates the operational and technical aspects of mandate implementation to the heads of all components of the mission
- The **Head of Military Component** (HOMC) reports to the HOM. The HOMC exercises operational control over all military personnel, including Military Observers, in the mission.
- The **Head of Police Component** (HOPC) reports to the Head of Mission, exercises operational control and provides direction to all members of the police component of the mission. This includes all UN Police Officers (including all members of Formed Police Units) and relevant civilian staff serving in the Police Component.
- The **Director of Mission Support! Chief of Mission Support** (DMS/CMS) reports to the HOM and is accountable to the HOM for the efficient and effective provision of administrative and logistical support to all mission components. The DMS/CMS has sole UN authority in the field to commit UN financial resources for any purpose, including any contractual arrangements for the use of local resources.
- The management of military, police and civilian operations below the level of Mission Headquarters as well as the supervision of individual personnel is considered to be at the tactical level and is exercised at various levels by subordinate commanders of respective components and designated civilian heads at levels below the Mission Headquarters.

While at strategic level the SG has the Secretariat to help him carry out the SC decisions, at operational level the SRSG has a Mission Headquarters and Leadership Team.

Finally the component heads exert their authority over their respective components: police, military, civilian, etc. as said before.
Key message: the Under Secretary-General for Management Strategy, Policy & Compliance has financial authority and responsibility over the Peace Operations. The Under Secretary-General for Safety and Security is responsible for the executive direction and control of the United Nations security management system and for the overall safety and security of United Nations civilian personnel. The Under Secretary General for Operational Support is responsible for delivering dedicated support to the field operations.

- The **Under Secretary-General for Management Strategy, Policy & Compliance** (USG DMSPC) has been delegated financial authority and responsibility from the Secretary-General for all financial matters relating to UN Peace Operations.
- The **Under Secretary-General for Safety and Security** (USG DSS) is directly accountable and responsible to the Secretary-General for the executive direction and control of the United Nations security management system and for the overall safety and security of United Nations civilian personnel and their recognized dependents at both headquarters locations and in the field.
- **Note:** The mandate of DSS is limited to the protection of United Nations staff, facilities and their recognized dependents and has no formal authority or responsibility in relation to military members of national contingents and the experts on mission.
- The **Under Secretary General for Operational Support** (USG DOS). On behalf of the Secretary General, the Under Secretary General directs all support for the peace operations by providing necessary strategic direction to guide the work programme of DOS. The Department of Operational Support is responsible for delivering dedicated support to the field operations, including on personnel, finance, procurement, logistical, communications, information technology and other administrative and general management issues.
Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 6 of Module B of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: situated at the strategic level, neither the Military Adviser nor the Police Adviser belong to the chain of command; these senior officers do not exert superior command over their respective components in the field.

As regards chain of command, we find again the same actors we identified before:

- In NY, as UNHQ level, the SC, SG and USG DPO with the Office of Operations
- In the field, the HOM / SRSG with the components under his command, here military and police are represented – but we could add the other components as well.

- We find again the same three levels of command we studied before: Strategic in the UNHQ, operational at mission level and tactical at component level
- Now what are the roles of these actors in the command function?

- The SC decides
- The SG implements the decision with the help of the Secretariat
- The USG DPO has delegated authority over the field missions
- The OO coordinates the actions of the various actors
- And finally the SRSG, as the representative for the SG, is the UN authority in the field.

- Now what are the roles of the Military Adviser and Police Adviser in this

- Vis a vis the strategic level, the MA and the PA have an advisory role, primarily to the USG DPO, but also upon request to the SG and SC
• Vis a vis their respective components in the field, both MA have first a technical relationship: recruiting and deploying (overseeing the deployment) of formed units and individuals, organizing the rotations, providing guidance and policies, etc.

• The HOMC and the HOPC maintain a technical reporting and communication link with the DPO Military Adviser and the DPO Police Adviser respectively. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the command chain between the USG DPO and the HOM, nor should it interfere with decisions taken by the HOM in accordance with this policy directive.

• Then both advisers have an oversight responsibility, making sure the military and police components operate in respect of the extant policies, decisions, regulations.

• Then as mentioned above, neither the Military Adviser nor the Police adviser belong to the chain of command: they do not exert superior command over their respective components: the chain of command goes clearly through the civilian channel: USG DPO – HOM.

• Second, it should be noted as well that either component – police, military – are under direct command and control of the SRSG, civilian authority and UN authority in the field.
Key message: The Head Of Mission has United Nations operational authority over all personnel deployed in a UN peacekeeping operation, including over the military and police components.

The Policy on Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (15 Feb. 2008) is the basis for all aspects of this lecture. It should be known of all aspiring TCC and PCC authorities.
Key message: Military Operational Control is the authority granted to a Military Commander in a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation to direct forces assigned so that the Commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location.

- **Operational Control** is the authority granted to a Military Commander in a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation to direct forces assigned so that the Commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location (or a combination), to deploy units concerned and/or military personnel, and to retain or assign Tactical Command or Control of those units/personnel.

- Operational Control includes the authority to assign separate tasks to sub units of a contingent, as required by operational necessities, within the mission area of responsibility, in consultation with the Contingent Commander and as approved by the United Nations Headquarters.
The Head Of Police Component exercises operational control over personnel of the police component of the peacekeeping operation. Such control allows the HOPC to assign separate tasks to all individual personnel, units and sub-units within the police component, as required, within the mission area of responsibility.

The HOPC may delegate such responsibility to the appropriate subordinate levels.

Key message: The Head Of Police Component exercises operational control over personnel of the police component of the peacekeeping operation, allowing him to assign separate tasks to all individual personnel, units and sub-units as required, within the mission area of responsibility.

- The Head Of Police Component exercises operational control over personnel of the police component of the peacekeeping operation. Such control allows the HOPC to assign separate tasks to all individual personnel, units and sub-units within the police component, as required, within the mission area of responsibility. The HOPC may delegate such responsibility to the appropriate subordinate levels.

- Police officers assigned by the HOPC to serve in integrated and joint offices, or to other offices within the mission, shall be responsible to, and report to, those heads of offices.
Tactical Control

The detailed and local direction and control of movement, or maneuver, necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. As required by operational necessities, the Head of Military Component (HOMC) and Head of Police Component (HOPC) may delegate the Tactical Control of assigned military forces/policemen to the subordinate sector and/or unit commanders.

Key message: tactical control is the detailed and local direction and control of movement, or maneuver, necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

The detailed and local direction and control of movement, or maneuver, necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. As required by operational necessities, the Head of Military Component (HOMC) and Head of Police Component (HOPC) may delegate the Tactical Control of assigned military forces/policemen to the subordinate sector and/or unit commanders.
Key message: Administrative Control is a national responsibility given to the National Contingent Commander (NCC) in Peace Operations.

- **Administrative Control** is the authority over subordinate or other organizations within national contingents for administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services and other non-operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Administrative Control is a national responsibility given to the National Contingent Commander (NCC) in Peace Operations.
Key message: while the Head Of Military Component exercises operational control over military personnel and units, the Director Mission Support has tasking authority over the military logistic and enabling units and each Senior National Officer retains administrative control over the personnel of their respective contingents.

- The military operational chain of command is established as follows: HOMC; Division; Sector (Brigade); Battalion Commanders; Company Commanders and sub-units.
- The level of the Division is shown in grey because it is very rarely implemented in UNPKOs (formerly once in MONUSCO, has disappeared ever since)
- Sub-sectors can be established if needed.

- The HOMC exercises 'UN operational control' over personnel and contingents assigned by Member States to the peacekeeping operation. 'UN operational control' allows the HOMC to assign separate tasks to units and sub units within the military component, as required, within the mission area of responsibility, in consultation (not meaning negotiation) with the senior national officer of the affected unit/sub-unit.
- The HOMC may further assign military personnel and units to a specific subordinate commander (for example, at Division, Brigade or Sector levels). These subordinate officers will exercise UN 'operational control' or 'UN tactical control' over assigned personnel and units.

- The Contributing Member State retains 'administrative control' over non operational administrative issues over deployed military personnel and units. Administrative control is exercised by a senior national officer of a contributed military contingent within a mission area. This authority is limited to
administrative matters such as personnel management, supply and services and must not adversely influence the management and conduct of UN operations within a mission area.

• **The Service Delivery** is a joint uniformed/civilian organization under the management supervision of a civilian Chief Service Delivery (formerly CISS). Under the direction of the DMS/CMS, the Chief Service Delivery (CSD) is responsible to meet as effectively and efficiently as possible all of the operational support requirements of the uniformed and civilian components of the mission.

• On behalf of the DMS/CMS, the CSD exercises **tasking authority** over all assigned uniformed logistics personnel and enabling units comprising medical, signal, logistics, construction engineering (except combat / field engineers), transportation and movements units, including military transport helicopters within the peacekeeping mission.
Key message: The tasking authority is the authority vested in specified senior appointments of UN Peace Operations to assign tasks to enabling units; it includes the authority to deploy, redeploy and employ all or part of an enabling unit.

- Tasking authority is the authority vested in specified senior appointments (Head of Military Component (HOMC), Head of Police Component (HOPC) or Director of Mission Support /Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS) of UN Peace Operations to assign tasks to enabling units.
- It is worth noting that the Command and Control Policy (2008) is currently under review.
Key message: on behalf of the DMS/CMS, the CSD exercises tasking authority over all assigned uniformed logistics personnel and enabling units comprising medical, signal, logistics, construction engineering (except combat / field engineers), transportation and movements units, including military transport helicopters.

• On behalf of the DMS/CMS, the CSD exercises tasking authority over all assigned uniformed logistics personnel and enabling units comprising medical, signal, logistics, construction engineering (except combat / field engineers), transportation and movements units, including military transport helicopters within the peacekeeping mission

• The HOMC shall exercise tasking authority over combat support units comprising combat aviation (attack/armed and observation helicopters), and other purpose-built helicopters for combat tasks such as reconnaissance and surveillance, combat engineers (field engineers) and EOD units. The HOMC exercises 'UN operational control' over these military enabling units whereas the 'tactical control' is exercised by the respective unit commanders.
Key message: the tasking authority exercised by civilians does not extend to **tactical control of military/police resources** exercised purely in pursuance of **military or police operations**.

- Tasking authority is the authority vested in specified senior appointments (Head of Military Component (HOMC), Head of Police Component (HOPC) or Director of Mission Support /Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS)) of UN Peace Operations to assign tasks to enabling units.
Key message: while the Head of Police Component exercises operational control over police personnel and units, each Senior National Police Officer retains administrative control over the personnel of their respective contingents.

- The Head of Police Component (HOPC) reports and is accountable to the Head of Mission, exercises operational control and provides direction to all members of the police component of the mission. This includes all UN Police Officers (including all members of Formed Police Units) and relevant civilian staff serving in the Police Component. The HOPC, in consultation with DPO, shall establish the police chain of command in the mission.

- Here is an example of centralized organization of the police component in a mission, but other types of organization of the Police component are possible depending on local factors. Refer to the Policy on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (revised), 01 March 2010.

- The Contributing Member State retains administrative control over non operational administrative issues over deployed police personnel and formed police units. Administrative control is exercised by a senior national police officer within a mission area. This authority is limited to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply and services and must not adversely influence the management and conduct of UN operations within a mission area.

- Operational control is often delegated to the level of the chief / deputy-chief operations, sometimes at the FPU or regional command level depending on the organization of the component.

- Finally, the FPU commanders have tactical control over their units.
Lecture Take Away

- The SRSG exercises UN operational authority over all civilian and military personnel deployed to a peacekeeping operation.
- The heads of military and police components exert operational control over military and police units and sub-units.
- Operational control can be delegated to sub-levels as circumstances warrant.
- The DMS/CSD has tasking authority over military and police enablers including military transport helicopters.
Command and Control

Questions
Module C: Peacekeeping Operations Planning Overview

Find guidance inserted in the note section of each slide.
Module Content

- Mission Planning Process
- Military & Police Planning
- Mission Support Planning Process
- Mission Life Cycle Overview
- Cooperation with National / Regional actors
Lecture 1 in the Module C “Peacekeeping Operations Planning Overview” of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Learning Outcomes

• Understand the key steps of the Integrated Assessment and Planning process (IAP)
• Know the content of a Security Council Resolution
• Know the content of the SOMA and SOFA.
Lecture Content

- Integrated Assessment and Planning process
- Strategic Assessment
- Operational Planning
- Security Council Resolution
- SOMA and SOFA
Integrated Assessment and Planning process (IAP)

Development of topic 1 of the Lecture 1 of the Module C of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Key message: the Integrated Assessment and Planning process is an overarching coordination and planning regime which seeks to include all relevant actors.

Amid a growing complexity of multi-dimensional peace operations today, the UN has developed an Integrated Assessment and Planning process (IAP). The IAP replaced the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) in 2014.

“The United Nations Secretary-General’s endorsement of the Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning reaffirms the Organization’s commitment to integration as a way of maximizing the individual and collective impact of the United Nations in conflict and post-conflict situations. Now more than ever, when the sources of instability and conflict are increasingly multidimensional and the environment is one of significant resource constraints, the United Nations family must maintain unity of purpose and work together to do “better with less”, if it is to be effective in meeting the needs of war-torn societies” (Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook, 2014).

The IAP thus represents an overarching coordination and planning regime which seeks to comprise all relevant actors, such as UN offices, agencies and funds (OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, OHCHR, etc.) at Headquarters and Country Team level as well as the World Bank and the IMF, if appropriate. An Integrated Mission can be understood as a UN System-wide response to a crisis. In a 2008 decision, the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee reaffirmed integration as “the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office, whether or not those presences are structurally integrated.”
Key message: the Integrated Task Force is the formal headquarters-based planning and coordinating body at strategic level. It is responsible for implementing the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) for the specific country and mission.

- As a key component of the Integrated Assessment and Planning, an Integrated Task Force (ITF) is established as the formal headquarters-based planning body for a UN operation. In addition, field-based coordination structures such as a Strategic Policy Group and an Integrated Strategy and Planning Team or a Joint Planning Unit are created as bodies in charge of strategic planning in the integrated mission setting.

- The ITF is the formal headquarters-based planning and coordinating body at strategic level. It is responsible for implementing the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) for the specific country and mission.

- NOTE: [Formerly an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) was established for DPKO-led operations, an ITF for DPA-led operations]
Key message: the Integrated Task Force (ITF) consists of representatives of all relevant UN entities at headquarters level as well as from the field and even external actors, possibly including Member States for consultation.

- The Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) or Integrated Task Force (ITF) consists of representatives of all relevant UN entities at headquarters level as well as from the field and even external actors. It is chaired by a senior representative from the lead department (DPO or DPPA).

- Therefore the IMTF will include representatives of DPO – DOS – DPPA – DSS

- But also the OCHA and other UN Offices

- The UN Country Team (UNCT) and other UN field presence will be represented

- UN agencies and funds as well as the World Bank and the IMF

- Finally ITFs/MTFs may also consider inviting external actors such as the host government(s), NGOs, external experts & academics, NGOs and civil society organizations, and TCCs/PCCs for consultations, and Member states supportive of a possible UN operation may assist the Secretariat, e.g. by providing field information.
• OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
• PBSO: United Nations Peace Building Support Office
• DOCO: United Nations Development Operations Coordination Office
• OHCHR: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
• UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
• UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
• WFP: World Food Programme
• IMF: International Monetary Fund
Key message: during the planning process, the office of military affairs and the police division are more specifically involved in the technical assessment, drafting of the operational plans and drafting of their respective component plans.

- It is the prerogative of the Security Council to determine when and where a United Nations field operation should be deployed but the SG may initiate assessments of a crisis situation and a possible UN involvement without prior consultation with the Security Council.

- In case of a crisis, the Secretary-General may task his Secretariat to develop a Strategic Assessment of the situation.

- The aim of the Strategic Assessment is to outline possible objectives of a potential mission as well as alternative options and strategies for UN involvement.

- The Strategic Assessment should be undertaken by a DPO-led Integrated Task Force (ITF) or DPPA-led ITF in case of a political mission, depending on the country situation to be assessed – and we saw the composition of an ITF earlier.

- The Strategic Assessment is carried out by the ITF which also writes its Terms of Reference, is responsible for potentially deploying an assessment team, and ensures follow-up to the assessment.

- The ITF presents the Strategic Assessment to the Secretary-General and his Policy Committee.

- Based on the planning assumptions set out in the Strategic Assessment, the Secretary-General decides on the strategic objectives and form of UN involvement. The Strategic Assessment may or may not lead to the fielding of a multi-dimensional peace operation.

- If a Peacekeeping Operation is deemed a suitable option for UN engagement, DPO will be designated as the lead for operational planning.
The SG may also seek consultations with the Security Council on the possible options of UN involvement. The UNSC may at this point already issue a formal statement or pass a resolution.

The Secretary-General, in consultation with the ITF, issues a Planning Directive as the basis for operational planning, setting out the strategic objectives, the proposed form and scope of a field operation. In practice, however, a decision by the Policy Committee often replaces such a Planning Directive.

*The red stars on the slide mark the places where OMA and PD are more specifically involved in the planning operations.*

The Under-Secretary-General of DPO issues a related operational planning directive which includes a situation analysis, planning assumptions, strategic objectives, a risk assessment, functions and responsibilities of the ITF.

Following an initial risk and threat assessment by the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) and DPO’s Office of Military Affairs (OMA), the ITF members deploy on a DPO-led joint Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) to evaluate the situation in the field.

TAMs undertaken prior to a mission’s deployment focus on the strategic and operational aspects of planning, including specific requirements for missions and UNCTs implementing the principles of integration. TAMs for mission start up also focus on mapping current UN capacities which is essential for mandate and budget planning.

The TAM’s findings provide the basis for further planning and for a Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council.

Based on the TAM’s findings, DPO and DOS commence work on draft Concepts of Operation (MIL CONOPS / POL CONOPS) for each prospective component of the mission (military, police, justice & corrections, logistical support).

We will see more of the details of operational planning in a short while.

This Report of the Secretary-General is presented to the SC.

It builds on the findings of the Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) and on the different draft CONOPS, and usually presents an analysis of strategic options.

The Security Council passes a resolution which authorizes the operation’s deployment and determines its size and mandate.

Later on we will say a word on the nature of the SCR.

After the mission is mandated and a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) is selected, IMTF under the leadership of the lead department may produce a directive of the Secretary-General to the SRSG, providing political and operational strategic guidance.

At this point, the overall lead begins to shift over to the SRSG as the Head of Mission. The SRSG is the most senior UN official in the host country.

The SRSG and his field team are in the lead to work out the overall Mission Concept, in close coordination and collaboration with ITF members and the Security Council.

Based on the provisions set forth in the Security Council Resolution and the budgetary guidelines given by the GA 5th Committee and ACABQ DPO revises the component Concepts of Operations. In the process, DPO closely consults with the ITF.
In order to bring together the Mission and the UNCT’s combined mandates and resources under an overarching strategy for the UN’s role in peace consolidation and to ensure system-wide coherence, the Strategic Policy Group tasks the integrated Strategy and Planning Team or Joint Planning Unit (field based) to produce an **Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF)** in continued dialogue with the IMTF at headquarters.

The ISF builds on possibly already existing planning frameworks (RBB, UNDAF, CAP). It contains:
- An updated conflict analysis;
- A vision statement;
- Strategic objectives and intended results, timelines, responsibilities;
- Coordination and implementation arrangements;
- And provisions on monitoring and reporting.

The agreed timeframe for an ISF varies based on the situation in the host country. As you can see, the ISF directly influences the Directive to the SRSG and Components plans and Mission budget.

- Of marked interest for the T/PCCs, is the production of the indispensable CONOPS (POL & MIL), Rules Of Engagement (MIL) & Directive on the Use of Force (POL), and SURs for each unit.
- Before the SCR is passed, it is only possible to get draft copies of these documents, as the final version will depend on the content of the SCR.
- After the SCR is passed, OMA and PD will work on the final versions of the respective documents.
- In terms of approval, the CONOPS are approved by the USG DPO, while the SURs are approved by the ASG OROLSI and the Military Adviser respectively.

- As a final step, a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) are prepared by the UN Office of Legal Affairs.
- We will have a look at their content in a next topic.
Development of the second topic of the Lecture 1 of the Module C of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Key message: the goal of the Strategic Assessment is

- The purpose of a Strategic Assessment is to bring the UN political, security, development, humanitarian and human rights entities together to develop a shared understanding of a conflict or post-conflict situation, role of stakeholders and core peace consolidation priorities, and to propose options for UN engagement on the basis of an assessment of risks and opportunities.
- Ahead of Mission start-up planning or during the life-cycle of established integrated presences, the Strategic Assessment provides a basis for the development of recommendations on the nature and (re)configuration of UN engagement for the consideration of the Secretary-General and, when required, subsequently the Security Council.
- What triggers a Strategic Assessment is a dramatic change in conflict/post-conflict/ political crisis situations and/or the need to (re-)formulate the UN’s system-wide strategy
- A SA can be requested by:
  - SG
  - Members of Policy Committee
  - Members of ECPS
  - ITF
  - Heads of Mission
  - IMPT
  - UNCT
Role of the ITF during the SA: The ITF coordinates and validates, at Headquarters level, the integrated assessment and planning processes and products

Strategic Options:

- **Strategic options** for United Nations engagement on peace consolidation priorities, including one recommended option (if there is agreement), or a limited number of options (if there are dissenting views) and recommendations on broad (re)configuration of United Nations presence (if any), with associated risks and opportunities, including the risks of strategic options for the United Nations as well as for affected populations.

- The Policy Committee will consider the options presented in the SA Report and decide either on a status quo or on a change of options / UN strategy.
- It will also decide on the adapted planning instruments.
- A Strategic Assessment is a dramatic change in conflict/post-conflict/ political crisis situations and/or the need to (re-)formulate the UN's system-wide strategy.
Operational Planning

Development of the third topic of the Lecture 1 of the Module C of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Key message: the execution of the DPO operational planning will result in the production of the Mission concept, military concept of operation and OROLSI components planning, including the Police planning.

Even before getting a Security Council Resolution, DPO and DOS initiate several concurrent planning steps.

For DPO:

**In the Single Regional Political-Operational Structure**

- The regional division in charge commences work on an overall Mission Concept in consultation with the IMTF.
- Initiation of recruitment planning for mission leadership & civilian staff (jointly with Department of Operational Support).
- As the coordinating office for operational planning, the SRPOS leads consultations with key partners through the IMTF.
- Once the Mission’s requirements are known the Strategic Force Generation and Capabilities Planning Cell prepares the "Force Generation and Police Recruitment and Capabilities Plan" to help OMA and the Police Division identify able T/PCCs (meaning, T/PCCs possessing the needed capabilities and having performed well enough in the past that they can be approached for participation in a new operation).

In the **Office of Military Affairs**
• MPS develops an Operational Estimate as the basis for a draft military CONOPS, incl. a risks & threats assessment and possible courses of action

• Meanwhile, FGS starts informal talks with potential Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to estimate potential force availability – and looks into the UN PCRS for available units (PCRS to be addressed in Module F1)

• The Operational Estimate will be refined, based on likely availability of troops and logistics and on a thorough options analysis

In the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
• Commencement of planning of the police and Rule of Law components in the future operation.
• Close cooperation with partners in planning ROL projects (e.g. DDR and SSR programs) in the country, such as UNDP, DPPA, UNICEF, etc.
• Meanwhile, informal talks start with potential Police Contributing Countries (PCCs).
Key message: the goal of the DOS operational planning is to produce a Mission budget (Result Based Budget), logistic support plan and civilian personnel recruitment plan.

Even before getting a Security Council Resolution, DPO and DOS initiate several concurrent planning steps:

For DPO:

**In the Division of Special Activities / DOS**
- DOS begins to develop cost estimates as the basis for a Results-Based Budget (RBB) for the mission in cooperation with DPO.

**In Logistic Division / Office of Supply Chain Management / DOS**
- Initiation of logistics and transport planning.
- Initiation of sourcing of equipment (contracts, other missions, UNLB, system contracts...)

**In Human Resources Services Division / DOS**
- Recruitment of mission leadership (SRSG, Force Commander, Police Commissioner, etc.) is initiated, together with DPO through the joint Leadership Support Section (DPO / DPPA Coordination and Shared Services).
Development of the fourth topic of the Lecture 1 of the Module C of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Key message: a Security Council resolution is a legally binding UN resolution adopted by the 15 members of the Security Council.

The Security Council is the UN body charged with "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" (UN Charter)

If the council cannot reach consensus or a passing vote on a resolution, they may choose to produce a non-binding presidential statement instead of a Resolution. These are adopted by consensus. They are meant to apply political pressure — a warning that the Council is paying attention and further action may follow.
Security Council Resolution

Formal expressions of the **opinion** or **will** of United Nations organs.

Two sections
- Preamble
- Operative part

Key message: United Nations resolutions are formal expressions of the opinion or will of United Nations organs.

The preamble generally presents the **considerations on the basis** of which an action is taken, an opinion expressed or a directive given.

The operative part states the **opinion** of the organ or the **action** to be taken.

(UNSC Website)
Security Council Resolution

Example of Preamble

Resolution 2100 (2013)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 6952nd meeting, on 25 April 2013

The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 2056 (2012), 2071 (2012) and 2085 (2012), its Presidential Statements of 26 March 2012 (S/PRST/2012/7) and 4 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/9) as well as its Press Statements of 22 March 2012, 9 April 2012, etc.

Key message: the preamble of a UNSCR resolution generally presents the considerations on the basis of which an action is taken, an opinion expressed or a directive given.

SCR 2100 (2013) Mali (Preamble)
Security Council Resolution

Example of Operative part

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. **Commends** the initial measures taken so far to restore constitutional order and national unity in Mali, including the adoption by the Malian National Assembly, on 29 January 2013, of a transitional road map,
2. **Decides** to establish etc.

Key message: the operative part of a UN resolution states the opinion of the organ or the action to be taken.

SCR 2100 (2013) Mali (Operative part)

- Mention of the Chapter of the Charter under which the Resolution is taken
- Opinion (Commends, decides,..)
Development of the fifth topic of the Lecture 1 of the Module C of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Key message: The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) are legal documents regulating all aspects of the relationship of the Mission with the host country.

The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) are comprehensive legal documents dealing with all aspects of the relationship of the Mission with the host country, such as

- freedom of movement of its members,
- jurisdiction over the mission’s personnel,
- the provision of water, electricity and other utilities, etc.

In practice, agreeing on the SOFA and the SOMA is one of the most critical and sometimes contentious issues between the UN and the host nation.
Key message: the SOFA and the SOMA are negotiated and signed by the UN representative and the host nation.

As a final step of the planning phase, SOFA and SOMA are prepared by the Office of Legal Affairs.

- These documents serve as the legal basis for the mission’s relations with the host nation,
- The SOFA covers the military component
- The SOMA covers the police/civilian component.
- SOFA and SOMA are negotiated and signed by the UN and the host nation.
Lecture Take Away (I)

• Due to the growing complexity of multi-dimensional missions, these are planned using the Integrated Assessment Planning process (IAP).
• The IAP basic principle is to have every UN and non-UN actor involved in the field participating in the planning operations.
• Taken by the Security Council, the decision to start a UN PKO or a UN Political Mission is the result of an extended dialogue between the Secretariat and the Security Council.
Lecture Take Away (II)

• The Status of Mission Agreement and the Status of Force Agreement are the legal basis for the relations of the UN Mission with the host Government.
• SOMA and SOFA are signed by the SG’s representative in the field (Head Of Mission) and representatives of the host Government.
Mission Planning Process

Questions

Lecture 1
Lecture 2 in the Module “Peacekeeping Operations Planning Overview” of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Learning Outcomes

- Understand the involvement of the Office of Military Affairs and of the Police Division in the IMPP.
- Learn the content of the Military and Police CONOPS
- Learn the content and use of the Statement of Unit Requirements
- Learn the content and use of the ROE and DUF.
- Learn what is a Mission Capability Review.
Lecture Content

- Mil & Pol Participation in the Planning Process
- Military Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
- Police Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
- Statement of Unit Requirements (SUR)
- Rules of Engagement (ROE)
- Directive on the Use of Force (DUF)
- Mission Capability Review
Development of the first topic of the Lecture 2 of the Module C of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Key message: Military and Police inputs to the advance planning will especially concern the situation analysis, planning assumptions, risk assessment and constraints.

Before starting, we need to say that the Military & Police inputs to planning, and the Military & Police planning processes, are mirrored by the logistic support planning – whose goal is to create a Mission Support Plan for all aspects of the Mission: Logistics, Personnel, Finances, and support needed by the various components of the mission. This will be seen in detail in Lecture 3 « Mission Support Planning Process ».

• Here are again some familiar steps in the IAP process.

• The MIL / POL inputs to the Strategic Assessment include risk / threat evaluations. It also includes evaluations of the warring parties in terms of volume, potential nuisance, etc.

• If the Strategic Assessment recommends the deployment of a UN PKO and that recommendation is endorsed by the Secretary-General, the SG issues a Planning Directive stating the broad strategic objectives and the proposed form and scope of the UN PKO.

• The USG’s Operational Planning Directive that will follow will include a situation analysis, planning assumptions, strategic objectives, priorities, benchmarks, risk assessment/constraints, functions and responsibilities of the ITF, timing and sequencing of planning activities and outputs, and required decision points.
• Military and Police inputs will especially concern the situation analysis, planning assumptions, risk assessment and constraints.

Key message: the operational estimate will lead to the development of a preliminary Concept of Operation.

As seen before, there are roughly 4 steps leading to the vote of an UN SCR / Mandate; the first one is the elaboration of an Integrated Mission Plan

• During the development of the draft integrated mission plan, each component will develop its own operational estimate which is the basis for the development of the future CONOPS.

• The Operational Estimate is an approach to military planning that, while drawn from UK and NATO doctrine, is based on concepts that are common to most military doctrine. It is a six-part process designed to analyze the nature of conflict/problem as a system, and develop, evaluate and select possible approaches/solutions (Courses of Action or COAs) to generate the desired change or outcome. The Operational Estimate “is essentially, a practical, flexible tool formatted to make sense out of confusion and to enable the development of a coherent plan for action.” In the context of planning for UN military operations, the Military Planning Service (MPS) is responsible for developing the Operational Estimate and the subsequent steps described below

• **CONOPS Development:** Having selected one COA from the options developed through the Operational Estimate, additional planning is undertaken to develop the approved COA into a full
Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The preliminary CONOPS developed at this stage describes with greater specificity exactly what the force will do, where the force will do it and how the force will do it. This includes undertaking the troop-to-task process to develop an estimate of the required force size and capabilities.

- **Technical Assessment Mission:** Once a CONOPS for the military component and its equivalent for other components have been developed, the ITF fields Technical Assessment Missions (TAMs). TAMs visit the area of operations (AO) to validate existing planning and gather additional information required to produce foundational planning documents.
  - TAMs can take place at mission start-up, during mandate reviews, when mission restructuring or draw-down is under consideration, or in response to crises or specific requests by the Security Council. They provide critical opportunities to consult directly with key stakeholders, obtain crucial and up-to-date information, and work towards a harmonized approach with the UNCT and relevant non-UN actors.
  - The Police Division and the OMA / Military Planning Service are always part of the TAMs – provided such a military or police component is to be necessary in the future mission.

- **Secretary-General’s Report to the UNSC:** Once the TAM has returned from the field, the lead department drafts the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, incorporating the TAM’s findings into existing planning. The SG’s report identifies strategic priorities for UN engagement and proposes a mandate for the UN PKO; describes functional strategies for each component of the operation and how they will contribute to the overall strategy; proposes mechanisms to coordinate the efforts of the UN PKO, the UNCT, and any other relevant actors; and discusses logistical, budgetary and personnel requirements.
  - This of course includes the inputs from the Police and military participants to the TAM.

- **UNSC Mandate:** The Security Council debates the Secretary-General’s proposal for the UN PKO contained in his report, and then drafts a mandate for the mission.
Key message: the finalized CONOPS provides the basis for the preparation of the Rules of Engagement / Directive on the Use of Force and the Statement of Unit Requirements for each type of military / Formed Police Unit.

- It is not uncommon that the Security Council resolutions modifies the parameters and strategies envisaged by the Secretary-General; as a consequence the draft plans will have to be revised accordingly.

- **Refinement of the CONOPS:** Additional detail is fleshed out regarding the formed units to be deployed, and their strength, tasks, equipment, capabilities, deployment and organization.

- The overall size / structure of the force may have to be re-worked depending on the content of the Mandate (the size of the POL / MIL components decided by the SC and inscribed in the mandate cannot be augmented by the Secretariat).

- **Production of Mission Documents:** Following the refinement of the Mission Concept/Plan, the ITF creates missions documents, including a directive to the SRSG that provides political and procedural guidance, outlines the roles and responsibilities of mission leadership and provides other detail on expectations of how the mission should coordinate to reach objectives.

- Mission documentation:
  - The finalized CONOPS provides the basis for the preparation of the Rules of Engagement, Directive on the Use of Force and the Statement of Unit Requirements for each type of military / Formed Police Unit. Draft versions of the SURs have been prepared in the previous steps of the planning process.
• Although informal consultations with potential Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) begin in the strategic planning phases, it is at this point that the Force and Police Generation elements of OMA and PD set about **securing** formal commitments of forces from UN Member States for the UN PKO mission.

• Later on the plans can be reviewed and revised anytime, which may lead to publication of revised mission documentation.

• Once the mission has deployed, the SRSG and his team will issue the ISF and other mission plans.
Key message: the CONOPS and its associated documents (SUR, ROE), produced by the Military Planning Service (MPS) of the Office of Military Affairs are integral part of the Integrated Mission Plan.

- In summary the CONOPS and its associated documents (SUR, ROE), produced by the Military Planning Service (MPS) of the Office of Military Affairs are integral part of the Integrated Mission Plan.
- These documents are also necessary to the TCCs for preparation of the units they pledge to contribute, reason why the need to have them as early as possible, even in their first draft form. As per COE Manual 2017, the Statement of Unit Requirements will be included in the corresponding Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) as its Annex G. (The COE Manual and the MOU will be reviewed in details in Module D – Reimbursement Framework).

Additionally, during the life of the Mission, MPS will also contribute to a number of events involving planning activities:
- Military Capability studies to review the format / capability of the Force,
- Strategic review initiated by DPO / ITF
- Contingency Planning in case of crisis
- Drawdown planning to organize the withdrawal of the Force during the transition phase (or a simple diminution of the strength of the military component during a stabilization phase).
Key message: the mission documents produced by Police Division’s planning cell are integral part of the Integrated Mission Plan – They include the Directive on the Use of Force and the Statements of Unit Requirements.

- The Police Planning follows almost the same pattern as the Military planning, although the number and types of the units are limited to FPUs and maybe some specific capabilities.
- The mission documents produced by PD’s planning cell are also integral part of the Integrated Mission Plan – although in the case of the Police the ROE is replaced by the DUF.
- As for the military units, these documents are also necessary to the PCCs for preparation of the units they pledge to contribute, reason why the need to have them as early as possible, even in their first draft form.
- Like for military units and as per COE Manual 2017, the Statement of Unit Requirements will be included in the corresponding Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) as its Annex G. (The COE Manual and the MOU will be reviewed in details in Module D – Reimbursement Framework).

Additionally, during the life of the Mission, PD will also contribute to a number of events involving planning activities:
- Police Capability studies to review the format / capability of the Force,
- Strategic review initiated by DPO / ITF
- Police Contingency Planning in case of crisis
- Drawdown planning to organize the withdrawal of the Police component during the transition phase (or an augmentation of the strength of the police component to anticipate a stabilization phase).
Military Concept of Operation (CONOPS)

Development of the second topic of the Lecture 2 of the Module C of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
• **Key message:** the military Concept of Operation (CONOPS) must not be confounded with the Mission Concept of Operation (Integrated Mission Plan).

• Military Strategic Concept of Operations: complete name
• Military CONOPS: short name, same animal
• Statement of Force Requirements: name change introduced by MPS a few years ago, to be the pendant of the Statement of Unit Requirements (SUR) – but it is not really used by anyone.
• Police CONOPS: the Police equivalent

• CONOPS designates all this in short.
• Not to be confounded, however, with the Mission Concept of Operation = Integrated Mission Plan.
Key message: The Military CONOPS provides high level guidance to military commanders and planning officers for the deployment and employment of the military component of the Mission.
Key message: the CONOPS will always include a presentation of the general situation, a threat assessment, the (military or police) component organization and the presentation of requested unit-specific capabilities.

The CONOPS outline may vary a little from mission to mission; however it will always include the following:

• General Situation / Background
• Threat Assessment (Annex)
• Military (or Police) Component Organization (Annex)
• Unit-Specific Capabilities (Annex)
Key message: the Situation/Background part of the CONOPS provides all necessary information to comprehend the military component’s tasks within the Mission’s framework, as well as the Mission’s parameters and mandated tasks.

The Situation / Background part of the CONOPS is the biggest section of the document:

Content is generally as follows:

- Introduction

SITUATION

- (Political, Humanitarian, Security,)
- Threat assessment
- Own Forces

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

- Mandate (recalling the various sections of the SC Mandate: Protection of civilians, Stabilization of key population centers, etc.)
- Mission concept
- Strategic objectives and end-states: Political, Military, Police

PLANNING PARAMETERS

- Assumptions
- Constraints,
- Restraints

MILITARY MISSION (POLICE MISSION)

- (Example)

EXECUTION

- Intent
• Scheme of maneuver
• Phases
• Lines of Operation
• Parallel Forces (if any)

COORDINATION INSTRUCTIONS
• Inter Mission Cooperation
• Other Regional Operation
  Mil & Pol Joint Operations
• Reporting procedures
• Safety & Security
• Force Protection
• Human Rights
• Sexual Exploitation & Abuse and Human Rights Abuse

MISSION ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
• General
• Enabling
• Administration of Military Personnel
• Host Nation Support
• Environment

COMMAND AND CONTROL
• Authority
• Transfer of Authority
• Military / Police Command and Control
Key message: the threat assessment part of the CONOPS always mentions all internal and external insecurity drivers as well as the risk factors.

- **External drivers**: like Organized crime, spill-over crises, weapons proliferation, etc. – No need to insist

- **Internal Insecurity Drivers**: like political instability, economic factors, presence of an insurgency, etc... - No need to insist

- **Risk Factors**: sexual exploitation and abuse risk, insurgent behavior, etc. – No need to insist

- **Critical Requirement for Transition** – like for example:
  - Information /Intelligence Sharing Framework
  - Logistical Sustainment Necessity
  - Protection of Civilians
  - Etc.

- **Threat Mitigation Considerations** – Like for example
  - Clear and Appropriate ROEs
  - Liaison Framework with MDSF (MDSF = Malian Defense and Security Forces, example drawn from the MINUSMA CONOPS).
  - Complementary Political Effort.
  - Development Support.
  - Regional Advocacy
Key message: the CONOPS includes the detailed organization of the military component, including characteristics and strength of each unit.

The component organization could be the organization of the Military (or Police) component, depending on which CONOPS we are looking at. Here we are going to use a military example. The component organization will provide:

- Number and Type of units
- Maximal strength for each kind of unit
- Some remarks on requested key units characteristics
- Total component troop strength when every unit is at full strength.
- Location(s) if possible – a deployment map is often provided with this annex.

In the next slide we will see a concrete example
### Military CONOPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Type</th>
<th>Number of Units</th>
<th>Unit Size</th>
<th>Total Troops</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FHQ</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>Bangui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector HQ</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Bouar, Kaga Bandoro, Bria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>6750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Reserve Battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces Company</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sous Groupement Sécurité</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>280</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Unit</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>3 x Mi -17 or Mi -8 MUH or equivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Helicopter Unit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2 x Mi -24 or equivalent, 1 x LOH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Airlift Unit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1 x C130 or equivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Coy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Company</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level II Hospital</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>Excludes 1 AMET per Level II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>24 x Team Sites, FHQ and SHQ: 24 UNMOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Company</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum Platoon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Fd Constr and Maint Pls</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Platoons attached to engineer companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering Coy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>2 BE, 2 UNMOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Sources Fusion Cell</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Supports HUMINT and UAV sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering Support Coy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Systems</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total                      | 9,980           |           |              |                                              |

Key message: the CONOPS provides basic information concerning each military/police unit that will be used to build the respective Statements of Unit Requirements.

Here is an example of Military Component composition found in a CONOPS (MINUSCA)

**In the case of the **Infantry battalions, we can see

- That there are 9 units of this type planned in the MIL CONOPS
- That each INF BN is in strength of 750
- That specific instructions will request to deploy an Engr Platoon + 20 troops with the first rotation (to speed up unit installation)

- It can be noted that in this case a body of UNMOs is included in the component strength – this is not always the case, sometimes the SC orders them apart from the main military component.
- Also the Staff Officers, counted as contingents members, are mentioned with the Force HQ and, in this case, with the Sector HQs

- In the case of the Unmanned Aerial Systems, the plan is to contract them – therefor they will not be counted in the overall component strength, liberating men for other units.

- Finally, MPS has tailored the number of units and the strength of each unit so that the component strength remains within the limits approved by the SC in the mandate.
- The SURs will be built on these basic elements.
• The MOUs for each unit will take these figures into consideration as the upper limit for each unit. Therefore there is no way an individual TCC can ask for additional strength: any augmentation would throw off the overall balance of the strength component, and the TCC would not be reimbursed for the men deployed in excess.

• These basic principles would be exactly the same for the Police component, at a different scale.
Key message: some very specific unit capabilities may be included in the CONOPS in advance of the relevant SUR.

Some CONOPS may include precisions on desirable or required unit capabilities, although these will be detailed in each corresponding SUR.
Here is an example in the case of the Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

Here is for transport Helicopter units with MINUSMA

Here is another one for the riverine unit

Again, this will be provided in more details with each individual SUR.
Development of the third topic of the Lecture 2 of the Module C of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Police CONOPS

The Police Concept of Operations provides strategic guidance for the implementation of police and law enforcement related aspects of the mandate in an integrated manner, within the overall context of the considered Mission.

The Police CONOPS is approved by the USG DPO.

Key message: The Police CONOPS provides strategic guidance for the implementation of police and law enforcement related aspects of the mandate, within the overall context of the considered Mission.

The intent of the Police CONOPS is the same toward the Police Component as the Military CONOPS is toward the Military Component.
Key message: in addition to the usual basic elements, the Police CONOPS includes instructions for the evaluation and assessment of the Police mandated tasks implementation.

The Police CONOPS outline may vary a little from mission to mission; however, it will always include the following:

- General Situation / Background / Mandate
- Threat Assessment (analysis and complete document in Annex)
- Strategic intent of the Police Commissioner
- What is not found in the military CONOPS (for now): instructions for the evaluation and assessment of the Police mandated tasks implementation.
- Police) Component Organization (Annex)
Key message: the first part (A) of the police CONOPS generally contains the factors leading to the strategic intent of the Police Adviser, including the situation in the Mission and challenges to the police operations.

In the first part (A) of the document we find the factors leading to the strategic intent of the Police Adviser:

Content is generally as follows:

INTRODUCTION
• Reference texts
• General considerations on the situation / Mandate
• SC Resolution

MANDATE
• Mandate of the Mission Police component
• Authorized strength of the Police Component, including IPOs and FPUs
• Mandated Police Tasks

SITUATION
• Local situation on the ground
• Criminal environment, organized crime, traffics, etc
• Situation of the local Police forces

CHALLENGES TO POLICE OPERATIONS
• Summary of the threat assessment, with the full and most recent TA document in annex
• Local resources
• International Coordination
• Political challenges (if any)

**CORE ASSUMPTIONS FOR POLICE OPERATIONS**
• Regarding the Mission
• Assumptions regarding the host government
• Assumptions regarding the various partners

**POLICE ADVISER’S STRATEGIC INTENT**
• Objective
• Method
• End State
Key message: Part B of the Police CONOPS exposes the implementation of the strategic intent.

Part B of the Police CONOPS consists basically in the implementation of the strategic intent:

- The strategies of the Mission Police, divided in phases, with an objective and benchmarks for each phase of the mission.

- Operational directives of the Police, expressed as tasks, each task characterized by a verb

- The monitoring and Evaluation of the Police mandate implementation is (until now) specific to the Police component. It uses a result based management system (hence the benchmarked tasks), a system of progress reports and periodic evaluations and assessments of the Police component led by DPO’s Police Division.

- Administration and reporting does not need description

- Integration and coordination is an important part of the CONOPS as the Police component will have to work with a great number of UN Partners, agencies, etc, but also with the local government, local police / security forces, and often international partners.

- Logistic support is a simple paragraph stating that the Director Mission Support is responsible for organizing the logistic support of the Police units. More detailed instructions will be provided in the SURs of the FPUs.
• The organization of the Police component will detail the HQ, command structure, regions, positions of the FPUs and IPO teams, etc. A flow chart and map showing the organization are generally provided in an annex to the CONOPS.

• A short paragraph at the end of the CONOPS mentions the exit strategy. Not very detailed at the start of a mission, this paragraph will develop with each new iteration of the CONOPS and as the Mission progresses to its end.
**Police CONOPS**

### PART C - Annexes

- Police Component Organizational Structure
- Threat Assessment
- [Current Deployment]
- Planned Deployment

---

**Key message:** The annexes to the police CONOPS describe the police component organization, including a threat assessment and the planned deployment of the units.

The component organization could be the organization of the Military or Police component, depending on which CONOPS we are looking at. Here we are going to use a military example. The component organization will provide:

- **Number and Type of units**
- **Maximal strength for each kind of unit**
- **Some remarks on requested key units characteristics**
- **Total component troop strength when every unit is at full strength.**

Location(s) if possible – a deployment map is often provided with this annex.

In the next slide we will see a concrete example.
Development of the fourth topic of the Lecture 2 of the Module C of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Key message: the CONOPS provides the basis for drafting each individual SUR corresponding to each type / variant of unit in the future Mission.

Origin of the SUR (identical for military and police)

The CONOPS is drafted by MPS under the direct influence of the Integrated Mission Plan and the Mission Support Plan drafted by DOS. At this point it must be said that there is a Logistic Support Concept and a Mission Support Plan which will be exposed in Module E – Logistic Support Framework.

From the CONOPS, MPS (or PD) will draft each individual SUR specific to each kind of unit as planned in the CONOPS.

Finally, it should be noted that both the Mission Support Plan and the CONOPS have to abide by the principles of the Reimbursement Framework, embodied in the COE Manual.
Key message: Statements of Unit Requirements are specific to a given Mission, as well as unit-specific.

Therefore we can try the following definition of the SUR
And we can add...

Remark...

As mentioned before, the SUR will be attached in the MOU of the unit as its annex G (new disposition, from COE Working Group / COE Manual 2017). Like the SUR, the MOU is unit specific and Mission specific.
**Key message:** the SUR provides background information on the Mission and describes in details the expected organization of the unit, its major equipment and logistic and life support equipment as well as the tasks expected from the unit.

The area of deployment is normally not part of the SUR as:

- Several units of the same type could be formed from the same SUR and deployed to different locations;
- The deployment location of a unit is never definitive and will probably change over time depending on operational factors;
- The deployment location of a given unit is probably not yet known from the planners at the time they draft the SUR.

- Some exceptions are possible (i.e. logistic support units working at Mission level).
Key message: the overview of the unit in the SUR provides its general organization and strength.

The Overview is a summary of the unit requirements – here a transport company:

- Type of unit
- Authorized strength
- Structure, in short
- Location and remarks.
11. **Employment Concept of the Transport Company.**

   a. The intent is to deploy the Transport Company in Bangui in order to provide transport support (heavy lift) for UN owned equipment (UNOE) and contingents' owned equipment (COE). Transport support will focus primarily on moving goods from the MINUSCA logistics hub in Bangui to MINUSCA Sector and sub-sector locations throughout the CAR, including to and from MINUSCA offices and military unit/sub-unit locations. The company may also support goods arriving and departing the mission area from neighboring countries.

   b. The UN infantry battalions deployed in CAR will concentrate on the protection of civilians, and will not be expected to have sufficient convoy escorts. During the execution of vise

**Key message:** the employment concept of the unit provides information on its role within the Force or Mission.

**Employment concept, self explanatory**
Key message: The SUR indicates the general mission of the unit within the Force and lists the tasks that are expected of the unit.

General mission of the unit and listing of the tasks it must be able to achieve.
Key message: the SUR provides indications on the general organization of the unit, completed by an annexed detailed flowchart.

These are general prescriptions on the organization of the unit, that are to be completed by a flowchart annexed, as indicated – see next slide.
Key message: within limits, the organization of a unit as proposed by DPO may be modified by the TCC to better match national doctrine; however the strength of the unit cannot be modified by the TCC without first negotiating with DPO/OMA, or with DPO and DOS for the logistic support units.

Here is the unit structure as proposed by the SUR.

At this point it should be remarked that the structure of the unit may be adapted by the TCC to take into account the national doctrine / organization.

However, in case of adaptation of the structure by the TCC:

- The authorized strength of the unit cannot be augmented; however the TCC can shift personnel around to amend the strength of each sub-unit, within the global limit of 250 allowed to the unit.
- The unit’s organization must allow to effect each and every task ascribed to the unit.
- Some organization prescriptions may be mandatory. For example, an Infantry Battalion may have 4 rifle companies because the Bn will be tasked to man 4 different locations / bases. In this case the TCC cannot propose an organization based on 3 x rifle companies, even though his INF BNs are nationally organized with 3 x rifle Cies.
Key message: as regards administrative requirements applicable to units, language requirements may apply depending on the context and tasks assigned to the unit.

These are very simple rules. Generally the standard rules do not change whatever the Mission.
Para 13 is a standing principle deriving from the UN Charter.
Para 14 is interesting as regards language. The question of personnel able to speak whatever particular language used in the mission, and of the presence of interpreters, is always a delicate one. Although the Mission may sometimes provide interpreters, it is recommended for the unit to deploy with its own interpreters.
Key message: the detailed logistic support instructions specific to the Mission provided in the SUR complete the general logistic information contained in the COE Manual and in the TCC Guidelines.
• **Key message:** changes in quantity of vehicles as prescribed by the SUR should be discussed first with OMA/FGS or the Police Division.

The equipment list normally follows the naming of the COE Manual—here for some support vehicles in our SUR of the Transport Coy:

• The SUR provides the designation of each kind of equipment and requested number to deploy.

• Additionally, precisions are given about detailed requirements of some pieces of equipment—as these details do not appear in the COE Manual which is rather generic.

• It should be remarked again, that the T/PCC may adapt the kind of equipment deployed as long as the it is able to accomplish the requested tasks.

• The quantity of each item should not be changed too much, as during the negotiation of the MOU the DOS/Uniformed Capabilities Support Division personnel will verify that the numbers proposed by the T/PCC match the requirements of the SUR.

• In any case, prior discussion with OMA/Force Generation Service or Police Division should help the T/PCC determine what is acceptable or not before taking any definitive organizational step.
Key message: due to the specific reimbursement principle applying to self-sustainment equipment, the quantities of these equipment’s are not imposed but must be sufficient to provide for the needs of the whole unit.

The same principles apply to the list of self sustainment equipment, although due to the different reimbursement rules the number of each kind of equipment is not always mentioned, only the expected capability.

• In the case of the tents, the actual number will depend on the capacity of the tents deployed by the T/PCC.

• For other categories, the SS rule is strictly followed: the equipment deployed must be « sufficient for the unit size » - here example of the bedding and furniture for which no numbers are given.
Rules Of Engagement (ROE)

Development of the fifth topic of the Lecture 2 of the Module C of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Key message: in the framework of robust peacekeeping, the Security Council may authorize peacekeeping operations to “use all necessary means” to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order.

Let’s remember the cases for the use of force, starting with TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING
This must respect one of the basic principles of peacekeeping:
• Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate

• ... and with the Security Council authorization

ROBUST PEACEKEEPING
• The environments into which United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed are often characterized by the presence of militias, criminal gangs, and other spoilers who may actively seek to undermine the peace process or pose a threat to the civilian population. In such situations, the Security Council has given United Nations peacekeeping operations “robust” mandates authorizing them to “use all necessary means” to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order.

• In this case the use of force is authorized by the mandate, “with the consent of the host authorities”.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT
• While robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the consent of the host authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict, it is different from peace enforcement which may involve the use of force at the strategic or international level,
• This is normally prohibited for Member States Under Article 2 (4) of the Charter unless authorized by the Security Council.
Key message: the Guidelines to the Use of Force by Military Components provide clarity in the appropriate use of force at the tactical and operational levels of United Nations peacekeeping missions. They complete the Rules of Engagement specific to each peacekeeping operation.


Numerous after action reviews and discussions with TCCs have identified a gap in the understanding of the use of force despite existing mission-specific rules of engagement. These guidelines are accordingly intended to address the hesitation or lack of willingness/readiness to use force, when appropriate, in order to carry out mandated activities as well as to address the use of excessive force. It provides guidance on the use of appropriate force.

The guidelines address in particular:

- **Use of Force Principles and Authorization** (Based on SCR and mandate)
- **Alternatives to the Use of Force** (like mediation, negotiation and the good offices of civilian peacekeeping staff. This should be complemented by the skillful use of a deterrent posture)
- **Graduated Application and the Use of Force Continuum** (The graduated application of increasing levels of force ensures that only the minimum level of force necessary is used to achieve the mandated objective)
- **Situational Awareness** Situational awareness is critical to understanding, preventing, and responding effectively to acts of violence. Commanders at all levels must keep abreast of evolving operational situations to better visualize and anticipate emerging threats, opportunities and the possible

- **Effective Command and Control** The authorization to use force comes with the responsibility to do so in accordance with the mandate and ROE. Force Commanders are responsible for ensuring that their orders are strictly followed.

- **Credible, Flexible Force Posture and Presence** Military commanders and their units must have a mindset that demonstrates a willingness, readiness and capacity to respond appropriately to hostile acts and hostile threats of violence. UN military units must openly display professional conduct at all times. Shows of force, determination and willingness to act contribute to military credibility and may reduce the need to use force.

- **Robust and Proactive Approach** Military units must be proactive to deter/disrupt hostile intent or act (as authorized by the mandate and ROE) before the situation becomes critical. Persons/groups displaying hostile intent against United Nations personnel, United Nations associated personnel or civilian populations, or attempting to interfere with the freedom of movement of the mission should be dealt with in accordance with the mission-specific ROE, as and when necessary.

- **Tactical Decision and Response Model** Deciding on the appropriate level of force is based on a number of factors including threat intensity, the effect of action/inaction and the availability of resources and assets to conduct operations that create a credible force posture. The Tactical Decision and Response Model described in the Guidelines captures concise details of the type and intensity of force capability requirements for a variety of situations.

- **Reporting and Accountability** Every instance of the use of force at the tactical level, both deadly and non-deadly, must be promptly reported to the Force chain of command. FHQ should report any incident of the use of force to UNHQ. Regular reporting on developing situations allows the chain of command to maintain timely awareness and provides direction to United Nations units involved, or supporting units to prepare to assist if the need arises.

- **Decision Factors and Risk Management** Any decision to use force should be first assessed through four key factors; **Legality, Appropriateness, Capacity and Criticality**. The intent of the HOM should be clearly understood and clarified throughout the immediate planning process. Peacekeepers require to answer the four questions in the affirmative prior to deciding to use force, particularly deadly use of force (refer to the matrix proposed in the Guidelines).

- **Training** The mission-specific ROE should form a part of the pre-deployment training. Training should focus on appropriate use of force in different situations and emphasize the graduated application of force. The use of force decision and response model, and the use of force matrix of indicators and possible tasks attached as Annex B to the Guidelines, should form the basis of any use of force training curriculum.

... all things necessary for an efficient, controlled and reasoned use of force by the military contingents...
Key message: Military units and contingents are accountable for any inaction in front of deadly danger or failure to obey the Force Commander’s lawful orders.


- The Security Council has given United Nations peacekeeping operations “robust mandates” authorizing them to “use all necessary means” to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order.
- In this case the use of force is authorized by the mandate, “with the consent of the host authorities”.
- Failure to use authorized force, especially when required to save lives, may be equaled to dereliction of duty; likewise for failure to obey the Force Commander’s lawful orders.
Rules Of Engagement (ROE)

- The use of force of any kind by a member of a peacekeeping contingent is defined by the Rules Of Engagement (ROE).
- The ROE are tailored to the specific mandate of the mission and the situation on the ground.
- Contingent commanders are responsible for ensuring that all troops comply with the mission-specific ROE.

Key message: the use of force by peacekeepers is defined by the Rules Of Engagement, which are tailored to the specific mandate of the mission and to the situation on the ground.
Key message: the Rules Of Engagement are defined by general principles and detailed in a series of annexes to the ROE document.

The General Principles part include, among other topics:
- Authority and control in the Mission
- Mission of the military component
- Execution of the ROE...
Key message: Annex A of the ROE recalls a number of principles and the legal basis for the Mission.

This annex starts by recalling a number of principles and legal basis for the Mission: SCR, Chapter VII of the Charter, summary of the mandate etc.
Key message: Annex A of the Rules Of Engagement enumerates a series of rules defining what is allowed or forbidden as regards use of force.

The rest of Annex A enumerates 46 numbered « Specific Rules of Engagement for MINUSCA » that define what is allowed or not allowed in the use of force.

The 46 rules (in the case of MINUSCA, this may be different in another Mission with a different mandate)) are divided into 5 sections:

- Use of force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized
  Use of force, excluding deadly force, is authorized
- Use of weapon systems
- Authority to carry and deploy weapons
- Authority to detain, search and disarm
- Duty to release or hand over detained persons to appropriate authorities
Key message: Annex C of the Rules of Engagement enumerates supporting directions and procedures pertaining to the use of force: prohibited weapons, warning procedures, firing procedures, etc.

Annex B – Definitions: a list of definitions of terms pertaining to the use of force – Not worth of a slide, therefore we jump directly to Annex C:

The supporting directions and procedures include:

• Prohibition in the use of weapons
• Weapons restrictions
• Warning procedures
• Precautions (against collateral damages)
• Firing procedures
• Procedures after firing (Medical assistance, recording...)
• Search & Apprehension procedures
Key message: Annex D of the Rules of Engagement define the rules concerning the use of each kind of weapon allowed in the Mission.

The weapon state Annex includes the rules concerning the use of each kind of weapon, as well as the numbered rule defining its state: loaded, not allowed loaded, etc.
Key message: Annex E of the Rules of Engagement consists in an aide-mémoire called Blue Card, meant to facilitate the understanding of the ROEs by the soldiers. Possession and understanding of the Blue Card by the soldiers is a responsibility of the contingent commander and of the units commanders.

ROEs are complex – 28 pages for the MINUSCA ROEs.

Therefore they always include a summary of the rules easily understandable by the soldiers: an « aide-mémoire » or « Blue Card »

It is the responsibility of the unit commander / contingent commander that each soldiers understand the ROEs, knows them and be in possession of a copy of the Blue Card.
Directive on the Use of Force (DUF)

Development of the sixth topic of the Lecture 2 of the Module C of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
The use of force by the United Nations Police, including FPUs, is regulated by:

- The “Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials”,
- The “Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials”,
- Mission-specific guidance, such as Directives on the Use of Force and Firearms (DUF).

Key message: the Directive on the Use of Force and Firearms is a mission-specific guidance to be applied by the United Nations Police.

- Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (General Assembly resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979);
Directive on the Use of Force

DUF full title:

Directive on arrest, detention, searches and use of force for all UN Police officers on assignment with the United Nations [Name of the Mission]

Key message: any important change in the mandate of the police component might lead to a revised edition of the corresponding DUF.

- The DUF is Mission-specific and mandate-specific.
- Any important change in the mandate of the police component might lead to a revised edition of the corresponding DUF.
Directive on the Use of Force

Command responsibility

The Police Commissioner and his subordinates vested with delegated command authority are responsible for the implementation of the DUF.

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Key message: The Police Commissioner and his subordinates are responsible for the implementation of the DUF.

The Police Commissioner can delegate his command functions to, inter alia:

- Deputy Police Commissioner
- Chief of Operations
- Deputy Chief of Operations for FPUs
- Sector Commanders
- Chief of Staff
- Chief Development Coordinator
Key message: the first part of the DUF document consists in a General part exposing a series of prescriptions on various topics: authority to arrest, detain, search and seize, use of force an firearms, reporting and investigations, etc.

- The General part include, among other topics: authority and mandate, command responsibility, training and qualifications for the use of force, equipment and weapons.
- Authority to stop and/or arrest, detain, search and seize details what the UN Police is allowed to do for each of these actions, in the framework of the mandate and of the existing Directives. The rules governing the detention of minors are particularly detailed.
- Use of force, firearms or other law enforcement equipment describe
  - The limits of the use of force by police officers (in which cases or occurrences it is permitted or not and to what extent)
  - Same regarding the use of lethal force
  - Gradation of force and instructions on the use of warnings before using lethal force
- Reporting and investigation describes the lawful procedures to be followed to report arrests, detentions, use of force,
- Contravention deals with obedience to orders in the framework of the SUR and the responsibility carried by giving an order
- Definitions refers to the corresponding Annex at the end of the document
- Entry into force refers to the validity of the SUR.
Key message: the general part of the DUF is completed by a series of 12 annexes detailing the Mission’s police regulations regarding authorized weapons and firearms, detention, and various related procedures.

The Annexes to the SUR are as follows:

- **Annex A – Definitions** contains definitions of terms related to the police work and the use of force.
- **Annex B - Authorized firearms, ammunitions and related items for members of FPU** provides the list of authorized weapons and ammunitions in the framework of the mission. Police Officers are forbidden to deploy with or use weapons or ammunitions that are not explicitly allowed by the DUF.
- **Annex C - Authorized firearms, ammunitions and related items for IPOs** is the same as above, applied to Individual Police Officers (IPOs in general are not armed but they may carry and use lawful equipment like handcuffs, pepper spray or police batons).
- **Annexes D to F** are templates of corresponding documents used to report events to the hierarchy. In francophone missions they are either bi-lingual or provided both in a French and in an English version.
Key message: one of the DUF annexes is an aide-mémoire called Blue Card which summarizes the rules applying to the use of force, the authority to search, arrest, detain in the relevant Mission.

- **Annexes G and H**, like D to F mentioned above, are are templates of corresponding documents used to report events to the hierarchy. In francophone missions they are either bi-lingual or provided both in a French and in an English version.
- **Annex I is the Blue Card** that all police personnel are to carry when operating in the mission area. The Blue Card summarizes the rules applying to the use of force, the authority to search, arrest, detain in the relevant Mission. In francophone missions the Blue Card is provided in both English and French versions.
- Finally, also annexed to the DUF are copies of three basic documents that are not mission specific but that the police component has to know and comply with:
  - DPO/DOS policy for Formed Police Units
  - UN SOP on detention
  - DPO/DOS guidelines on taking, publication and distribution of images of persons in custody
  - The Force Requirements relevant to the FPU(s) to be deployed to the mission considered.
Key message: the General part of the DUF provides information on the lawful basis of the Mission.

This is the legal basis for the existence and prescriptions of the DUF.
DUF Content - General

Training and Qualifications for the Use of Force

7. Every MINUSCA Police Officer who carries a firearm or other item(s) of law enforcement equipment must be fully familiar with this Directive and understand the rules it contains, and must have received correct and proper training on the care and use of the particular weapon or item(s) of law enforcement equipment assigned to him/her. The Police Commissioner will issue detailed instructions regarding induction training and briefings on this Directive, including the documentation that must be submitted to prove that they have been received. A MINUSCA Police Officer can only carry a firearm or other item(s) of law enforcement equipment if they have passed the requisite firearm assessments detailed hereunder and the Police Commissioner has certified that he/she has received the required briefings.

8. IPOs who have not been tested prior to deployment through the Assessment for Mission Service (AMS) are required to pass the AMS in the mission area, including the requisite AMS firearm handling and shooting assessment, as per EMCO/DFS Standard Operating Procedure on Assessment of Individual Police Officers for Service (OFS) 11.1B. (Note: translations and interpretation issues means 8011.1B).

Key message: the general part of the DUF contains instructions on the training and qualifications of the police personnel deployed to the Mission.

Also in General: reminder of the rules related to training and qualification of police personnel
Key message: the general part of the DUF provides information on weapons and equipment authorized for use by the police officers in the Mission area.

FPUs and IPOs alike are only allowed to use equipment and weapons as listed in Annexes B and C respectively.
Key message: the general part of the DUF lists the cases where use of non lethal force is allowed.

Cases where use of non lethal force is allowed

- To prevent or stop the commission of a crime that does not involve a grave threat to life or serious bodily injury, including in arresting or detaining the offender;
- To protect or defend any of the following against a hostile act or a hostile intent that does not involve a grave threat to life or serious bodily injury:
  - Civilians, including women, children and humanitarian workers;
  - Themselves or other members of their unit;
  - Other United Nations and associated personnel;
  - Members of the law enforcement agencies of the Central African Republic to whom they are providing support.

Use of Force, excluding Lethal Force

26. MINUSCA Police Officers are authorized to use force or items of law enforcement equipment, excluding lethal force:

\[\text{Include examples of use of non-lethal force.}\]
Key message: the general part of the DUF lists the cases where lethal use of force is allowed.

Cases where the use of lethal force is allowed (always as a last resort)
Key message: the general part of the DUF contains detailed instructions regarding the mandatory warnings before using force of firearms.

Instructions regarding the mandatory warnings before using force of firearms.
Here in the case of MINUSCA (Central African Republic), the warnings are provided in all three mission languages: English, French, and Sango (local language).
Key message: Annex B of the DUF lists the weapons and ammunitions authorized for use by members of the FPUs in the Mission.

The list of authorized weapons and ammos for FPUs, here in the case of MINUSCA. For example no machine gun above 15 mm would be allowed.
Key message: Annex C of the DUF lists the weapons and ammunitions authorized for use by Individual Police officers in the Mission.

In the case of the IPOs for the same Mission (MINUSQCA), the list of authorized equipment is notably reduced. It’s mainly protective and restraining equipment, and just side-arms as regards firearms.
Key message: in bilingual missions, annexes to the DUF provide templates of bilingual forms to be used by the Police component.

Just an example of a bilingual form in a francophone mission, here in the case of MINUSCA.
Development of the seventh topic of the Lecture 2 of the Module C of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Mission Capability Review may be ordered for:
- Mission start-up; mandate review;
- Mid-cycle review; restructuring;
- Draw-down; crisis response;
- Or in response to a specific request from the Security Council

Key message: DPO may order a Mission capability review in case of important change in the situation on the ground or in the mandate.
Key message: a capability review is normally done by means of a Technical Assessment Mission.
Key message: The Office of Military Affairs and the Police Division are usually represented in a Technical Assessment Mission through their respective planning services.

- PD and OMA are to be represented only if a Police component or a military component are respectively part of the Mission.
- OMA is represented by Military Planning Service.
- PD is represented by the Planning Cell of the Police Division.
Lecture Take Away (I)

- For the Police Division and Office of Military Affairs, the outcome of the Integrated Assessment Planning is their producing key planning documents: CONOPS, ROE, DUF and SUR.
- Both Mission-specific and unit-specific, the Statement of Unit Requirements describes the structure, equipment and tasks expected of a formed Military or Police unit.
Lecture Take Away (II)

- The ROE and DUF govern the use of force by the military and police components respectively. They are specific to each UN peacekeeping operation.
- ROE and DUF state the rules governing the use of force, restraint, authorized and unauthorized use of weapons and procedures.
- The Blue Card summarizes for the rank soldiers and the police officers the rules governing the use of force in a specific mission. It must be known and carried by each contingent member.
Military and Police Planning

Questions

Lecture 2
Lecture 3
Mission Support
Planning Process

Lecture 3 in the Module “Peacekeeping Operations Planning Overview” of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Learning Outcomes

• Understand the Logistic Support planning process for a starting mission and how its is synchronized with the Mission Planning Process and Mission components planning processes.
Lecture Content

- Logistic Support planning steps
- Summary of inputs and outputs provided by DOS during Mission Support planning
Mission Support Planning Process

Planning Stage

Pre-Planning
- Conflict assessment
- Prelim planning parameters
- Early warnings concerning deployment
- Recommendation to develop UN strategy

UN Strategy
- Strategic Estimate/Options Paper
- Recommended UN strategy
- Outline functional strategies
- Framework for integration of UN, other countries/organizations
- Guidance for Special Envoys
- Recommendation for next planning step

Outputs
- Designate entity or entities for planning
- Advice
- Analysis and deductions
- Prioritize scenarios
- Identify, collect, seek, recommend policy direction.

Mission Support Planning
- Advise DPO/DPPA
- Review existing arrangements
- Maintain operational readiness – SDS, RDT/MSTs, PCRS, etc.
- Preliminary planning parameters
- Collect and collate information – country study...

Key message: in the pre-planning phase DOS starts looking at the possibilities and challenges proposed by the mission area, from a logistic support point of view, while coordinating with the various actors already involved in the future host country.

In this whole sequence we will be looking at the events from the point of view of a new mission.

As we saw in the planning module, we start from a situation that is developing in a country, a conflict situation, information coming to the SC and the GA, conducting the UN to wonder whether we will have to start a new mission in this country – like happened in the recent years for Somalia, Yemen, Libya, Ukraine, etc.

We involve in this a lot of partners, not only DPO/DOS: Dept. of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, people in the field: WFP, Agencies, any UN presence on the ground – since although there is no PKO yet does not mean that there is no UN presence, country team, political mission, agencies etc.

So beside the general assessment made by the military and police and of course the Integrated Planning Team, DOS will start studying a number of issues more specifically oriented toward Logistic Support:
- Locations,
- Resupply possibilities
- Avenues of approach to the country (airports, seaports, borders to cross)
- Communication network within the country (infrastructure, roads, trails, bridges, general circulation)
- Generally collect information on the country.
• While the UN strategy is being designed, we start reviewing existing arrangements and contracts, maybe with other agencies (rations if WFP is operating in the country), possibilities of local contracts, existing arrangements with the Govt...

• We also start reviewing our own readiness: the Strategic Deployment Stocks we spoke about earlier, what’s available in the UN Reserve, building a Mission Support Team, a rapid Deployment Team, and contacting OMA about the PCRS and see what’s available in it.

• DOS will also conduct assessment missions on the ground and start coordinating with colleagues on the ground, the Govt, other actors.

• We now have a UN strategy; the UN Special Envoy gets guidance regarding the next steps.

• [Special Envoys are different from SRSGs, they have a smaller team, they do not manage a complete UN Mission with operations going on, they have more of a political role, playing good offices, engaging the Government].

• SO that’s where DOS starts identifying where it wants to go, prioritize scenarios for the Mission and its support; that’s also where DOS starts playing with figures: what and how many air assets are we going to need, transport units, construction engineers, MOVCON team at the airport or not etc.... that going in parallel with the military planning and the possible commercial contracts, since the final result will be a mix of commercial contracts and military support assets.
Key message: before approving the creation of a new mission, the financial implications of the Mission Support Plan, as presented in the Secretary General Report, are an important element of decision for the Security Council.

* MRP : Materiel Resource Plan
* RBB : Result Based Budget

The previous was mainly the broad strategy, now we are getting into the functional strategy.

The functional strategy is basically the specific steps for the deployment and the operations.

The Mission Support Concepts starts, that is where we talk about planning assumptions, resources constraints, what are going to be the challenges for the support, what are going to be the various components, their sizes, their activities, their needs – by component must be understood the Military and Police, but also the civilian component: political affairs, civil affairs, command staff, not only the logistic support...

So we come up with a concept paper, and that will be an integrated concept, the same way the mission will be an integrated one, all components working together to achieve common Mission goals.

Once we have a Mission Support Plan, we will do the Materiel Resource Plan, which is the way to find where all these things we need are going to come from, where do we find them or who is providing them; and we are going back to an earlier part of this lecture: some items may exist in-house, some will have to be contracted, some may come from members states...
Then the financial implications, which will feed into the Secretary General’s report. This is way for the SG to tell to the SC and to the GA what the Mission is going to look like and what he intends it to do (if a mandate is approved), and what it is going to cost.

From there we’ll go into the Result Based Budget framework, which turns the simple financial forecast into measurable goals to achieve in relation with the allocated budget. The RBB will mention things like:

• How many troops we want to have deployed in each phase of the mission (or month by month)
• How many FPUs
• How many individual staff officers and UNMOs.

• From a Military point of view, the RBB could mention
• How many patrols will we perform for that number of soldiers,
• How militia are we going to demobilize
• How many refugees in how many camps are we going to have to protect,
• Etc.
Key message: the Mission Implementation Plan defines goals and quantifies support requirements consistent with the mandated tasks assigned to the Mission.

We presume at this point that we have a Security Council Resolution.

So we now have a Mission Implementation Plan, so we should actually have a SRSG designated at this point, (selection and designation process having started far ahead) and we go with more documents; since the mission exist we can now have policies and guidance documents, specific to the Mission, and DOS will start working on the Support Plan for the sustainment phase – the phase that comes after Mission start-up.
Key message: the necessary inputs provided by DOS cover the materiel requirements, the personnel requirements as well as the budgetary requirements of the new mission.

*PMCA: Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority*

This is the list of documents that either DOS has inputs in, or that DOS will issue as outputs:

- **Assessment mission/technical survey** – in the pre-planning phase
- **Concept of Operations (substantive, military, police).** – DOS will provide Logistic Support inputs to contribute to the various CONOPS. In particular, discussion with OMA to balance the commercial support assets and the member states provided support assets (ie, how many contracted civilian transport helicopters vs how many military utility helicopters, what engineering work can be contracted vs what engineering work can be done by how many engineering companies...)
- **Input for Force Requirements.** Same as above, how many units of each kind in the military and police components, need in logistic support units, numbers and capabilities.. So that the logistic support military capabilities dovetail correctly with the civilian assets as envisioned by DOS.
- **Logistics/Mission Support Concept.** DOS specific output document
- **Logistics/Mission Support Plan.** DOS specific output document. Works by section: Medical Support, engineering support, Ground Transport, Air Transport – How many units of each, with what capabilities, to mix with how many commercial or UNOE assets...
- **Materiel Resourcing Plan.** DOS specific output document that flows from the Mission Support Plan (where to source from the equipment we need: SDS, UN Reserve, commercial contracts, LOA, TCCs / COE.
• **Mission Deployment Plan.** For the civilian personnel and UNOE, but also for the military and police units and personnel (impact on Mission budget and spending as well as necessary ground transport, transit camp, camps construction, fuel and rations contracts etc.).

• **PMCA/CA for anticipated expenditures.** Pre-mandate commitment authority already discussed, to provide necessary starting funds to the mission before a full fledged budget is prepared (for the next year).

• **Key staff for Mission HQ.** Recruitment, temporary reinforcement, Mission Deployment Team, etc. Necessary input for Human Resources Services Division.

• **Integrated support structure and long term staffing table to assist Human Resources Services Division advance planning.** Elaboration of the Mission support structure and staffing. Absolute need for recruitment and budget purposes.

• **Service Delivery (formerly ISS) military staff requirements to assist FGS planning.** Number and qualifications of each officer to generate for each Service Delivery cell, for selection and deployment purposes. Force Generation Service needs these requirements to be able to start working.
Lecture Take Away

• The logistic support planning process accompanies and mirrors the Mission planning process.
• DOS provides logistic support inputs to the Force requirements, to each component Concept of Operations and to each Statement of Unit Requirements.
• The financial implications of the creation of a new mission are an essential part of the Secretary General’s report presented to the Security Council for decision.
Mission Support Planning Process

Questions

Lecture 3
Lecture 4 in the Module “Peacekeeping Operations Planning Overview” of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Learning Outcomes

• Learn about the different phases of the life of a peacekeeping operation, and form an idea of the various activities taking place during each phase.
Lecture Content

- Mission Life Cycle Overview
- Start-up
- Mission Sustainment (Mandate Implementation)
- Transition
Mission Life Cycle Overview

Topic 1

Development of the first topic of the Lecture 4 of the Module C of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
• **Key message:** the life cycle of a peacekeeping operation can be divided in three phases: start-up, mandate implementation, transition.

• The life of a UN operation may be schematically divided into several different phases.

• The life cycle of a PKO starts with the planning phase of the mission, which follows the process called “Integrated Assessment Planning” process (IAP)”

• One most important step in the planning is the approval of a Security Council Resolution (SCR) which authorizes the establishment of a mission (PKO or Political Mission)

• The mission starts with the date fixed by the SC in the initial SCR.

• It will end at the end of the last mandate as decided by the SC, after completion of the mandated tasks.

• The mandates are generally decided for one year, and renewed from year to year until completion of the mandated tasks.

• The startup phase corresponds to the progressive strengthening of the operation: deployment of the administration, civilian personnel, police and military components, mission support dispositive etc.

• The sustainment phase corresponds to the phase when the mission is fully manned and functional. It starts in theory when the Mission reaches its full operational capacity (FOC)

• From a planning point of view, capability reviews may be carried out during that phase in order to adapt the format of the mission and of the military and police components to the evolution of the situation on the ground or apparition of new requirements.
• Finally, the liquidation phase takes place at the end of the mandate: the administration draws down, the military and police components progressively repatriate, UN properties sold, repatriated or disposed of and the mission budget liquidated. This phase often lasts several months, if not years, particularly in the case of large complex operations.
Development of the second topic of the Lecture 4 of the Module C of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Key message: during the start-up phase of a peacekeeping operation, initial funds, personnel and equipment are deployed by the UN and the necessary commodities and service contracts are organized.

A lot of events take place during the startup phase, the most critical phase of the operation since the mission has only minimum assets and is still fledgling.

First thing first, the Finance aspect since which there is operation possible.

- Since the new mission does not have a budget yet, the SC and the GA approve rapidly a sum of money called pre-mandate commitment authority, to the tune of USD 50 Millions maximum, in order to allow the mission administration (Director Mission Support) to fund the initial expenses needed to establish the Mission: contracts, purchase of equipment, transport of equipment (COE), travel of the staff members....

The new mission also needs to be manned:

- The Secretariat provides a rapid deployment team of civilian staff which will constitute the initial core team of the PKO deployed in the field.
- Then PD and OMA have started to generate the individual police and military staff officers, and UNMOs if need be, to deploy to the field.
- Likewise, the generation of the formed units has started.
- Finally, Mission Support starts recruiting the necessary (civilian) local staff.

As regards various kinds of material and equipment:
• DOS organizes the transport of equipment already present in the Rapid Deployment Stock / Brindisi – thus saving time over the negotiation and realization of procurement contracts
• Whenever possible, equipment available from the stores of other missions will be used
• Indispensable procurement actions are started, although they may sometimes take a long time (although local procurement, when possible, is quicker – but also limited in terms of available goods)
• The COE of the military and Police units is negotiated through the MOU system; their transport to the mission area will be organized by DOS/MOVCON as soon as declared available by the T/PCCs (following PDVs)

Finally commodities and services are obtained by the negotiation of a number of contracts:
• Letter of Assist allow member states or other entities to provide a variety of services (strategic transport...)
• System contracts, which are pre-arranged contracts negotiated in advance by the Secretariat for the short term delivery of various goods (vehicles...), are activated
• Short term contracts are negotiated for provision of a variety of services
• Self sustainment is negotiated with the MS (formed units)
Development of the third topic of the Lecture 4 of the Module C of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Key message: during the mandate implementation phase of a peacekeeping operation, the mandate and the budget are renewed annually while the formed military and police units are rotated on a yearly basis.

During the sustainment phase, the mission is up and running, delivering the mandated tasks (although implementation of mandated tasks have likely started during the startup phase, it is only after the Mission has reached full operational capability that it can really fully deliver the mandated tasks). It is normally at full strength and full operational capacity (FOC).

However beside the core jobs of the various components a number of events are worth mentioning:

- Finance wise, the mission will have a complete budget, approved by the GA and renewed yearly with ad hoc modifications.
- As regards military and police personnel, the units will have to rotate every year.
- Therefore the capitals will be busy preparing and training the relief contingent.
- The Mission will prepare rotation plans to integrate the necessary movements of the various units.
- The MS will have to decide if they want the rotations to be carried out by the UN or if they prefer to do them themselves under LOA. In any case the Mission’s rotation plan will have to be respected.
- After the initial COE verification following the arrival of the unit in the mission area, the quarterly COE verifications will be implemented by the COE Verification Unit and the Military / Police units.
- Damaged or worn out equipment will have to be replaced, in principle at T/PCC’s expense. Under the wet lease system, spare parts will have to be provided to the units by the capitals. This in itself requires a dedicated organization on the part of the Capital.
• In the course of a mission lasting several years, units will be withdrawn and replaced by other TCCs, or new units will be deployed to adapt to new requirements.
• Same operations as for the initial deployments will have to be carried out by DPO and DOS and by the Mission.

• In terms of planning, DPO will organize Mission Capability Reviews through Technical Assessment Missions (TAM) each time it is necessary: following changes in the mandate, or evolution of the situation on the ground.
• This Integrated Planning activity will see the participation of PD and OMA to organize, within the broader activity, their own Police and Military Capability Reviews.
• These PCR and MCR are the subject of the next topic.
• Toward the end of the mandate, DPO, DOS and the Mission will start planning an exit strategy to prepare the Transition phase.
Development of the fourth topic of the Lecture 4 of the Module C of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Key message: after the end date of the last mandate, the transition phase allows the Mission to be gradually withdrawn, its assets redeployed or repatriated and its contracts closed.

Once the SC has decided to end the mission and a date has been fixed in a SC Resolution, a number of operations must be done to prepare and then execute the transition toward draw down and liquidation of the Mission.

- The transition includes handover to host country authorities, drawdown and liquidation. Here we will mainly address the drawdown and liquidation aspect, leaving aside the political handover to the host country authorities.
- There is an important planning aspect to devise an exit strategy and prepare the various plans to drawdown the components of the mission.
- For the Police and Military components, there is an operational, political and logistic aspect to the drawdown.
- The sequence of withdrawal of the units has to be prepared in very close coordination with DOS and Mission Support, as the units COE will have to be transported locally within the mission area, then from the mission area to the capitals.
- Given that the mission’s transport assets have a limited capacity, the withdrawal plan must take into account the transport capacities of the mission.
- Likewise, contracts have to be put in place for the strategic transport of the COE and personnel.
- In the same way, Mission Support will have to prepare liquidations plans for the logistic support part, civilian personnel, general administration and finance.
• Like for any other UN activity, closing a mission has a cost that must be carefully assessed. Several options may have to be considered.

• As regard materials, the units will have to prepare load lists the same way they did for the deployment.
• Additional consideration is to sort out which equipment will stay in the mission to be discarded, given away or sometimes sold.
• The mission will have to consider as well what will happen with the UNOE. This can be given to the local government, sent back to UNLB for refurbishment and recycling in another mission, or sometimes shipped directly to another UN Mission.

• Personnel repatriation has to be prepared as well, including conclusion of transport contracts (UN arrangement) or LOAs (national arrangement).
• Most of the times rear parties will have to be left behind after departure of the main body in order to take care of the COE locally until its shipment.

• Finally, the DMS has to terminate the various contracts, local and others, that were agreed for sustenance of the mission.
Lecture Take Away

- The start-up phase of mission lasts until the mission reaches its Full Operational Capability (FOC).
- During the mandate implementation phase, the mission may undergo Mission Capability Reviews in order to adapt its structure, composition and mandate to any evolution of the situation on the ground.
- The transition phase includes handover to host country authorities, drawdown and liquidation.
- The transition necessitates the planning of an exit strategy.
Mission Life Cycle
Overview
Questions

Lecture 4
120
Lecture 5
Cooperation with National and Regional Actors

Lecture 5 in the Module “Peacekeeping Operations Planning Overview” of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Learning Outcomes

• At the end of the lecture the students will know how the TCCs can best be present during the planning phase of an operation.
• They will form an idea about the UN’s partnerships with regional organizations and understand the complexity of multidimensional missions through the cooperation scheme put in place in Mali (MINUSMA).
Lecture Content

• Role of member States in Planning Phase
• UN Partnerships with Regional Organizations
• Example of Cooperation in the field: Mali
• EU Training Mission in Mali
Role of Member States in the Planning Phase

Development of the first topic of the Lecture 5 of the Module C of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Role of Member States During Planning Phase of a PKO

Strategic Dialogue (Before planning phase)

- Take part in the strategic dialogue with UNHQ
- Better plan and prepare engagement
- Facilitate timely deployment with the right capabilities

Key message: the strategic dialogue during the planning phase enables Member States who wish to contribute to a peacekeeping operation to better plan and prepare their engagement.

- Even before the planning phase of a future operation, Member States should take part in the strategic dialogue with the UNHQ.
- The strategic dialogue enables Member States who wish to contribute to peacekeeping operations to better plan and prepare their engagements.
- The strategic interaction between the UN and potential Troop Contributing Countries/Police Contributing Countries (TCCs/PCCs) will enable peacekeepers to be deployed in a timely fashion with the right capabilities.
Role of Member States During Planning Phase of a PKO

Attend T/PCC Meetings

- Keep member states informed about the planning of an operation.
- Options, specific needs, particularities of the environment and situation
- Invaluable way of keeping abreast of the UN’s need for a future operation and of informing the capital

Key message: For the T/PCC representatives to the UNHQ, T/PCC meetings are an invaluable way of keeping abreast of the UN’s need for a future operation and of informing their capitals.

- TCC meetings are regularly organized by DPO during the planning phase to keep member states informed about the direction taken by the planning of an operation.
- Options, specific needs, particularities of the environment and situation will be exposed and discussed during these meetings.
- For T/PCCs representatives, these meetings are an invaluable way of keeping abreast of the UN’s need for a future operation and of informing their capitals.
Key message: close and constant interaction with the Police Division or Office of Military Affairs officers in charge of the generation of the unit is the best way to ensure the success of important steps in the generation process.

- Planning for the contribution and deployment of a military or police unit is a long term and complex endeavor.
- Close and constant interaction with the PD or OMA officers in charge of the generation of the unit is the best way to ensure the success of important steps in the planning / generation process: exchange of Notes Verbal, T/PCC field reconnaissance, MOU negotiation, PDV...
- Likewise, T/PCC representatives should make it a priority to inform relevant UN services of every decision made by their capital.
Role of Member States During Planning Phase of a PKO

Assimilate requirements

- CONOPS and SUR are complex documents.
- Need to analyze and understand every detail of the requirements.
- Lapses or oversights are cause for misunderstandings and delays.

Key message: It is of crucial importance that the T/PCC representatives and the relevant services in their capitals analyze and understand every detail of the requirements contained in the CONOPS and in the Statement of Unit Requirements.

- CONOPS and SUR are complex documents full of vital information regarding the mission and task of the future units and the technical requirements laid out by the UN.
- It is of crucial importance that the T/PCC representatives and the relevant services in their capitals analyze and understand every detail of the requirements.
- Any lapse or oversight in the matter is bound to cause misunderstandings and unacceptable delays in the deployment of the unit.
Key message: proactivity and anticipation are decisive factors in the successful contribution and deployment of a formed unit to a peacekeeping operation.

- T/PCCs should not wait for the UN to knock at their door to start preparing for a deployment.
- T/PCCs willing to play a role in Peacekeeping operations should anticipate every UN requirement since the very beginning of the preparatory planning started by the IMTF:
  - Training
  - Equipment
  - Procurement
  - Personnel preparation
- Preparing in these domains takes time and should be part of a reasoned long term program rather than be a last minute reaction to an unanticipated UN request.
- The pre-deployment preparation of a contingent will be addressed in details in Module G “Contingent Preparation for Deployment”.

Role of Member States During Planning Phase of a PKO

Anticipate and be proactive

- T/PCCs should be proactive.
- T/PCCs should anticipate UN requirements:
  - Training
  - Equipment
  - Procurement
  - Personnel preparation
- Preparing a unit takes time and should be part of a reasoned long term program.
UN Partnerships with Regional Organizations

Development of the second topic of the Lecture 5 of the Module C of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Key message: Partnerships with international and regional organizations have become increasingly common in UN Peacekeeping and may come as a great help in the accomplishment of the mandate of any peacekeeping operation.

Partnerships with international and regional organizations have become increasingly common in UN Peacekeeping. Regional organizations may have comparative advantages such as:

- knowledge of the region,
- proximity to conflict aiding in rapid and less costly deployment,
- troops who are acclimatized to the environment and climate.
- cultural considerations can also play a significant role in the welcome of peacekeepers.
- high investment in regional stability
- appreciation for historical, cultural, political and economic interests.

Cooperation between the UN and regional organizations is necessary, in part to meet the demand for various types of peacekeeping operations. Cooperation frameworks and modalities have been institutionalized between the UN and the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the European Union, the League of Arab States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization of American States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The UN Office of the African Union leads the partnership dialogue with the African Union in the UN Secretariat. For all other regions, the Partnerships Team within DPET coordinates the dialogue.

All these factors may come as a great help in the accomplishment of the mandate in any PKO.
Key message: recent successful UN partnerships with regional organizations include African Union in Darfur, European Union in Kosovo or ECOWAS in Mali.

Some recent examples of collaboration with regional organizations include the UN:
• working with the African Union (AU) in Darfur
• Working with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in South Sudan,
• working alongside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Kosovo and Afghanistan,
• handing over policing operations to the European Union (EU) in Kosovo
• succeeding Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) troops in Mali
• Succeeding the EU military operation in Chad.
Example of the Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

Development of the third topic of the Lecture 5 of the Module C of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)
Key message: the Security Council Resolution creating the Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) explicitly quotes several partnerships with various regional organizations and one member state.

The SCR creating the Mission in Mali: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) explicitly quotes:

- France operating under UN mandate
- The African Union,
- EUCAP
- The European Union
- The transitional authority in Mali (before the elections were held)
Key message: MINUSMA’s cooperation scheme includes cross links with the Malian Defense and Security Forces and the European Training Mission in Mali.

Therefore MINUSMA in Mali does not operate alone, and beside the cooperation with the local Government (which is not shown here for the sake of simplifying the view), MINUSMA has relations with:

Of course ECOWAS, which launched the operation named AFISMA, from which MINUSMA took over at the start of the UN mandate. AFISMA provided the first group of TCCS and the first body of troops to MINUSMA before new contingents could be generated and deployed (see the lecture on re-hatting). Even with the end of AFISMA, ECOWAS is still present through the EERT (ECOWAS Emergency Response Team) whose stated goal was to support rehabilitation of the country’s essential services and provision of assistance to the people affected by the security and political crises.

France was present in country before MINUSMA, under a UN mandate to proactively combat the terrorist forces operating in Sahel. Supported by several western countries, the French force operates in coordination with MINUSMA, MINUSMA doing the peacekeeping part and SERVAL doing the aggressive counter terrorism part.

The European Union is present through the EUCAP The European Capabilities Sahel Mali is a European Union civilian mission based in Bamako. The mission provides experts in training and strategic advice to the Malian Police, Gendarmerie and National Guard and the relevant ministries in order to support reform in the security sector. The European Training Mission has the mission to train the Malian armed forces.
The EU of course works in coordination with MINUSMA, be it the political side of the mission, the Police component or the military component. Needless to say that the MDSF work in close coordination with MINUSMA, as well as all ministries involved – but there are too many MINUSMA links with the Govt of Mali to be shown here.
Lecture Take Away

• While the Member States do not participate in the building of the mission plans, they can use numerous ways to be present during the planning phase and to keep abreast of the plans.
• To be present and proactive during the planning phase is the best way for a P/TCC to prepare for a future contribution.
• Partnering with Regional Organizations is indispensable for the UN from a political point of view.
• It also allows a better knowledge of the specific cultural background of an operation which is one of the keys to a successful implementation of the mandate.
Cooperation with National and Regional Actors

Questions
Module D: Reimbursement Framework

Module Content

- T/PCCs Reimbursement Framework
- COE Methodology
- COE Reimbursements
- Personnel Methodology
- Personnel Reimbursements
Learning Outcomes

Learn about the two pillars of the T/PCCs reimbursements: personnel and equipment. Learn about the Secretariat cells in charge of managing T/PCCs reimbursements at UNHQ.
Lecture Content

1. T/PCCs Reimbursement Framework, Personnel & Equipment
2. Cost of T/PCC reimbursements
3. Uniformed Capabilities Support Division
4. MOU and Reimbursement Policy Section responsibilities
5. Reimbursement Claims Management and Performance Section responsibilities
6. Office of Programme Planning, Budgets and Accounts responsibilities
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 1 of Module D of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the UN reimbursements to T/PCCs are divided in COE reimbursements and personnel reimbursements.

The compensations to the T/PCCs for contributions to UN peacekeeping operations are based on two pillars:

- **Reimbursement of COE**, both major equipment and self sustainment equipment, including small associated equipment and consumables. Spare parts and maintenance are included under the wet lease regime (will be defined later on).

- **Reimbursement for the personnel contributions**: preparation, training, medical preparation, individual equipment and training ammunitions.

- Note: the contribution of Staff officers and UNMOs, (or IPOs) (experts on mission) is done under a different regime and is not reimbursed.
Key message: personnel reimbursements form the most important part of the reimbursements paid to T/PCCs.

Total peacekeeping budget for 2018/2019 is $6.69 billion. Troop Contributors and Police Contributor reimbursements account for $2,100 Million with the Personnel Reimbursement accounting for 60% of this amount and the COE for 40% (Major Equipment accounts for 25% and Self Sustainment payments account for 15%).
Key message: on average, the various reimbursements paid to the T/PCC account for 75% of the direct costs of maintaining an infantry soldier.

As an additional information:

• The typical cost for an infantry soldier include deployment rations, COE and Self Sustainment and Personnel payments
• T/PCCs reimbursements are composed of Personnel reimbursements + COE (major equipment) reimbursements + Self Sustainment Reimbursements.
• The various Reimbursements to Member State (ME + SS + troop cost) account for ¾ of maintaining each soldier.
Key message: the costs of combat and support vehicles, both military and civilian pattern, account for 90% of the major equipment costs.
Key message: the cost of facilities and infrastructure account for more than 50% of the self-sustainment costs.
Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 1 of Module D of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: The Uniformed Capabilities Support Division is the single point of entry within the Secretariat for support and reimbursement issues related to military and police contingents.

The Division is the single point of entry within the Secretariat for support and reimbursement issues related to military and police contingents, for both Member States and counterparts within the Secretariat, including the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations.

All of the related functions formerly residing in the Memorandum of Understanding and Claims Management Section and the Reimbursement Policy and Liaison Section of the Field Budget and Finance Division, the Contingent-Owned Equipment Unit in the Logistics Support Division and the Financial Information Operations Service in the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts were consolidated into a single Uniformed Capabilities Support Division.

Within the UCSD:

- The **Memorandum of Understanding and Reimbursement Policy Section** is responsible for:
  - policies and procedures related to the reimbursement to troop- and police-contributing countries and the verification and control of contingent-owned equipment,
  - Supporting the triennial meetings of the Working Group on Contingent-Owned Equipment and updating the COE Manual
  - undertaking the quadrennial survey of personnel costs established by the General Assembly in its resolution 67/261
- leading the negotiations with troop- and police-contributing countries in preparing memorandums of understanding to support the deployment of formed military and police units;
- Act as the focal point to technical logistics experts on COE management and support to deploying T/PCCs.

- It serves as the primary focal point for communications between permanent missions of troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat on questions related to reimbursement and the memorandums of understanding and subsequent amendments.

• The **Reimbursement Claims Management and Performance Section** is responsible for:
  - the calculation, analysis and processing of reimbursement to troop- and police-contributing countries for contingent personnel, major equipment and self-sustainment (includes the automated calculation of the wet lease, dry lease and maintenance rates applicable for each formed unit);
  - The death and disability compensation for uniformed personnel, in addition to ad hoc claims (such as ammunition, loss and damage), and premiums (including the risk and key enabler premiums);
  - The preparation of estimates for the costs associated with reimbursement to troop- and police-contributing countries for inclusion in budget proposals;
  - Prepare reports on performance of military / police units, using standardized metrics related to equipment availability (NIMA) and serviceability (USV), with a primary focus on operational capability gaps, safety considerations, and financial inefficiencies.
Key message: the Uniformed Capabilities Support Division is the single point of entry within the Secretariat for support and reimbursement issues related to military and police contingents.

The Uniformed Capabilities Support Division has been created as a single point of contact for troop- and police-contributing countries on all administrative and logistical issues related to force generation, memorandums of understanding, contingent-owned equipment and reimbursement.

The consolidation of all functions within one Division also allow for close coordination with other units within the Office of Supply Chain Management that provide support to troop- and police-contributing countries, such as the Movement Control Section.
Key message: the MOU and Reimbursement Policy Section is the primary focal point for P/TCCs on questions related to reimbursements and MOUs.

The MOU and Reimbursement Policy Section (MRPS) is located in the Department of Operational Support / Uniformed Capabilities Support Division.

The MRPS is responsible for policies and procedures related to the reimbursement to troop- and police-contributing countries and the verification and control of contingent-owned equipment, for support to the triennial COE Working Group and updating the COE Manual, and for undertaking the quadrennial survey of personnel costs established by the General Assembly in its resolution 67/261.

The Section also leads the negotiations with troop- and police-contributing countries in preparing memorandums of understanding to support the deployment of formed military and police units. It serves as the primary focal point for communications between permanent missions of troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat on questions related to reimbursement and the memorandums of understanding and subsequent amendments, where applicable.

Finally, it assumes the overall responsibility in developing, reviewing, promulgating the verification framework and ensuring that verification inspectors are fully trained.
Key message: Reimbursement Claims Management and Performance Section is responsible for calculating the monthly personnel and quarterly COE reimbursements, and for certifying other claims.

The Reimbursement Claims Management and Performance Section (RCMPS) is located in the Department of Operational Support / Uniformed Capabilities Support Division.

The RCMPS is responsible for the calculation, analysis and processing of reimbursement to troop- and police-contributing countries for contingent personnel, major equipment and self-sustainment, as well as death and disability compensation for uniformed personnel.

It also calculates the wet lease, dry lease and maintenance rates applicable for each formed unit in accordance with the decisions of the General Assembly and prepare estimates for the costs associated with reimbursement to troop- and police-contributing countries for inclusion in budget proposals.

The Section also takes responsibility for the adherence to the verification framework by individual field missions, ensuring that appropriate processes and robust controls are in place to measure deployed and serviceable equipment capabilities in field missions. Emphasis on performance information and analysis also ensures that gaps in operational performance can be identified and that reimbursement is appropriately aligned with performance.
Development of **Topic 3 of Lecture 1 of Module D** of the **United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)**.
Key message: the Office Programme Planning, Finance and Budget is headed by the UN Financial Controller; it is responsible for the troops and COE disbursements.

Beside the Department of Operational Support, the Department of Management Strategy, Policy & Compliance also has responsibilities with regards to T/PCCs reimbursements.

Part of the Department of Management Strategy, Policy & Compliance, the Office of Programme Planning, Budgets and Accounts is headed by an Assistant Secretary-General who is also the Financial Controller of the UN.

OPPFB provides strategic value-added services for programme planning and budgeting for the programme and peacekeeping budgets and voluntary contributions, accounting, treasury and financial information operations services.

In particular the treasury effects the payment of due financial compensations to the troop and police contributing countries. With the 01 January 2019 management reorganization, the latter is now the only responsibility of DMSPC in terms of COE and Personnel compensations.

Since the reform of the Secretariat, the calculation of the troop costs reimbursement, which used to be part of the predecessor of OPPFB, has been tasked to the Uniformed Capabilities Support Division (DOS).
The T/PCCs reimbursement framework is based on the two pillars of personnel reimbursements and COE reimbursements.

The Reimbursement Claims Management and Performance Section (RCMPS) deals with all MOU and LOA reimbursement-related issues, as well as death & disability and other claims.

The MOU and Reimbursement Policy Section (MRPS) deals with the general COE policies and procedures, and with the various related premiums. It leads the MOU negotiations with the T/PCCs.

The MRPS is the T/PCCs primary point of contact for all reimbursement-related issues.

The OPPFB/DMSPC does the actual payments of reimbursements to T/PCCs.
Questions

Lecture 1

Learning Outcomes

- Understand the COE Reimbursement System as mandated by the General Assembly.
- Understand the purpose and organization of the COE Manual.
- Learn about the content of the main COE Manual chapters, know how to navigate the Manual.
- Learn about major equipment and self sustainment standards.
- Learn about and understand the differences between MOU and LOA.
### Lecture Content

1. COE reimbursement system
2. The COE manual: purpose, organization, important chapters for T/PCCs
3. Transportation
4. Loss and damage of COE
5. Mission factors
6. Major Equipment
7. Special case equipment
8. Self-Sustainment Standards
9. Memorandum Of Understanding
10. Letter Of Assist

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**Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 2 of Module D of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).**
Key message: the **COE Reimbursement System** is based on **standard reimbursement rates approved by the General Assembly** that are reviewed periodically.

The **COE Manual** is a consolidation of recommendations made at the Working Groups – contains policies and procedures for UNHQ and Peacekeeping missions as mandated by GA.

**Key features of the COE system:**

- Performance driven
- Member States can appreciate their commitment immediately
- Simplified budgeting and reimbursement
- Integrated management structure in the Field

Since 1996, reimbursement to countries contributing contingents to UN peacekeeping operations has been based on a methodology characterized by:

- Model MOU negotiated individually with T/PCCs
- Standard reimbursement rates for personnel, major equipment, and self-sustainment approved by the GA
• COE reimbursement (major equipment and self-sustainment) is administered in accordance with the COE Manual

• Periodical review of policies, inclusions and rates of reimbursement:
  - triennial COE Working Group and quadrennial personnel cost survey (latest cost survey done in 2018).

Key message: the COE Reimbursement System is based on the key principles of simplicity, accountability, certainty of financial impact, and management control.

The COE Reimbursement system is based on four key principles:

• simplicity, (standard rates, standard MOU, common standards of equipment and services)

• accountability, (management of assets by T/PCC, financial implication in case of failure)

• certainty of financial impact, (established rates and rules of calculation)

• management control (though verifications in the field and certification of claims).
**Key message:** all member states may participate in the COE Working Group convened every three years.

Technical working group with participation from all interested Member States  
Convened every 3 years  
Takes decisions on basis of:  
- National cost data provided by MS  
- Issue papers submitted by MS and the Secretariat  

Managed by a Bureau elected by participants (Chair, Vice-Chair, and Rapporteur)  
Discussions in 3 sub-working groups on ME, SS and medical support issues  

The organization of the COE Working Group is managed by the MOU & Reimbursements Policy Section (MRPS / UCSD / OSCM / DOS).
Key Outcomes of the 2017 Working Group

- Increase of 0.6% across all rates of reimbursement
- Generators (new types based on power ratings)
- Additional ME categories for rotation at UN expense
- Reimbursement for ME in RDL of PCRS (25% maintenance rate)
- Reimbursement of COE lost/damaged in hostile action ($250,000 over one year / $100,000 for single action)
- Accommodation (Standard United Nations accommodation)
- Medical Support (AMET; Physiotherapy module; and upgrade of analog to digital equipment)

Key message: the COE WG 2017 recommended a series of reimbursement augmentations favorable to the T/PCCs.

- Increase of 0.6% across all rates of reimbursement
- Generators (new types based on power ratings)
- Additional ME categories for rotation at UN expense
- Reimbursement for ME in RDL of PCRS (25% maintenance rate)
- Reimbursement of COE lost/damaged in hostile action ($250,000 over one year / $100,000 for single action)
- Accommodation (Standard United Nations accommodation)
- Medical Support (AMET; Physiotherapy module; and upgrade of analog to digital equipment)
**Preparation for 2020 COE WG**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date/Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>NV with template packages (NCD* and IP**) sent in June 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dedicated website and dedicated email inbox established</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deadline of submission by T/PCCs (NCD &amp; IPs)</td>
<td>31 May 2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deadline of sharing of package by Sec</td>
<td>End of August 2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>Draft agenda and nominees for Bureau membership</td>
<td>21 November 2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regular briefings to T/PCCs up until the COE WG</td>
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* NCD: National Cost Data  
** IP: Issue paper

**Key message:** the deadline for submission of proposals for the 2020 Working Group is 31 May 2019.

NCD: National Cost Data  
IP: Issue paper
Development of **Topic 2 of Lecture 2** of **Module D** of the **United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)**.

**Notes:**

The COE Manual is the key guidance document that documents the entire COE methodology including standards as they relate to reimbursement. It also includes all the key recommendations from all the COE working groups.

Chapter 3 gives all the standards that the TCC/PCC has to meet in order to get reimbursed. We will go through all the categories and the structure of the manual.

Chapter 8 has all the approved Major equipment and the Self Sustainment categories.

Any changes to the COE Manual have to be made through the COE working Group which is held every 3 years.
Key message: the COE Manual is a GA-approved policies and procedures document, which covers all matters related to the reimbursement of the Contingent Owned Equipment contributed by Member States to Peacekeeping Missions.

The complete designation of the COE Manual is as follows:
Manual on **Policies** and **Procedures** Concerning the **Reimbursement** and **Control** of **Contingent-Owned Equipment** of **Troop/Police** Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions

The operative words are in RED and summarize the content and purpose of the COE Manual:

- **Policies**: governing all that follows
- **Procedures**: how UNHQ and field missions implement said policies, to the below domains
- **Reimbursement**: the final purpose of the COE Manual – this is not an operational procedures manual!
- **Control**: control of the COE is mandatory before any reimbursement and is part of the system
- **Contingent-Owned Equipment**: ME, SS, and also individual equipment (to an extent: minimum kit of individual equipment as per UN standards).
- **Troop/Police**: the COE Manual concerns both the Police and the Military formed units.
“The COE Manual contains the **policies, procedures and actions to be followed by United Nations Headquarters and peacekeeping missions**. The Manual is intended to provide assistance to troop/police contributors and to ensure that the decisions of the Assembly are fully and consistently implemented.

Consolidation of recommendations made at various working groups through issue papers submitted by both Member States and the Secretariat.

Lists the current monthly reimbursement rates
- Annex B – current rates for major equipment
- Annex C – current rates for self-sustainment


Original in English but translated in all UN official languages.

The COE Manual is not a technical manual that can be amended at will by the Secretariat. Only the General Assembly may approve amendments to the COE Manual.
Key message: the COE Manual does NOT cover the financial aspects linked to the contribution of individual personnel, like Individual Police Officers, UNMOs or Staff Officers.

These are the main subjects covered by the COE Manual, and in the next slides we are going to see how the information is provided and where to find it.
Key message: there are 10 chapters in the COE Manual covering all aspects of the reimbursement of COE contributions to Members states.

The COE Manual 2017 is a 250-page document arranged in 10 chapters whose titles are as follows (complete titles):

- **Chapter 1, Introduction** - recalls the history of the COE system and its evolution since 1996 and presents the basic principles of the system.

- **Chapter 2, Standard Elements of the COE System** - Presents the basis of the various elements composing the COE system; most of the domains presented in Chapter 2 are then developed in further specific chapters.

- **Chapter 3, Standards, Verification, Controls of the COE and SS** - Presents the minimum standards to be respected concerning various kinds and categories of equipment. As such it is of particular importance for a T/PCC in order to know if existing equipment meets the standard, or to form a better idea about what kind of equipment is to be procured.

- **Chapter 4, Preparation to Deployment, redeployment, transportation** - presents these elements from a reimbursement point of view: what can be reimbursed, and how. The Letter Of Assist, which is the object of a specific lecture, is mentioned in this Chapter (during the COE Working Group 2014, the member states agreed to provide some basic explanation about the LOAs in the COE Manual, although in reality the LOA is not part of the reimbursement framework per se). This chapter does not indicate how to prepare the equipment for transport or how to organize its strategic transport (this is addressed in the last Module of the course “Preparation & Execution of Transport for Deployment”).
• **Chapter 5, Special case equipment** – addresses the case of major equipment that is not listed in chapter 8 and therefore does not have a standard rate of reimbursement in the COE system.

• **Chapter 6, Loss and damage of COE** - addresses the condition of compensation for the COE lost in various circumstances (topic addressed in the Major Equipment lecture).

• **Chapter 7, Determining Mission Factors** - details the procedure leading to the determination of the Mission Factors (which are explained in a next slide). This chapter is more useful to the UN personnel in charge of determining the factors for a given operation.

• **Chapter 8, Reimbursement rates of the ME and SS** - Gives basic explanation on how the reimbursement rates are computed, and provides the rates for all categories of major equipment and self sustainment equipment. Therefore it allows the T/PCC to form an idea about the level of reimbursement of a given kind of equipment, even before receiving precise information from the UNHQ.

• **Chapter 9, Memorandum of Understanding** - Contains the models of the MOUs both for the Military units and the Police units, as well as their annexes. This is where the complete generic text of the MOU can be found (this generic text is the same for all units and is not negotiated; any amendment would have to be approved by the Office of Legal Affairs.

• **Chapter 10, Responsibilities under the COE system** - Details the responsibilities of the principals and of the various offices and services, both in UNHQ and in the field, in the implementation of the COE system. No paragraph addresses the responsibilities of the P/TCCs, although the responsibilities of the Contingent Commander are spelled out.
Key message: Chapter 2 presents a summary of the policy governing each element of the COE system, which are then developed in dedicated chapters.

It is important to understand that Chapter 2 presents the policy governing each element of the COE system, which are then each developed in dedicated chapters. So the text for a given domain in Chapter 2 refers to the related chapter which will deal with it in detail. For people not familiar with the COE Manual, it is therefore advised to start by Chapter 2, find what you are looking for and then jump to the relevant chapter.
Key message: the COE Manual contains all the information needed by P/TCCs to assess a possible future formed unit contribution in terms of equipment standards and expected reimbursements.

Every word is important in the COE Manual, but as regards T/PCCs starting the preparing for a new deployment, there are 4 chapters that may be considered more immediately important than the others. We will review them in a more detailed way before having a brief word about the other chapters.

• Chapter 2 as said before presents the basis of the various elements composing the COE system; most of the domains presented in Chapter 2 are then developed in further specific chapters.

• Chapter 3 presents the minimum standards to be respected concerning various kinds and categories of equipment. As such it is of particular importance for a T/PCC in order to know if existing equipment meets the standard, or to form a better idea about what kind of equipment is to be procured.

• Chapter 8 gives basic explanation on how the reimbursement rates are computed, and provides the rates for all categories of major equipment and self sustainment equipment. Therefore it allows the T/PCC to form an idea about the level of reimbursement of a given kind of equipment, even before receiving precise information from the UNHQ.

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Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 2 of Module D of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
### Preparation to Deployment, Redeployment, Transportation

| • UN responsible for deployment, redeployment, repatriation of COE and rotation of ME at UN expense. |
| • Painting/repainting of Major Equipment |
| • Inland Transportation:  
  – From originating location to agreed port of embarkation |
| • Resupply of spare parts and minor equipment included in rates (2%) + additional incremental mission factors |
| • Unique Transportation Factor |

---

**Key message:** Chapter 4 of the COE Manual covers reimbursement topics linked to the transportation of COE and personnel, but not the technical arrangements.

A few basic principles regarding transportation of COE and personnel:

- **Transportation:** The United Nations is responsible for the transportation of troops, police and contingent-owned equipment upon deployment and repatriation but may request the troop/police contributor, or consider a request from a troop/police contributor, to provide this service via a letter of assist (LOA, which is detailed in a specific topic of the present module).
- **Inland Transportation** – is the reimbursement of the transportation of COE between its normal operating base to the agreed upon port of embarkation (within the country)
- **TCC/PCC** is responsible for resupply of spare parts and minor equipment – to that effect 2% are included in the reimbursement rates.
- **For mission factors refer to topic 5 below.**
Development of Topic 4 of Lecture 2 of Module D of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Loss and damage of COE

- No-fault incidents
  - No additional reimbursement
  - Reimbursement rates include a no-fault incident factor

- Hostile action / forced abandonment
  - Reimbursement for each item whose GFMV is $100,000 or greater, for one incident, or when collective value of such items is $250,000 or greater for several incidents in one fiscal year.

- Loss and damage during transportation
  - The party arranging the transportation is responsible
  - Reimbursement for significant damage (repair costs 10% or more of GFMV)

Key message: the reimbursements for loss and damages of COE in case of hostile action / forced abandonment have been improved with COE Working Group 2017: GFMV threshold lowered to $100,000 for each item for one incident and cumulative value fixed at $250,000 or greater for several separate incidents.

The UN does not pay for equipment that is lost during the normal course of operations because the monthly rates include a no-fault incident factor.

The UN will pay for equipment that is lost under Hostile / Action or Forced Abandonment as determined by the Force Commander provided the Generic Fair Market Value is $100,000 or greater for a single piece of Major Equipment for one incident, or several pieces of Major Equipment totaling $250,000 or more.

The party arranging transportation during deployment and or / repatriation to or from the Field Mission is responsible for the loss and damage during transportation. If the UN arranges the transportation then they are liable for any significant damage whose repair costs is more than 10% of the generic fair market value.
Loss and damage of COE

- No reimbursement for loss or damage to:
  - spare parts
  - minor equipment and consumables (covered by hostile action/abandonment factor in SS rates and the no-fault incident factor)

- Method of calculation for damages is based on reasonable cost of repair

- Damage greater than 75% of GFMV is considered a TOTAL LOSS

Key message: no reimbursement is due from the UN for loss or damage of spare parts or minor equipment as these are already covered in the self-sustainment rate and through the no-fault incident factor of the major equipment rate.

- No reimbursement is made for loss or damage to spare parts, minor equipment and consumables

- The UN calculates damage base on reasonable cost of repair.

- Damage that is more that is 75% of the Generic Fair Market value is considered a total loss.
Key message: the threshold for UN liability for major equipment destroyed in mission is US$100,000 for individual piece of equipment or US$250,000 for several pieces of equipment, based on the GFMV of the equipment.

- Loss of individual equipment below the threshold of US$100,000 is not compensated as this is already covered by the hostile action / forced abandonment factor specific to the mission (see next topic, “Mission factors”).
- In addition, the wet lease/dry lease rates include a no-fault factor to cover the loss of or damage to equipment in a no-fault incident (= incident where the responsibility of the P/TCC is not engaged).
- Loss of several pieces of equipment in one or several events occurring in the course of a single fiscal year are compensated above the threshold of US$ 250,000.
Development of Topic 5 of Lecture 2 of Module D of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: The mission factors are intended to compensate T/PCCs for specific conditions prevailing in the area of responsibility that cause shorter life of equipment or additional maintenance costs.

Mission factors are multipliers applied to the reimbursement rates for major equipment and self-sustainment intended to compensate troop/police contributors for specific conditions prevailing in the area of responsibility that cause unusual wear and tear, shorter life of equipment, increased maintenance costs and/or risk of damage to and loss of the equipment.

There are three kinds of mission factors:

• **Extreme Environmental conditions** – taking into account mountainous, climatic and terrain conditions ME& SS (max 5%)

• **Hostile Action / forced abandonment** – not to exceed 6% of the spares element of the wet lease rate (or half of the estimated monthly maintenance cost when the spares cost cannot be calculated separately) and the self-sustainment rate to compensate for the cost of losses borne by contingents for minor equipment, spare parts and consumables.

• **Intensified Operational conditions** – Intensified ME & SS logistics chain non availability of commercial repair and support facilities and operational hazards (max 5%)

• Mission Factors are applied to both ME and SS
• These are the basic principles. Chapter 7 provides detailed instructions on the calculation of the factors, as well as decision sheets for same (Mainly for UN personnel use – This is a DPO/OMA/MPS responsibility, via a Technical Survey Team).

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Key message: the mission factors % are higher in the most dangerous missions.

Here are examples of actual mission factors in various missions, as of 01 July 2017. The most dangerous or demanding the mission, the higher the mission factors.

[Please note that the sum total value of the mission factors is not applied as such (last column), as the factor on hostile action/forced abandonment is applied to half of maintenance rate only and the other two factors on wet/dry lease rates.]
Development of **Topic 6** of **Lecture 2** of **Module D** of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Major Equipment Definition

- Major equipment consists of items directly related to the unit’s mission as mutually determined by the United Nations and the troop/police contributor.
  - Combat and transport vehicles, trailers
  - Engineering equipment
  - Heavy / collective weapons
  - Ablution sets
  - Generators above 20 KVA
  - Etc.

Key message: directly related to the unit’s mission.

Chapter 2 of the COE Manual defines the Major Equipment of a formed unit as “items directly related to the unit mission as mutually determined by the United Nations and the troop/police contributor.

In addition to vehicles of all types, major equipment can be heavy weapons (field guns, rocket launchers), engineering equipment, generators above 20 KVA (below 20 KVA they are counted as self-sustainment equipment), ablution sets, storage containers, demining equipment, communication equipment, etc.

It is worth noting that some equipment (communication, demining, etc.) may be reimbursed either as major equipment or self-sustainment equipment, depending on whether they are used in the framework of a Mission-wide task or for the benefit of the unit only.

Example:
- EOD kits used by an engineering unit as a mission asset are reimbursed as major equipment.
- Same EOD kit used as a unit asset to keep its compound safe are reimbursed as self-sustainment equipment.
Key message: for the Major Equipment, the wet lease option includes reimbursements for the equipment and the maintenance costs whereas in the dry lease option only the equipment is reimbursed, the maintenance being assumed by a third party.

Chapter 3 of the COE Manual provides information about the nature and characteristics of major equipment, inspection standards, rules governing the classification of vehicles in military pattern or commercial pattern and detailed standards of the medical installations and equipment, as well as the standards for verification of COE in the field.

- **Wet lease**: The UN leases the equipment but the country is responsible for the maintenance of that equipment. The wet lease includes a usage rate component and a maintenance rate. The country is responsible for the resupply of its spare parts and consumables. The rates include a transportation factor based on the distance of the countries original location.
- **Dry lease**: The UN leases the equipment but only pays the usage rate. The UN or another country provides the maintenance for the equipment.

The UN COE reimbursement system as it relates to Major Equipment is essentially a lease. The UN leases the equipment from the TCC/PCC using established rates via two ways:

- **Wet Lease**
- **Dry Lease**
- Wet Lease payment is compensation for using the equipment and for the country maintaining the equipment.

- For more details about wet lease and dry lease refer to Lecture 3, same module.

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Development of Topic 7 of Lecture 2 of Module D of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: Special Case equipment is reimbursed at a rate negotiated with the UNHQ, and based on the generic fair market value of the equipment.

- Special case equipment is major equipment for which, because of the uniqueness of the item, its high value or the lack of a generic group, a standard rate of reimbursement has not been defined in the tables of reimbursement (in Chapter 8).

- Often concerns unique specialized equipment not listed in Chapter 8 of the COE Manual but needed / requested by a Mission.

- Reimbursement rate negotiated with UNHQ, based on the Generic Fair Market Value of the equipment (with proof of cost: invoice, etc.). Same rules of calculation as for standard ME.

- Special case major equipment should be of a value greater than $1,000 and have a life expectancy of more than one year.

- Loss or damage: same rules as for standard ME.

- Once the General Assembly approves a generic reimbursement rate for a special case item, the said item can no longer be considered or reimbursed as a special case.
Development of **Topic 8** of **Lecture 2** of **Module D** of the **United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)**.
Key message: self-sustainment concerns the provision of services for logistics and operational support; there is no partial category reimbursement and if the T/PCC cannot provide in a category, the UN will take over the service.

- Self-Sustainment includes minor equipment and consumables and is according to categories established in the COE Manual.
- Self-Sustainment is paid based on the number of people supported according to the rates established in the COE manual.
- Payment is per contingent member.
- UN does not pay for partial standards all or nothing.
- Self Sustainment is paid for the well being of the soldier maintaining of the accommodation area as provisioning.

There are standards for each self sustainment category which are listed in the COE manual. The country must meet the whole standards or else no payment will be issued for the category.

In case the UN has to take over a self-sustainment service:
- The TCC does not get reimbursement for this category;
- The MOU will have to be amended.
- Reference COE Manual Chapter 3 / Annex B / Para 7
Key message: each self-sustainment category has its own rate of reimbursement.

- There are several categories of self sustainment for which we will go into the requirements in a later slide
- Each category has its own monthly rate of reimbursement
- Some categories have sub-categories, like Communications.
Key message: each self-sustainment category has its own rate of reimbursement.

- To be discussed in more details in COE Manual – Chapter 3
- Other categories that have sub-categories: Medical, Observation, Miscellaneous General Stores.
Key message: the Catering category concerns the kitchen equipment necessary to keep and process the food, but also to deliver and consume it.

- Catering SS is what the T/PCC needs to operate a clean kitchen including pots and pans, stove and hot water facilities to wash the plates.
- Included in this category are the utensils needed to eat: plates, knives, spoons, and a refrigerator that can keep food for 7 days and a deep fridge to keep food for 14 days.
- The furniture for eating facilities is included under Accommodation category.
Key message: the Communications category covers equipment needed to assume communications at the unit level, excluding communications with the capital which are not reimbursed.

Communications with the capital are not reimbursed as they are considered national activities. Satellite communications equipment can be reimbursed in lieu of HF communications equipment.

Depending on the deployment of the unit in the mission area, and on the tasks assigned (as per the unit’s SUR), the HF equipment may not be reimbursed for the full complement of the unit:
- If only a part of the unit is supposed to do long distance missions justifying the use of HF assets to remain in contact with HQ;
- If only a part of the unit is permanently stationed far away from the main body (i.e., one Company from an Infantry Battalion having to deploy far from the rest of the Battalion, too far for use of UHF only).

In this case the partial reimbursement of the unit for HF will be negotiated before and during the MOU negotiation, as a percentage of the whole unit.

Telephone equipment (switchboard and associated equipment) are generally mandatory in permanent camps.

The equipment necessary to assume communications above the unit level, with either Force HQ, Sector HQ or Police HQ, is provided by the Mission (the operators of the Mission’s assets are either provided by the Mission – i.e. from a Signal unit – or drawn from the receiving unit and trained by the Mission specialists).
Key message: Electrical and Minor Engineering categories must allow the unit to effect normal installation and maintenance of relevant equipment at unit level.

- Category of office includes furniture, paper, stationary, computers
- Electrical bulbs, generators (under 20KVA), wires
- Minor Equipment minor equipment that can be used to repair the camp including minor plumbing
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) have the ability to locate **and dismantle or destroy** unexploded ordnance. Includes protective clothing.
Key message: the Laundry and Cleaning categories include the consumables that are necessary to operate any cleaning / washing equipment.

- Laundry – washing machines detergents and supplies to keep soldiers clean.
- Mops buckets cleaning materials to keep the Accommodation clean.
Key message: in addition to offer sound living and working structures, the accommodation facilities should be designed with environmental concerns in mind so as to save on energy consumption and diminish greenhouse gas emissions.

- Tentage must have flooring heating and also includes the provision of temporary offices and workspace

- Accommodation is permanent rigid structures and must have flooring heating cooling lightening sanitation and running water and also dining furniture and offices.

- New minimal conditions fixed in COE Manual 2017, Chapter 3 (no more mention of rigid or semi-rigid structures).

- COE Manual 2017 also makes provision for an additional 5% reimbursement supplement for Environmental enhancements to accommodation or tentage (double roofing, wall shading, additional thermal insulation, A/C with appropriate energy efficiency ratio).
Key message: fire detection and alarm capabilities must be present throughout the camp facilities, both in working and living quarters.

- Basic Firefighting includes the capability to put out a simple fire buckets beaters and fire extinguishers.

- Fire Detection and alarm capability includes providing smoke detectors and fire alarm systems.
Key message: basic medical support and first aid training are T/PCCs responsibilities.

- UN provides blood and blood related products.
- Basic is your first line medical attention first aid kits and training in first aid
- Level 1 is your basic clinic to perform routine exams and care of minor sickness
- High Risk areas is prophylaxis and preventive health measures for endemic infectious disease .
- Level II is the where the first line surgical care is provided and ancillary service.
- Level III is advance hospitals for surgical care including extended intensive care
Self-Sustainment

**General Observation**
- Handheld binoculars

**Night Observation**
- Passive or active infrared, thermal or image intensification
- Detection, identification range of $\geq 1,000$ m

**Positioning**
- Determine exact geographic location of person or item
- Global positioning and laser range finders

**Key message:** the Observation category includes general observation, night observation and geographic positioning equipment.

- General Observation is handheld binoculars
- Night Observation includes passive or active infrared thermal and image and detection identification $> 1,000$ m
- Positioning includes global positioning and laser range finders with the ability to determine the exact location of an item or person
Key message: Field Defense Stores material is generally provided by the Mission.

- Field Defense Store is what is used to secure the camp composing of barbed wire sand bags and concertina wire.

- It also includes early warning systems.

- Identification includes photographic equipment and editing equipment for surveillance operations.
Key message: Internet Access and Welfare equipment should be provided in sufficient quantities for the strength of the contingent to support, consistent with the sums received by the T/PCC in these categories.

- Bedding category includes what you typically need to sleep on a bed
- Furniture includes the bed mattress night stand and locker
- Internet Access includes the computers to be used to access the commercial provider
- Welfare includes TVs VRs sports equipment games and Fitness Equipment.
- Internet access equipment and welfare items are listed in the MOU (Annex C : Appendix 2).
Development of Topic 9 of Lecture 2 of Module D of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the MOU is a financial, legally binding document, which formalizes and details the contribution by a T/PCC of personnel, equipment, and services to a peacekeeping operation. The generic text of the MOU is approved by the General Assembly.

- The Memorandum Of Understanding is the foundational agreement between the UN and the contributing Member State
- Its generic text is approved by the General Assembly in the COE manual (Chapter 9)
- The MOU is a financial document that details the number and type of personnel, as well as equipment and services, to be contributed
- The MOU is based on the statement of unit requirements / force requirement, to reflect the concept of operations (CONOPS). Starting in 2017 (COE WG 2017 recommendation) the SUR will be included in the MOU as Annex G (Military + Police).
Key message: The MOU contains three annexes dealing with the reimbursement of Personnel, Major Equipment and Self Sustainment Equipment, and two annexes listing the verification standards of the ME and SS.

Annex A – the number of troops/police and the soldier/police kit

Annex B – the major equipment list that will be deployed and corresponding rates of reimbursement;

Annex C – self-sustainment capabilities a country will undertake, with the corresponding rates of reimbursement and also a list of welfare stores that the TC/PC will be making available to their personnel in the field;

Annexes D and E are basically Chapter 3 of the COE Manual for ME and SS respectively.
Key message: The MOU contains three annexes dealing with the reimbursement of Personnel, Major Equipment and Self-Sustainment Equipment, and two annexes listing the verification standards of the ME and SS.

Annex A – the number of troops/police and the soldier/police kit

Annex B – the major equipment list that will be deployed and corresponding rates of reimbursement;

Annex C – self-sustainment capabilities a country will undertake, with the corresponding rates of reimbursement and also a list of welfare stores that the TC/PC will be making available to their personnel in the field;

Annexes D and E are basically Chapter 3 of the COE Manual for ME and SS respectively.

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<td>Guidelines for troop contributing countries</td>
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<td>Bulletin on observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law</td>
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Annexes D and E are basically Chapter 3 of the COE Manual for ME and SS respectively.
Key message: the draft MOU is established by DOS/MRPS, which also coordinates the negotiation.

Purpose of Recce visit is to evaluate the conditions in the mission area under which COE and personnel would operate. It may happen that observations made by the Director of Mission Support’s team lead to slightly amend the unit’s list of equipment, which is why the recce has to take place before the MOU negotiation. Recce visit is governed by a DPO policy and will be seen in details in Module F – Force Generation Process.

The draft MOU is created by MRPS based on the Statement of Unit Requirements. During the negotiation, MRPS will create and maintain a table recording every accepted modification of the quantity or change in nature of the Major Equipment required in the SUR.

Delegation from Capital – the negotiation always takes place at the UNHQ. Delegation should have the proper authority to negotiate an MOU and be comprised of:

- Military officer, preferably commanding officer of the contingent unit, or senior military officer;

- Logistics officer who knows the national equipment;

- Relevant officers, e.g. Medical Officer for a Hospital, Engineer for an Engineering Unit, etc.
- Finance Officer or Auditor for some TC/PCs.

Delegation always travels at National expense, which means its composition is left to the appreciation of the TCC.
Key message: no reimbursement shall be paid until the MOU is signed by both the Government and the UN.

Upon confirmation from the TCC/PCC that they are ready to deploy, a Pre-deployment visit is conducted by UNHQ and Mission Representatives (will be seen in details in Module F / Force Generation process).

The purpose of the PDV is for the team to verify that the equipment agreed upon in the MOU is indeed realized in quantity and nature - and is fit for the mission.

Upon completion of the PDV and finalization of changes resulting from the PDV, a final draft of the MOU is sent to the PM in New York for them to concur.

Upon receipt of concurrence, the MOU is prepared for signature by MRPS and signed by the Under Secretary General of DOS and the Permanent Representative of the TCC/PCC – or whichever person in charge is designated by the Government.

It may happen that a cycle of approvals at Government / administration level delay the signature by the TCC’s authorities.

Upon signature, the Reimbursement process of COE can begin. No reimbursement shall be paid until the MOU is signed by both parties.
Key message: Any change to the quantity of various COE items required by the SUR and accepted during the MOU negotiation is recorded by MRPS.

Note: click to make the post-its appear / disappear

During the MOU negotiation, RCMPS records and keeps track of the modification in COE with regard to the nature or quantities of equipment stated in the SUR. Deviations can augment or diminish the SUR quantities, suppress equipment or add equipment initially not requested by the SUR. Reasons for the deviations may come from:

- P/TCC request for reasons of internal organization;
- P/TCC request for reason of availability of equipment (substitution);
- P/TCC request following field reconnaissance;
- Mission request during or after the reconnaissance, due to changes in local support conditions;
- Mission request during or after the reconnaissance due to changes in local operational environment;
- OMA or Police Division request due to operational changes having intervened since the SUR was drafted.

Proposed deviations are discussed during the negotiation and can be accepted or rejected. The justification for the decision is recorded in the table, which is a UN internal document. Same table may be used later on during the life of the unit, whenever a change happens in its COE quantities, for whatever reason (especially a change of unit requirements).
Development of **Topic 10** of **Lecture 2** of **Module D** of the **United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)**.
Key message: the Letter Of Assist is legally binding contractual document that determines the scope and cost of a service provided to the UN by a Member State.

A detailed definition, use of, content of and other matters of an LOA has been included as annex A to chapter 4 since the 2011 COE manual.

Legally binding document, signed by both parties and determines the scope and cost of a service provided to the UN by a Member State.

The service may be specific, unique, not available commercially.
Key message: a Letter Of Assist is a legally binding contractual document between the United Nations and a Government for provision of services to the UN.

LOAs are typically used for (non-limitative examples):
- Rotation of personnel
- Deployment of equipment
- Provision of military aircraft or vessels (here: BNS Osman with Indonesia Navy Sigma class corvette in Lebanon UN) to a mission.
- Provision of services to a mission by a member state; typically, a special need arises for essential equipment or services not available through normal sources of supply in the mission area. For example, a well drilling team, rehabilitation of an unpaved runway by personnel which are not part of the Force (therefore not working under a MOU).
- T/PCCs mainly use LOAs for rotation of personnel, deployment of COE and provision of military vessels and aviation units (will be detailed in Module F2)
Key message: the Letter Of Assist is used for the rotation / transport of personnel and equipment, provision of aircraft or vessels to a peacekeeping operation, or provision of services not available in the mission area through normal procurement action.

There are five cases when a LOA may be used – Refer to COE Manual, Chapter 4, Annex A

A LOA is a contracting method by which the UN arranges for special supplies or services to be provided by the TCC/PCC. LOAs are used when:
- a) a special need arises for essential items or services that are not available from normal sources of supply;
- b) a contingent’s country is the only logical source of supply;
- c) a contingent’s COE MOU does not cover the items or services required;
- d) military aircraft(s) or naval vessel(s) are contributed by a TCC/PCC; or
- e) a TCC/PCC wishes to arrange for the transportation of equipment/personnel for deployment, rotation or repatriation.

The contribution of aircraft or vessels to a peacekeeping mission is always covered by both a MOU and a LOA. The MOU takes care of the personnel and ground equipment, including SS services, while the LOA takes care of the terms of the contract by which the T/PCC provides the aircraft or vessel to the PKO.

An LOA can be required either by United Nations Headquarters or the troop contributing country.

DOS has the authority to issue LOAs, which must be signed by representatives of the TCC/PCC Permanent Mission and the UN prior to deployment of whatever asset is mentioned in the LOA, or prior to the delivery of the service that is the object of the LOA (ex., transportation of contingent personnel).
A LOA is a legally binding contractual document between the United Nations and a Government. It provides the appropriate authority for procurement of services on behalf of the United Nations. It will also specify how reimbursement will be made. Detailed information about letters of assist can be found in the Procurement Manual.

A LOA is an exception to a formal method of solicitation: no evaluation of the offer, no international competition, etc. This is also the reason why there is no formal evaluation of the assets the P/TCC is using to provide the service (whereas in a commercial contracting process, as per Procurement rules there is a mandatory technical evaluation of each offer submitted by the bidders, with a check of compliance and a comparative note attributed to each offer).
**Key message:** since the LOA is a contract, it must be signed by both parties before the T/PCC starts providing the agreed service.

The LOA workflow starts with an agreement between the T/PCC and Logistics Division (LD). Procurement Division will be involved in case of provision of aircraft or vessels.

LD then prepares the LOA after approval by Headquarters Committee on Contracts for signature by LD and the Permanent Mission. The LOA being a contractual arrangement, it must be signed by both parties before the P/TCC starts providing the corresponding service.

The TCC/PCC renders the goods or services as per the LOA

TCC/PCC submits the claim to RCPMS/UCSD

RCMPS certifies claim for payment upon confirmation from LD that the services and or goods were provided as per the LOA.
Lecture Take Away

- The COE Reimbursement System is approved by the General Assembly.
- The COE Manual contains all the policies and procedures governing the COE reimbursements.
- The MOU is a financial, legally binding document which formalizes and details the contribution by a T/PCC of personnel, equipment, and services to a peacekeeping operation.
- The LOA is a contracting method by which the UN arranges for special supplies or services to be provided by T/PCCs.
Questions

Lecture 2
Learning Outcomes

- Learn about the difference between dry lease and wet lease.
- Understand the differences between reimbursement of major equipment and reimbursement of self sustainment equipment.
- Learn about various claims for reimbursement.
- Learn about the COE reimbursement procedures.
- Learn about the verifications of COE in the field.
Lecture Content

- Major Equipment reimbursement
- Dry lease
- Wet lease
- Reimbursement during withdrawal
- Self Sustainment reimbursement
- Various claims
- Life cycle of COE procedures
- Verifications in the field
- COE reimbursement process
Development of **Topic 1** of **Lecture 3** of **Module D** of the **United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)**.
Key message: as regards Major Equipment, the T/PCC are responsible for deploying serviceable equipment with all associated minor equipment and consumable.

- TCC/PCC are allowed to bring 10% more in equipment in order to maintain serviceability at all times. The UN will pay to transport the additional equipment and will also pay to paint and repaint it.
Key message: under the COE Reimbursement System, unserviceable equipment will not be reimbursed.

- No reimbursement is made for major equipment that is not deployed.
- A deduction is made to equipment that is not serviceable except vehicles which are allowed a 10% leeway to account for regular maintenance that is required to be performed to vehicles.
Key message: for the Major Equipment, the wet lease option includes reimbursements for the equipment and the maintenance costs whereas in the dry lease option only the equipment is reimbursed, the maintenance being assumed by a third party.

The UN COE reimbursement system as it relates to Major Equipment is essentially a lease. The UN leases the equipment from the TCC/PCC using established rates via two ways:

Wet Lease — The UN leases the equipment but the country is responsible for the maintenance of that equipment. The wet lease includes a usage rate component and a maintenance rate. The country is responsible for the resupply of its spare parts and consumables. The rates include a transportation factor based on the distance of the country's original location.

Dry Lease — The UN leases the equipment but only pays the usage rate. The UN or another country provides the maintenance for the equipment.

The UN leases the TCC/PCC equipment under two types of payments — Dry Lease and Wet lease. The Dry lease is essentially to compensate the country for using the equipment. Maintenance for a Dry lease is done by the UN or a third party.

Wet Lease payment is compensation for using the equipment and for the country maintaining the equipment.

We will go in more detail at a later slide.
Key message: the dry lease arrangement is limited to the reimbursement of the equipment usage charge, augmented by the Mission factors and transportation factor.

The dry lease includes only the usage charge of the Major Equipment without maintenance; it is augmented by the mission factors specific to the mission and possibly by an incremental transportation factor (1) for minor equipment.

(1) An incremental transportation factor of 0.25 per cent for each complete 500 statute miles or 800 kilometers (after the first 500 statute miles or 800 kilometers) along the consignment route between the port of embarkation and the port of entry to the mission area.
Key message: the wet lease arrangement includes the reimbursement of spare parts and maintenance operations for each piece of major equipment.

Wet lease includes spare parts and all the minor equipment in support of the Major Equipment, a usage charge (dry lease) and maintenance.

In addition to the wet lease rate mission factors for the specific mission are added and the transportation factor (1) unique to the country to come up with the monthly reimbursement rate for each major equipment item.

(1) An incremental transportation factor of 0.25 per cent for each complete 500 statute miles or 800 kilometers (after the first 500 statute miles or 800 kilometers) along the consignment route between the port of embarkation and the port of entry to the mission area.
Key message: Annex B of the MOU provides all necessary information on the concerned unit, nature of the lease (wet/dry), nature and quantities of major equipment items.

Here is how the reimbursement for major equipment appears in the MOU Annex B. This is the example of a draft MOU for a Force Reserve Battalion for MINUSCA. The Government name has been blackened. Please note that in this example the rates of reimbursement are outdated, corresponding to the 2014 version of the COE Manual.

The method of reimbursement is mentioned: here wet lease.

For this mission and for this unit deployed in this area, the mission factors have been established as presented here (this is a responsibility of the Military Planning Service, DPO/OMA).

On this partial copy of annex B, let’s see the case of the Wheeled APCs, unarmed (Class II)

As per the SUR for this unit, 6 APCs of this type are required.
Key message: the exploitation of the COE Manual with the SUR allows to estimate the reimbursements that will be perceived by the Government for a given unit deploying to a given mission.

For this equipment (wheeled APCs, unarmed), the monthly rate, under the wet lease arrangement (i.e. maintenance included), is of $3,041.00. This is for one piece of equipment.

Adding the mission factors mentioned above, the monthly rate passes to $3,230.73 per item.

Therefore the total monthly reimbursement for the 6 items required amounts to $19,384.38.

It is therefore easy, even with a draft MOU, to anticipate the monthly reimbursement that will be perceived by the Government, provided all the major equipment is serviceable.
Key message: in case of repatriation of the unit, the ME and SS are reimbursed at 50% of the agreed rates between the cease of operations date and the effective date of departure of the unit.

At the end of the TCC/PCC deployment the Force Commander /Police Commissioner issues a Cease of Operations date.

After **Cease of Operation** date reimbursement is made at 50% until departure from Mission area. This applies to both ME and SS.
Development of **Topic 2** of **Lecture 3** of **Module D** of the **United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)**.
Key message: the monthly reimbursement for each self-sustainment category is a combination of the individual base rate plus factors, times the actual number of personnel in the unit.

Rate is per contingent member.

So for a given category we have a base rate that is monthly and individual = for one contingent member. To that base rate we add the factors for the considered mission: hostile action, environmental, intensified operational.

We multiply the result by the number of personnel in the unit (or the number of personnel to support for that category).

With that we obtain the total monthly reimbursement for the unit, for this category.

Please note:
- Reimbursement based on actual troop strength
- Modular - no partial reimbursement per category
- No reimbursement for major equipment deployed for self-sustainment support
Key message: the self-sustainment reimbursements are easy to forecast from Annex C of the MOU.

As an example, this is a partial copy of the MOU Annex C (self sustainment) for a Force Reserve Battalion in strength of 510. Please note that the rates in this example are outdated, as they correspond to the 2014 COE Manual.

Here are the additional factors that will augment the base rate. The factors are established by the Military Planning Service / DPO / OMA.

Let’s see the example of the « Catering » category.

Here is the base rate for this category; therefore this is a monthly rate per man.

Here is the same rate, augmented with the above factors.

Here is the authorized strength for the unit, that can be found in Annex A of the MOU (that will be seen later on in details). Note that the authorized strength for one category can be higher in case the unit is requested to support personnel of other units. In the case of catering, the supporting unit would receive the additional food rations accordingly.

Total monthly reimbursement for the complete strength of 510, supposing they all are present this month. 
Note that if a self sustainment category is not provided by the unit, i.e. is provided by the UN, then the strength for the category is put to 0 and no reimbursement is due for that category. This is notably the case when the T/PCC is unable to provide one of the required services.
Various claims

Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 3 of Module D of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: unliquidated obligations remain valid for five years after which they are cancelled and the liquidated amounts credited to the member states.

Beside the processing of Letters Of Assist claims and Death and Disability claims, which are examined further in the module, RCMPS is responsible to process a series of claims for services that may be reimbursed to T/PCCs:

- **Operational ammunition** means ammunition (including aircraft self-defense systems such as chaff or infrared flares) that the United Nations and troop/police contributors agree to deploy to the mission area so that it is readily available for use in the event of need. Ammunition expended (used) for operational training/exercise beyond accepted United Nations readiness standards on the authority of and at the specific direction of the Force Commander, in anticipation of an operational requirement, will be considered operational ammunition. An “operational ammunition expenditure certificate” with authorizing signatures from the Commanding Officer, COE Section, Force Commander and DMS are needed.

- The administration of **vaccinations**, as recommended by the United Nations, is a national responsibility. Reimbursement of vaccinations are included in the rate of reimbursement for personnel (see Lecture 4 in present module). Yellow Fever is a mandatory inoculation whereas other vaccinations are **recommended** to troops. Vaccinations specifically required by the UN for service in certain areas of operations may be reimbursed through specific claims or directly provided by the UN.

- **Initial provisioning** means a logistics support arrangement in a peacekeeping mission whereby the troop/police contributors provide rations, water and petrol, oil and lubricants to the contingent/unit on a reimbursable basis. Reimbursement will be made to troop/police contributors upon submission of invoices. Normally, initial provisioning for contingents/units is required only for the initial
deployment of the contingent/unit, and for a limited period (30-60 days), until the United Nations is able to provide these consumables. The requirement for initial provision of water, rations and fuel will be specified in troop/police contributors guidelines.

- **Inland Transportation** The United Nations is responsible for transportation of troops/police and COE upon deployment and repatriation but may request, or consider a request from a troop/police contributor to provide this service via a letter of assist. The actual cost of inland transportation of major equipment from its normal operating location to an agreed port of embarkation will be reimbursed, subject to the presentation of validated claims based on terms and conditions agreed in advance in a letter of assist.

- **Loss and damage in transit** Liability for loss or damage during transportation will be assumed by the party making the arrangements. Liability for damage only applies to significant damage. Significant damage means damage where the repairs amount to 10 per cent or more of the generic fair market value of the item of equipment.

(The wet lease/dry lease rates include a no-fault factor to cover loss of or damage to equipment in a no-fault incident. There is no additional reimbursement and no other claims are receivable in case of equipment loss or damage in such incidents)

Our unliquidated obligations remain valid for 5 years after which they are cancelled and the liquidated amounts are returned as credits to the member states. Payment on claims for service rendered which are 5 years old, is not guaranteed.
Development of **Topic 4** of **Lecture 3** of **Module D** of the **United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC)**.
Key message: No COE claim can be processed without a signed MOU.

Process begins with a Reece visit by TCC/PCC to the Field Mission for the purpose of gaining first-hand knowledge of where they are to deploy. UN pays for 3 people. Reece visit is followed by the MOU negotiation to be held in NY Country prepares for deployment to Field Mission and invites UN to conduct a Pre-Deployment visit to inspect the Equipment and give final guidance on suitability of equipment.

TCC will deploy to Field Mission and an Arrival inspection will be conducted by COE unit. Periodic inspection will follow where a Verification Report signed by the Force Commander Director of Mission Support Contingent Commander and Chief Service Delivery.

Verification Report will be sent to HQ for further processing deductions will be made for unserviceable equipment and equipment not deployed. Substations recommended by Field Mission will also be made. End process a claim

RCMPS will calculate the reimbursement based on the MOU + verification report. COE claim sent to Controllers Office who will determine whether there are enough funds in the Missions account to pay everybody if yes payment Is made if not placed in Accounts payable.

Following what, payment will be made. However one condition is missing – Guess which one? A condition that is not part of the Force Generation process.
The corresponding MOU must have been signed by both parties, failing which no payment can be disbursed.

The life cycle of the new methodology is first based on internal negotiations between MRPS, FGS, Field Mission and then, with the P/TCC. All must agree, and often a pre-deployment visit is made to ensure that the major equipment, and/or self-sustainment that will be deployed is indeed what is required. Ideally, the deployment does not occur until there is a signed MOU. Although often, the MOU is signed months after the field has received the material.

The actual claim processing is based on the VR – verification report. The claim cannot be processed without a signed MOU. Payments to the TC depend on the cash-flow and budget assessments/contributions of the UN organization and is under the responsibility of the Controller. MOU Negotiation – important partners MRPS and FGS, to coordinate the Process.
Key message: in order to assess the operational capability of the unit, there is a continuous regime of verification and control inspections during the deployment of the unit.

There are four types of inspections

Each type of inspection comes with its own set of rules.

- **Arrival inspection** - to be completed within one month or arrival. What happens when equipment arrives before MOU signed?

- **Operational readiness inspection** - at least once in every six month period – to assess if capability is sufficient and satisfactory.

- **Periodic inspections** are conducted on a quarterly basis to produce the verification report which provides the basis for the quarterly COE reimbursements.

- **Repatriation inspection** - prior to departure – all equipment checked – condition of dry lease equipment checked – UN equipment eliminated from repatriation.
Key message: Payments of COE reimbursement to the T/PCCs depend on the cash-flow and budget assessments/contributions of the UN organization and are under the responsibility of the Financial Controller.

- Applicable to military and police contingents for the costs associated with personnel, major equipment and self-sustainment.
- Reimbursements paid at the end of each quarter (ending Mar, June, Sept, Dec).
  - COE reimbursement => processed by DOS/UCSD
  - personnel reimbursement => processed by DOS/UCSD *(Before the Secretariat Reorganization of 1st January 2019, the office of the financial controller (OPPBA/DM) used to process the personnel reimbursements).*
- Actual payments are dependent on availability of cash as determined by the Controller (DMSPC/OPPFB):
  - Missions are funded individually
  - All T/PCCs for a mission are paid at same time
  - Payments are usually for a full quarter
Key message: no claim from the T/PCCs is needed for processing of the COE reimbursement, contrary to LOA reimbursement for which the T/PCC needs to lay a claim to RCMPS.

Different reimbursements follow different paths / procedures within the UNHQ.

**COE** is processed by the Reimbursement Claims Management and Performance Section and paid by Accounts / DMSPC (no claim from T/PCC needed, but the MOU needs to be signed)

**Letters of Assist** are verified by Logistics Division and the Mission and processed for payment by Reimbursement Claims Management and Performance Section, and paid by Accounts / DMSPC. The processing of LOA payment is not automatic and necessitates a claim from the T/PCC

- **UCSD**: Uniformed Capabilities Support Division / DOS
- **RCMPS**: Reimbursement Claims Management & Performance Section / UCSD
- **OPPFB**: Office of Programme Planning, Finance and Budget / DMSPC
- **DMSPC**: Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance
Key message: P/TCCs having a unit registered at RDL level are eligible to a yearly financial compensation equivalent to 25% of the maintenance rate for the Major Equipment of that unit.

The UN General Assembly, based on the recommendation of the 2017 COE working group, agreed on a financial compensation to cover a portion of the costs of maintaining standby forces at the Rapid Deployment Level of the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System.

The compensation to be paid to the T/PCCS meeting the conditions amounts to **25 per cent of the maintenance component of set reimbursement rates for major equipment during the period these units are registered to the Rapid Deployment Level (normally one year).**

The detailed conditions will be presented with the Peacekeeping Capabilities Readiness System in Module F “Force Generation Framework”.
Lecture Take Away

- No COE reimbursement will be processed without a signed MOU.
- The COE must undergo verifications in the field before any reimbursement can be processed.
- Absent or unserviceable Major Equipment will not be reimbursed.
- There is no partial reimbursement for self-sustainment categories.
- Some kinds of contributions need a claim from the T/PCC to be reimbursed: operational ammunitions, inland transportation, losses and damages, etc.
- After cease of operations of a unit, the reimbursement of the COE is made at 50% of the MOU rate.
Questions
Learning Outcomes

- Learn about the construction of the reimbursement rate for personnel.
- Learn about the personnel reimbursement process.
- Understand the possible deductions to personnel reimbursement due to missing or unserviceable equipment.
- Learn about the premiums that may be paid for operational risks or contribution of enabling capabilities.
- Learn about personnel allowances and death and disability compensations.
Lecture Content

- Senior Advisory Group (SAG) recommendations
- Troop costs survey
- Rates of reimbursement for personnel
- Personnel reimbursement process
- Deductions for missing or unserviceable equipment
- Premium for enabling capabilities
- Premium for operational risks
- Other claims and allowances: personnel allowances, death and disability compensation
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 4 of Module D of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the personnel reimbursement rate is determined through a troop costs survey as approved by GA resolution A/RES/67/261 (2013).

A/RES/67/261: Report of the Senior Advisory Group established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 65/289 to consider rates of reimbursement to troop-contributing countries and other related issues

Following the report of the Senior Advisory Group, the GA decided to approve the following recommendations:

• Establish a new Personnel Reimbursement Framework with:

  ✓ A new single standard rate of reimbursement based on a new method of survey to determine T/PCC costs
  ✓ Possible deductions to personnel reimbursements for gaps in required COE
  ✓ Create a Premium payable for risks
  ✓ Create a Premium payable for contribution of key enabling capabilities
Although not a reimbursement issue, the SAG also recommended a « typical 12-month rotation period » for the contingents, for better operational performance, which was adopted by DPO and has now become standard (save a few exceptions like vessels, flying crews, doctors).

Key message: the standard rate of reimbursement for personnel includes the pre-deployment preparation costs; it is reviewed every four years.

Troop costs survey:

- Establishes a single, standard rate of reimbursement inclusive of:
  - Allowance
  - Personal kit and equipment
  - Pre-deployment medical costs
  - UN-Specific Pre-deployment training
  - Inland transportation
- Common and essential additional costs incurred by T/PCCs.
Rate to be reviewed every four years based on a survey.

- 10 of the top 20 contributing countries (three-year average)
- 50 per cent of all T/PCCs should be represented
- Sample countries distributed across four income groups

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**Current Reimbursement Rate**

Resolution 68/281

*established a single rate of reimbursement to countries contributing contingent personnel to United Nations field operations in the amount of:*

- $1,332 per month per person from 1 July 2014
- $1,365 per month per person from 1 July 2016
- $1,410 per month per person from 1 July 2017
- $1,428 per month per person from 1 July 2018

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Key message: The personnel reimbursement amounts to $1,428 per contingent member and per month as of 01 July 2018.

Based on the results of a troop cost survey which reviewed the following categories: Allowances, pre-deployment training, inland transportation, pre-deployment medical and personal kit, the general Assembly approved a 3 tier rate structure:

- $1332 from 1 July 2014
- $1365 from 1 Jul 2016
- $1410 from 1 July 2017
- **$1428 from 1 July 2018** (Current, GA Resolution A/RES/72/285 – 05 July 2018, following new survey completed in 2018, which proposed updated costs approved by the GA in July 2018.)
Key message: The personnel reimbursement include costs entailed by pre-deployment training, inland transportation, medical preparation, personal kit of equipment.

Here the breakdown of the Personnel costs reimbursed to the T/PCCs, as a result of the 2017/2018 survey approved by the GA (Troop cost updated at 01 July 2018 rate).

- The inclusion of pre-deployment medical preparation in the personnel costs explains that vaccinations are not reimbursed separately any more.

Any personnel above the strength authorized in the MOU are national responsibility and are not subject to reimbursement or support by the UN.
Key message: the personnel reimbursements are processed by the Reimbursement Claims Management and Performance Section and do not necessitate claims from the T/PCCs.

**Personnel Reimbursement** is processed by Reimbursement Claims Management and Performance Section / UCSD and paid by DMSPC (no claim from T/PCC needed)

[As a reminder from previous slide, COE reimbursement process]:
**COE** is processed by the Reimbursement Claims Management and Performance Section and paid by the Accounts (Department of management (no claim from T/PCC needed)

**Letter of Assist** are verified by Logistics and the Mission and processed for payment by Reimbursement Claims Management and Performance Section and paid by Accounts ; processing of payment is not automatic and necessitates a claim from the T/PCC

- **UCSD**: Uniformed Capabilities Support Division / DOS
- **RCMPS**: Reimbursement Claims Management & Performance Section / UCSD
- **OPPFB**: Office of Programme Planning, Finance and Budget / DMSPC
- **DMSPC**: Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance
Deductions & Premiums

Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 4 of Module D of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: there will be no penalty if the reason the equipment is absent or non-functional is beyond the control of the TCC.

Penalties - Absent and Non Functional Equipment Deductions

In order to diminish the number of contingents that did not have a full complement of serviceable major equipment corresponding to their MOU, the SAG recommended, and the GA approved, to reduce the personnel reimbursements proportionally to the gaps in major equipment. The resolution has been in effect since 3 quarters ending October 31 2013

These are the rules governing this decision:

• Personnel reimbursements to be reduced proportionally for absent or non-functional COE (major equipment)
  - based on COE agreed in MOUs
  - proportionally deduction based on value of foregone COE reimbursement

• Two consecutive quarters allowed for TCCs/PCCs to address shortfalls

• No deductions for shortfalls beyond the control of the TCC/PCC

• Deductions for equipment gaps only if shortfall is more than 10% of requirements
- days of availability across established COE groupings (‘line items’)

- Max. deduction for any one unit => 35% of personnel reimbursement.

Average total of deductions per year: $100 Millions.
Key message: the payment of premiums for the rapid deployment of key enabling capabilities is subject to the need of the UN, decision of DPO authorities and funds available.

The Senior Advisory group recommended that TCC/PCC that provide key enabling capabilities that have been decided mission by mission which enabling capacities would be paid a premium equal to 15% premium to 20 % of the average number of contingents deployed during the peacekeeping fiscal year. The premium may be paid for the rapid deployment of said capabilities (30, 60 or 90 days) and is subject to a special procedure involving validation of the need, approval by the USG DPO and availability of funds.

Premium to be paid for the provision of a limited number of key enabling capabilities that are in high demand and short supply

- New capability requirements to be periodically determined based on operational needs – capabilities in high demand and/or short supply.
- Personnel must be matched with needed COE.
- Incentive scale based on speed of deployment.
  - 30 days => bonus of 25% of annual reimbursement amount
  - 60 days => bonus of 15% of annual reimbursement amount
  - 90 days => bonus of 10% of annual reimbursement amount
- Ceiling: no greater than a premium of 15% paid to 20% of the average number of personnel deployed during fiscal year.
- Only paid once, in the amount of $252,662 (as of January 2018).
Key message: the payment of the risk premium is subject to a report from the Force Commander and subsequent approval by the USG DPO.

The Senior Advisory group recommended that the UN reimburse TCC/PCC whose units are operating with no caveats or restrictions and perform exceptionally well despite the Exceptional Risk. The payment is no more than 10% of the average number of contingent personnel deployed during the peacekeeping fiscal year.

Bonuses to individual units that are operating without restrictions and caveats imposed by troop- and police-contributing countries and that have acquitted themselves well despite exceptional levels of risk:

- An exception, rather than the norm.
- Based on recommendations from missions; approved by DPO/DOS USGs.
- Unit-based performance; bonus paid to the individual soldier or police officer.
- Qualifying units to also receive a commendation.
- Ceiling: no greater than a premium of 10% paid to 10% of the average number of personnel deployed during the fiscal year.
- Paid $6 million thus far. (Jan 2018)
Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 4 of Module D of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).

Notes:

There are other allowances and compensations paid directly to the personnel, which must not be confused with the personnel reimbursements made to the T/PCCs.
Key message: the daily allowance and the recreational leave allowance are paid directly to the military contingents in the field.

In addition to the payments we went over before there are payments that are made in the Field Missions to the soldiers.

These allowances must not be confused with the personnel reimbursements paid to T/PCCs

- Daily allowance of $1.28 (cost of a pack of cigarettes in the Golan heights at beginning of UN) – Allowance also paid to Staff Officers when contingent members.

- Recreational leave allowance of $10.50 per day up to 15 days of leave.  
  NOTE: must complete a full 6 months not a day less

[GA Resolution A/RES/63/285 of 30 June 2009: increased from 7 to 15 days (entitlement started to accrue as of 1 July 2009)]
Key message: in case of payment for death or permanent disability, the amount paid by the Government to the beneficiary cannot be less than the amount reimbursed by the UN to the Government.

GA Resolution A/RES/72/285, 05 July 2018, decided to increase the level of death compensation of all categories of uniformed personnel to $77,000 (+ 10% added to previous rate of $70,000).

[Previous rate used to $70,000 since 1 July 2010, GA resolution A/RES/64/269 (Paragraph 3 Section 2)]

Can also claim for funeral benefits- Up to $5,000 with itemized receipts.

Funeral/Burial Expenses: Generally, the UN will arrange the transportation of remains under escort via commercial carriers. Where the Government makes the arrangement, reimbursement by the UN will be limited to what it would have cost the UN to arrange via commercial carriers. The maximum reimbursement amount for funeral/burial expenses is $5,000.

Permanent Disability - the disability must be permanent, i.e. there must be permanent loss of function.

Claim from T/PCC is required.
Note Verbale must specify that the amount paid by the Government to the beneficiary will not be less than the amount reimbursed by the UN to the Government is necessary in both categories. Important that any incident be reported to the Mission for proper documentation in case the incident results in permanent impairment or death later.
Usually, there will be a:

• Medical Visit and Report;
• Military or Civilian Police Report.
Key message: death or permanent disability claims shall not be paid in case of medical pre-existing condition – thus outlining the importance of thorough medical screening before any deployment.

Not payable in case of:
• Gross negligence,
• Willful misconduct/intent to bring about death, injury or illness to him-/herself or another
• Pre-existing conditions: need to outline the necessity of a thorough pre-deployment medical screening. Death incurred from pre-existing condition puts the family at risk of not getting the monetary compensation resulting from the death.
• Suicide

Death or Disability must be ‘serviced incurred’ and a direct result of the contingent member’s performance of official duties on behalf of the UN.

Guidelines for submitting claims arising from death and disability incidents are included in A/52/369 (1997).
The Personnel Reimbursement System stems from the SAG recommendations approved by the General Assembly.

The standard personnel reimbursement rate includes the contingent preparation costs and allowances as determined by a quadrennial troop costs survey.

The daily personnel allowance and recreational leave allowance are distinct and separate from the personnel reimbursement rate. They are directly paid to the individuals in the field.

The deduction for absent or unserviceable major equipment above 10% of MOU quantity is applied to the troop cost reimbursement and limited to 35% of same.

Claim of compensation for death or disability may be denied for various reasons, particularly in case of pre-existing medical condition.
Questions
Module E: LOGISTIC SUPPORT FRAMEWORK
These are the subjects we are going to tackle, trying to see for each what it means for you.

- Magnitude of logistic support to get an idea of what it is we do, and to what extent
- In NY we have the DPO and the DOS, and LD is part of the latter and we will discuss its structure and organization
- We will talk about functional areas, and about the support options available in the field;
- And then we will have a look at the planning process. You saw the planning process from a Military and Police point of view, and now we will look at it from the logistic support side, and see what it takes to plan for a new mission
- We will talk about the support concept for the various categories of personnel we have to support and for the various categories of support we have to provide.
- Finally we will have a look at the environment strategy for the field missions implemented by DOS.
Learning Outcomes

- Learn about the scale and scope of peacekeeping logistic support.
- Learn about the domains of the logistic support in a UN operation.
Lecture Content

• Scope and scale of the UN logistic support
• Domains involved
Key message: Supporting peacekeeping operations, special political or peace building missions, and all UN Secretariat entities (95 entities in 41 locations) across 12 time zones, the United Nations spends $2.9 billions annually in member States reimbursements and owns $2.5 billion in equipment.

These figures change all the time, but it is to give you an idea of what we are doing now in the field.

- We support 14 peacekeeping operations and 11 special political and peace building missions, and we are still working on 4 continents and across 10 time zones.
- Regarding the aircraft, ships and vehicles, these are the assets supported by the UN. The 200 aircraft are not owned by the UN, since the UN does not own any aircraft. We are not a sovereign entity, so we do not have our own registration. All aircraft in the field are operating either under a commercial contract, or under a letter of assist with a member states – so even if it’s painted white with UN markings on the sides, you cannot tell whether it’s military or civilian – save for some unique aircraft like ATT helicopters. But we operate military utility helicopters and even long term charters like the Boeing 767 of Ethiopian AL, to do troop rotations, that we will talk about next week in the Transport framework module.
- Hospitals: any level 2 or level 3 facility that we operate in the field. Majority of the hospitals are Level 2s (one L3, in Goma as at 2019). Level 4s are always infrastructure hospitals under commercial contract – often outside the mission area. So a injured person in MONUSCO / Goma will be stabilized in the Indian Level 3 there. If additional treatment is required, he will be sent to a regional hospital, like Kampala, Johannesberg, or Nairobi.
- Personnel transported, the figure corresponds to strategic transport, that is to and from the capitals as we well see in Module H (Transport for Deployment)). The local transports within the mission area is more complicated, with various transport requirements between locations, in-mission transport between airport and locations of deployment etc.
• Fuel consumed daily. It’s primarily diesel as we require that only diesel vehicles be deployed, or procured by the UN, to avoid more complexity in the logistic lines of supply.

• Food: most food is procured through turnkey contracts. These are fresh and frozen rations, usually delivered weekly to your location, sometimes as far as company locations.

• Most of the water you get in the missions is bulk water. The UN provides access to a source of raw water, well, bore hole or other. For ex. in Eastern Congo / MONUSCO units send trucks to pull water out of Lake Kivu and take it back to their camps where they will process the raw water through their own water treatment plant. For lots of contingents water purification is a challenge as water purification units are not so common – and need a precise protocol of maintenance, spare parts (filters) and products.

• Power generation, again not everything comes from the UN, but also from generators deployed by contingents under MOU. Typical planning ratio for power generation is 3 Kva per person.

• Reimbursements: that’s what is reimbursed annually through MOUs or LOAs that were discussed before.

• And $ 2.5 billions is the value of the UN Owned Equipment – to support the PKOs we buy furniture, 4x4 vehicles, computers, phones, prefab units etc., all that being UNOE.
175,000 auth. field personnel in PKMs, SPMs and offices
230 airplanes and helicopters
13,000 UN-owned vehicles (excl. contingent owned equipment)
UN Senior National Planners Programme

Slide 11

- **350m** litres of fuel per year
- **10m** litres of water per day
- **313 MVA** power generated per day
Key message: DOS provides support to the field missions in all logistic domains as well as in terms of personnel and budget management.

So how do we support the missions?
These are the divisions in NY:

You have Office of Support Operations / Human Resources Services for civilian staffing, and the Division of Special Activities (for the starting missions budgets – for the ongoing missions, they take care themselves of their budget).

Then we have the Logistics Division, which includes:
- Strategic Movement also called MOVCON
- Air Transport Service which does the contracting and letters of assist for the UN aerial fleet,
- Surface transports which deals with our vehicles and vehicle maintenance contracts
- Supply and Life Support, life support including the rations and fuel
- Engineering,
- Medical Support (in terms of equipment, field capabilities, provision of drugs etc.).

- The (Computers, communications), which includes GIS – Geospatial Information Systems – which itself now includes cartography (Satellite imagery…) – is now an independent office which reports both to DOS and to the DMSPC. OICT works also for humanitarian purposes, not only military (tracking migrations, refugees, border trafficking, deforestation, animal population…).
Lecture Take-away

- The United Nations owns only a portion of the assets it uses in peacekeeping operations: aircraft, ships and hospitals are either contracted commercially or sourced from Member States under Letters of Assist.

- The UN relies on Member States for several critical support areas.

- The Department of Operational Support provides support services to enable UN peacekeeping and political missions to deliver on their mandates by drawing on and integrating civilian and military assets, and in the various categories of logistic support.
Lecture 1
Magnitude of Logistic Support
Questions
Learning Outcomes

• Learn about the structure and responsibilities of the UNHQ's Logistics Division, Office of Supply Chain Management (OSCM) / Department of Operational Support (DOS).
Lecture Content

• DOS Mission
• DOS organization
• Logistics Division mission statement
• Logistics Division organization
Role of the Department of Operational Support

“To provide UN field operations with effective, efficient, compliant and timely administrative and logistics support to assist in establishing the missions by M + 90 days and to assist in fulfilment of the missions’ mandates.”

(M Day = Day mandate is issued by SC).

Key message: DOS goal is to provide new missions with complete administrative and logistic support 90 days after the start of the mandate at the latest.

So that’s DOS role as defined by the USG DOS. Compliance refers to the Financial Regulations and Rules as imposed by the member States. And of course we just saw that DOS provides an administrative support to the missions (that’s the personnel and budget part), and all kinds of logistic support. « M day » is the start date of the Mandate as defined by the SC Resolution, as we saw in Module C / Mission Planning.
Key message: the Department of Operational Support provides support services to enable UN peacekeeping and political missions to deliver on their mandates.

The Department of Operational Support is not the continuation of pre-2019 DFS with another name: it is a new department, with new functional areas and new processes.

The size of the bubbles is proportional to the financial impact of the different domains. The majority of UN spending for goods and services in the field is now spent on air and ground transportation – transport of COE, buying vehicles, heavy transport convoys performing in missions, long term charter aircraft, etc. – The second largest amount is facilities – building camps, renovating facilities that the host nations provide to us, etc...
Key message: The Department of Operational Support provides support in the areas of finance, logistics, health care, Information, communication and technology, human resources and general administration to support the field operations.

As you know since Module B, Department of Operational Support (DOS) provides support in the areas of finance, logistics, health care, information, communication and technology (ICT), human resources and general administration to the field operations.

We saw in Module B the general structure of the Department. Likewise we are not going to discuss again the offices and divisions that we saw already: Office of Support Operations, Special Activities, Administration and OICT.

The Logistic Support Division is now organized following the principles of Supply Chain Management, whose principles are:

- integrated 'end-to-end' processes,
- robust planning and managing global demand,
- strategic sourcing,
- consolidated delivery and return,
- strong performance management framework.

This is the new organization of the Department of Operational Support, with the dual reporting line of the Office of Information and Communications Technology. The office of the USG DOS includes three specific entities providing him with Strategic Support.
The Health-Care Management and Occupational Safety and Health Division regroups two medical entities that used to be split between DFS and the DM.
Likewise for the Procurement Division which merges capacities once split between DFS and the DM.

A single Office of Information and Communications Technology has been established through the consolidation of the former Office of Information and Communications Technology in the Department of Management and the Information and Communications Technology Division in the Department of Field Support.
As this Office both performs some policy- and standard-setting functions and delivers operational support to clients throughout the Secretariat, it retains reporting lines to both the Under-Secretary-General for Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance and the Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support.
Given that ICT is a cross-cutting function underpinning the Organization’s core mandates and activities, a single entity to cover the Organization’s operations and business processes from end to end under a single integrated structure with a holistic approach to the delivery of ICT services has been deemed to better meets client needs.

For information and communications technology, the UN has its own global communications network that allows the UNHQ to keep in touch on a permanent basis with the missions. The satellite communications are commercially contracted.
In the missions the UN sets up the mission’s communications network between the Mission’s HQ and the various components, including down to the level of battalions, or independent units smaller than the Battalions, FPU’s, transport Companies etc. The communications internal to the units must be provided by the P/TCC, and the possible communications with the capitals are considered a national affair and are not reimbursed.
Likewise for the computers and digital network, that the UN will put in place at mission level, as well as the necessary hardware at each end. The UN will either train the T/PCC operators, or even detach operators at unit’s level to operate the UN equipment. Military Signal units may have to provide personnel to that effect.
Key message: DOS activities encompass all domains of logistics support to field missions, including both internal and external (client) support activities.

Note: in the UN sense:
- CASEVAC means taking care of a wounded from the place the injury occurred through the medical support chain to professional medical treatment and to the medical facility for stabilization (Level 2 Hospital) – Basic emergency care by trained (peer) personnel within 10 min (buddy system), professional medical care (advanced life-saving) in less than 1 hour, admission to damage control surgery in less than 2 hours (level 2 hospital).
- MEDEVAC means transfer of the stabilized patient from one medical provider to another. While this can occur between Level 1 and Level 2, typically this movement occurs from the Mission area to a level 3 hospital, to a level 4 hospital (infrastructure hospital, often out of mission area) for specialized, long term treatment, or back home for final medical repatriation.
Key message: The Department of Operational Support provides support to all UN PKO, and SPM operations in multiple countries as shown.

The Department of Operational Support supports different UN field operations across the planet. The number of uniformed personnel by mission is indicated in blue. The circle in light blue color is an example of coordination with a regional security provider, the African Union mission (AMISOM), (UN Charter chapter 8) receiving UN logistics support (UNSOS).
Key Message: Founded in on 01 January 2019, the Department of Operational Support is also responsible to sustain all UN Secretariat operations throughout the world.

Spanning geographically from Bangkok to Bogota, the map here shows the HQ location of all Secretariat entities now part of the DOS support dependencies.

Noting the concentration of offices in locations such as the Middle East, East Africa, etc... you can see the opportunities for a consolidation of service support – through arrangements such as the Regional Service Centre – Entebbe (RSC-E) and the Kuwait Joint Support Office (KJSO)
Key message: The Logistics Division is the lead planning element within the Office of Supply Chain part of the end-to-end supply chain process.

The Logistics Division performs a central role in the planning function of the end-to-end supply chain management. It provides direction and advice on logistical matters, monitors and assesses the delivery of strategic transportation and support services and directs the delivery of transportation and specialist support services in the functional areas of air transport, ground transport, engineering, medical and supply, inclusive of fuel, rations and general supplies and security equipment.

The Division also performs and leads global integrated supply chain planning functions to facilitate global demand, source and delivery planning across all technical areas within its functional scope. The Logistics Division consists of an Air Transport Service and a Movement Control Section, a Supply Chain Planning Service and a Sourcing Support Service (planning for contracted provision of fuel, rations, etc., assessing future missions needs).

The Air Transport Service is particularly responsible for the respect of the technical requirements pertaining to military aircraft and flying crews contributed by member states.

The Air Transport Service is of special importance for TCCs contributing air assets to UN operations.

- Working with the Force Generation Service (Office of Military Adviser/DPO), ATS defines the technical requirements pertaining to the TCC-contributed aircraft as an input to the relevant Statements of Unit Requirements, provides the UN Team’s air specialists during the AAVs and PDVs and leads the negotiation of the Letter Of Assist with the TCC, along with the Procurement Department.
• The management of UN commercially contracted air assets, fixed or rotary wings, is also part of the ATS’ responsibilities. – shared with the recipient Missions.

The role of the **Movement Control Section** is to organize the transport of UN goods and personnel at the strategic level.

• The role of Movement Control Section is to ensure that effective logistic capabilities in terms of Air Support, Strategic Air and Sea Lift for movement of Military and that Civilian personnel and cargo, vehicles, and spare parts are provided at the required time and place, in the most effective and efficient manner, in order to support UN peacekeeping and other field operations.
• MOVCON organizes the strategic transport of the COE for the deploying or repatriating units. T/PCCs personnel are directly in touch with this service during the preparation phase of the transport.
• MOVCON also organizes the deployment and rotation of military/police personnel by air, using either contracted commercial assets or UN assets.
• In case of movement carried out by the T/PCC under Letter Of Assist, MOVCON again is the service receiving and processing the LOA requests.
• MOVCON’s role and responsibilities will be further detailed in Module H “Strategic Transport for Deployment”.

• The **Supply Chain Planning Service** is responsible for developing and managing a global plan for demand forecasting, source planning and delivery through the identification and assessment of the needs of all clients across all Secretariat entities. Integrated Business Planning process...

• The **Sourcing Support Service** provides senior-level professional, technical and operational knowledge to all clients, with a focus on conducting a full range of activities in support of operations in the portfolio areas of medical support, engineering, rations, fuel, ground transportation, general supplies and security equipment

• The **Engineering Support Section** provides specialist support for specific projects, including generation of specialized units: horizontal and vertical engineers construction unit, airfield engineer units, etc.
LD Mission Statement

To provide peace operations with timely, efficient and effective support to enable the mandates to be implemented

Key message: the Logistics Division focuses on the upstream part of the supply chain, from the source of supply to the mission area.

LD realizes this mission using the supply chain management concept, which means the “just in time delivery” of goods and services to the field.
LD focuses on the upstream portion of the supply chain, meaning from the source of supply to the mission area.
Once in the mission area, it becomes downstream and it is a Mission Support responsibility.
Key message: the Logistics Division is organized following the principles of the Supply Chain Management and includes the T/PCCS main points of contact for aviation contracts, strategic transport, life support, and medical support.

As seen in Module B, the Logistics Division is organized in three services and one section:

Under the Supply Chain Planning Service we find

- The Supply Chain Planning section, which does the integrated planning for the whole logistic support chain. This section provides LD with a dedicated planning capacity & decision-making processes. The service additionally identifies appropriate sourcing options (where available) and the most effective delivery method, including the best route and mode of transportation.

Then the Strategic Sourcing Service has

- Life Support & Transport Section in New York puts in place the contracts for fuel, rations, general supply and vehicles (UNOE) that Life Support in the field will use to support the mission’s personnel and units.
- Engineering support section, which works mainly on missions contracts, in the field – but is also able to provide advice during the generation of an engineering unit (including participation on PDVs).
- Medical support section deals with Medical Logistics goods and services (drugs, blood products, medical equipment).

The Air Transport Service

- ATS defines the technical requirements pertaining to the TCC-contributed aircraft as an input to the relevant Statements of Unit Requirements, provides the UN Team’s air specialists during the AAVs
and PDVs and leads the negotiation of the Letter Of Assist with the TCC, along with the Procurement Department also within the Office of Supply Chain Management (OSCM).

- The establishment and management of UN commercially contracted air assets, fixed or rotary wings, is also part of the ATS’ responsibilities – though daily operational control and accountability is delegated to the field operation.
- Including UAVs (above 2 kg) which are typically also Mission enabling assets.
- The Strategic Air Operations Center / Brindisi provides an air transport capacity for special or short term transport requirements – including coordination of aircraft deployed to support other missions on a temporary basis.

The Movement Control Section (MOVCON)
- organizes the strategic transport of the COE for the deploying or repatriating units. T/PCCs personnel are directly in touch with this service during the preparation phase of the transport.
- also organizes the deployment and rotation of military/police personnel by air, using either contracted commercial assets or UN assets – or under Letter of Assist
- In case of movement carried out by the T/PCC under Letter Of Assist, MOVCON again is the service receiving and processing the LOA requests for strategic movement, including review of packing and crating claims.

- The Supply Chain Management concept has `implemented within DOS to enhance and simplify th provision of support provided by OSCM to the field missions and the T/PCCs.
Lecture Take Away

• The Logistics Division manages the upstream supply chain, from the supply sources to the mission area.

• The Logistics Division is structured as three services and one section that are the primary sources of logistics support information to T/PPCs for any related issue; they include the Movement Control Section, Medical Support Section, Air Transport Service.
Logistics Division

Questions
Learning Outcomes

• Understand the role of the various Logistics Division cells in the support provided to the field missions.
• Learn the logistic support functional areas LD deals with in the accomplishment of its mission
Lecture Content

• Role of the Transportation, MOVCON, Air Transport Service and Aviation Safety (OSCM) cells
• Role and Responsibilities of the Strategic Sourcing Service
• Functional areas of logistic support
Key message: the Logistics Division provides Strategic Movement, Ground Transportation and Air transportation help and services to field missions and member states.

Provides Strategic Movement of Assets and Personnel: for the T/PCCs, either with contracted commercial companies or using Member States assets under a Letter of Assist, or for the UN, moving UNOE through commercial transport contracts.

Provides Ground Transportation: within the missions areas, for a variety of clients (troops, civilian personnel, authorities),

- Vehicles: a mix of commercially contracted assets, TCC assets and UN owned vehicles
- Specialized equipment with ancillary services

Provides Air Transportation, including:
- Air assets (contracted, TCC-provided)
- Airfield and Aviation Ground support services, contracted and sometimes provided by TCCs
- Aviation Compliance and Quality Assurance: Aviation Safety verifies compliance of contracted aircraft with safety and security regulations, same with member states aircraft under LOA, before and after deployment.
Key message: the Strategic Sourcing Service arranges for the provision of a range of services, including medical support, transportation, engineering services and rations and fuel supply arrangements.

The Strategic Support Service:
• Provides Rations, Fuel, and other supplies (organizing commercial contracts for all missions)
• Provides Engineering services
• Provides Medical support services and supplies (through Medical Support Section, with commercial contracts or member states-provided assets)
Key message: the provision of engineering services, supply and life support and medical support are some of the functional areas of the Logistics Division.

So again that’s what we do, this time arranged by functions.

**Engineering**

Accommodation is either provided by the engineering service, or for the contingents as a self-sustainment feature. Note that the definition of the various categories of accommodations have changed with the new COE Manual 2017. (The COE Manual describes characteristics of the structures, rather than using finished categories like tents, or hard wall accommodation).

The COE Manual, Chapter 3, describes what the accommodation system chosen must provide, in terms of structure, platform, resistance, isolation, environmental standards etc. It is then up to the TCC to choose its preferred structures – when the UN is not providing accommodation. The use of tents remains important for the first times of the installation of a new contingent, as well as for operations far from the base that impose staying in an area for a limited period of time.

It remains important, however, that the contingents be able to move from a location to another in case the situation on the ground changes and the mission has to review and amend its deployment.

Engineering fixes the standards relative to water purification and sanitation. Sanitation has become an important issue as the missions try to minimize the impact of the operation on the environment. Therefore engineering has been implementing ways to sanitize waste water and products so that these used waters can be recycled and reused. This is also important for the contingents when they set up their ablution facilities.
Sanitation and sewage and trash removal are a UN responsibility. The contingents, however, are often asked to deploy septic trucks. That’s in order to be able to collect waste and bring it to a treatment plant nearby.

**Electricity**
Most of the PK mission areas do not have a working power distribution network, so the UN provides electricity to itself with generators, and so do most of the contingents when they are not stationed in a camp where the UN power plant can provide electricity. Note that the COE Manual 2017 defines new classes of generators based on international norm ISO 8528 that supplement the existing classes. P/TCCs may choose to deploy generators based on the old system, or opt for the new arrangement which is not mandatory but incentive-based. This entails drafting a site energy plan, the whole system being geared toward saving energy by better adapting the charge of the generators and avoid generators running at low charge.

**Field Defense Stores**
The contingent is responsible to define the kind of defense it wants around its camp, and the UN will provide the material to build it (wire, concertina, gabions, etc.).

**Supply / Life Support**
This is a summary of what we provide to the missions, generally through commercial contracts. The drinking water is part of the rations contracts, although the contingents most of the times are requested to produce their own drinking water – the UN providing bulk raw water, in the form of a well or other access to a raw water source – then the contingent has to refine that raw water to make it drinkable. A Water Treatment Plants and associated equipment (storage) are a very important part and often problematic part, of the self sustainment equipment of the contingents to which a particular attention should be granted.

**Medical**
Of course MEDEVAC/CASEVAC is another essential service we have to provide, generally through member states assets, but it can also be through commercially contracted helicopters for example. CASEVAC in the UN is the movement of an injured personnel from the point of injury to a medical care facility. MEDEVAC in the UN is the movement of a stabilized patient from one medical facility to another, for example form a Level 2 Hospital to a Level 3 Hospital. We said a word already of the certification of the medical personnel before deployment, which was started as a way to improve the quality of the medical service rendered in the field by contingent medical personnel.
Key message: the Logistics Division arranges for aircraft commercial contracts and letters of assist in compliance with international regulations and provides strategic transport services to the UN and the member states. The provision of transports means is also part of the domains of action of the Logistics Division.

Aviation
In UNHQ the aviation people arrange the commercial contracts for rotary-wings and fixed-wings aircraft, as well as the Letters Of Assist with the TCCs for same (LOA for aircraft will be discussed in the force generation module).
They also devise policies for aircraft operations. – including the aviation manual (UNMAM, etc...) They come up with standards for needed capabilities – that is in particular when they provide inputs to the Statements of Unit Requirements (SURs) for aviation units: night flying (NVG), CASEVAC equipment, safety equipment, performances in terms of range, payload, ceiling etc.
They also do risks analysis and risk evaluation with regard to military operations and / or logistic operations.

Movement Control
They arrange the strategic movements for the deployment and repatriation of equipment and personnel, as well as for the rotations of personnel and generally provide an assistance to the P/TCCs for the preparation of the shipments and movements. The role of MOVCON will be seen in detail in Module H / Preparation and execution of Transport for Deployment.

Transport
The UN buys vehicles and heavy equipment and has its own workshop and maintenance facilities, so we also buy spare parts.
Recovery trucks are mainly for civilian vehicles and light trucks, not for heavy stuff like APCs for which the contingents are providing their own assets.
Lecture Take Away

- The Strategic Sourcing Service establishes the necessary arrangements to facilitate the provision of logistics support to all peace operations.
- The Logistics Division covers all domains of logistic support (including transportation), therefore is able to answer any question raised by a T/PCC in that regard.
Functional Areas
Questions
Learning Outcomes

• Learn about the three possible sources of support for UN operations in the field.

• Key Message: Recall the scale and scope of support operations and areas of support – specific to UN field (PKO and SPM) operations
Lecture Content

- Available sources, and decision criteria
- UN Civilian Personnel
- Commercial Support
- Member State Support

So how does the UN support its activities in the field?

We have three major means of support:
- UN civilian personnel, or UN staff
- Commercially contracted companies and their personnel
- Member state-provided support.
Key message: UN civilian personnel provide to UN field missions a kind of support that is easily adjusted and directly controlled by the Mission.

Civilian personnel that we sometimes call in-house support, can be International Staff (professional UN staff) or National Staff (locally hired for that mission only, with short term contracts).

- Main advantage is to have full control (within regulations) on personnel that we know, of which we know the capabilities and the terms of reference.
- Likewise their duties can be relatively easily adjusted to changing conditions, based on the development of the Mission – within the limits of their professional capabilities and qualifications.
- Surprisingly enough they can operate in pretty much all mission’s areas; from experience these personnel have a pretty high tolerance for risks, whatever the remoteness of the operation area or security conditions – as long as the Mission is able to provide them with suitable accommodation, communications etc.
- The downside is that, especially at the start of the mission but also when expanding or reinforcing it, it may take time to get the necessary personnel to deploy: moving personnel from other missions takes time to organize, and hiring new personnel takes a longer time yet. Same for shipping to the mission the equipment that is necessary to the accomplishment of their duties. One possibility to go around this problem is to temporarily deploy reinforcement personnel, for example from UNHQ.
Key message: commercial contracts allow UN field missions to benefit from comprehensive services precisely tailored to the needs of the mission.

With commercial companies the UN typically organizes turn-key contracts, particularly for fuel and rations.

• That means that fuel, for example, can be delivered to precisely that pump, and not only in a general area – and with most contracts fuel can be delivered down to a specific tank in a camp from which the fuel can be distributed directly to the vehicles.

• So it is very flexible, and the commercial company provides all necessary equipment and work force.

• The downside is that most of the time it takes time to put in place such a contract, due to procurement rules and regulations. In most missions, in post-conflict regions, there is not a robust commercial network so the UN has to contract regional providers or global providers from outside the country. The provider also has to have the necessary capability (number of trucks / drivers) which is not always immediately possible.

• One way around for the UN is, whenever possible, to start a mission using extensions to existing contracts, which is quicker and easier to set up than a brand new contract.

• As regards hostile conditions, the company will do its own risk assessment. So they will be ready to deliver almost anywhere given the right price, but not under any condition. That’s where the role of the contingents becomes important, to provide convoy escort for security. This may become a burden on the contingents, like it was in Northern Mali for the fuel convoys going to Kidal / Tessalit.
Key message: Support provided by Member States to UN field operations come through formed units deployed under MOU or Letter Of Assist.

By Member State support we understand support provided through formed units deployed under a MOU or a LOA.

- Once in the mission they can be mobilized quickly, and in any case more rapidly than organizing a new commercial contract, or even an extension to an existing contract.
- The main advantage is that, being military personnel they may be able to operate under more hostile conditions than commercially contracted personnel, or even UN staff.
- However the units may come equipped as per national regulations and not exactly meet UN requirements (logistic transport, fuel distribution...) – although this should normally be addressed in the Statement of Unit Requirement – remember LD normally puts in the necessary requirements as it sees fit, and that is particularly true for logistic support units.
- The rotation schedule which may have been an impediment when rotations occurred every six month has become less disruptive since the normal rhythm of rotations has been fixed to one per year.
- Rotation schedule and familiarization flights – aviation units
- The cost may be considered superior to that of negotiated commercial assets, which may be part of bigger contracts with scale savings and where low costs are achieved whenever possible - while the military units have a fixed cost to the mission, whatever the service rendered (or not rendered).
- Finally the generation of these units may present challenges, and not only related to deployment delays; when approaching TCCs the UN has to consider a number of factors like:
  - What are the parties in conflict (main religion; international support, allies?)
  - What do we already have in the mission in terms of countries, religions, etc.
• How did the targeted TCCs perform previously with other Missions?
• Known and unknown caveats
• Etc.

• It is worth noting that Member State support also includes the host nation, through the clauses contained in the SOMA/SOFA.
Lecture Take Away

- UN civilian personnel, commercial companies and Member States-provided formed units are the three regular sources of support for UN operations in the field.
- Member State support is provided by formed units deployed under MOU or Letter Of Assist.
- The host nation can provide support to a UN Mission through the provisions of the SOMA or SOFA.
Logistic Support Options

Questions
Learning Outcomes

• Learn about the variety of support sources available to the Mission and to the deployed units.
Lecture Content

- Providers of support to deployed units
- Origin of resources available to the Mission
- Command and control of military logistic support assets in an integrated mission: units, Deputy-Chief Service Delivery and staff officers.
Key message: beside Mission Support, a T/PCC deployed unit will receive support from a whole range of partners in and out the mission.

Here are all the different parties that provide or may provide support to a unit deployed in the field.

- **Other contingents** may support a smaller unit in the same region, especially some units that are too small to be self-sustained in some departments (Ex. A MOVCON platoon of 30, whose most of members are assigned to different sectors). This may come through a bilateral arrangement between two TCCs or through DOS/DPO/Mission Support proposal – Then the supporting unit receives the SS reimbursement consistent with the category of support provided and the strength supported. It could also be the case of a combined unit (ex., a level 2 hospital mainly provided by a TCC, a second TCC providing a surgical team integrated to the L2H).

- **Mission support** obviously provides at the bare minimum the fuel and rations necessary to the contingent, sometimes drinkable water (most of the time bulk raw water). Some of this comes through commercial contracts, some of it may be UN-provided. As you will recall DOS is behind Mission Support to help it achieve its mission (securing systems contracts or arranging for urgent delivery of need equipment).

- **National Support**, when the unit is resupplied in spare parts or receives a special maintenance team to perform an exceptional maintenance operation on a heavy piece of equipment

- **Host Nation** – in some countries that are not too disabled, the host nation may be able to provide some support, like utilities

- **DPO**, either Force Generation or Police Division is able to provide remote support, especially to solve administration issues or play an intermediary role with other UNHQ services.
Key message: the field missions use a mix of personnel from various origins in order to reach the right balance between readiness and capabilities. Adapted regulations exist to provide the Missions with financial support from the moment a SC Resolution is approved.

How does the UN get the capabilities it needs on the ground, for each kind of resource?

**Personnel**

- **Rapid Deployment Teams** – there are identified UN staff with specific qualifications that are willing and able to deploy rapidly to a starting mission and work there for several months, while regular personnel is being recruited. This works also in case of emergency, like for example following the earthquake in Haiti when most of the UN staff in MINUSTAH was either killed or wounded and therefore had to be replaced very rapidly.

- **Recruitment** – There are rapid procedures to rapidly recruit local staff. The need still exists to establish requirements, TORs, etc., but the procedure itself is accelerated.

- **UN Volunteers** – For a stipend of about $2000 a month, UN volunteers can be very useful when they bring to the Mission a particular skill set they developed during their previous careers (accounting, finance, etc.), that they can put to good use to help the mission or to help local staff develop the same skillset.

- **Consultants / Individual Contractors** – Hired for a well defined task or job, with less responsibilities at mission level. They are not full staff members.

- **Secondment** – These are Government-provided personnel, to bring their capabilities in finance, budget, procurement, etc. They have the same status as certain Military or Police officers seconded.
to UNHQ or to a Mission (Deputy Chief Service Delivery for example): they have the same privileges, benefit and responsibilities as full time staff members, included drawing the right to retirement pension after 5 years of service. They cannot receive a Government pay during their secondment. Initially hired for 2 years, extensions possible year per year (3 to 4 years max normally) and they are returned to their Government to resume their career.

Finance
So where does the money come from for the Mission to Operate?

• **Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority** – When a new mission is coming up, ready to be authorized but not yet having a SCR approved, there is already the need for the DOMP and DOS to have money to spend in order to fund travels, recruitments, deployment of personnel etc. at a time when there is no mission budget yet, and no SCR to justify the expense. The PMCA is a way to get a limited funding for these pre-mandate expenses that allow to prepare for the establishment of the new Mission ahead of getting the SCR.

• Once there is a mandate, then there is a full **Commitment Authority**. This is an internal procedure that allows the finance people to release enough money, based on a budget estimate, at a time when there is not yet a Mission budget established.

• **Peacekeeping budget** – The peacekeeping budget will provide the funds needed by the Mission, based on a full fledged budget established a year in advance. Peacekeeping Missions budgets are based on the fiscal year, that is from 01 July to 30 June, whereas SPM budgets are based on the calendar year. [That explains that often there is a gap in Missions funding in the first part of July, after the GA has approved the budgets, and that we ask TCCs not to deploy personnel during the first part of July while the new budget is put in place].

• **Trust funds – Voluntary Contributions** – This is money donated by Governments or Regional Organizations to help fund a Mission (Somalia) or to fund a specific project within an existing Mission (Ex. Chadian Police training in MINURCAT) – sometimes by Government who do not wish to see their funds used for general peacekeeping or missions they disapprove, but want their funds to be devoted entirely to a particular project. Then a trust fund is organized, administered by the UN and receives the donations. Voluntary contributions are also donations in addition to the contributions to the assessed peacekeeping contribution, sometimes flexible and sometimes earmarked for a specific project.

Finally the host nation also participates in an indirect manner to the mission budget by not collecting taxes on UN goods, docking fees, landing fees or visa fees.
Mission Support Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MATERIEL</th>
<th>COMMODITIES &amp; SERVICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS)</td>
<td>• System contracts</td>
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<td>• UN Reserve</td>
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<td>• Contingent Owned Equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Host Nation support</td>
<td>• Host Nation support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key message: contingent owned equipment and self-sustainment services are a way for the P/TCCs to participate in the overall support of the mission, for which they receive financial compensation from the UN.

**Materiel**
- The **Strategic Deployment Stock** is a quantity of materiel of all kinds, sitting mainly in Brindisi, that is available in an emergency to set up a new mission or to face an emergency situation. We keep about $200 M worth of equipment that way.
  - The **UN reserve** is mostly lightly used equipment, possibly overhauled, that come from closed missions and that have been restocked for future use.
- **Transfer from other missions.** There may be unused stock of equipment, or equipment in surplus in some Missions, that can be rapidly shipped to a starting mission or to a mission facing an urgent need, and sometimes it may be more rapid and cheaper than procuring new equipment.
- **Procurement.** New equipment is ordered from UNHQ, or form the Regional Procurement Office or possibly from the local Procurement Office.
- **Contingent Owned Equipment** – We are talking here about particular mission assets like communications unit, engineers (construction), transport units, aviation (utility), medical (Level 2 Hosp., AMETS) – Even though they are coming with uniformed people and a national flag, they are mission assets and as such are tasked by the DMS / Mission support, and not by the Force Commander – which is often a sore point, especially as regards aviation. Of course, the Force will always be able to use transport helicopters to set up a military operation if need be, but this is a requirement that will have to be dealt with along with the other, logistic support requirement.
- **Host Nation support.** The Host Nation is supposed to provide for free the necessary buildings to house the Mission HQ and other facilities, grant permission to use the airports, provide terrain in
order to set up camps, etc., for free. At least that’s the basic principle which does not always work in reality, where the Mission often has to rent facilities from private owners when the Government is unable to provide.

Commodities & Services

• **Systems contracts.** The UNHQ will organize contracts for categories of equipment or goods that are needed by all missions. Ordering in larger quantities over several years will ensure uniformity of quality and characteristics while obtaining better prices than for several orders of smaller quantities of the same goods. Then a Mission that need a resupply of such materiel has just to draw a purchase order under that systems contract.

• **Short term contracts and Long Term Contracts.** Are done by the local procurement in the field, for a number of goods and services that can be procured locally to satisfy the Mission’s needs. Note that it may happen that the Mission’s Procurement is able to buy for your contingent some equipment that you are missing and that would be cheaper to buy locally than to ship from your capital. Procurement office may be able to use an existing contract, or to buy the item off a systems contract.

• **Self Sustainment** – As said before, the SS categories are basically services that the UN is paying the TCC to render instead of contracting them commercially. And if a TCC is unable to provide the requested service in a category of SS, the UN will take over and assume it.

• **Letter Of Assist** – We have seen that this is a way for the UN to have a Government provide a service against a compensation, most of the time for transport or engineering. Engineering may be interesting if a Mission needs a series of constructions that a Government is willing to realize using an engineer unit provided for limited tasks and for a limited time. That’s a private contract between this Government and the UN and in this case the Engineering outfit providing the service is not counted against the authorized strength of the Military Component [also noting that the “Engineering outfit” in this example is not mandatorily a military unit, it may as well consist of civilian government assets].

• Let’s talk again about Host Nation support in the next slide.
Key message: waiving various fees and taxes must be considered as the way the host nation contributes to the support of a peacekeeping mission. The details of these arrangements are fixed in the SOMA or SOFA agreed between both parties.

Governed by a SOFA or a SOMA, the support provided by the host government may consist in direct support and indirect support.

Direct support could be the provision of buildings and land for deployment of the camps, electricity and water supply, etc.

Indirect support: waiver of fees for entry visas, waiver of landing or docking fees, etc.

Waiver of taxes for import of goods (duty free).

These privileges and immunities extend to the UN personnel, contractors and contributors (troops and police). (UN Convention)

The UN, however, will pay the requested fees for service whenever it is the case: unloading of ships or cargo planes, compound security, participation in runway maintenance, etc.
Key message: as per the DPKO Command and Control Policy in United nations Peacekeeping Operations (2008), all force logistic support units are tasked by the Director Mission Support.


Policy organizing the command and control functions in peacekeeping operations: role and prerogatives of the SRSG, Force Commander, Police commissioner, Director Mission Support, etc.

« This policy clarifies the authority and command and control arrangements for the uniformed components of United Nations peacekeeping operations. This document also provides important information regarding the relevant civilian and other managerial structures and their relationship to the uniformed components so as to enable more effective integration of the mission effort in multidimensional peacekeeping operations”.

Operational and tactical control rest with the senior military or police officers in the mission.

- “Integration of civilian and military support asset and elements should be ensured for optimum utilization of resources”.

- “Military logistics and support units/elements, including force logistics units, signals units, force military engineering units, force supply and transport units, force aviation units are considered military components of the Mission Support and are tasked by the Director of Mission Support (DMS)”.

UN Authority, Command & Control (AC2) Policy – 2008.04
From a logistic support point of view, this is again about managing our resources in the same logic as seen above in this lecture.
Integrated Assets and Resources

Mission resources are distributed to all mission components on an equitable basis, depending on functional needs and assessed priorities.

Assets considered common to the mission:
- Engineering Units (construction)
- Transportation Units
- Aviation Units (utility, surveillance*)
- Communication Units
- Medical Units
- Logistics Units

Key message: the distribution of tasks between the various logistic support assets of the Mission, including military assets, is centralized by the Mission Support Center in order to ensure that every mission component receives equitable support, consistent with identified priorities.

- Mission resources, including the services of mission-enabling units, are distributed to all mission components on an equitable basis, depending on functional needs and assessed overall mission-priorities. This is the reason why the management of the logistic support assets – civilian and military – is centralized at the mission level, with a unique point of entry for all requests for support (Mission Support Center).

- Irrespective of their origin or ownership, the following assets are mission assets, available to support any mission requirement:
  - Engineering Units*
  - Transportation Units
  - Aviation Units*
  - Communication Units
  - Medical Units
Logistics Units

Surveillance assets may not be only military: fixed cameras, tethered balloons, etc.

*Combat aviation (attack) and Combat Engineer units are excluded – they remain under the HoMC control for all tasking in support of military operations

These assets will be tasked and used along and in complement with UN assets and commercially contracted assets, under coordination of the Mission Support Center. – example, Mission Air Operations Centre and air tasking...
Key message: military staff officers are posted in various services of the mission support structure in order to facilitate the integration of the civilian / military support functions.

The blue helmets symbols show where in the mission support organization military staff officers are posted to help in the civilian / military integration of the support functions.
Role of Military Staff Officers in Service Delivery

Military logistics capability
- Providing special military expertise and advice in relation to military unit deployment and support
- Direct contact to contingent logistic structure

Working relations
- Deployed as Subject experts, with MSA entitlement.
- The Deputy-Chief Service Delivery is a military seconded personnel.
- Integrated planning and operational structure

Key message: in order to facilitate the communication between supported units and Mission Support, there are military officers selected and embedded within each support component of the Mission.

Service Delivery formerly called Integrated Support Service (ISS)

Service delivery cells are always composed of a majority of UN civilian staff along with a number of military and police, staff officers specifically selected for their background and qualifications to work within designated positions – as requested by the DMS services. Beside providing qualified help, this practice aims to facilitate the communication between the supported units and Mission Support.

This comes in addition with the Deputy-Chief Service Delivery who is a seconded military officer, for the same reasons. (Ranks P4 or P5, depending on the rank of the Chief Service Delivery). This is a civilian UN staff position, though the officer typically wears his uniform while on duty to ease interaction with the mission military component. By serving under a UN civilian contract, the officer is selected through the standard comparative recruitment process, and is also fully empowered as deputy to fill in as OIC during the absence of the Chief.

Military logistics capability
- Providing special military expertise and advice in relation to military unit deployment and support
- Direct contact to contingent logistic structure

Working relations
• Deployed as Subject experts, staff officers with MSA entitlement. (Like a Military Observer)
• The Deputy-Chief Service Delivery is a military seconded personnel (= UN Staff contract) (Formerly DCISS)
• Integrated planning and operational structure
The support resources available to a UN field mission are always drawn from various sources - military, civilian, commercial, local, UNHQ - ensuring that the Mission has the possibility to choose from a mix of complementary assets most appropriate to fulfill the support tasks.
Learning Outcomes

• Learn about the nature of support provided to each uniformed component in a peacekeeping operation.
In this lecture we see who we are supporting in the field, and how we are supporting them – especially what kind of support is available or adapted in each case. We will be dealing with uniformed personnel only, not mentioning the support provided to civilian personnel.
Key message: the UN is responsible for the strategic and final transport of all uniformed personnel deployed to a mission, be it individually or belonging to a formed unit.

So in the deployment phase we have to deal with three broad kinds of elements: individual personnel, Formed units / contingents, and equipment, be it COE or UNOE. Please note that this will be tackled in more details in the final module H “Preparation and Execution of Transport for Deployment”, in particular from a practical point of view for the T/PCCs.

- **Individuals** (UNMOs, Staff Officers, CIVPOL, etc. are normally deployed by commercial airlift or sometimes can seize the opportunity of a LOA. Charters are normally contracted for groups of 50 and above; below 50 it is more advantageous to have the personnel travel with a commercial ticket. However, charters or LOA flights might be the solution when travelling with weapons and ammunitions.

- **Formed units** (Military and Police contingents) normally travel in groups by UN contracted short term charter aircraft, although the T/PCC may always decide to execute the move by itself through LOA. A long term charter aircraft is also available and widely used (Boeing 767 of Ethiopian Air Lines).

- **UNOE and COE** will normally travel by sea-lift as it is the best cost effective means. For high priority movements airlift will be chosen (high priority may concern only the advance party of a contingent for time-related reasons, but also the transport of sensitive equipment – medical equipment for example). LOA is possible although rarely done (Pakistan...).

- In all these cases, depending on the Mission location and resources available, the trip to final destination will be done either by air (UN assets), road or rail – or a mix of these solutions.
Support Concept - Sustainment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>UN Staff, SOs, UNMOs, UNPol (IPO)</th>
<th>Military Contingents and FPUs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Accommodation</td>
<td>MSA, UN provided to SOs (or MSA).</td>
<td>Existing camps, if any. New contingents self-sufficient if required. UN provided thereafter or contingent self sustainment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Accommodation</td>
<td>UN provided</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>MSA</td>
<td>Mission specific initial provisioning Standard UN scales thereafter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>MSA</td>
<td>UN provides water source. Contingents provide water treatment plants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>UN provided.</td>
<td>UN provided.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key message: the UN is responsible for providing food, accommodation, fuel and water to every unformed individual or contingent member, either through commercial contracts, UN resources or TCC-provided support through LOA or self-sustainment).

This is going to show you what is being provided in the Mission area (categories) and how, to the individuals one the one hand and to the formed units on the other hand. We are still limited the exercise to the uniformed people here.

First the Individuals

- For **Domestic accommodation**, the individuals get the Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA). So the Officer is responsible for securing his own accommodation. In remote locations where there is no possibility, the UN will have to provide. In this case the individual still gets the MSA but at a reduced rate (50%), since the accommodation portion of the MSA is deducted.

- **Mission subsistence allowance (MSA)** is a daily allowance payable by the Organization for living expenses incurred by staff members in the field in connection with their temporary assignment or appointment to a special mission. MSA rates are established for each mission on the basis of cost of **long-term accommodation, food and miscellaneous expenses**. When accommodation is provided free of charge by the United Nations, the standard rate of MSA
will be reduced by 50 per cent regardless of whether the accommodation provided is permanent, prefabricated or tented

- **The Office accommodation** is provided by the UN., and that includes furniture, workstation, stationery, land line telephone, Internet access, printer etc.

- **Food** and **water** have to be secured by the Officer on his MSA. He may have access to a UN catering facility against reimbursement.

- The **fuel** (for vehicles or generators) is UN provided (as well as the vehicles and generators, i.e. in the case of military observers).

**As regards the contingents**

- **Accommodation** is realized in existing camps. New contingents have to be self sufficient for the first six months (tentage) or can provide directly prefabs or other kind of hard wall accommodation. Please note that the COE Manual 2017 edition does not mention hard wall accommodation anymore, but instead gives a list of minimum standards for “field mission accommodations” that have to be followed whatever the solution retained by the contingent (Chapter 3, Annex A).
  
  Long term accommodation should be provided by the UN within 6 months of the arrival of the contingent; if not provided, after 6 months the Member State will get both the reimbursement for tentage and for field mission accommodation (Chapter 3, Annex B):

  “When the United Nations is unable to provide standard United Nations field mission accommodation for a unit after six months in tents, the troop/police contributor will be entitled to receive reimbursement at both the tentage and the accommodation self-sustainment rates. This combined rate will continue until personnel are housed to the standard specified in paragraph 20 of chapter 3, annex A”.

- For the **food**, in case of a new contingent the UN arranges for the necessary contract to be in place at the date of arrival. The UN will provide fresh, fry and frozen food, the contingent having the responsibility to have adequate storage. Special needs (traditional food...) may be catered for as long as the UN is warned early enough so as to be able to alert its contractor.

- For a new contingent the UN will initially provide bottled **water** until what time the contingent is able to refine its own drinking water. The UN has the responsibility to provide a source of raw water, and leases the water purification units and storage equipment from the contingent (principle of self sustainment). In case the contingent becomes unable to produce drinkable water, the UN has the responsibility to provide.

- **Fuel** is provided by the UN, the contingent having the charge to store it, distribute it and monitor its use / consumption. In some cases a distribution point may be arranged by the contractor nearby, where the contingent vehicles will be able to fill up. We are normally talking diesel fuel uniquely; to avoid doubling the chain of distribution the UN does not provide gasoline, or exceptionally. Small quantities of gasoline that may be necessary for small back up generators may often be purchased locally.
Support Concept - Sustainment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>SOs, UNMOs, UNPol</th>
<th>Mil. Contingents and FPUs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surface Transport</td>
<td>UN provided. Standard scales.</td>
<td>COE Major Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transport</td>
<td>UN provided.</td>
<td>UN provided, or under LOA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>UN DPD WAN (voice, data, fax, e-mail, Internet), Telephone landline, Cell-phone, VHF.</td>
<td>UN provided down to Bn HQ, Self-sustained for internal communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>Level 1: UN/TCC/PCC clinic. Level 2, 3, 4: UN provided, or under LOA.</td>
<td>Level 1: Self-sustained. Level 2, 3, 4: UN provided, or under LOA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste Treatment</td>
<td>UN provided</td>
<td>UN provided / contingent sewage plants / trucks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key message: as regards in-mission transport, communications and medical support, the UN provides to individuals and formed units through a mix of its own resources, commercial contracts, and TCC-provided assets, either through LOA or self-sustainment.

As regards other services:

**Surface transport**
- For **individuals** the UN provides individual vehicles (4x4) or a bus service (regular bus services between an hotel and the office, or between a camp and the airport...)
- **Contingents** have to use their own COE assets. In some cases the UN may provide group transportation, be it UNOE or commercial (like, transport to and from the airport for the rotation of the contingent).

**Air Transport**
- UN-provided for individuals within the mission area and for deployment / repatriation, subject to certain rules. Most important missions will have a regular air service between major locations in the mission area.
- For contingents it is UN-provided, or under LOA (deployment, rotation).

**Information & Communication Technology**
- As mentioned before, individuals get all necessary equipment with their workstation.
- Intra mission communication assets are provided by the UN down to Battalion HQ or independent Company level (or FPU), including terminal equipment and operators or dedicated training. For internal communications the units are self sustained.
Medical support

Reminder:

- **level 1** (primary health and emergency care) - Level 1 medical facilities provide the first level of medical care, i.e. primary health care and immediate life-saving and resuscitation services.

- **level 2** (basic field hospital) - Level 2 medical facilities provide the next level of medical care and the first level at which basic surgical expertise is available and life support services and hospital and ancillary services are provided within the mission area. A level 2 medical facility provides all level 1 capabilities and, in addition, includes capabilities for emergency surgery, damage control surgery, post-operative services and high-dependency care, intensive care resuscitation and inpatient services; and basic imagistic, laboratory, pharmaceutical, preventive medicine and dental services.

- **level 3** (advanced field hospital) - Level 3 medical facilities provide the third and highest level of medical care deployed within a mission area. At this level, all capabilities of a level 1 and 2 medical facility are provided, as are capabilities for multidisciplinary surgical services, specialist services and specialist diagnostic services, increased high-dependency care capacity, extended intensive care services and specialist outpatient services.

- **Individuals** have access to UN or T/PCC Level 1 facilities, as well as UN-provided or TCC-provided Level 2 hospitals, possibly Level 3 and 4 if need be, transport included.

- **Formed units** have either their own Level 1 clinic (self sustainment) or have access to a neighboring Level 1 from another unit. Level 1 clinic is normally at the level of the Battalion or FPU. Due to dispersion of company locations, some battalions may be required to deploy with two Level 1 (isolated company), possibly with a Level 1 + which has additional capabilities (surgical, dental...). Exceptionally an independent company may be required to deploy with a Level 1 facility, in case it is not stationed within convenient (safe) distance from another Level 1 or Level 2 hospital.

Waste management (sewage etc.)

- Waste management is provided by the UN in both cases. However, **contingents** will often be requested to collect waste and bring it to a treatment facility, hence the requirement for a sewage trucks. Disposing of waste is otherwise a UN responsibility. UN camps may be equipped already, but small camps for independent units may require further equipment on the part of the TCC. This is a sensitive subject as more and more the UN tries to lower the impact of deployments on the host country environment.
Lecture Take Away

- Every T/PCC provided uniformed personnel deployed to a peacekeeping operation is a UN support dependent, be it that he is part of a formed unit or deployed individually.
- The UN is responsible for providing all means of living and working accommodation to individual personnel.
- The UN will provide food, fuel and (access to) raw water for every formed unit.
- Formed units provide self sustainment services against an agreed, fixed rate of reimbursement as per the COE Manual.
- If the T/PCC is unable to provide a self sustainment category of service the UN may fill the gap – through the T/PCC would then lose its right to the reimbursement of the corresponding category.

Bullet two – either through MSA or UN provided (specifically accommodation)
Support Concept
Questions
Lecture 7
Environment Strategy
for UN Field Missions

Learning Outcomes

• Learn about the environment strategy for responsible environment management in the field and the obligations of the contingents as regards environment.
Lecture Content

• Environmental risks
• UN Environment Strategy’s vision
• Five strategy pillars
• Contingents obligations
Key message: between 96 and 100% of all pollution risks created by the UN Secretariat activities overall happen in the field missions.

**Wastewater risks**: Of all risks arising from poor waste water management in the UN Secretariat virtually 100% arise in the field and create serious health, legal, financial and reputational risks (e.g. Haiti)

**Solid waste risks**: Of all risks arising from poor solid waste management in the UN Secretariat virtually 100% arise in the field and create serious health, legal, financial and reputational risks.

**CO² emissions**: Of about 2 million tons in CO²-equivalent greenhouse gas emissions in the UN system, the Secretariat emits 1 million, of which 96% are from field operations.
DOS Environment Strategy Vision

By June 2023, realize the deployment of:

"Responsible missions that achieve maximum efficiency in their use of natural resources and operate at minimum risk to people, societies and ecosystems; contributing to a positive impact on these wherever possible."

Key message: by June 2023 DOS wants to achieve the deployment of Missions that operate at minimum environmental risks to the missions areas.

The Environment Strategy of the United Nations Department of Operational Support (DOS) came into effect in January 2017. It sets out a vision that DOS will strive to achieve by 2023 in relation to environmental management in peace operations. It also defines 'phase one' objectives up to June 2020 across five pillars. The strategy is a living document, updated as progress is made and approaches evolve.
Key message: The DOS environment strategy is based on five pillars designed to reduce the missions’ footprint on the environment while managing the efficiency of the strategy.

DOS has designed an Environment Strategy with 5 pillars and a 6.5-year time horizon.

Objectives of each pillar:

**Energy:** To reduce overall demand for energy through efficiencies; increase the proportion of energy used that is produced from renewables; reduce the level of pollution created by peace operations.

**Water and wastewater:** To conserve water and reduce the level of risk to personnel, local communities and ecosystems from wastewater management practices.

**Solid waste:** To improve waste management, and reduce the level of risk to personnel, local communities and ecosystems from waste.

**Wider impact:** To increase the level to which missions both take into account the wider environmental impact of their deployments and attempt to deliver a positive legacy.

**Environmental Management System:** to implement a management system that is effective at achieving progress towards the DOS environmental vision.
Key message: each UN field mission must integrate environmental measures into its planning and operations and translate them in the form of a Mission-wide Environmental Action Plan (MEAP).

Each United Nations field mission will take actions to integrate environmental measures into its planning and operations in order to avoid and minimize the impact of activities carried out by the mission and its staff on the environment and to protect human health from such environmental impact DPKO/DOS Environmental Policy for UN Field Missions (2009).

According to the policy, each field mission is to create an Environmental Action Plan based on the mission’s environmental objectives in which specific achievable, realistic and timely targets for environmental protection measures and actions to be undertaken are detailed. Responsibilities for achieving each specific target are to be clearly stated in the plan. The MEAP is created and executed under the responsibility of the DMS/CMS.

All components of the mission are concerned by the MEAP, including the military and police contingents.
Key message: the completion of the contingents’ environmental obligations mentioned in the Mission-wide Environmental Action Plan are reported annually to the Member States.

Indicators in the Mission-wide Environmental Action Plan (MEAP) that get reported to Member States in the annual Environmental Scorecard include the following:

- Fuel use in COE generators and vehicles
- Sites with bounded platforms / containment basins under generators, fuel tanks and in vehicle maintenance bays
- Water consumption
- Risk in wastewater management (e.g. any septic tank overflow)
- TCCs/PCCs with stockpiled non-functional COE and expired materials for more than 12 months
- Completed initiatives intended to leave a positive legacy
- Military and Police camps/sites that have an environmental focal point
- On-site environmental briefings for uniformed personnel
Key message: contingents must now include an environmental focal point designed to help implement safe environment policies.

Contingents are now required to appoint environment focal points which will be the correspondents of the environmental unit attached to the office of the Director Mission Support.

In case of redeployment or repatriation, contingents must leave the premises and physical environment in the condition it was provided to them. This is meant to minimize the contingent footprint on the local environment. This means in particular taking ware of all liquid and solid waste.
A4P and Environment

Paragraph 23 of the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) declaration:

- We further commit to sound environmental management by implementing the United Nations Environmental Policy for UN field missions, and to support environmentally-responsible solutions to our operations and mandate delivery.

Such commitment could translate into the following:

- Deployment of units trained in environmental awareness;
- Deployment of COE focused on minimization of environmental impact; and
- Provision of capacity and expertise in environmental management.

Key message: the UN’s Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) declaration includes commitment to a sound environmental management.

Paragraph 23 of the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) declaration:

- We further commit to sound environmental management by implementing the United Nations Environmental Policy for UN field missions, and to support environmentally-responsible solutions to our operations and mandate delivery.

Such commitment could translate into the following:

- Deployment of units trained in environmental awareness and, where applicable, relevant technical knowledge to fulfill their roles and responsibilities with regard to good environmental stewardship;
- Deployment of contingent-owned equipment focused on minimization of environmental impact, using provisions in the 2017 COE Manual and actively engaging in the 2020 COE Working Group, with the UN facilitating bilateral engagement between donors and troop/police-contributing countries; and
- Provision of capacity and expertise in environmental management, including technical areas in water, waste and energy.
Examples from missions
Lecture Take Away

• The goal of environment strategy is to achieve the deployment of environmentally responsible missions by June 2023.

• The environment strategy is based on 5 pillars which include energy, solid waste, water and wastewater management, as well as an environment management system.

• Contingents have specific obligations including, inter alia, deploying with an environment focal point and leaving their physical environment in the condition it was provided to them.
Environment Strategy for UN Field Missions

Questions

Lecture 7
Module F1: FORCE GENERATION FRAMEWORK PART 1

Find guidance inserted in the note section of each slide.
Module Content

- UN PeaceKeeping Capability Readiness System (UN PCRS)
- The UN PCRS for Emerging P/TCCs
- UN PCRS and Rapid Deployment

- The module explains the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS), as well as the generic force generation process for a military or formed police unit.
- Lecture number 1 will describe the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System.
Learning Outcomes

• Describe the goals and generic functioning of the PCRS
Lecture Content

- Principles and goal of the UN PCRS
- PCRS Level 1
- PCRS Level 2
- PCRS Level 3
- PCRS Rapid Deployment Level
- Organization and functioning
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 1 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the UN PCRS replaced the old UNSAS in July 2015

- The old UNSAS was inefficient in terms of facilitating the generation of military units
- Too many empty pledges not linked to any existing unit
- No verification system to accompany the P/TCC
- No strategic engagement of the Member States
Key message: the goal of the PCRS is to manage Member States pledges in order to ensure readiness and timely deployment of quality peacekeeping capabilities.

**Aim:**

The objective of the PCRS is to ensure readiness and timely deployment of quality peacekeeping capabilities that meet UN standards by enabling Member States to submit pledges of future contributions.

- The Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning cell deals with engaging regional organizations and member states at the strategic level.
- It also marks the commitment of the DPO leadership in strategic FG
- The aim is to get realistic pledges allowing a timely deployment whenever required.
- In addition, a verification system must allow for the generation / deployment of quality units.
Key message: the PCRS is based on the principles of efficiency, collaborative approach, predictability and readiness.

**Basic Principles:**

- **Efficiency** in the management of Member States commitments: Modern, online management of the pledges and database.

- **Collaborative** approach between UNHQ and Members States: Reinforcement of the collaboration between UNHQ and MS: AAVs, advice, controls, help, during the process.

- A transparent approach means both the UN and the member state have a better understanding of each other’s needs.

- Greater degree of **predictability**: the above facilitates of better predictability on the availability of pledged units.

- Greater degree of **readiness**: Likewise regarding the level of readiness of the pledged units.
Key message: In the short term, the PCRS should become the only window for selection of P/TCCs for deployment.

Other Principles:

Eventually, PCRS will be the single window for selection of P/TCCs for deployments
➢ In that sense the Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning system feeds the Force Generation process.

The final decision to deploy, or not, remains the intangible right of the Member State: Whatever the unit pledged, the final decision to deploy or not to a given operation rests with the Member State
Key message: the PCRS functions with clear criteria defining each level and actual commitments from the Member States

The PCRS methodology is based on:

• Criteria clearly define what are the Levels 1 to 3 and the RDL:
  Four Levels of commitment
  L1 – L2 – L3
  Rapid Deployment Level (RDL)

• Actual commitments: no intention to pledge based on non-existing units will be accepted.

• Emerging P/TCCs willing to pledge will follow a specific path (next lecture)

• While designed primarily for military units, Police units and capabilities may be pledged in advance through the UN PCRS. PD and OMA work together.

• Likewise for non-military capabilities that may be of interest to the UN: civilian engineering capabilities, airfield management system, airport security / fire fighting capabilities, well drilling capabilities, etc.
Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 1 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the UN PCRS is managed by the Office of Military Affairs / Force Generation Service both for Military and Police capabilities.

The UN PCRS is co-managed by the Strategic Force Generation and Capabilities Readiness Cell and by OMA / Force Generation Service.

- Both for Military and Police units
- OMA / FGS delivers access codes to the online PCRS website upon simple request

https://pcrs.un.org

The PCRS Website provides free access to a range of information resources and allows pledging online. The Website will also be expanded to provide more important information to the P/TCCs, especially but not only as regards the certification process for military units (Refer to Lecture 8 of the present Module F – Military Units Certification Process).

Historical data tracking: the member state has access to the history of its previous year’s pledges, included uploaded documents.
Key message: the UN PCRS Website can be reached from any browser connected to the Internet

The home page of the PCRS Website shows a top menu. The links on the menu are publicly available and their content is as follows:

- **Resources**: Public library of documents updated by administrators. That’s where the Member States User Guide can be found and downloaded.
- **PCRS FAQ’s**: Frequently asked questions about the PCRS application.
- **Announcements**: List of all released announcements by administrators.
- **Contact Us**: Information on how to contact different administrators.
- **Calendar**: Calendar with upcoming events.
- **Links**: A few interesting links about UN, DOS, DPO, etc.

The Resources menu gives free access to a series of official UN documents related to the PCRS rules and functioning and to the generation of forces.

The Sign In menu allows registered members to access their pledges and manage them: add a pledge, renew it, cancel it, download accompanying documents, etc.
Key message: pledging to the PCRS can be done online and the pledges must be confirmed every six months.

Member States should pledge online through the UN Force Link website. Once a pledge has been received, the Member State will receive an acknowledgement receipt. After the first year on the PCRS, Member States must renew their pledges every twelve months to reaffirm the availability of the capability.

The Office of Military Affairs / Force Generation Service will provide detailed instructions on the UN Force Link website upon simple request from the Permanent Mission.

Said instructions may be provided:
- To the Military/Police Adviser
- To a visiting delegation, in New York
- During an AAV, in the Capital
Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 1 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: at Level 1, pledges are made through a Note Verbal accompanied by necessary documents describing the unit organization and equipment. The pledges are accepted only after review of the documents by DPO.

T/PCC makes a formal pledge for a unit with:
• Filling online form plus uploading Note Verbal describing the pledged unit / capability

Annexes to the NV:
• Table of organization
• Lists of ME and SSE
  • The table of organization and lists of equipment may preferably be based on standard Statement of Unit Requirements (SUR) provided by OMA/FGS
  • The lists of equipment to be based on existing equipment
  • Future equipment or equipment still under procurement would have to be mentioned
  • No elevation to Level 2 possible with an incomplete list of equipment (= equipment not realized, not present in the unit or in the warehouse).
• Details of specialists (whenever necessary)
  • The detail of specialists concern mainly some specialized enabling units: airfield engineers, medical doctors, nurses, pilots in command / co-pilots, etc.
• Certification of basic training completion
  • The certification of completion of basic training is a self certification, as described in the DPO Military Manuals (refer to the Infantry Battalion Manual)
• Caveats if any
• The pledge will be accepted at level 1 of the PCRS after review of the documents by the Strategic Force Generation Cell / Force Generation team.
Key message: Pledging a capability in the PCRS means filling an online form and uploading the corresponding signed Note Verbal.

*(Copy from the PCRS Member State User Guide)*

- Each pledge has now a unique reference number, making it easy to sort out and follow multiple pledges from the same member state.
- Pledging a unit a level 1 implies filling a form in the PCRS website and uploading a signed Note Verbal with accompanying documents formalizing the pledge.
Key message: PCRS Level 2 pledges are accepted based on UN operational requirements; only selected Level 1 pledges can be elevated to Level 2.

The access to PCRS Level 2:

• Is based on UN operational requirements
  • Priority will be given by DPO to these capacities that are scarce or lacking
  • A successful AAV will allow to raise the unit to level 2

• Selected Level 1 pledges to be elevated to Level 2
  - The discussion for access to Level 3 can start.

• Since the number of possible AAVs to be financed / realized in one budget cycle is limited, priority for these will be given to capabilities most needed by the UN (immediately or in the foreseeable future)
• For these selected pledge, the draft MOU will be established based on the lists of equipment already provided, and on a standard SUR for the type of unit if no immediate deployment is considered.
• The AAV will be organized and conducted along the lines described during topic dealing with same subject in Lecture 1 of the Module (Standard FG process)
Key message: the Assessment and Advisory visit done in view of a unit registration in the PCRS differs from the standard AAV in that it is not mission-specific and not designed to fill an immediate need.

The AAV PCRS differs slightly from the regular mission-specific AAV:

- It is initiated to fill a UN global capability requirements versus an immediate mission-specific need
- The visit itself is preceded and followed by extended exchanges with the Permanent mission in order to explore the status of the would-be unit, manage expectations of the visit and to help with the follow-up process after the visit
- Both the DPO leadership and the DPO working level services will use the AAV report
- If gaps are identified and the MS agrees, the SFGCPC will try to match the TCC’s needs with potential donors of equipment, trainings or funds
- The SFGCPC team will explore with the TCC additional potential capabilities that they might be considering to deploy in the future that could be useful to the UN.
- The SFGCPC will discuss with the MS internal decision making processes and timings in terms of the approval process for deployment (ie 1 week vs. 60 days to reply to a request to deploy)
Key message: Elevation to PCRS Level 3 requires the preparation of a financially non-binding PCRS MOU and provision of corresponding load lists.

To access the PCRS at Level 3:

- The detailed draft L3 MOU to the PCRS which is discussed is specific to the PCRS; it consists in a draft that bears no financial obligation to the UN. It exists only to prepare for the future negotiation of the real MOU and as the basis for the draft load list to be provided to DOS/MOVCON for evaluation.
- Level of preparedness: the majority of the equipment should exist, either in service or stored in warehouses. This concerns ME and SS equipment (Annexes B and C of the MOU).
- The provisional load lists to be provided to DOS would not be the definitive load lists in most cases. After evaluation MOVCON will be in a position to tell whether the load lists are acceptable (= corresponding to the required standards) for commercial bidding in terms of form and content.
Key message: Rapid Deployment Level – all ME tables and LL must be filled in as a part of the RDL Agreement. The RDL Agreement must be signed prior to the Verification Visit

Reference: Guidelines on the Rapid Deployment Level (RDL) of the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS), January 2019

To access the PCRS at the Rapid Deployment Level:

• The RDL is normally accessed by elevation from Level 3 – although exceptions may occur

The RDL, ideally, has the equivalent of an integrated brigade of about 4.000 (Vanguard Brigade) comprising the following units:

• 3 x infantry battalions,
• 1 x logistics battalion,
• 1 x force headquarters support company,
• 1 x quick reaction force company,
• 1 x Special Forces Company,
• 1 x engineering company,
• 1 x level 2 hospital,
• 1 x military police company,
• 1 x signals company,
• 1 x medium utility helicopter unit,
• 1 x attack helicopter unit,
• 1 x tactical/transport airlift unit,
• 125 Military Observers and 30 Staff Officers.
• Police components including 2 x FPUs, 1 x SWAT and 20 Individual Police Officers.

Conditions set forth for a P/TCC unit to apply for the RDL:
• Receive a RDL Verification visit and demonstrate:
  • That all ME and a sample of SS of the unit is available
  • The pre-deployment training requirements of the unit are met and will be maintained – including medical screening and HR screening
  • The unit is able to deploy within 60 days of being called.
Key message: the registration of a unit is a process which starts at least six months before the start of the RDL year. The MS is provisionally accepted until an RDL Agreement is negotiation and a successful RDL verification visit occurs and DPO invites the MS to the RDL Level.

Registration of a unit at the RDL of PCRS

- The process begins when DPO communicates the RDL requirements and requests pledges of all Member States. RDL pledges should be made no less than four months before the start of the next fiscal year (= 01 March).

- The only accepted form of communication for a Member State to pledge a unit at RDL is a Note Verbale. The Note Verbale should contain the following information:
  - Unit type and description;
  - Commitment by the T/PCC that the unit will be able to deploy fully within 60 days of a request by DPO;
  - Certification that the unit personnel have undergone all required UN pre-deployment training up to the mission-specific training stage, as well as all human rights screening and non-mission-specific medical requirements;
  - Time period proposed to stay on the RDL: proposed time period should be for twelve months starting at the beginning of the fiscal year (1 July to 30 June). T/PCC may propose a shorter period but may not propose a time greater than twelve months. Priority for selection will be for units that offer to commit to a twelve month RDL availability;
  - Proposed form of deployment (self-deployed under a Letter of Assist, or UN arranged deployment);
• Port and/or airport of embarkation for troops and equipment.
• Invitation from the Member State for a UN visit to certify that the T/PCC has the required equipment and personnel.

CLICK
• Once DPO receives an RDL pledge, the Military Adviser, (or Police Adviser if a police unit), will decide whether to provisionally accept the pledge at the RDL following a recommendation from the SFGCPC or PD/SRS and taking into account the following factors (in no particular order):
  • Vanguard Brigade composition;
  • The other units that have been pledged and accepted for that period;
  • The T/PCC’s contribution history (e.g. national decision-making process timeline, unit preparation timeline, regional preferences or caveats, etc.);
  • The T/PCC’s recent peacekeeping performance record, including COE;
  • The capabilities, composition and gender balance of the pledged unit;
  • The current PCRS level of the unit and the relevant AAV report conclusions and FPAT report for FPUs, if applicable;
  • The need for geographic & language diversity among RDL contributors;
  • Length of proposed pledge (if less than 12 months).

Once the unit is provisionally accepted to the RDL, DPO will notify the respective T/PCC in writing and request DOS, in consultation with OMA, to start the RDL Agreement process based on the respective unit’s generic SUR provided by the UN. DOS will invite the Member State for RDL Agreement negotiations based on the Vanguard generic SUR and, if relevant, Level 3 MOU to the PCRS.

• DPO will also notify T/PCCs of any RDL pledges that were not accepted. Such pledges will be considered for a reserve roster to replenish the RDL units during the remainder of the fiscal year. These units will not be eligible for maintenance reimbursement during their time on the reserve roster, but would be considered for new deployment opportunities.

CLICK
• The RDL year starts on 1st July, until the 30th June of the following year (UN fiscal year).
• Member States with units on the RDL might be requested to participate with their contingent commanders in one command post exercise during the fiscal year should external support be available to fund such an exercise
• A final RDL verification visit, to be organized toward the end of the year, will ascertain that the unit is still meeting the RDL conditions and is therefore eligible for RDL reimbursement.
Key message: The purpose of the RDL verification visit is to inspect all major equipment listed in the PCRS RDL agreement and verify that the unit meets all self-sustainment requirements.

Units accepted at the RDL undergo an RDL Verification Visit to be eligible for RDL reimbursement as appropriate.

- RDL verification visit will take place within 60 days of the completion of negotiations on the RDL Agreement.
- The purpose of the RDL verification visit is to inspect all major equipment listed in the PCRS RDL agreement and verify that the unit meets self-sustainment requirements.
- The verification of major equipment and self-sustainment facilities will be governed by the standards established in the COE Manual.
- Units must demonstrate the presence and functionality of all major equipment and self-sustainment to be eligible for RDL reimbursement.
- In addition to the presence of 100% of the equipment, the T/PCC must also show that the unit’s commander and personnel selection has been done and that a mobilization plan is in place; and that their human rights vetting, and core pre-deployment training requirements are met and can be guaranteed to be maintained until the deployment.

- In the case of police units, the Assessment of Operational Readiness will be conducted, if not done prior, to ensure unit personnel meets all requirements (experience, language, driving, shooting, and performance demonstration). The AOR will be described in details in the lecture devoted to the generation of Police Unit.
- For a Police unit the equipment verification requirements are identical to those of a military unit.
Key message: P/TCCs having a unit registered at RDL level are eligible to a yearly financial compensation equivalent to 25% of the maintenance rate for the Major Equipment of that unit. A P/TCC which refuses the UN call to deploy a unit placed at RDL level automatically forfeits its eligibility to reimbursement and will be removed from the RDL.

The UN General Assembly, based on the recommendation of the 2017 COE working group, agreed on a financial compensation to cover a portion of the costs of maintaining standby forces at RDL, with those troop and police contributing countries to be paid 25 per cent of the maintenance component of set reimbursement rates for major equipment during the period these units are registered to the RDL.

RDL reimbursements take place at the end of each fiscal year:
- If no request is made to a T/PCC to deploy its RDL unit before the end of its period on the RDL, a final verification visit will be conducted to ensure that the T/PCC has met all requirements during the length of the RDL period.
- If successful, the respective T/PCC is entitled to receive 25 per cent of the maintenance reimbursement rate of all major equipment as per the negotiated RDL Agreement for the applicable period the unit was on the RDL.
- If a unit deploys within 60 days of a request in accordance with the agreement, the respective T/PCC is entitled to receive 25 per cent of the maintenance reimbursement rate of all major equipment as per negotiated PCRS Agreement from the RDL start period (i.e., the date DPO sends formal notification of registration at RDL) until the date that transport to the mission begins.
• The reimbursement payment for the RDL period will occur as soon as possible after the unit is fully deployed.

• If a unit is requested to deploy by DPO but the T/PCC decides not to deploy the unit, fails to deploy within days or fails to meet any of the agreed criteria, the T/PCC will forfeit the right to any reimbursement for the period the unit was placed at RDL of PCRS. OMA will remove that unit from the RDL for the remainder of the fiscal year.

• T/PCCs may still be eligible for RDL reimbursement in cases where the requested deployment of any unit is delayed or cancelled due to the matters beyond their control and as agreed to by the United Nations.

• Reimbursement for units at RDL of the PCRS does not preclude the unit from also receiving, once deployed and at the UN Secretary-General's discretion, the premium for critical enablers approved by General Assembly resolution 671261.
Lecture Take Away

- The **objective** of the PCRS is to ensure readiness and timely deployment of quality peacekeeping capabilities that meet UN standards.
- **Collaboration** of the TCC with DPO & DOS is key to the smooth functioning of the PCRS.
- In the long term, the PCRS should become the **sole point of entry** for selection of deployable military or police units.
- Whatever its pledge, the final decision to deploy or not is a prerogative of the **Member State**.
- To **register** as a user, contact DPO/OMA/FGS.

- Emerging P/TCCs should first contact DPO before pledging in the PCRS: this is the subject of the next lecture.
UN PCRS
Questions

Lecture 1

27
Learning Outcomes

• Explain how DPO can help emerging P/TCCs access the UN PCRS
Lecture Content

- Basic principle for emerging P/TCCs
- Progression toward PCRS

- Explain the standard Force Generation process globally, then step by step
- Explain some steps in details: Assessment and Advisory Visit, Field Reconnaissance, Pre-Deployment Visit, National Support Element, etc
- Some steps will be describes in more details in other modules: planning, Memorandum Of Understanding negotiation...
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 2 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: P/TCCs totally novice in peacekeeping should start by deploying individual officers in order to gain experience.

- P/TCCs totally novice in peacekeeping should start by deploying individual officers in order to gain experience in peacekeeping.
- Deploying individual officers allows to build a peacekeeping culture among the officers corps (military or police).
- Upon returning from deployments these experienced officers will be useful in helping to build a peacekeeping capability.
- The individual officers should be deployed with a set of precise instructions designed to make them come home with practical information on peacekeeping in the field.
Key message: emerging P/TCCs should first contact DPO to engage in a preparatory process aimed at pledging with guidance.

- P/TCCs having a basic experience in peacekeeping should first contact DPO (OMA, SFGCPC)
- Upon contacting DPO they will be engaged in a preparatory process managed by the Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell.
- The preparatory process is designed to help emerging TCCs conceive their first contribution offer.
- Only pledges for existing or near complete capabilities can be received at Level 1
Key message: the first step of the preparatory process for emerging TCCs consists in establishing a plan for the future contribution.

Preparatory process (I):

Help the T/PCC set up a plan for future contribution
- Based on the Member State’s aspirations
- Based on the MS existing assets and capabilities
- Based on the MS specific competencies
- Taking into account UN requirements and gaps

There is no obligation to start pledging with an important unit. Pledging a platoon or a team providing a specialized capability can be an excellent way to learn the process and prepare for a more ambitious pledge.
Key message: establishing a realistic time line taking existing shortfalls into account is an essential step of the preparatory process for emerging TCCs.

**Preparatory process (II):**

**Identify shortfalls**
- With regard to the contribution plan previously established
- Using standard approved SUR and relevant UN Military Units Manual for the envisaged capability
- Possibly using AAV or visit to capital

- Complete plan with realistic time line for meeting basic requirements, including making up for identified shortfalls (See next slide)
Key message: if needed, DPO will help contacting capacity-building donor countries to make up for identified shortfalls.

**Preparatory process (III):**

Identify ways to build the unit / make up for shortfalls
- Use DPO network of capacity-building donor countries if needed
- Establish three-way dialogue between UNHQ, Member State and donor country, and possibly with an experienced TCC acting in a mentoring role.
- Use collaboration with a more experienced TCC which will play the role of a mentor.

In any case
- Advise on equipment to be procured
- Advise on personnel preparation / training
Key message: in the PCRS preparatory process, the role of the Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell is to verify requirements, advise on preparation and accompany the P/TCC toward Level 1.

Preparatory process (IV):

- **Verify** details of basic requirements
  - Provide advice as necessary

- **Accompany** T/PCC toward PCRS
  - Facilitate pledge at PCRS Level 1

- **In any case**
  - Advise on equipment to be procured
  - Advise on personnel preparation / training

- This is once the new unit has reached a minimum preparedness level as described for PCRS Level 1.
Lecture Take Away

- Totally inexperienced T/PCCs are advised to start by deploying individual officers and / or co-deploying.
- T/PCCs with limited experience should start by seeking guidance from DPO before pledging.
- DPO/SFGCPC will relay requirements, help identify shortfalls and design a contribution plan.
- DPO will help identify possible partner countries if needed.
- DPO will provide help and advice on the way toward pledging in PCRS.
PCRS for emerging P/TCCs

Questions
Learning Outcomes

- Describe the link between PCRS and Force Generation process
- Describe the normal sequence of events in the Force Generation process
- Explain the goals and processes governing the various events that are part of the Force Generation process
- Briefly describe Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) negotiations
- Explain the rules governing the use of National Support Elements (NSE)

- Understand the standard steps of the FG Process
- Understand the most important details concerning the goals and processes related to Assessment and Advisory Visits (AAV), field Reconnaissance Visits (RV), Pre-deployment Visits (PDV), and the policy and regulations regarding the use of National Support Elements.
- Other steps in the overall force generation process have already been covered or will be covered in detail in other Modules: MOU, planning, transport, etc.
Lecture Content

- The link between PCRS and Force Generation
- Standard sequencing of the Force Generation process
- Pre-mandate phase – Informal approach
- Mission Specific Assessment and Advisory Visit
- Request – Pledge – Caveats – Acceptance
- Contributing Country Reconnaissance Visit
- MOU Negotiation
- Pre-Deployment Visit
- Deployment / Transport operations
- National Support Elements

• Explain the standard Force Generation process globally, then step by step
• Explain some steps in detail: i.e. Assessment and Advisory Visit, field Reconnaissance Visit, Pre-Deployment Visit, National Support Element, etc.
• Some steps will be described in more detail in other modules: i.e. planning, Memorandum Of Understanding negotiations.
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 3 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key Message: Generating units for deployment is a process that is linked to but separate from registering units in the PCRS database.

This slide is meant to visualize the difference between putting an asset in the PCRS, and generating it for deployment to a PKO.
It shows that registering a unit in the PCRS and taking steps for its deployment are two activities that are separate in time but also linked.

- The PCRS as explained in the previous lecture can be considered as a cupboard with a set of four shelves where units are put away, each shelf being one of the levels of readiness as spelled out in the PCRS system.
- Of note, the three first levels (in blue) are the choice of the P/TCCs, meaning each P/TCC can elect to advance its registered unit to the next level, provided it works with DPO and the unit meets the requirements of the Level sought. The RDL level is in a different color because it is not only the choice of the P/TCC but corresponds to a definite number of units that cannot be exceeded; therefore accepting units at the RDL level is also a choice and decision of DPO, in addition to a will of the P/TCC.

CLICK

- Garnishing the PCRS “shelves” with assets at various levels of readiness is an activity that is not directly linked to the establishment / reinforcement of a Mission.
- As explained in Module C of the present course, whenever a Security Council Resolution decides that there is a new need for a mission, either for the establishment of a new mission or for the reinforcement of an existing one, an operational planning phase will take place that will result in the
publication of a concept of operations and the requirement of a new (or augmented, or modified) force; this is also true regarding the Police component of a mission.

CLICK

• As an image, the CONOPS / Force Requirements results in a series of empty boxes, each box being filled with a SUR corresponding to a certain type of unit. As you will remember from Module C, each SUR is unique, being both Mission-specific and unit-specific.

CLICK

• So we have a number of SURs on which we have to pin real units to deploy; the first step of the Force Generation process will be to match as many SURs as possible to units existing in the PCRS database, as far as possible at Level 3 or RDL, depending on the urgency, and to gain approval from the corresponding members states to their participation in the Mission.

• At this point there could still be capabilities generated through direct offer, which are not present in the PCRS database; this should be avoided and should happen only for special assets that are rare capabilities, not currently found in the PCRS and which need to be deployed rapidly – in short, it should be an exception to the common rule.

CLICK

• Each time the Force Generation Service (or the Police Division) finds a unit that corresponds to a need, then the Force Generation process can start, as will be explained in details in this module. Therefore the PCRS feeds the Force Generation process; for the “feeding” to take place, the operations previously described of registering and accepting a unit in the PCRS database must have been completed prior to the Force Generation process.
Key Message: The Peacekeeping Capabilities Readiness System is based on a continuous collaboration between the Member States, the Strategic Force Generation Cell and the Force Generation Service.

The functioning of the Peacekeeping Capabilities Readiness System is based on a continuous collaboration between three main actors:

- The **Strategic Force Generation and Capabilities Planning Cell** (SFGCPC / DPO) manages the strategic engagement of the Secretariat with the member states and the international community with regard to contributions of capabilities to peace operations; it also deals directly with the member states when capabilities are first registered in the PCRS database;

- The **Force Generation Service of the Office of Military Affairs** (DPO) co-manages the system with the SFGCPC and directly manages the PCRS database; working with the Member States, the Department of Operational Support and the Missions, it leads the Force Generation process when assets are selected to be deployed to a UN PKO;

- The **Member States** are the providers of the capabilities to be deployed; they need to work in close collaboration with the two aforementioned entities of the DPO, both to register a capability in the database and, later, to ready it for its generation once selected by the DPO for a PKO.

- Member States place capabilities in the PCRS database, the Force Generation Service drawing from the registered assets whenever needed. While not placing assets in the database itself, the SFGCPC is helping along the process and tries to plan for the future needs of the UN at the strategic level, engaging member states with a view to fulfil these needs.
Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 3 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).

First we will describe the process in its entirety; then we will detail each step.
Key Message: The Force Generation process is shaped by a complete set of Political, Financial, Technical and Functional usages, rules and regulations.

- The Force Generation Process is not an invention of the Secretariat “out of the blue”. Member States, T/PCC, UN legislative and other bodies have all contributed.

- Regarding the Force Generation Process (FGP) as it exists today, the steps it contains and their order are dictated by a number of constraints that are inherent to the UN framework and cannot be avoided.

- It may be considered that the FG process is shaped by 4 broad families of factors: Political, Financial, Technical, Functional.

- Some of these include, 1) the way a PKO is planned and executed, 2) the way UN Security Council Resolutions are discussed and approved, 3) the GA-approved COE reimbursement framework, 4) the Logistic Support organization in the field and in the Secretariat, 5) the fact that the UN does not ‘own’ any strategic transport assets and has to contract commercial carriers through a mandatory bidding and contracting process respecting UN financial regulations and rules, or obtain strategic transport services from Member States under similar technical and financial constraints (Letters of Assist), 6) the decision making processes in DPO and DOS, 7) the prevalent political aspect of any PKO old or new, 8) the assessment that is made of the TCC pre-deployment standards, etc....
Key Message: The Force Generation process can be divided in 3 phases: Planning, Generation, Deployment

The Force Generation Process (FGP) can be divided into 3 phases:
- Planning (Pre-mandate phase),
- Generation,
- Deployment (Strategic Transport).

As explained at the start of the lecture, the FGP is fed upstream by the UN Peacekeeping Capabilities Readiness System.

Although not everything is always rigid or strictly unfolding according to theory, the PCRS should feed into the FG process at the planning phase: this is when the OMA is looking for units as requested by the CONOPS.

- These three phases frequently overlap, even during the generation of the same unit.
- The planning phase is formally over once a Security Council Resolution (SCR) has been approved, although the finalization of the planning documents (CONOPS, ROE, SUR) is most of the time carried out after the vote of the SCR. CONOPS, ROE and SUR were described in detail in Module C: – Peacekeeping Operations Planning.
- The UN PCRS is not formally part of the FGP. It is an ongoing activity led by the Office of Military Affairs / Force Generation Service, and the Police Division/Selection and Recruitment Section which aims to provide a reservoir of units with verified capabilities, proposed by P/TCCs, even before a new PKO is formally envisaged. It will however be covered in Lecture 2 of the present module.
Key Message: The Force Generation process can be divided in 3 phases: Planning, Generation, Deployment

- A diagrammatic representation of the three main phases of the FGP, that we will detail further on
- on the base line – Planning, Generation, Deployment (Strategic Transport) phases are shown, while the main events in their normal order are shown in the scale:
- Events in the Planning phase, formally stopping at the approval of the SCR
- The events in the Generation phase itself, which formally stop after the Pre-Deployment Visit
- The events leading to and including the strategic transport of the unit to the mission area.
Key Message: Fed by the Strategic Force Generation and Capabilities Planning Cell, the Force Generation process is politically controlled by the DPO / Single Regional Political-Operational Structure and supported by the Department of Operational Support.

As seen before, the work done by both the Secretariat and the Member States with the PCRS is a precursor to the force generation process.

- For Military units, the FGP is led by the Office of Military Affairs / Force Generation Service with the support, in the planning phase, of the Strategic Force Generation and Capabilities Planning Cell – SFGCPC).
- For Formed Police Units, the FGP is led by the Police Division / Selection and Recruitment Section.
- The Single Regional Political-Operational Structure exert a political oversight over the whole process.
- Political factors are predominant in selecting P/TCCs for a given UN PKO and therefore the role of the DPO/Single Regional Political-Operational Structure is to approve, from a political point of view, any proposal of a contribution suggested by either the OMA or the PD.
- The Department of Operational Support provides an administrative and logistic support to the FG process.
- The main Services of the DOS involved in the FGP are:
  - Logistic Division : Logistic support in the field, especially when the Mission logistic support structure is not yet in place.
  - Logistic Division / Movement Control ("MOVCON"): strategic transport of the equipment and personnel.
• Logistic Division / Air Transport Service (ATS): generation of aviation units – along with LD / Aviation Safety Section.
• Uniformed Capabilities Support Division: financial aspects, reimbursement framework and MOU.
Key Message: The planning phase formally ends with the adoption of the Security Council Resolution.

In the Planning Phase, the normal sequence of events includes:

- Strategic Assessment
- Integrated Assessment Planning; including Military and Police planning and planning for logistic support.
- Security Council deliberations
- Informal approach of Member States
- P/TCC information meetings

This Phase formally ends with the adoption of the Security Council Resolution (SCR)

- In the later stages, OMA/FGS or PD/SRS will start to informally approach Members States with known capabilities in order to start assessing their willingness to contribute.
- A formal approach to a P/TCC is not possible until the SCR has been approved, and the P/TCC has been vetted for political acceptability by DPO/SRPOS.
- The planning of a UN PKO is studied in detail in Module C: “Peacekeeping Operations Planning”.
Key Message: The generation phase – identifying and accepting the contributor, generation itself – formally ends with the Pre-Deployment Visit.

In the Generation Phase

This phase could be divided into two stages: Identifying and Generating

**First** identifying the contributor  
*(CLICK)*
- Approval of planning documents: CONOPS, ROE, SUR.
- Identification of T/PCCs. The Strategic Force Generation and Capabilities Planning Cell (SFGCPC) will issue the "Force Generation and Police Recruitment and Capabilities Plan" based on the content of the PCRS and of the Knowledge Management System of the SFGCPC (passed history and performances of the T/PCCs, known capabilities, etc.).
- Invitation to contribute (DPO) – TCC Acceptance.
- Possible Assessment and Advisory Visit (AAV): especially in case the PCRS AAV is too old.

**Second** accepting the contributor and launching the generation itself  
*(CLICK)*
- Acceptance of pledge by DPO :
  - There may be several TCC candidates for the same unit: choice to be made
  - Final decision may be linked to AAV result.
- Contributing Country Reconnaissance Visit (“Recce visit”) to the PKO.
• Final MOU negotiation. [This is called final MOU negotiation because in some instances there are preliminary MOU discussions in earlier phases. There is also a preliminary MOU negotiation when generating aviation units, which will be discussed in the relevant lecture].
• Pre-Deployment Visit (PDV).

• The planning documents (CONOPS, SUR, ROE) are necessary to allow the potential P/TCCs to do their own assessments, in the field, and continue their preparations. In some cases, draft copies of these documents may be made available.
• The pre-deployment visit formally ends the Generation Phase. With the final approval of the contribution, DOS/MOVCON is able to start preparing for the transport to the PKO phase.
Key Message: The deployment phase includes the preparation for shipment and strategic transport of both the equipment and personnel.

**In the Deployment Phase the normal sequence of events includes:**

- Approval of transportation related documents: Load Lists, Dangerous Cargo Lists, Passengers Manifests.
- Bidding and Contracting process.
- Preparation for shipment.
- Execution of transport of contingent equipment and personnel.

- **This Phase ends when the unit is complete with its equipment and personnel in the mission area.**

- Everything that happens following the strategic transport, once the unit is complete in the mission area, is not part of the Force Generation Process.

The Transport function will be covered in detail in Module H: – Preparation and Execution of Transport for Deployment.
Key Message: The duration of the force generation process will vary depending on a number of factors, among them the rapidity of reaction of the P/TCC.

Note to the Instructor:
This diagram intends to show that the generation of different units progresses at different paces depending on varying delays introduced in the process, sometimes by the Secretariat, sometimes by the P/TCC. Therefore a unit (Red on the graph) may start its generation process later than other units (Green, Blue on the graph) and nevertheless deploy earlier.

Additional comments:
The diagram also shows that
• A number of these events may happen in parallel, or overlap
• In some cases this standard process may be slightly different: i.e. Aviation Units, Formed Police Units, Re-hatting units, or rapid deployment of an enabling unit.
• The differences existing in these particular cases will be covered later in the same Module.

• However, despite the differences, the generation of the latter units follow the same general principles in terms of political factors, reimbursement principles, financial and technical factors (transport), etc.

• Some activities may overlap, but their order is generally as shown due to constraining factors.
• As regards time frame, the capacity for reaction of the P/TCC, and its current state of preparedness, influence to a very large extent the duration of the FGP as a whole.
• Political factors, reimbursement framework and UN financial regulations and rules must be respected and they often shape the Force Generation Process.
Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 3 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).

In order to save time, the OMA/FGS will start approaching P/TCC representatives even before the approval of a mandate (SCR), at the end of the planning phase.
Key Message: The pre-mandate phase ends with the adoption of the Security Council Resolution.

- A diagrammatic view of the three main phases of the FG process on the base line – Planning, Generation, Deployment, with the main events in their normal order, is shown in this slide.

- The pre-mandate phase formally ends with the approval of a Security Council Resolution.
Key Message: In order to save time on the force generation process, informal approach of P/TCCs and distribution of draft planning documents will often happen during the pre-mandate phase.

During the pre-mandate phase, the integrated planning of the future Mission is carried out, including Military and Police planning and planning of the logistic support to be provided in/to the field.

• In the last phases of the planning, OMA / FGS and PD / SRS will start informally approaching MS representatives to check the willingness of their Governments to contribute.

• Informal approaches can happen two ways:
  - From DPO to the P/TCC, based on the Force Generation and Police Recruitment and Capabilities Plan prepared by the SFGCPC / DPO
  - From the P/TCC to DPO.

• During the pre-mandate phase, P/TCC Meetings will be organized by DPO with a goal to keep the MS and would-be P/TCC informed on the planning process and on the future PKO.

• Whenever possible, draft planning documents (CONOPS, SUR) will be provided to the P/TCC representatives on the occasion of an informal approach.
Key Message: Member States approached with priority will be those having current verified pledge in the PCRS, known capabilities and/or a proven contribution record.

The Member States informally approached will be in priority:

• Those MS having units pledged in the UNPCRS with a verified state of readiness – and revealed by the "Force Generation and Police Recruitment and Capabilities Plan"

• Those MS possessing known capabilities deemed useful to the future mission.

• MS with a proven record of contribution will often be approached directly, even without having units in the UN PCRS.

• Emerging P/TCCs will have to be in the PCRS in order to be first approached.
• [Emerging P/TCCs are member states which have never contributed formed units to PKOs, or which have not contributed for a long time].

• OMA/FGS or PD/SRS will always check with the DPO/SRPOS that MS they want to approach informally would not present any political issue
• The lecture on the UN PCRS will cover the various levels and conditions
Development of Topic 4 of Lecture 3 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).

The Assessment and Advisory Visit (AAV) is meant both to provide factual elements to help the DPO decision making process in selecting units, and to advise the TCC on important aspects of the envisioned contribution.

AAVs are governed by a specific SOP that is subsidiary to the DPO/DOS Policy on Force Generation/Police Recruitment visits.
Key Message: The AAV normally takes place before formal DPO acceptance of the contribution.

- The diagram shows the normal place of the AAV in the FG process. This is not to be confounded with the PCRS AAV.
- The AAV may be skipped if the PCRS AAV is recent.
- The AAV normally takes place between the formal response to DPO invitation made by a TCC and the formal acceptance of said pledge by DPO.
- The AAV shall inform and support DPKO’s final decision regarding the acceptance of the unit.
- However, AAVs are also part of the UN PCRS process and are mandatory in the case of critical enablers (aviation, medical, engineers).
Key Message: The main goals of the AAV are to inform DPKO’s decision making process relative to the choice of T/PCCs and to advise T/PCCs in meeting UN requirements.

- See rationale in the relevant SOP
- Goals 1 to 4 cover both roles of the visit: the assessment part and the advisory part

The AAV is a collaborative undertaking between a Member State and the Secretariat whose goals are:

- To inform the UNHQ decision-making process.
- To improve DPKO’s understanding of the preparedness of a Member State wishing to contribute to UN PKOs.
- To advise the Member State on the specific UN requirements for a contribution.
- To assist the Member State in meeting these requirements.
- To provide feedback to the Member State about the result of the AAV and ensuing recommendations.
Key Message: The AAV tries to assess every aspect of the preparedness of a unit.

Practical and quantitative assessment of all factors contributing to the specific capabilities sought:
- Personnel availability and training.
- Organization of the unit.
- Equipment.
- Sustainment.
- Internal (political) decision making process (which in some cases may delay the final decision to contribute).

- Understanding the level of preparedness is a very important point regarding the usefulness of AAV: too often OMA/FGS and/or PD/SRS has been blind about the actual status of a pledged unit, in terms of personnel preparedness and availability of necessary equipment. Statements issued by MS Permanent Missions have often been unreliable in that regard and have led to many disappointments.
- The AAV is the only way for DPO personnel to truly see by themselves where the P/TCC stands with regard to the above.
Key Message: Checking the unit’s personnel during the AAV includes verifying all aspects of their training as well as the existence of a unit certification process.

**Personnel:**
- As far as possible the availability, experience and training level of all categories of personnel will be assessed.
- The overall capability of the TCC to concentrate, train and deploy a homogeneous unit will be assessed.
- The training cursus, unit certification process and training facilities available will be especially examined...
- As well as the military skills of the personnel
- Human rights screening is an integral part of the personnel selection process and the national procedure will be assessed by the team.
Key Message: Checking the unit’s equipment during the AAV means trying to check at least a sample of every kind of both operational and support equipment, including maintenance items and equipment under procurement.

**Equipment**
Based on the relevant SUR, and on the draft MOU and its annexes:

- At least samples of every kind of major and self-sustainment equipment should be shown to the AAV Team. This includes maintenance plans and replacement parts.
- Procurement orders and characteristics of equipment under procurement should be made available to the AAV Team.
- Availability of a sufficient number of shipping containers should not be forgotten.
Key Message: the AAV team is able to advise the P/TCC upon all aspects of the unit’s generation and deployment.

**Advising the T/PCC**
- Visiting team will be prepared to brief MS representatives on any issue related to UN peacekeeping operations.
- Whenever the AAV precedes an immediate deployment, Mission-specific operational and logistic requirements, as well as deployment timings, will be especially addressed.
- The MS should make sure to request any specific briefing in advance of the visit (see Preparation).
- Advise member states on UN requirements and policies, including on environment, gender balance and SEA training.
Assessment And Advisory Visit
Planning

Formal request / Acceptance
Smooth communication
Force Generation Service or Selection & Recruitment Service
Sufficient lead time

Key Message: an AAV can only be done at the invitation of the P/TCC.

Planning the AAV
- The AAV is organized at the formal request of the Member State through its Permanent Mission to the UNHQ. The AAV cannot be imposed on a Member State.
- Smooth communication between the PM and the capital is essential to organize the AAV.
- The point of contact and lead service is either the OMS/Force Generation Service or the PD/Selection and Recruitment Service.
- Sufficient lead time should be allowed for practical preparations on both sides.

A formal request means a Note Verbal from the PM to DPO.
Key Message: the preparation of the AAV requires a centralized organization above the level of the unit’s

This slide addresses the preparation aspects for AAV; from the P/TCC perspective.

The display of equipment types during the AAV should as far as possible be arranged in the order of the major equipment lists in Chapter 8 of the COE Manual and preferably in one location only, as this will be the format used during any subsequent Pre-deployment Visit (PDV).

- **Request** specific briefings with sufficient lead time.
- **Suitable facility** to conduct the AAV, preferably with the unit gathered in one location only, including meeting / briefing rooms.
- Organize **provision** of relevant **documents** (copies) to the team: training courses and calendar, procurement orders, lists of parts, etc.
- Plan for presence of at least the **key personnel P/TCC** (leadership, logistic support, procurement...).
- Plan for courtesy **local transport** of the UN team.

However, all major costs (travel to and from NYC, accommodation) are at UN expense.
Key Message: the main goal of the AAV report is to make clear recommendations to the DPO authorities with regard either to the acceptance of the unit or to its elevation to the next PCRS level.

- The AAV will end with a **Wrap up** meeting, to summarize and reach agreement on the recommendations made by the AAV Team; or P/TCC.
- A **Summary** shared with the P/TCC, will record the following: overall assessment, key findings, capability gaps, recommendations to overcome any identified issue.
- In addition the AAV team leader will finalize a full report to the DPO authorities within 5 days of returning to UNHQ. (*) In case the MS was requested to provide additional or missing documents, the report will be finalized only after reception of said documents.
- The AAV report will include a clear recommendation on whether the unit should be considered for immediate deployment (or elevation to the next level in the PCRS process).
- [If the AAV is successful in identifying and solving key issues, the conduct of a Pre-Deployment Visit (PDV) assessing the same capability and readiness might be waived if the intended deployment takes place within 12 months of the conduct of the AAV.] Ref: Force Generation Manual 2017.
Development of Topic 5 of Lecture 3 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key Message: Requests for, pledge for and acceptance of troop contributions are always formally made by means of a Note Verbal.

- The UN is a political / diplomatic organization.
- The **Note Verbal (NV)** is the only official / formal means of communication between the Secretariat and the MS.
- Informal agreement on any issue is a good principle to implement, but must always be confirmed by means of a NV.

**Therefore**

**CLICK**

- All formal communications between the Secretariat and the Member States pertaining to military or police contributions are to be made by Note Verbal (NV) only, through the MS Permanent Missions to the UN.
- Copies of signed NVs can be faxed or emailed for the sake of rapidity.
- Any informal agreement reached verbally or through email must be confirmed by a NV.
Key Message: political vetting by DPO/Single Regional Political-Operational Structure is mandatory before sending a request for contribution to a Member State.

- Once the mandate is approved, and the structure of the Military / Police components decided upon, DPO sends formal requests for contributions to MS through NV.
- The CONOPS and SUR relative to the mission and unit sought will normally be attached to the NV.
- The list of MS to approach is proposed by OMA/PD, vetted by the DPO/Single Regional Political-Operational Structure for political suitability and approved by the USG DPO.

- If the approved planning documents (CONOPS, SUR and ROE) are not ready by the time NVs are to be sent; draft versions of these may be provided to the P/TCCs.
- The political vetting of the list of would-be contributors is mandatory. PKOs are first and foremost political acts, in which the military or police components are but tools provided as a means, among others, to reach the political goals of the mandate.
- DPO/SRPOS provides the political vetting.
- OMA or PD provides the technical vetting (next slide).
Request for Contribution

MEMBER STATES APPROACHED

- Verified Pledge in PCRS
- Possessing Known Capabilities
- Proven Contribution Record
- Making direct offers to DPO *

Key Message: P/TCCs registered in the PCRS or possessing verified capabilities stand a better chance to be selected for contribution.

(Similar to the informal approach in the pre-mandate phase)

Member States approached will be:

- MS having made a verified pledge in the UN PCRS
- MS known to possess capabilities that are sought for execution of the mandated tasks.
- MS having a proven history of satisfactory contribution to PKOs.
- MS having informally approached DPO with offers of contribution * [However it should be noted that DPO intends, in the short term, to accept only units registered in the PCRS – Refer to PCRS lecture].
- ... or any combination of these factors.

Priority will be given to MS having pledged units in the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System database and having reached a proven level of preparedness.

- It must be understood that this « Technical Vetting » occurs only if the Political Vetting evoked earlier was successful.
- A pledge or offer of contribution should be made to DPO by means of a NV.
• Informal discussions with the OMA or PD will usefully precede the sending of a NV. Informal discussions prior to formulating a pledge will allow the military / police authorities to better shape their offer and make it consistent with DPO requirements.

• Regular contacts with OMA/FGS or PD/SRS guarantee smooth operations.

• Details on the UN PCRS will be examined in the next lecture.

• Direct offers (without pledging first in the PCRS) are possible for seasoned P/TCCs having a proven record of satisfactory contributions.

• Emerging P/TCCs (i.e. making their first or second offer of contribution) must first go through the PCRS process.
Key Message: any offer of contribution should include a complete set of descriptive documents relative to the unit as well as any caveat put in by the P/TCC.

The NV pledging a contribution should enclose detailed information about the offer, consistent with the relevant Statement of Unit Requirements:

- Table of Organization of the unit.
- Table of Equipment of the unit.
- Tentative time line for readiness / deployment.
- Possible caveats (See next slide).

Pledges of contributions received without detailed information on the proposed unit(s) are of little use for force generation purposes and will be treated as non-priority offers.

- The SUR was studied in Module C: “Peacekeeping Operations Planning Overview”
- It is a fact that pledging a unit without providing any substantial information on it often means that the unit is not ready for deployment. Equipment still missing at the time of the pledge will entail protracted delays before the unit is ready to deploy.
- Most of the time these delays will not be acceptable by DPO or by the Mission.
Key Message: an offer of contribution burdened with caveats is at a greater risk to be denied.

- ‘Caveats’ or stipulated conditions on pledges, which might restrict the operational capability, tasking, deployment locations etc. of the unit, to achieve the mandated tasks, should be avoided whenever possible.

- A pledge without caveats will usually have priority over a pledge burdened with caveats.

- Caveats or technical requests conditioning the contribution should be detailed in a letter annexed to the NV, pledging the unit.

- Caveats should be discussed beforehand with DPO, not put forth at the last minute.
Key Message: caveats or technical conditions commanding the deployment will be officially answered to by means of a Note Verbal.

- Political or employment caveats expressed by a P/TCC will be discussed, usually at the level of the DPO or OMA or PD leadership.
- Technical conditions proposed concerning the deployment of the unit will be discussed with the OMA / PD / DOS relevant representatives.
- Following discussions, official response to caveats or stipulated conditions will be provided in writing through a DPO or DOS NV.

- Political caveats restricting the use of a unit in the field are likely to cause DPO to refuse the offer of contribution.
- Resolution of the caveats is bound to delay the deployment of a unit and might be a reason for the non-approval of the corresponding offer.
- Technical requirements conditioning a contribution may address logistic support, technical requirements, (like provision of hangars for maintenance of aircraft), etc… Discussions with DOS LOGOPS, and possibly the Mission’s Director Mission Support, will be necessary.
- Said discussions will often be coordinated through the officer in charge in OMA/FGS or PD/SRS.
Key Message: the USG DPO is responsible for making the final decision to accept or deny an offer of contribution.

- Unless the proposed unit is already registered in the UN PCRS database and its capabilities have already been validated by DPO, credible pledges from P/TCCs are usually followed by an Assessment and Advisory Visit.
- The USG DPO will decide to accept or reject the offer of contribution based in part on the assessment made during the AAV.

- An AAV is usually conducted, unless the unit has already been verified in the PCRS, and that verification is considered as current.
  - The PCRS policy indicates that pledges should be reviewed and renewed every 6 months after the first year the pledge has been accepted. Renewed pledges may need to be re-verified in the PCRS, in light of changed circumstances and depending on the length of time since the previous verification was conducted. An AAV may be decided in case a pledge is not considered current by DPO authorities.
  - Experienced P/TCCs may not need an AAV, but an AAV will be always be done for less experienced P/TCC or for some kinds of specialized units: helicopter units, FPU, certain enablers like Level 2 Hospitals etc. (see specific lectures for these)
  - A credible pledge is a pledge supported by complete information on the unit offered, as explained above (TOE, list of equipment, etc.).

- Acceptance of a contribution for a PKO will be advised by DPO by a Note Verbal to the Permanent Mission.
• The NV will invite the P/TCC to contact OMA or PD as soon as possible in order to start the next stage of the force generation process.

• **Non-acceptance** of an offer of contribution will also be conveyed to the PM through a **Note Verbal** from DPO.
Acceptance of Offer

**Key Message:** Complete units whose capabilities and training have been verified and registered in the PCRS stand a better chance to be accepted.

- Any offer of contribution is more likely to be accepted if the unit’s capabilities are complete and the personnel training is complete or nearing completion.
- Any pledge previously recorded in the UN PCRS and verified at Level 3 or above has a better chance to be accepted than a non-verified offer.
- In case of several offers for the same unit types the USG DPO makes a final decision on which offers to accept based on a mix of political factors, verified existing capabilities and readiness levels including a planned deployment time line meeting the Mission’s requirements.

- Lecture 2 will explain the PCRS Process and Levels system.
- Despite the existence of technical considerations, political factors often constrain the leadership’s final decision.
- It is therefore possible that a pledge meeting all the technical requirements won’t be accepted due to political considerations.
Development of Topic 6 of Lecture 3 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).

As the costs (only those allowable under the SOP and Policy) of the recce are reimbursed to the P/TCC after deployment of its unit, the recce cannot be authorized before official acceptance of the contribution. Official acceptance of a unit means the P/TCC is officially part of the Mission, therefore UN financial bodies are allowed to effect disbursements to that P/TCC in the framework of the Mission.
Key Message: for financial reasons the Recce visit by the P/TCC can only happen following official acceptance of the unit by DPO. It is normally organized before the MOU negotiation.

An essential step in the Force Generation process:

Following official acceptance of a contribution, the next step in the force generation process is the Contributing Country Reconnaissance Visit, (Recce Visit) to the Mission area.

The Contributing Country Reconnaissance Visits are governed by a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) that is subsidiary to the DPO/DOS Policy on Force Generation/Police Recruitment Visits.

The recce visit:
• Can only take place after official acceptance of the contribution by DPO
• Has to take place before the MOU negotiation

• As the costs of the recce are reimbursed to the P/TCC after deployment of its unit, the recce cannot be authorized before official acceptance of the contribution. Official acceptance of a unit means the P/TCC is officially part of the Mission, therefore UN financial bodies are allowed to effect disbursements to that P/TCC in the framework of the Mission.
• The Recce has to take place before the final MOU negotiation, as the findings of the recce may lead to alter the equipment / capabilities of the unit, and therefore to modify accordingly the draft MOU
Key Message: the Recce visit should allow the P/TCC to gain knowledge of all aspects of the local situation and conditions of living and operations before deployment.

Rationale:

to facilitate and allow the T/PCCs to visit the field mission before deployment so as to gather current information on:

- Local situation, terrain, climate.
- Operational environment.
- Logistic support conditions.
- Infrastructure.

- Central to the reconnaissance visit is gathering of technical information on key logistic and operational issues that directly affect the elements of the contingent’s capability.
- The actual situation on the ground and expected contingent tasks together inform how the P/TCC should prepare and train its contingent personnel, what skills are required, how should the unit/contingent be organised, and what major equipment, self-sustainment, consumables re-supply and equipment maintenance are required.
Key Message: the Recce visit should not result in a complete change of tasks / equipment / structure of the unit as defined in the Statement of Unit Requirements.

- The **primary goal** of the visit, both for the T/PCC and for the Mission, is to ensure the unit/contingent has the necessary capabilities to achieve its assigned mandated tasks successfully.

- All capabilities and other necessary requirements have already been included in the Statement of Unit Requirements but the Recce Visit serves to allow indispensable last-minute **adjustments** to take into account the prevailing local conditions.

- **(Meaning: the RECCE visit normally should not result in a complete change of tasks / equipment / structure of the unit, such changes not being the Mission’s decision to make).**
Key Message: the conditions of the Recce visit are jointly agreed to by DPO, DOS, the Mission on the ground and the P/TCC. An invitation has to be sent in writing by DPO to the P/TCC.

**Procedure: Invitation**

**Coordination:** OMA/FGS or PD/SRS  
**Agreement:** T/PCC, DPO, DOS/LD, DOS/UCSD, UNMAS, Field Mission (Mission Support, Force Commander / Police Commissioner)  
**Final approval:** USG DPO  
**Invitation:** fax from DPO to T/PCC

- A template of the invitation fax exists in the SOP, Annex B.
Key Message: the written proposal from the P/TCC relative to the recce visit must include complete information relative to the recce team and to its trip. Specific requests to the Mission (briefings...) should be conveyed well in advance.

Procedure: Response from T/PCC

Ideally: 6 to 8 weeks before the visit

Written proposal from T/PCC:
- Preferred dates.
- Proposed itinerary (incl. locations in Mission area).
- Names and appointments of participants. (Note the restrictions in the SOP on reimbursable costs for numbers of participants.
- Specific requests for the visit (briefings, meetings, etc.).

- The delays are often shorter as regards organizing the visit, due to operational exigencies.
- The dates are often a function of the Field Mission possibilities: especially in starting missions, the number of visits / activities and the low quantity of transportation means available may lead to the mission requesting different dates – since it should be understood that the Mission is supporting the recce team while in the mission area.
- Proposed itinerary should be the most direct, in economy class.
- Number of participants defined by SOP – see extant regulations in the coming slides
- The participants, or at least the team leader, should have sufficient decisional authority to face and solve likely issues in terms of additional equipment requests, logistic support requests etc.
• Beside, given the relatively low number of participants authorized, each one of them should be an expert in his field. The recce visit is an additional burden for the Mission in terms of support, therefore there is no room for tourists in a recce team.
Key Message: The travel of the Recce team has to be coordinated by the P/TCC with the Mission through DPO and DOS.

Procedure: Trip organization

**Travel:** arranged by T/PCC, coordination with Field Mission through OMA / PD.

**DPO/DOS coordinate with Field Mission:**
- Accommodation
- Administrative Support
- Transportation within the Mission area
- Programme of the visit

- The coordination with the Field Mission is mandatory to take into account the events the Mission has to support and its transport capabilities.
- Important events (elections, inaugural ceremony...) may lead to a modification of the dates proposed by the T/PCC.
- Starting missions especially, having limited capabilities, are often under duress when it comes to supporting multiple recce missions.
- It is preferable to postpone a recce and do it in good conditions than suffer from a lack of support from the Mission.
Key Message: the composition of the Recce team and the duration of the trip are defined by a specific SOP and any unauthorized deviation from the regulations will be at the expense of the P/TCC.

Procedure: Composition of the Team / Duration

- The maximum number of T/PCC participants reimbursed by the UN and duration of the visit is defined in the SOP (Maximum 5 days) – (See next slide)
- Any exception regarding strength or duration to be approved by USG DPO
- Number of approved participants and authorized duration of visit are mentioned in the invitation fax
- Any member in addition to the approved strength will travel at his Government’s expense.
- Any additional day will be at Govt’s expense.

- Exceptions to the number of participants exist in the SOP (emerging P/TCCs).
- Exceptions to duration of the visit possible depending on number of locations to visit, transport difficulties etc.
- Exceptions to be approved beforehand and mentioned in the invitation.
- The duration is to be understood as the number of days spent in the Mission area.
**Key Message:** any deviation to the extant regulations have to be negotiated with and accepted by DPO beforehand.

- This table is an extract of the SOP defining the composition of the recce teams and the duration of the recce in relation with the type of unit to be deployed.
- Any deviation from these conditions would have to be accepted beforehand by DPO.
- (Amendments would be authorized, in particular, whenever a P/TCC is due to deploy several units to one Mission and in the same time frame).
- While the composition of the recce team is left at the T/PCC’s appreciation, it must be considered that the recce team is a working team and not a high level diplomatic / courtesy visit. The team should ideally include the unit commander and his logistics officer and operations officer in case of an Infantry battalion.
Key Message: the Recce team will have to meet with the Mission Military or Police component, with the Mission support component, and will have to travel to the location of deployment of the unit.

**During the visit the recce team must:**

**Meet and work with:** Military / Police components representatives (Operations, Plans, FC/DFC or PC/DPC etc.).

**Meet and work with:** Director Mission Support and/or his representatives to discuss conditions of logistic support and infrastructure issues, specific requirements as regards Major Equipment / Self Sustainment

**Request:** necessary briefings on any administrative or operational matter as the recce team sees fit.

**Visit:** area(s) of deployment of the unit to form an idea on:
- Terrain, roads, camp location, existing infrastructure if any
- Threats / Defenses / Security conditions
- Local possibilities (supply of certain goods)
- Food / Fuel / Electricity: conditions of provision and issues

• Working in close partnership with the UN staff during the visit is an essential condition for the success of the recce.
• Requesting specific briefings / information sessions should be done in advance (see response to the UN invitation)
• It is essential that any agreement reached with Mission personnel on any issue be recorded in writing and put in the report (see recce report further down)

Phased Reconnaissance Visit

In particular for large units deploying to several areas / bases:

• During the starting phase of a mission, some areas may not be reachable at the time of the recce due to security conditions, lack of UN presence, lack of transportation means, etc.
• In such case a **phased reconnaissance** may be envisaged, several trips spaced in time being necessary to complete the recces of all locations.
• **Such arrangement may only be coordinated with and approved by DPO, in liaison with the Field Mission.**
Key Message: the wrap up meeting at the end of the Recce visit will serve to list any issues and the agreed remedies, as well as the agreed further actions of every party involved. Unresolved issues would be listed as well to be addressed later on.

**End of Recce:**

**Wrap up meeting** before departure:
- Any unit equipment / organization issue
- Contributing country actions agreed on
- UNHQ / Mission actions agreed on

- Unresolved issues
- Etc.

- Deviations from the approved SUR should be kept to the minimum and only if warranted by drastic changes in the situation on the ground, as said deviations are bound to cause more delays in the preparation / deployment of the unit in case they involve procuring additional equipment.
Key Message: following the wrap up meeting, a recce report drafted before the departure of the team will list every decision made and will be jointly signed by the representatives of the Force Commander or Police Commissioner, of the Director Mission Support and by the Recce Team Leader.

Recce Report:

All arrangements agreed during the recce visit / wrap up meeting must be recorded in writing in the recce report.
The recce report must be jointly signed, before the recce team departs, by:
- DMS or his authorized representative
- FC / PC or their authorized representative
- Recce Team leader

The recce team must leave the mission area with a copy of the jointly signed report.

- The joint signature of all three parties involved is mandatory for the report to have any value in the future.
- The recce party must not accept to leave the Mission area without a signed copy of the report
Key Message: the Recce team must never leave the Mission without a signed copy of the Recce report for later reference.

**Recce Report:**

- It is of the **utmost importance** that the recce report be drafted, signed and a copy remitted to the recce team before departure as explained above.
- The recce report is the only proof of the arrangements jointly agreed by the Mission staff and the T/PCC (“Agreed actions”).
- In case a disagreement occurs several months later at the arrival of the unit in the mission area, the T/PCC would be able to refer to the report so established.

**CLICK**

- We cannot overstate the importance of having a report established and jointly signed before the team leaves the Mission.
- Countless problems will be avoided in the future if both parties can refer to a jointly accepted arrangement put in writing at the time of the reconnaissance.
- It should be kept in mind that the actual arrival of the unit in the mission area might happen several months after the reconnaissance took place. By then, any arrangement not put in writing will have been completely forgotten – not even mentioning the possible changes of UN staff members within the Mission.
• Beside remitting the report to the T/PCC authorities back in the capital, a copy must be forwarded to the Permanent Mission / Military or Police Adviser in New York. This will help support any discussion that might take place later between the PM and the UNHQ.
Key Message: any expense in excess of the limits approved by DPO will not be reimbursed to the P/TCC.

Finance: Rules
- The UN reimburses the travel expenses, including accommodation and meals, incurred by the approved recce team.
- The UN does not reimburse the expenses incurred in excess of the eligible reimbursement.
- With approval of the Mission, the T/PCC may send more Officers than the approved number but it must keep in mind that it will support all travel expenses for the additional personnel.
- It should also be kept in mind that starting missions usually have limited transport / accommodation assets available; therefore, most starting missions would not be able to support too big a recce party anyway.
Key Message: the expenses incurred within the DPKO-approved limits will be reimbursed after the effective deployment of the unit.

Finance: Conditions for reimbursement

- The recce is coordinated with and approved by DPO.
- The recce team completes the reconnaissance in partnership with the UN Staff
- The Permanent Mission agrees with the itinerary, travel and accommodation arrangements.
- The T/PCC submits a claim for reimbursement
- The unit has effectively deployed to the Mission area
  *(Or if it has not deployed, it is due to a UNHQ decision).*
- Therefore the reimbursement can only happen after the complete unit has arrived in the Mission area.
- Failure to deploy due to T/PCC responsibility means the reconnaissance visit will not be reimbursed.
- Cancelled deployment due to UNHQ decision without responsibility of the T/PCC means that the reconnaissance will be reimbursed by the UN.
Key Message: all claims and supporting documents pertaining to the reimbursement of Recce visit expenses have to be forwarded to DOS/UCSD/Reimbursement Claims Management and Performance Section.

Finance: Reimbursement Procedure

The PM of the T/PCC submits a claim for reimbursement to DOS/UCSD/RCMPS [Reimbursement Claims Management and Performance Section]

Click
Claim must include:
- Original air tickets
- Boarding passes

- Refer to the Reimbursement Framework / Module D.
- Providing original plane tickets and boarding passes is mandatory.
MOU Negotiation

Development of Topic 7 of Lecture 3 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key Message: for practical reasons the negotiation of the MOU normally takes place after the Recce Visit and before the Pre-Deployment Visit.

- A synthetic view of the three main phase of the FG process on the base line – Planning, Generation, Deployment, with the main events in their normal order.

The final negotiation of the MOU usually takes place:

- **Following** the T/PCC Reconnaissance visit
  Because the findings of the recce visit may alter the list of equipment of the unit as shown in the SUR
- **Before** the Pre-Deployment Visit
  Because the draft MOU obtained at the end of the negotiation will be used as the basis for checking the equipment during the PDV.

In some instances, a preliminary MOU negotiation may take place before the recce; however the final MOU negotiation may only happen after the recce has been completed and list of equipment finalized. [cf Force Generation Manual]. Preliminary discussions are not mandatory, save in the specific case of the aviation units, that we will see in a further lecture.
Key Message: the P/TCC MOU Negotiation Team Leader should be empowered with sufficient decisional authority. Bringing along detailed descriptions of the various pieces of equipment proposed by the P/TCC will facilitate the discussions.

• The negotiation of the MOU has been explained in the Reimbursements lecture.
• From the Force Generation process point of view, here are simply two ideas to complete the lecture:

• For the draft MOU to be accurate, it is important that the negotiation be well prepared, the T/PCC team bringing detailed characteristics of the Major Equipment for exact categorization.

• It is important that the T/PCC team leader possesses enough decisional authority to amend the list of equipment if needed and to conclude the negotiation, as the draft MOU will be the basis for the Pre-Deployment Visit.

• Although the draft MOU may be amended following the PDV, it is important to obtain a draft as accurate as possible at the end of the MOU negotiation.
• This will facilitate the PDV and minimize the risks of confusion.
• The negotiation team should bring to the table a file detailing the characteristics of all major equipment, with the denomination following that of the COE Manual: pictures, capabilities, important points as per COE Manual categories: for vehicles, for example – 4x4 or 4x2, civilian or military pattern, weight, capacity, radio equipment, other equipment turning a civilian pattern equipment into a military pattern one, etc..
• It would help to arrange the pieces of equipment in the file in the order of the COE Manual.
• For the draft MOU to be accurate, it is important that the negotiation be well prepared, the T/PCC team bringing detailed characteristics of the Major Equipment for exact categorization.
• It is important that the T/PCC team leader possesses enough decisional authority to amend the list of equipment if needed and to conclude the negotiation, as the draft MOU will be the basis for the Pre-Deployment Visit.
Key Message: the MOU negotiation team should take advantage of its time in New York to arrange several work sessions with MOVCON, in order to receive important information and start coordinating the future movements.

When preparing its stay in New York, the MOU negotiation team should arrange for several hours of work with MOVCON, separate from the negotiation sessions, in order to receive crucial information for the future cargo and personnel movements. These sessions will allow MOVCON and the P/TCC to start coordinating for the movement and will provide the P/TCC team with precious information:

A complete MOVCON agenda for such meetings, in the case of an inexperienced P/TCC, could cover:

**Introduction, MCS Roles & Responsibilities;**

**Start taking options for the future movements:**
- Movement options: under LOA or UN Contract;
- LOA procedures and reimbursement;
- Mode of transportation (Air/Sea/Surface) for COE and Troops;
- Phases of the deployment & timelines;

**Essential to initiate the procurement process for transport:**
- Required accurate Cargo (load lists and DG load lists) & Pax Documentation:
- Cargo Readiness date;
- Pick-up location(s), pre-carriage to from Air/Sea port of embarkation;
Preparation of COE for the transportation, eligibility for the packing materials, extra containers (UNOE) for the transportation.

Personal baggage entitlement;

Deployment of MOVCON specialists to T/PCC to assist with:
- Preparation of proper cargo and DG documentation,
- Packing of the COE,
- Coordination between T/PCC, UN contractor, mission and UNHQ,
- Loading of an aircraft or vessel.

UN procedures on claims related to packing, inland transportation, possible damages.

Specific areas of concern for the Peacekeeping Mission where a Unit to be deployed;

Possible risks for delays, vessel demurrage, trucks detention charges, etc.
Pre-Deployment Visit and Report

Development of Topic 8 of Lecture 3 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key Message: Because it is based on the draft MOU, the Pre-Deployment Visit has to take place after the final MOU negotiation.

PDV
• Since the draft MOU is used for verification purpose, the Pre-Deployment Visit has to be placed after the final MOU negotiation.
• The PDV is the last operation in the Generation phase, before the preparation for strategic transport starts.
• Of note: as said in the AAV topic, If the AAV is successful in identifying and solving key issues, the conduct of a Pre-Deployment Visit (PDV) assessing the same capability and readiness might be waived if the intended deployment takes place within 12 months of the conduct of the AAV. (Force Generation Manual 2017).
Pre-Deployment Visit

Key Message: the PDV provides the decisive argument for the USG DPO to authorize or deny the deployment of the unit to the Mission area.

The most important and challenging step in the Force Generation process, to:

- Verify the ability of the unit to deliver the mandated tasks
- Provide the basis for the decisive authorization for deployment by the USG DPO
Key Message: The PDV's goals are to check facts about the unit to deploy and to provide necessary assistance to the P/TCC. It will also support the DPO authorities decision making process.

Rationale

- Activity governed by a SOP.
- Meant to check facts about the unit to be deployed.
- Meant to provide the T/PCC with necessary assistance.
- Support DPO leadership decision making process regarding the deployment of the unit.

- The Pre-Deployment Visit is governed by a SOP that is subsidiary to the DPO/DOS Policy on Force Generation and Police Recruitment Visits.
- The PDV is meant both to verify a number of facts about the unit to be deployed and to provide the T/PCC with necessary assistance from DPO/DOS personnel.
- Ultimately the PDV team shall provide the DPO leadership with enough objective arguments to make the decision to allow or refuse the deployment of the unit.
Key Message: jointly agreed by DPO and the P/TCC, The PDV planning process is led by OMA/FGS (military units) or PD/SRS (Police Units).

Planning
• UNHQ Lead : OMA/FGS or PD/SRS
• Contacts and coordination through Permanent Mission / NY
• Inscribed in time line for generation of unit:
  AAV – Recce – MOU Negotiation – PDV – etc.
• **OMA Internal regulation provides that the TCC must provide pictures of existing equipment, without which the PDV might be postponed or even cancelled.**
• Dates and arrangements fixed in accordance with and on invitation from T/PCC

• The PDV is inscribed in the general time line of the generation process for the considered unit.
• The time line is jointly agreed between DPO and the T/PCC represented by the Permanent mission / NY
• As for the other events in the FG process, the lead offices are OMA/FGS or PD/SRS
Key Message: the travel and accommodation costs incurred by the PDV are supported by the UN.

Finance

• T/PCC bears the costs associated with its own preparation.
• Travel and accommodation costs of UN team supported by the UN.
• UN generally requests courtesy transport of the team within the Capital / PDV locations.

• The PDV is at no cost to the P/TCC, save for its own organization.
• Transfer from/to the airport is usually kindly requested
• Transport between hotel and different sites usually provided by the host government
• Travel, meals, accommodation are at UN expense
Key Message: always led by OMA/FGS (MIL) or PD/SRS (POL), the PDV team includes UN staff specialized in Logistic Support, Finance, Training, and whatever specialty is required by the type of unit visited.

The PDV Team

- OMA/FGS or PD/SRS (Team leader)
- MOU and Reimbursement Policy Section
- Logistic Support (UNHQ or field Mission)
- Integrated Training Service
- Specialist as required: Medical, Engineering, Air domain, etc. depending on type of unit

- The team is always led by the Officer in charge in Force Generation Service (military) or Selection and Recruitment Service (Police), regardless of the ranks of the respective participants.
- MRPS personnel will help with COE Manual requirements and possible amendments to the draft MOU
- Logistic Support officer to solve logistic issues, be the link with Mission Support if need be
- Integrated Training Service to help with any training issue
- Enabling specialist indispensable for checking what belongs to his domain (specialized equipment, professional qualifications, security and safety regulations, etc.)
Key Message: during the PDV, an initial meeting and a wrap up meeting will bracket the various verifications made by the PDV team.

The visit

- Initial meeting with authorities
- Equipment verification, meetings, briefings.
- Wrap up meeting

Duration: 2 to 7 days in-country.

- Initial meeting is a start off meant to agree on the programme, modalities, with the authorities.
- Wrap up meeting: summarize and put in writing:
  - Findings
  - Amendments to draft MOU
  - Actions to be realized by P/TCC
  - Actions to be realized by UN
- Conclusion to be put in writing, jointly signed by PDV Team and P/TCC representative. Copy will be left to the P/TCC.
- The duration is adapted to the size of the unit.
Key Message: working together with the P/TCC representatives, the PDV Team will brief the national authorities as requested, assess the readiness of the unit in all domains and determine the amendments to be made to the negotiated MOU.

Operating in agreement with the P/TCC authorities, the tasks of the PDV Team can be divided in 4 broad families:

- Briefing
- Assessing
- Making a number of determinations
- Reporting

CLICK
- Briefing the T/PCC personnel / authorities is one of the main points of the PDV.
- There are two different levels of briefings: the national officials and the key contingent personnel
- Assistance brought to the T/PCC by the team is an essential part of the PDV. Therefore the T/PCC should not hesitate to request in advance of the PDV any specific briefing they feel they need. This would ensure a better preparation by the team, hence better satisfaction of the T/PCC.
- The briefings will mainly concern the requirements for the deployment of COE and Personnel, as well as the management of the COE in the field.

CLICK
- The assessment part will consist in assessing technical specifications of the equipment and its serviceability
- Also assessed will be the deployment readiness and the operational capability of the unit
• Finally the team will examine which pre-deployment training was undertaken and advise on which additional pre-deployment training is still necessary
  • The T/PCC should be ready to provide every information on these subjects, including training cursus, records of exercises and tests, etc.

CLICK
• Working together with the P/TCC representatives, the team will have to decide on the necessary deviations / amendments to the negotiated draft MOU, as the needs arise.
  • The T/PCC should strive from the beginning to abide by the UN requirements, which are dictated by operational constraints and logistic support constraints.
  • Any deviation from the technical requirements as laid down in the SUR must be accepted by the PDV team. Important deviations may have to be referred to DPO/DOS or to the field mission for acceptance.
• The technical specifications of the equipment result and are available from:
  • The SUR
  • The COE Manual
  • The recce visit
  • The MOU negotiation

CLICK
• In the reporting part can be included the wrap up meeting and drafting its brief summary recording all the decisions and recommendations made.
• Collection of unit Certification Document (Military only) should be done be done the end of the visit
• The team will have to issue the final PDV Report 5 working days after the end of the visit.
• The final report must be shared with the P/TCC.
Key Message: the success of a PDV depends on the commitment of the national authorities at every level of the hierarchy.

**Commitment of the T/PCC**

- Organizing a Pre-Deployment Visit is a huge undertaking which should involve all levels of command and support, and not be left to the sole responsibility of the unit commander.

- A condition of success is a thorough understanding of the goals and principles of the PDV

- Organizing a PDV from the point of view of the T/PCC is a collective endeavor involving the whole chain of command.
Key Message: the preparation of a PDV must follow the basic principles of centralized Organization, Simplicity, Concentration and Transparency.

**PDV Principles**

- Simplicity, organization, concentration and transparency should be the master words when organizing a PDV.
- The general **Organization** must be centralized at a sufficient level and not left to the unit commander.
- **Simplicity** means no spectacular display of the equipment and no organization of spectacular demonstration that says little about the unit’s true level of training.
- **Concentration** means that the unit’s personnel and equipment ideally must be concentrated in one location.
- **Transparency** means that no problem should be hidden from the UN team. A biased presentation of the unit, its capabilities or its state of readiness is bound to hurt the credibility of the P/TCC in the long term.
Key Message: the presentation of the equipment should follow the order of the MOU, each item being presented in working order with all its accessories (save ammunition).

Preparation Major Equipment
- ME, especially vehicles, must be painted at the time of the PDV
- ME presented by categories, in the order of the draft MOU
- Accessories mounted (radio sets etc.)
- Keys available if any
- ME in working order, operators present and ready to operate equipment / demonstrate ability
- Tool sets and manuals presented with each item of ME
- Weapons mounted, no ammos.
- Sheets of characteristics prepared as per SOP / Annex C (see next slide)
- List of chassis numbers (see next slide)

- The order of the draft MOU is the same as the order of the COE Manual
- All accessories should be mounted and functional, including weapons.
- No ammunitions will be shown on or near the weapons.
- The ME, especially all vehicles and generators, should be in working order, keys available, drivers or operators ready to demonstrate the serviceability of the material and their own capability to operate it.
- Tool set and accessories displayed near each vehicle.
- The characteristics of the vehicles (Annex C of the SOP on PDVs) should be ready before the PDV, a copy given to the PDV team.


• Likewise for the chassis numbers, particularly as regards vehicles
• [DPO would forward the list of chassis numbers in advance to the COE Verification unit, in order to prepare the UN license plates and speed up the arrival inspection]
Key Message: Complete file including the detailed characteristic of all items of major equipment and the list of the vehicles’ chassis numbers should be remitted to the PDV team before its departure.

**Paperwork for Major Equipment**
- manuals presented with each item of ME
- Sheets of characteristics prepared as per SOP / Annex C (see next slide)
  - The characteristics of the vehicles (Annex C of the SOP on PDVs) should be ready before the PDV, a copy given to the PDV team.
- List of chassis numbers (vehicles)
  - [DPO would forward the list of chassis numbers in advance to the COE Verification unit, in order to prepare the UN license plates and speed up the arrival inspection]
Key Message: no major equipment should still be under procurement at the time of the PDV, or the visit may be postponed.

It used to be that in case some items of ME were still under procurement at the time of the PDV, the T/PCC would be asked to show a maximum of documents allowing the PDV Team to assess the capabilities of the missing equipment, the reality of the orders and the influence of the gap on deployment the time line.

This is not accepted anymore.

The Military Adviser decided that the TCC has to provide to FGS before the PDV pictures of all major equipment present in the country, painted and with UN markings, failing which he will not authorize the PDV team to leave New York.
Key Message: a copy of the major equipment detailed characteristics sheets must be made available to the PDV team.

- This slide is for broad information only.
- This form can be found in Annex C / SOP on PDVs: characteristics of Major Equipment
- These detailed characteristics should be sent to DPO before the PDV, along with the pictures of the ME.
- Such a characteristics sheet should be filled for every category of major equipment.
- A copy must be made available for the PDV Team to take back home, along with the lists of chassis numbers of the vehicles.
- Digital copies are possible and even recommended.
Key Message: self sustainment equipment should be presented in the order of the MOU, in working order, complete with accessories and personnel ready to operate them.

**Preparation Self Sustainment Equipment**
- SS presented by categories, in the order of the draft MOU / COE Manual
- Accessories, tool sets and manuals presented
- Material in working order, operators present and ready to operate equipment / demonstrate ability
- Specialists to present their domain: cooks, mechanics, physicians, etc.

- Like for the ME, the complex SS equipment should be presented in working order and able to be operated by their regular operators: field kitchen, water treatment plants and associated equipment, generators, deep freeze containers, ablution sets, etc.
- All accessories and sets of tools / equipment forming part of a SS category to be presented grouped as part of the category.
- Example for catering: field kitchen but also refrigerators / refrigerated containers, stores, kitchen equipment and accessories (to prepare food and to serve it), dining room furniture, glassware and silverware, kitchen security equipment (smoke detectors, fire fighting equipment, etc.)
- Each specialist / specialized operator is part of the presentation.

**SAMPLES**
- Some SS equipment to be presented by samples:
  - one tent of each kind,
  - one set of furniture of each kind
- one soldier kit complete
- Etc.

• The bulk of the lots can be seen / counted in the warehouse
• Procurement orders to be shown in case of still-missing equipment.
Key Message: each aspect of the personnel preparation and training will be assessed by the PDV team, with emphasis on individual and collective training.

**Preparation for personnel**

- Current state of unit manning
- Training cursus and status (State of training: individual, collective, date of completion)
- Professional qualifications of specialized personnel (physicians, nurses, cooks...)
- Language qualifications (leadership, interpreters)
- Estimated time line for formation of unit.
- Unit Certification document (Military)

In the new dispositions approved by DPO for the PDVs, a member of the Integrated Training Service will be part of the PDV teams. This outlines the importance of quality, verified individual and collective pre-deployment training of the units in the minds of the DPO authorities.

[See corresponding lecture regarding unit certification document (last lecture of the module)]
Key Message: each aspect of the unit’s medical preparation will be assessed. This encompasses the unit’s medical equipment as well as the medical preparation of the personnel.

**Preparation for personnel**

Updated information to be provided on:
- Medical screening
- Immunizations
- Planned date of completion (whole unit)
- Human rights screening

For detailed information see corresponding lecture on Medical Preparation of the personnel (Module G – contingent preparation for deployment)
- Copy of records (save confidential individual information) should be made available to the team.
Key Message: at the wrap up meeting the PDV team will present its findings and recommendations to the P/TCC authorities. Written copy of the latter will be remitted to the P/TCC.

**Wrap up meeting**

- Organized jointly with the T/PCC and the PDV Team at the end of the visit
- Goal: to summarize and put in writing:
  - Findings of the visit
  - Amendments to be made to the draft MOU
  - Actions to be realized by P/TCC
  - Actions to be realized by UN
  - Recommendations made to the T/PCC
  - The conclusions are to be put in writing in a brief jointly signed by PDV Team and P/TCC representative.
  - Copy to be left to the P/TCC.
  - PdV Team will also collects the signed Unit Certification Document (Military units only)

- Copy of the wrap up brief left to the T/PCC for action and later reference
• The wrap up meeting is mainly technical in content. It is the basis for the PDV report to be drafted by the team, but not as complete.

• Unit Certification Document: for military units see details in Lecture 8 of the present module ("Military Units Certification Process").

• For Police units see Lecture 6 of the present module “Generating a Formed Police Unit”.

Outcome

The outcome of the visit consists in a detailed PDV report drafted by the team, to be shared with the P/TCC.

CLICK

• **PDV report** within 5 days of returning to base.
• Contains detailed findings and recommendations.
• Contains final recommendation on the assessed capability of the unit to fulfil the mandated tasks.

CLICK

• The PDV report informs the USG DPKO’s decision to **authorize the deployment of the unit or to cancel the contribution**.

• A copy of the PDV report will be forwarded to the T/PCC Permanent Mission.
• Missing or unserviceable equipment, incomplete training or extensive delays expected before the unit is able to deploy are causes for not authorizing the deployment, or to cancel the acceptance of the contribution.
• Authorizing the deployment means to start the next phase in the process: prepare the transport of the COE and personnel.
The decision to cancel the contribution would be notified in writing through a Note Verbal to the T/PCC signed by the USG DPO.

Key Message: drafted within 5 days of the end of the PDV, the PDV report presents the team’s findings and recommendations made to the P/TCC and makes a final recommendation to the DPO authorities regarding the unit’s ability to fulfil the mandated tasks.
Development of Topic 9 of Lecture 3 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key Message: the preparation and execution of the material and personnel's strategic transport is the last phase of the Force Generation process.

Formally starting following a successful Pre-Deployment Visit, the deployment of the unit comprises of:

- Preparation of COE for transport
- Execution of COE transport
- Deployment of advance party
- Transport / deployment of the main body of personnel.
Key Message: the satisfactory completion of the PDV allows to start preparing the strategic transport of the unit and to finalize the deployment time line.

This is the chain of events viewed from a Force Generation Process point of view:

- Satisfactory completion of PDV means getting to a final version of the MOU, allowing the finalization of the draft MOU
- This in turn allows to have a final unit’s Table of Organization and Equipment
- This also allows to notify MOVCON about the move and to fine tune with DPO/DOS the deployment time line of the unit.
- From now on the MOU will live its separate life toward approval / signature by both parties – please refer to the “Reimbursement Framework” module.
- The signature of the MOU is not necessary to deploy the unit.
- The deployment time line is fine tuned to take into account the state of readiness of the unit, final delivery of procured equipment if any, completion of personnel training, contracting of strategic transport assets / commercial company, etc.
Key Message: with the final Table of Organization and Equipment approved, the P/TCC is able to urgently forward to MOVCON the Load Lists and Cargo Readiness Date which are indispensable for MOVCON to organize the strategic transport of the COE.

With the final approved TOE the T/PCC can:

• Provide to MOVCON the **Load Lists**
• Provide to MOVCON the **Cargo Readiness Date**
• Start the packing of the equipment and its **preparation for shipment**.

This is studied in detail in Module H – “Preparation and Execution of Transport for Deployment”

• The Cargo Load List and the Dangerous Cargo List, with the Cargo Readiness Date, are mandatory for MOVCON to start the bidding / contracting process for transport of the COE (and even if the P/TCC intends to self-deploy under a LOA).
• Please refer to Module H – “Preparation and Execution of Transport for Deployment” for details.
Development of Topic 10 of Lecture 3 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key Message: the National Support Element is to support its national military or police contingent on administrative and logistical services. The NSE personnel and equipment come in addition to those envisaged by the UN in the SUR for the specific unit and Mission.

- The National Support Element (NSE) includes personnel and equipment **in addition to those envisaged by the UN** in the Statement of Unit or Force Requirement for the specific unit and for the specific field mission.

- These are to support their National Military Contingent or Formed Police Unit (FPU) on **administrative and logistical services**

- The NSE is approved by the USG DPO and reflected in the applicable MOU. It is governed by a dedicated policy.

- DPO/DOS Policy on National Support Elements, approved 01 November 2015
- The NSE is mentioned in the MOU separately from the authorized strength of the unit (see reimbursement framework module).
Key Message: the possible tasks of the NSE are mandatorily restricted to non-mandated tasks.

The possible tasks of the NSE are restricted to non-mandated tasks:
- Rear link communication
- Managing personnel’s travel arrangements
- Monitoring COE & SS records
- Providing postal services to contingent
- Pay services
- National administrative or advanced logistic support
- Welfare support
Key Message: The authorized strength of the NSE is mentioned in the MOU and must be proportionate to that of the contingent without exceeding 50 personnel.

Other criteria
- Total strength specified in MOU (Annex A)
- Strength proportionate to that of the contingent, not to exceed 50 personnel
- T/PCC assumes all costs related to deployment and operation of the NSE
- Policy on Human Rights screening applies to NSE
Key Message: the NSE personnel supporting military units are considered part of the contingent, with the same legal status, privileges and immunities as the contingent personnel.

Legal status of the NSE personnel (Military):

- NSE members are considered part of the MS’s military contingent
- They enjoy the same legal status, privileges and immunities
- Like other members of the military contingent, NSE military personnel are subject to their respective government’s exclusive jurisdiction with regard to crimes or offences they may commit while assigned to a UN Mission
Key Message: the NSE personnel supporting Formed Police Units are considered part of the FPU, with the same legal status, privileges and immunities as the FPU personnel.

**Legal status of the NSE personnel (Police):**

- NSE members are considered part of the MS’ Formed Police Unit
- They enjoy the same legal status, privileges and immunities
- Like their Formed Police Unit counterparts, NSE police personnel enjoy the same privileges and immunities accorded to UN Experts on Mission.
- NSE personnel shall be subject to the rules and regulations as outlined in the Secretary’s Bulletin ST/SGB/2002/9.
Key Message: NSE personnel are placed under disciplinary and administrative authority of their national contingent commander.

**As regards Command and Control:**

**CLICK**
- NSE members are placed under disciplinary and administrative authority of their National Contingent Commander (NCC).

**CLICK**
- NCC to enforce compliance with UN standards of conduct, rules and regulations, obligations under national and local laws in accordance with the SOFA and SOMA.
Key Message: all costs incurred by the deployment and maintenance of the NSE are to be supported by their Government. The UN bears no financial obligation or responsibility whatsoever toward NSEs.

As regards Finances:

Considering that the decision to deploy a NSE is not a UN request and is made by the P/TCC:

CLICK

• There is no UN reimbursement for personnel and equipment deployed as NSE.
• No troop or police costs.
• No rotation of personnel at UN cost
• No ME or SS reimbursement
• No UN financial obligation or responsibility
National Support Element (NSE)

Principle of cost recovery for any UN support provided to NSE:

- Fuel
- Accommodation
- Rations
- Electricity
- Infrastructure
- Transport
- Etc.

Key Message: any support provided by the UN to a NSE will be under the principle of cost recovery.

Support:

- In case of UN support provided to NSE (fuel, accommodation, rations, electricity, infrastructure, etc.):
  - Field Mission keeps record of the costs incurred
  - Costs will be recovered from the quarterly COE reimbursements due to the MS.
Key Message: NSE personnel are allowed to wear the same UN headgears and accoutrements as their national contingent. NSE personnel will also be provided with a UN ID card.

**NSE Uniforms, markings and identification:**

CLICK

- As members of a UN peacekeeping contingent:
- NSE personnel authorized to wear UN headgear and accoutrements
- NSE accoutrement to be worn for segregation purpose.
- NSE vehicles authorized to bear UN colors and markings.
- NSE personnel are also provided with a UN ID Card.
Key Message: NSE personnel are authorized to carry an individual weapon for protection and self defense only.

**Weapons:**

**CLICK**
- NSE personnel authorized to carry a firearm for personnel protection and self-defense (*no performance of mandated combat tasks*).
Key Message: under extant policies, NSE personnel are not eligible to the UN medal. Exceptions may be granted by the USG DPO on a case by case basis.

**UN Medal award:**

- According to the relevant policy, the UN Medal should be awarded to personnel under operational or tactical control of the United Nations. **CLICK**

- NSE operate strictly for national purpose and in national interest. NSE are not to accomplish any mandated task, nor are they under operational or tactical control of the UN, therefore NSE personnel are normally not eligible to the UN Medal **CLICK**

- However, the policy allows for exceptions which should be duly requested by the national command. Exceptions are allowed by the USG DPO, by delegation of the Secretary General.
Lecture Take Away

• The Force Generation Process is a long and complex one that requires the active involvement of all services in the MOD/IM and at all levels of the Military / Police hierarchy.

• High quality communication between the Capital and the Permanent Mission is key to success.

• Keeping permanent contacts with DPO/DOS is another key to success.

• The more the unit has been prepared in advance, working closely with DPO, the greater chance it has to be selected.
Force Generation Process

Questions

Lecture 3
Learning Outcomes

- Describe how the UN PCRS comes into play in case of rapid deployment of a unit.
- Show how the rapid deployment builds on the UN PCRS / Rapid Deployment Level.
- Show how this rapid deployment abides by the basic principles of the Force Generation Process as studied earlier.
- Recall that rapidly deploying an enabling unit may be eligible to payment of the corresponding premium to the Member State.
Lecture Content

- Principles
- Initial situation
- Request – Pledge – Acceptance
- No modification of negotiated RDL agreement
- Phased deployment
- Transport
- Enabling premium
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 4 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the rapid deployment of military units or police capabilities means deploying the unit on the ground within 60 days of DPKO’s sending its Note Verbal requesting the deployment.

**Principles (I)**

- Rapid Deployment of military / police units builds on the preparation for PCRS / Rapid Deployment Level (RDL)
- It concerns Military Units or specific police capabilities, including FPUs, registered in the PCRS database at Rapid Deployment Level (RDL)
- Rapid Deployment means “the unit is present on the ground within 60 days of DPO sending the request for deployment (through a Note Verbal)”
- Deployment within 60 days is part of the negotiated RDL agreement.
Key message: effecting all the steps of the force generation process in the PCRS beforehand is what will allow the P/TCC to react rapidly and deploy in time when called by DPO.

**Principles (II)**

- As explained before and as is showed in this graph,
- All the mandatory steps of the Force Generation process are respected: exchange of Notes Verbal, Recce, MOU, Load Lists...
- But most of the preparation is done beforehand based on a standard Vanguard Brigade SUR, which will speed up the actual deployment.
- The Guidelines on RDL implementation do not mention a PDV, as the RDL Visit must have verified that all necessary equipment was available and operational.
Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 4 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the initial conditions for starting a rapid deployment from the RDL level are the urgent need for a critical capability and a matching unit registered in the RDL with a negotiated RDL Agreement and approved load lists.

**Initial Situation**

- **A Unit is recorded in the PCRS at the Rapid Deployment Level:**
  - RDL Agreement (=draft MOU) negotiated based on standard SUR
  - Load Lists approved by DOS/MOVCON
  - T/PCC pledged to deploy within 60 days
- **Then**

**CLICK**

- **A critical capability offered by the unit is needed at short notice**
  - For a starting mission or reinforcement of an existing PKO
- **There is possible eligibility for the enabling premium**
  - depending on USG DPO decision

- The unit is in a state of verified readiness: equipment complete, personnel available, medically cleared and screened for HR violations, all basic training and pre-deployment UN training done
- The capability is identified by DPO/DOS as critical and rapidly needed
• USG DPO may or may not declare the capability eligible for enabling premium (refer to Reimbursement Framework Module) – See this subject below
Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 4 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: in case of rapid deployment the exchange of Notes Verbal still form the basis of the agreement between DPO and the P/TCC.

**Standard sequence of events:**

- **Informal contacts** to check T/PCC’s will

- **Formal request** from DPO: Note Verbal, which starts time count for 60 days
  - Mention of possible premium
  - Not mentioned in the guidelines: T/PCC will have to accept formally through a NV

- T/PCC starts final preparations, painting, vaccinations, etc.

- T/PCC may do a recce visit which should not delay the deployment (see next topic). Recce visit may triggers adjustments to the COE as accepted in the RDL Agreement, which will produce final MOU.

- Deployment will be either arranged by the UN, or done by the T/PCC itself under LOA – See Module H on strategic transport.

- All this is in the framework of the unit pledged at rapid Deployment Level in the UN PCRS.
Development of Topic 4 of Lecture 4 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the recce must not delay the deployment and should be conducted in parallel with the preparation for transport at home.

**T/PCC Reconnaissance**

- The field reconnaissance is still needed, but its execution must not delay the deployment of the unit.

- The reconnaissance in this case should only touch operational / support aspects while the COE is being simultaneously prepared for transport at home.

- The recce is important for the unit commander for the same motives as studied in the Lecture on Field Recce: contact with support and mission command, reconnaissance of the area of deployment, identification of specific issues, get the lay of the land and form an idea on the environment, both geographic and operational.

- However, a reconnaissance is a long operation to organize and to carry out.

- For that reason, the reconnaissance should not delay the preparation of the unit for deployment / shipment.
Modification of
RDL Agreement

Development of Topic 5 of Lecture 4 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: in case the procurement of additional equipment is found absolutely necessary, a phased deployment of the COE may be envisioned so as to not delay the arrival of the unit in the mission area.

In case the Recce reveals that for operational reasons the pre-negotiated list of equipment must absolutely be modified:

- If the T/PCC has the complement of equipment in store, a quick amendment to the negotiated MOU (and load lists) can be done while preparing the deployment
- If the complement of equipment has to be procured, a phased deployment may be considered.

- The recce should not lead to modify the list of equipment as previously approved.
- Any addition of equipment, or worse any procurement of more equipment, will delay the actual deployment of the unit.
- Any last-minute modification of the list of equipment, particularly if it involves important items of ME or SSE, is bound to ruin the rapid deployment of the unit when it has to be procured.
- In case it is found that additional equipment is absolutely necessary, a phased deployment should be envisioned with the Mission and DPO: first the COE as approved in the RDL Agreement, then later on the complement of equipment when available.
- The decision of resorting to a phased deployment is a balance between the urgent need of having the unit operational in the Mission, the additional expense incurred by the second transport needed for the complement of equipment, the operational value of the unit initially deploying without the complement of equipment.
Key message: phasing the deployment of the unit’s COE has to be a joint decision of all parties involved: DPO, DOS, Mission and P/TCC.

Phased deployment:

- **First phase**: deployment of the COE as per negotiated PCRS MOU.
- **Second phase**: deployment of the complement of COE once realized.

CLICK

However:

**Phasing the deployment has to be a joint DPO / DOS / Mission / T/PCC decision.**

- This way, the procurement of the complement of equipment will not delay the deployment of the bulk of the unit.
- As this double transport is going to cost more to the UN, the decision has to be approved by all parties involved.
- Note: This is a scenario that can be also played if the deployment of an advanced party is requested.
Development of Topic 6 of Lecture 4 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the strategic transport of the COE and personnel may be effected by any of the usual means: by MOVCON arrangement, by P/TCC under LOA or through the involvement of a donor country.

The strategic transport of the **COE** is generally arranged by MOVCON as per extant regulations and rules, based on the previously approved load lists.

- See details in Module H - Preparation and Execution of Transport for Deployment

The transport of the **personnel** will be arranged as per extant rules and regulations, with or without an advance party.

- The transport of COE and/or personnel under LOA by the T/PCC or by a third-part donor country is possible.

- Updated load lists may be used, provided the overall cargo volume does not change and they are forwarded in due time to MOVCON

- In some cases, depending upon urgency in the mission, airlift of the COE may be arranged.

- Given the financial implications, airlifting the COE is always a joint decision by DOS / DPO / Field Mission.

- T/PCC is always involved in the decision.

- Request for LOA should still be forwarded in time to MOVCON for proposal and approval before execution of the transport.
Development of Topic 7 of Lecture 4 of Module F1 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: in case of rapid deployment, the final decision to allow payment of a premium is made by the USG DPO and is not an obligation.

**Enabling Premium**
Refer to the corresponding lecture in Module D / Reimbursement Framework

The decision to allow payment of the premium for deployment of a capability within 60 days is made by the USG DPO.

**The Premium is not an obligation** and depends on:
- Mission situation and needs on the ground
- Urgency
- Available funds

- The conditions of execution, control and payment of the premium are as described in the corresponding lecture of Module D / Reimbursement Framework
Lecture Take Away

• The rapid deployment of a unit builds on the preparations made for the UN PCRS / Rapid Deployment Level (RDL).
• The key steps of the Force Generation process are respected, but most are done beforehand as part of the RDL registration process.
• Reconnaissance in the field is still indispensable in most cases.
• Modifying the RDL MOU must not delay the deployment. Phased deployment may be considered in this case.
PCRS and Rapid Deployment

Questions

Lecture 4

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Module F2:
FORCE GENERATION
FRAMEWORK PART 2

Find guidance inserted in the note section of each slide.
Module Content

• Generating an Aviation Unit
• Generating a Formed Police Unit (FPU)
• Re-hatting under UN Authority
• Military Unit Certification Process
• Gender Perspective on Military and Police Contributions

• This module describes several particular processes that differ from the basic generic force generation process (i.e. rapid deployment, re-hatting, generating aviation units and generating formed police units).
• Finally, the module explains the military unit certification process (the certification of FPU being described in the presentation devoted to the generation of these units, Lecture 2).
• Lecture number 1 will describe the specifics of the generation of an aviation unit.
Learning Outcomes

- Describe in what particular ways the process of generating an aviation unit differs from the standard Force Generation process.

- Learn the standard steps of the FG Process.
- Know the most important in details (PDV, AAV, NSE).
- Other steps have been seen or will be seen in other modules: MOU, planning, etc.
Lecture Content

- Principle of reimbursement: MOU + LOA
- Differences in the sequencing of the FG process
- Offer of contribution – Caveats
- Assessment and Advisory Visit
- Pre-negotiation of LOA before approval
- Approval of contribution
- Field reconnaissance – Recce report
- MOU and LOA negotiations
- Pre-deployment visit - Report

- Explain the standard Force Generation process globally, then step by step
- Explain some steps in details: Assessment and Advisory Visit, Field Reconnaissance, Pre-Deployment Visit, National Support Element, etc.
- Some steps will be describes in more details in other modules: planning, Memorandum Of Understanding negotiation...
Principle of Reimbursement
MOU + LOA

Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 1 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: A UN aviation unit may be constituted of one or several fixed-wing cargo aircraft, or of several helicopters or Unmanned Aerial System. Transport helicopter units are generally requested to comprise at least 3 aircraft.

As far as UN contributions are concerned, an aviation unit may be defined as:

- A unit of either fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft, whatever the type of aircraft, their purpose or their number.
- This includes Unmanned Aerial Systems – UAS – which are units composed of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) plus necessary related ground based equipment.
- One unit may be composed of several different types of aircraft.
- One aircraft may suffice to constitute a unit (Ex.: C-130 Hercules)

**Note:** Unmanned aerial systems of class I micro (*) of up to 2 kg operated at an altitude that is not to exceed 200 feet will be reimbursable as major equipment at the rate listed in chapter 8, annex A. (These are typically short-range UAVs deployed with an Infantry Unit for line-of-sight reconnaissance purpose, in support of the unit itself).

All other types, deployed to fulfil mission tasks, will be addressed under a letter of assist.

(*) Class I unmanned aerial systems: Unmanned aerial systems operated only up to a limited altitude of not more than 1,000 feet above ground level, with a maximum gross take-off weight of between 1 and 150 kg, and within the line of sight of the operator, with a maximum range up to 50 km. (Ref. COE Manual Chapter 3).
**Helicopters roles:** transport, attack, medical evacuation, reconnaissance, multipurpose

**Planes roles:** cargo, MEDEVAC, reconnaissance, multipurpose

**UAVs / UAS roles:** surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, geospatial information.

**Why do I show three helicopters, and not 1 or 2?** Most of the time military helicopter units are supposed to have two aircraft operational 24/7. Taking into account the regulation limits of duty period and crew rest for the pilots, the possible unavailability of some crew members and the maintenance constraints of the aircraft, transport helicopter units should be composed of at least 3 aircraft. A unit comprising of only two aircraft cannot have both aircraft operational 24/7. Based on Force Requirements, units comprising of four helicopters will allow a temporary redeployment of two aircraft.
Key message: in an aviation unit, the air component includes the crew members and the aircraft, while the ground component includes the command and administrative and logistic support functions.

An aviation unit comprises of:

- An air component
  The aircraft and the flying crew members
- A ground component
  Command cell
  Administrative support cell
  Maintenance and technical support cell

- Depending on the Force Requirements and on the SUR, the airfield requisite support may be provided by the unit, or by a separate one (Air Traffic Control, weather service, etc.).
Key message: in addition to the standard information, the Statement of Unit Requirement of an aviation unit provides the minimal technical requirements required from the flying crew and from the aircraft, which will be the basis for the corresponding LOA.

The *Statement of Unit Requirement* (SUR) for an Aviation unit:

- Has the same general organization as the standard SUR
- Provides information about mandatory or desirable aircraft equipment and performances
  - Avionics
  - Night flying capability
  - Load capacity
  - Range
  - Etc.
- Provides information about mandatory or desirable crew experience and qualifications.

- In addition to the standard information provided on equipment, unit organization and background information, the SUR of an aviation unit provides information about
  - Expected aircraft performance and equipment (Have / Have not)
  - Expected flying crew experience and qualifications (mandatory or desirable)

- As regards aircraft performances and capabilities, the SUR constitutes the basis for the corresponding LOA (and MOU for the rest of the equipment). Therefore the equipment of the aircraft should not detract from the prescriptions of the SUR.
• In case of several units candidates to the same contribution, the unit meeting most of the mandatory / desirable requirements has the most chances to be finally selected.
Key message: in terms of reimbursement of the aviation unit, the aircraft and specialized maintenance required for the aircraft to fly as requested in the SUR are reimbursed under a Letter of Assist while the ground component COE is reimbursed under a MOU. Both the ground personnel and flying crew are reimbursed under the troop cost system.

For reimbursement purpose:

The unit may be broken down in 3 major components: the aircraft, the ground equipment, the personnel (ground crew + flying crew).

- The **aircraft utilization** is reimbursed under a Letter Of Assist (LOA) specifically negotiated. Depending on the type of aircraft, the reimbursement is based on the number of monthly flight hours (transport aircraft) or on a monthly fee (attack helicopters).
- A Letter of Assist (LOA) is a legally binding contractual document between the United Nations and a Government. It provides the appropriate authority for procurement of services on behalf of the United Nations. It will also specify how reimbursement will be made.
- Governments can provide a range of services to the UN under LOA. Most of the time it is transport services (deployment of COE an personnel, rotations of personnel), but in this case it is for provision of military aircraft that the UN is unable to find and contract on the market. This is true for military aircraft and for military vessels.
- The **ground equipment** is reimbursed under a standard Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU)
  - Annex B of the MOU mentions major equipment of the unit (not the aircraft): jeeps, trucks, generators, busses, etc.
• Specific aircraft maintenance equipment, even remaining on the ground, is often included in the LOA (but reimbursed under the MOU).

• Both the **ground crew and the flying crew** fall under the troop cost reimbursement system
  • Annex A of the MOU mentions the total strength of the unit, [ground crew + flying crew]
  • Unique monthly rate of reimbursement whatever the qualification of the personnel.
Differences in the sequencing of the Force Generation process

Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 1 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the force generation process of an aviation unit always includes an Assessment and Advisory Visit – which is mandatory for emerging TCCs.

- Most of the times an AAV shall take place before acceptance of the unit.
- For emerging TCCs (first time contribution of an aviation unit) the AAV is mandatory - and strongly recommended for Aviation Units in general.
- Even though OMA/FGS will be in the lead, DOS/Air Transport Service has the final say about deciding to have an AAV or not.
Key message: in addition to pilots qualifications and aircraft technical characteristics, safety and security procedures are the most important domains assessed by an AAV team.

Mandatory AAV based on the SUR:

In addition to what a standard AAV does:

CLICK

Assess the proposed aircraft, provide guidance if need be
• Type, age, state, etc.
• Maintenance procedures
• Regulatory documents
• Spare parts
• Operational procedures
• Safety procedures
• Security procedures

CLICK

Assess the flying crew, provide guidance when needed
• Qualifications / Training
• Experience (flight hours)
Recommend upgrades / improvements

- Avionics
- SOPs...
- Safety & Security equipment
- Etc.

- Safety and security is one of the more important domains DOS / Aviation Safety & Security will verify – as regards the aircraft, crew members and procedures.
Key message: in order to verify that the price asked by the TCC will remain within acceptable limits, a pre-LOA negotiation will take place before formal acceptance of an aviation unit.

A preliminary LOA negotiation takes place before formal acceptance of the unit

**Pre-LOA Negotiation before acceptance:**

- To avoid DPO accepting a unit (equivalent to signing on a contract) whose price is not known
- To verify that the price asked by the TCC is within acceptable brackets
- The LOA negotiation will not be finalized yet

- Accepting the unit before negotiating the LOA would be equivalent to signing a contract without knowing the price; this is contrary to procurement rules and the Financial Controller did not like it much.
- This is because, contrary to the MOU where the prices are determined by the COE Manual, the LOA is negotiated each time between the TCC and DOS/Procurement, and no fixed / pre-determined price list exist for aircraft because they vary greatly in types, age, avionics, special equipment, etc.
- The LOA will be finalized later at the same time as the MOU.
Offer of contribution
Caveats

Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 1 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: caveats restricting the operational use of an aviation unit are bound to be cause for DPO to refuse the unit.

There is a difference between specific technical requests issued by the TCC and caveats

Example of particular requests to be mentioned with the offer of contribution

• Hangar for maintenance,
• specific support requested from the Mission...

CLICK

But, Ever more so than for standard units, caveats restricting the operational use of the unit are not welcome and may be a cause for DPO to deny the contribution.

Ever since publication of the Dos Santos Cruz report (*), DPO and DOS are less and less likely to accept operational deviations from the SUR.
Approval of contribution

Development of Topic 4 of Lecture 1 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: beside the usual factors, the technical and safety and security factors will play an essential role in the acceptance of an aviation unit.

- Accepting an aviation unit is based on a mix of:
  - Political criteria (DPO/SRPOS)
  - Military criteria (OMA)
  - Technical criteria (DOS / Air Transport Service)
  - Security / Safety criteria (DOS / Aviation Safety)
  - Logistic criteria (DOS / LD )

Same process (NV) as for any other unit, but subject to meeting specific additional requirements

CLICK

In particular, a satisfactory AAV will show:

- Pilots in sufficient number, with sufficient flight hours as per DOS requirements
- Specific qualifications as required (night flying, etc.)
- Satisfactory maintenance and maintenance procedures of the aircraft
- Satisfactory condition of the aircraft (age of cell and engines, etc.)
- Satisfactory operational SOPs: flight, operations, emergency, safety & security regulations etc.
- The aircraft has the required specific equipment (NVG, FLIR, etc.) and the flying crew hold the corresponding qualifications.
Development of Topic 5 of Lecture 1 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: in addition to the usual factors, the recce team of an aviation unit must verify specific factors: airport security, jet fuel availability, airport firefighting dispositions, runways and parking's, pilot accommodations and availability of flight and meteorological information, etc.

The general goals are the same as for the standard Recce

CLICK

In addition, check specific technical items:
- Availability of jet fuel
- Security of airport / air base
- Necessary fire fighting assets
- State of runways (for heavy cargo planes) and parking's
- Availability of adequate hangars for delicate maintenance
- Ammunition storage (availability? Specific requirements?)
- Pilots accommodations (specific rules)
- Who provides security: aviation unit? Neighboring UN unit? Sector? Is there an agreement on provision of security with the Sector command, INF BN Command?
- Who provides fire fighting security?
- State of runways / aprons when necessary
- Presence of air control?
- Who provides the necessary airfield services: Flight information/ATS? Meteorological information?
MOU and LOA Negotiations

Development of Topic 6 of Lecture 1 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the LOA and MOU negotiations of an aviation unit usually happen in parallel, although the LOA negotiation will often take more time than the MOU’s.

LOA and MOU negotiations are held separately, but generally at the same time / in parallel.

CLICK

• Not an obligation though, as LOA negotiations will often take more time than MOU

• Extension of negotiation windows to be envisioned for LOA

• Normally the LOA should be signed by the parties before the aircraft be allowed to fly (different from MOU). (According to the UN Financial Regulations and Rules, Ex-post Facto LOAs should be an exception and should be avoided).

• There is no absolute rule imposing to have the LOA and MOU negotiation held at the same time. It is often more practical from the TCC point of view (travel), but also for the UN has all services involved can work together.

• LOA negotiations are often held in several sessions separated in time, therefore extend after the end of the MOU negotiations.

• Signature of LOAs: TCCs have been known to allow their aircraft to fly even though the LOA had not yet been signed / renewed. However it is strongly recommended that LOAs are signed before
provision of the services. Exceptions should be authorized by the USGs DPO/DOS on the sole basis of operational necessity.
Development of Topic 7 of Lecture 1 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: as for the AAV, the PDV of an aviation unit will verify specific aspects of the unit and therefore the PDV team will include an air domain specialist.

- The PDV is organized according to the same rules as for a standard unit.
- PDV team to include ATS specialists for the aviation part.
- PDV report will make recommendation about the ability of the unit to fulfil the mandated tasks in the Mission.
Key message: the PDV team checking an aviation unit will particularly verify the implementation of the recommendations made during the AAV.

**Regarding the Aviation part of the PDV, UN specialists will check the same items as during the AAV:**

**Aircraft**
- Type, age, state, etc.
- Maintenance procedures and documents
- Avionics
- Spare parts
- Operational / Security procedures

**Flying crew**
- Qualifications / Training
- Experience (flight hours)

**In addition**
- Implementation of the recommendations made following the AAV (although this will probably have been discussed, agreed and followed during the course of the force generation process).
Lecture Take Away

- An aviation unit is governed both by a **MOU and a LOA** that are specific to the unit.
- The LOA should strictly reflect the **technical requirements** of the SUR.
- An **AAV** is mandatory before acceptance of the unit.
- A **preliminary LOA negotiation** will take place before acceptance of the unit.
- **Air safety and security** aspects are essential factors for acceptance of an aviation unit.
Generating an Aviation Unit

Questions

Lecture 1
Lecture 2
Generating a Formed Police Unit

"The unprecedented global demand for United Nations Police reflects a growing understanding of the beneficial role they are playing in war-torn countries during the crucial post conflict stabilization phase [...] In addition to protecting individuals, they help society as a whole by redefining the role of policing in countries emerging from conflict, forging trust in uniformed police, establishing faith in national justice systems and fostering confidence in peace processes."

Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, July 2009
Growing Complexity of Police Tasks

1962-1999
1999 - 2002
2002 - 2009

Monitoring
Monitoring
Monitoring
Monitoring
Monitoring

Humanitarian Assistance
Humanitarian Assistance
Humanitarian Assistance
Humanitarian Assistance
Humanitarian Assistance

Emergency Response
Stabilization and Improvement
Development

Interim Law Enforcement
Reform and Restructuring & Rebuilding
Law Enforcement Capacity Building
Integrated approach (RoL, SSR)

Unforeseen

Training and Mentoring
Advisory Support
Operational Support

FPU deployed in the 90's, 57 FPU deployed today.
Learning Outcomes

• Describe what a formed police unit (FPU) is, and in what particular ways the process of generating a FPU differs from the standard Force Generation process.
Lecture Content

• What is a Formed Police Unit?
• FPU functions and concept
• FPU organization
• Criteria for deployment of a FPU
• FPU training
• FPU certification
• Challenges
Key message: within DPO, the Police Division belongs to the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI).

The **Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI)** is the largest provider of police, justice and corrections specialists in the world. It also has experts on hand in weapons and ammunition management, mine action, security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).

OROLSI was established in 2007 by the UN General Assembly to find innovative ways to catalyze peacekeeping and peace sustaining processes, protect civilians and assist in re-establishing national rule of law and security institutions.
**Key Message:** the Police Division is in charge of generating and deploying all individual UN police officers as well as all Formed Police Units.
Key message: the Selection and Recruitment Section (SRS) ensures the selection, deployment, rotation and extension of United Nations police officers, including members of formed police units and recruited professional civilian staff.

The primary role of the Police Selection and Recruitment Section is to select and recruit qualified personnel, manage human resources of the Police Division, including the Standing Police Capacity (SPC), and the police components of field missions.

Core functions of the SRS:

- Providing technical advice related to selection and recruitment and human resources Management, to the police components of field missions, in coordination with other sections of PD and IOT;
- Liaising with DPO-led operations and DPPA-led missions, Member States and other stakeholders, as appropriate, in relation to selection, recruitment, extension and rotation of police personnel;
- Planning, organizing and undertaking selection assistance and pre-deployment visits to police-contributing countries (PCCs), collaborating with the Department of Operational Support in the contingent owned equipment negotiation process, coordinating negotiations on memoranda of understanding for the timely deployment of police units, providing technical advice on contingent owned equipment claims by Member States, as required, and taking part in reconnaissance visits to the field;
- Ensuring the selection, recruitment, deployment, rotation and extension of United Nations police officers, including members of formed police units and internationally-recruited professional civilian staff in the police components of field missions; and interacting with Permanent Missions of Member States concerning relevant PD/field mission police component vacancies;
• Selection, rotation and extension of personnel of the PD, including the Standing Police Capacity (located in UN logistics Base, Brindisi, Italy);
• Organizing and participating in meetings of police-contributing countries (PCCs), working groups, video teleconferences (VTC) and briefings that touch on issues of police selection and recruitment.
Formed Police Units
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 2 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
What is a Formed Police Unit?

“United Nations Formed Police Units are defined as specialized, cohesive, armed and mobile police units, providing security support to United Nations operations by ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel and assets; contributing to the protection of civilians; and supporting police operations that require a formed response.”

Key message: The concept of cohesive armed mobile police units represents an added value in the hands of the Head of Police Component

- United Nations Formed Police Units are defined as specialized, cohesive, armed mobile police units, providing security support to United Nations operations by ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel and assets; contributing to the protection of civilians; and supporting police operations that require a formed response.
- As a coherent part of the United Nations police component, FPUs work in support of the establishment and maintenance of safe, democratic and human rights abiding communities by delivering professional, responsive and more robust policing in accordance with the mission mandate.
- Normally FPUs are provided by a single nation however in the past we had a case of one multinational FPU deployed to Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake of the 2010. In this case Italy deployed the main body of the unit while Israel deployed a specialized team of 14 police officers.
Key message: FPUs are a tool to perform police operations beyond the capabilities of IPOs.

The primary objective in assigning tasks to FPUs is to make the best possible use of their added value, which is derived from their ability to act as a cohesive unit and their special weapons and equipment which gives them a heightened robustness compared to IPOs. FPUs have three core tasks:

- Contribute to the Protection of Civilians;
- Protection of United Nations personnel and facilities;
- Supporting police operations that require a formed response and may involve a higher risk (above the general capability of individual United Nations police).

The primary focus of public order management is to facilitate the population’s exercise of their fundamental rights without any disturbance or unjustified hindrance and to prevent assemblies from threatening or actually harming public safety. This is the most central competence of FPUs and should be applied within a strict legal framework and with the minimum appropriate use of force, keeping in mind the principle of proportionality and the necessity of continued negotiation. Protection of armed and unarmed United Nations police and other civilian mission personnel, as well as facilities and equipment can include protection of convoys, relocation or evacuation of staff and intervention where necessary for the protection of staff and in accordance with FPU capabilities. In accordance with mandated tasks, FPUs contribute to the protection of civilians by undertaking their core tasks of public order management, protection of United Nations mission personnel and facilities and support to higher risk police operations. With Capacity-building is not one of the FPU’s core tasks, due to frequent rotations and the absence of a standardized approach. As a rule, if training experts on public order management are required, they

### FPUs Core Functions

- **Protection of UN personnel and property.**
- **Contribute to the Protection of Civilians**
  - To facilitate the population’s exercise of their fundamental rights
- **Police operations with formed response or specialised capacity**
  - Beyond capacities of Individual Police Officers
- **Additional task:**
  - Capacity-building
should be recruited separately and serve with UNPOL capacity-building program in order to provide relevant long-term expertise to build sustainable host state capacity. However, FPUs under guidance and coordination of the FPU training officer may be made available for exercises and joint training with host state police. If the mandate and the security situation allow for a diversion from the core tasks into capacity building and if an FPU has dedicated training capabilities, an FPU may support the United Nations police capacity-building program in the development of the host state police, mainly in the area of public order management, on a case by case basis.

All functions should be carried out on the basis of reliable intelligence or information and a subsequent threat assessment.
**Key message: self-sustainability and a strong leadership keys to FPU success.**

It has to be highlighted that self-sustainability and a strong command and control structure are crucial for the success of FPUs mission.

- Fully self-sufficient, mobile police unit of 160 members (may vary from 140 - 200)
- Formed entirely from one contingent in common cases
- The Units are subordinated exclusively to the HOPC (Police)
- Internal Operational Command and Control are Unit responsibility
- Self-sustained with unit integrity and equipment
- Respond to situations of security, law and order challenges
- Might also be called upon to assist other UNPOL components in the development of capacity building for local law-enforcement agencies.
Key message: the structure of the unit in terms of strength can be flexible however each unit always comprises of a command structure, an operational element and a logistic support component.

The composition and organization of FPUs may vary due to mission-specific requirements as determined in the strategic assessment phase. According to the existing FPU policy a Formed Police Unit will consist of a minimum operational capacity and a command and logistics elements to make up an approximate total strength of 160. FPUs may also contain an additional discretionary national support element (NSE). NSE personnel are beyond the number of agreed staff as per the MOU; PCCs will thus not be reimbursed by the United Nations for this capacity nor will personnel be rotated by the United Nations. The minimum overall operational capacity is approximately 140 police officers. The operational capacity consists of inter-operable tactical sub-units (platoons).

In addition to the operational capacity, on the right side of the slide you can see that in addition to the Commander and the Deputy Commander the unit should comprise of sufficient capacity in information analysis, logistics, operations, communications in order to ensure that all functions are covered at all times, the command element shown on the right side of the slide should consist of at least 12 staff members.

The logistics element may vary in size but needs to have sufficient capacity in terms of trained craftsmen and personnel to provide all agreed services under the MOU to the FPU.
Basic Requirements of the FPU

- 3/4 x OPERATIONAL PLATOONS
- 1 x ADMIN/LOG PLATOON
- OPERATIONAL / LOGISTIC SELF-SUSTAIN
- MEDICAL – LEVEL 1
Key message: as of February 2019, 10 peacekeeping operations have a police components, 7 of which include Formed Police Units.

Blue boxes – Anglophone missions
Orange boxes – Francophone
Key message: as of February 2019 7 peacekeeping operations have formed police units for a total of 54 authorised units.

Currently there are 54 Units authorised to be deployed in 7 Peacekeeping Operations. This represent a total of 8025 FPU personnel authorised. However today only 51 Units are effectively deployed with a total of 77815 officers on the ground, while 3 others Units are being generated (UNISFA, UNMISS, MINUSMA)
Key message: as of February 2019, 51 Formed Police Units are effectively deployed for 54 authorized.
Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 2 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Main Criteria for Deployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational Component formed not less than <strong>six months</strong> before mission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Staff must avail <strong>5 years</strong> of Police service experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-commissioned ranks must avail <strong>two years</strong> of policing experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-deployment assessment</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Key message: the unit must be formed at least 6 months before the deployment. The pre-deployment assessment is a mandatory step for the deployment.
Key message: The steps for the deployment of FPUs are almost the same as other units with the difference that FPUs have to go through the Formed Police Assessment Team assessment before the deployment.

The above process has been already highlighted in other presentations and you can see it is the same as the generation of other units. What is different for the FPUs is the pre-deployment assessment which could be part of the PDV or independent in case of rotation of units. In this regard more details will be provided during the presentation regarding the FPAT (Formed Police Units pre-deployment assessment).

With regard to the deployment of the Advance party it has to be considered that normally up to 10% of the strength of the unit can be deployed by commercial flight or in alternative the PCC has the opportunity to keep on the ground a rear party and the personnel also in this case will be deployed by commercial flight.

Finally, I would like also to mention that in case of the initial deployment there is also the possibility for the Member State to have two or three, normally two, officers travelling with the COE, this is called Super cargo.
Key message: the FPU generation process is an exercise which is conducted with different UN entities with the full involvement and commitment from the PCC.

This time scale is compressed and not real.
Several events can unfold in parallel
Different entities own different steps of the process: PD-SPDS (planning), PD-SRS, DOS (MOU, Transport contract)
PCCs are contacted at the planning stage; draft documents (CONOPS, Status of Units Requirements may be distributed to interested PCCs at this point). Briefings to Military/Police Advisers are also organized ("PCC Meetings").
Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 2 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: Both the pre-deployment training and the in-mission training play a critical role for the success of the mission.

All FPU staff must attend pre-deployment training based on the UN Peacekeeping Pre-deployment Training Standards for Formed Police Units approved by the Police Adviser/DPO and Chief of the Integrated Training Service/DPET, in accordance with the Policy on Support to Military and Police Pre-deployment Training.

Formed Police Units should be trained to a standard whereby they are competent in
· Police techniques in peacekeeping operations,
· Public order management and
· Firearms.

All FPU staff should receive pre-deployment training based on the UN Peacekeeping Pre-deployment Training Standards for Formed Police Units.
Key message: pre-deployment training is a responsibility of the PCC which can benefit of UN guidance.

Formed Police Units must be trained to a standard to be competent in:

- Police techniques and tactics in peacekeeping operations
- Public Order Management
- Weapons handling and shooting.

Whilst training remains the responsibility of the PCC, the United Nations provides guidance on pre-deployment training of the FPUs.
Key message: FPUs pre-deployment training standards are accessible at
http://research.un.org/STM/FPUPackage/

New or updated Pre-deployment Training Standards are communicated to Member States and the C-34, and posted on the Peacekeeping Resource Hub (http://research.un.org/STM/FPUPackage/) so that they are accessible to peacekeeping training institutions in a timely manner.
Pre-deployment training activities and in-mission training are of paramount importance to maintain operational readiness of the Police units.

Pre-deployment training is a national responsibility.

The UN provides PCCs with clear directives and guidelines on the contents of the required specialized training.

In the slide you can see the Key message concerning training........ if we fail in training it will be like having a Jumbo without pilots to fly it....... Or like having a Ferrari without pilot who can drive it. As already mentioned earlier in this presentation also the in-mission training is critical either to keep a high level of operational readiness of the unit but also to facilitate the inter-operability among different units in the mission area as well as with military contingents. In this context it will be crucial to organize joint exercises with the military contingents and FPU's from other PCC's, this will be a task for the Deputy Chief Operations/FPU coordinator.
Development of Topic 4 of Lecture 2 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: The Assessment of Operational Capability / Formed Police Assessment Team (AOC/FPAT) process aims to ensure that the FPUs which are going to be deployed to a field mission have an adequate operational readiness level to properly perform the mandated tasks.

All FPUs from Member States must meet the requirements of operational capability to qualify for service in a PKO. Prior to deployment of any rotation, the unit operational capabilities are tested by an UN team to ensure proficiency in unit functions such as: firearms, crowd and riot control, tactical police operations. The requirements of operational capability consist of individual and unit requirements, such requirements will be explained during the presentation. Only FPU that have successfully completed the entire Assessment of Operational Capability (AOC) regime and meet all individual and unit requirements of operational capability qualify for peacekeeping service. To have the full picture of all the related procedures concerning the AOC process reference can be made to the Standard Operating Procedure on „Assessment of Operational Capability of Formed Police Units for Service in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations“.
Key message: the Assessment of Operational Capability is a mandatory process which is specific to Formed Police Units as military contingents do not go through a similar process.

AOC – Assessment of Operational Capability
“The AOC is mandatory and AOC clearance is a pre-requisite for service in a PKO. On the basis of the AOC results, the DPO Police Adviser decides on the deployment of the unit.”

Whether an FPU and its members meet the requirements of operational capability is determined in an AOC by a United Nations Formed Police Assessment Team (FPAT) deployed to a MS.

In the context of a pre-deployment visit (PDV) prior to the first FPU deployment from a Member State (MS) to a specific PKO, the FPAT will be integrated into the PDV team.

The AOC is mandatory and AOC clearance is a pre-requisite for service in a PKO. On the basis of the AOC results, the DPO Police Adviser, in consultation with DPO/DOS leadership, decides on the deployment of the unit.
Key message: The final decision on the deployment of a Formed Police Unit is made by the Police Adviser based on the recommendation formulated by the Formed Police Assessment Team.

The assessment conducted by United Nations “FPAT*/AOC Visit” will focus on verifying Unit’s operational capacity and readiness, identifying the professional background of the units and specific training received.

A Formed Police Assessment Team (FPAT) is established to oversee an AOC. The FPAT determines whether an FPU meets the requirements of operational capability; makes recommendations on additional pre-deployment training needs; comments on the overall operational readiness of the unit; and makes recommendations about its possible deployment.

Generally, an AOC should take place between two (2) months and one (1) month before the planned FPU deployment date. The AOC should be completed no less than one (1) month before the deployment date to ensure enough time to take remedial action should the FPU not meet all requirements of operational capability during the AOC and to finalize all necessary preparations for deployment. The SRS will inform the MS about the proposed dates, duration and scope of the AOC.
Key message: FPUs which fail the Assessment of Operational Capability will have to undergo retraining and retesting.

- All FPUs must meet the requirements of operational capability to qualify for service in a PKO.
- The requirements of operational capability consist of individual and unit requirements.
- Only FPU that have successfully completed the entire AOC regime and meet all individual and unit requirements of operational capability qualify for peacekeeping service.
- **Unsuccessful FPUs will have to undergo retraining and retesting.**
Key message: individual requirements of operational capability are a mix of factors comprising age, rank, medical fitness and professional competence.

The slide shows with details which are the individual requirements divided in basic eligibility and professional competence.

The basic eligibility requirements fall into four (4) sub-categories: age and professional experience; rank; medical fitness; and UN performance.

The age and professional experience requirements for FPU members are as follows:

Minimum experience of FPU no ranked personnel: they shall have a minimum of two (2) years of police service in their home countries prior to deployment. The years of police experience may include periods of police service in assignments other than formed police functions but shall not include periods of basic police training.

Minimum experience of certain senior FPU staff: The FPU Commander, the Deputy Commander, the Platoon Commanders, the Section Commanders, the Operations Officer, the Liaison Officer, the Logistics Officer and the Duty Officers must have a minimum of five (5) years of police experience in their home.

Rank: Generally, it is the responsibility of the MS to determine the appropriate ranks of the FPU officers in command positions. However, the FPU Commander will be at a rank of no less than Major or equivalent; Platoon Commanders will be at a rank of no less than Lieutenant or equivalent.

Medical fitness: All FPU members must be physically and mentally fit taking into consideration that they will have to perform crowd management and other physically demanding tasks, and that they will be deployed to a potentially hostile and hazardous environment.
**United Nations performance of certain senior FPU officers:** The FPU Commander, the Deputy Commander, the Platoon Commanders, the Section Commanders, the Operations Officer, the Liaison Officer, the Logistics Officer and the Duty Officers are subject to United Nations performance appraisals for service in PKO. An FPU officer who received an unsatisfactory performance rating for a service with a PKO will be disqualified from future peacekeeping service.

**Professional Competence:**

**Professional knowledge and skills:** All FPU members should have a good understanding of the following three (3) areas: United Nations peacekeeping; United Nations policing; and the mission mandate. In addition, FPU officers in command positions should have a detailed understanding of command, control and coordination of FPUs in PKOs and will know how to react to and manage public order incidents.

**Language skills of senior FPU officers:** The FPU Commander, the Deputy Commander, the Platoon Commanders, as well as the Operations Officer, the Liaison Officer, the Logistics Officer and the Duty Officers will speak fluently, read easily, and write clearly in the working language(s) of the PKO they are deployed to, generally either English or French. On an exceptional basis when the working language is not English, a minimum of 50% of these officers must have proven skills in the working language of the PKO while the remaining officers must have proven English skills. However, either the FPU Commander or the Deputy Commander must have proven skills in the PKO’s working language. Basic language skills in either English or the working language of the PKO are sufficient for the Medical Officer and for the Section Commanders.

**Driving skills:** An FPU member authorized to drive a vehicle in the PKO must be in possession of a valid national driving license, have at least one (1) year of driving experience with the category of vehicle he or she is authorized to drive, know standard traffic regulations, and be able to safely operate the vehicle he or she is authorized to drive.

**Weapons handling and shooting skills:** An FPU member who will carry a firearm or a non-lethal weapon in the PKO must be able to handle it safely and must have proven shooting skills with the weapon. The specific handling and shooting requirements are different for sidearm, rifles and other types of firearms/non-lethal weapons.
Key message: requirements of operational capability for FPUs include organizational standards, police technique and public order management.

- In addition to the individual requirements that the individual members of a FPU must meet, the FPU as an entire unit must meet specific requirements to qualify for peacekeeping service. The unit requirements of operational capacity fall into five categories: organizational standards; police techniques in peacekeeping operations; public order management capacity; capacity to provide protection to UN personnel, UN facilities and civilians; and support to capacity building.
- The organizational standards of an FPU refer to its composition of personnel and to the weapons and other equipment needed. The composition and organization of FPUs may vary due to mission-specific requirements.
- At a minimum, an FPU will have a total strength of approximately 140 members and will consist of an operational component, a command element and a logistics element.
- The specific weapons and other equipment needed in a given mission environment are determined by the United Nations on the basis of the strategic and operational planning process and reflected in the related planning documents, particularly in the mission’s Concept of Operations (CONOPS), the Operational Plan (OPLAN), and the mission-specific directive on detention, searches and use of force for members of FPUs.
- Police Techniques in Peacekeeping Operations.
  - The FPU will, in its smallest deployable units, be able to carry out police interventions in PKO environments. In particular, the units will be capable of conducting a body search; handcuffing a person; performing basic self-defense techniques; conducting a vehicle control; conducting tactical progression both indoors and outdoors; providing first aid; and using an inbuilt stress management mechanism.
• Public Order Management.
  • The FPU as a unit will be able to perform public order management techniques in PKO environments. In particular, the FPU shall be familiar with crowd control equipment; foot maneuvers and tactical formations; techniques to clear barricades; tactical use of vehicles and water cannons; arrest methods in public order situations; firefighting in crowd control situations; response to sniper incidents in public order situations; rescue of threatened or injured FPU member(s); and methods of tactical withdrawal and unit relief.
  • The FPU as a unit will be able, in collaboration with the UN military component, to provide protection to United Nations personnel, United Nations facilities and when so mandated, to local civilians, local officials and/or local facilities. In particular, the FPU will be capable of planning and conducting checkpoint operations; planning and conducting patrols; providing tactical responses to incidents such as roadblocks; providing static and dynamic security to UN personnel and facilities; and providing security for UN convoys.
• Support to Capacity Building.
  • Support to capacity building is not a core FPU task. As a rule, training experts on public order management are recruited separately and serve in United Nations police capacity-building program. Nonetheless, if the mandate and the security situation allow for a diversion from the core tasks, an FPU may support the United Nations police in building the capacity of the national police in the area of public order management. Generally, such support will be provided through joint trainings and joint exercises.
Formed Police Assessment Team (FPAT)

FPAT Mandate

- To oversee an Assessment of Operational Capability
- To determine whether an FPU meets the operational capability requirements
- To make recommendations:
  - On additional pre-deployment training needs
  - On the operational readiness of the unit
  - About the FPU deployment

Key message: The Formed Police Assessment Team (FPAT) assessment is conducted only by UN certified instructors. The FPAT Team leader makes a recommendation regarding the deployment of the unit.

- A Formed Police Assessment Team (FPAT) is established to oversee an Assessment of Operational Capability (AOC).

- The FPAT:
  - determines whether an FPU meets the requirements of operational capability,
  - makes recommendations on additional pre-deployment training needs,
  - comments on the operational readiness of the unit,
  - makes recommendations about FPU deployment.

- The FPAT is composed of certified AOC instructors. Whenever possible, the members of a FPAT should include both Police Division Selection and Recruitment staff and serving United Nations police officers. Where possible, there should be at least one female instructor on the team.

- During the AOC, the fulfilment of certain requirements is assessed by the FPAT directly, while the MS certifies the fulfilment of the other requirements. The medical fitness of the FPU members is certified by the MS to the Police Division SRS after the AOC and shortly before deployment.
Key message: In case the FPAT is conducted in the context of the PDV, the focus will be on the logistic readiness of the unit in addition to the unit’s operational readiness.

• When the AOC is conducted in the context of a Pre-deployment visit (PDV) the FPAT will also assess the weapons and other operational equipment of the FPU on the basis of the draft MOU and the COE manual to ensure they meet the operational requirements of the PKO where the unit will be deployed.

• Among others, the FPAT will ensure that the expiry dates on lethal and less-lethal ammunition do not affect the operational capability of the FPU. Particular attention has to be given in this regard to the expiration date of tear gas canisters as their replacement is an exercise that requires a lot of time and consequently can affect the operational readiness of the unit.

• With regard to the composition of the team at least one FPU member will be familiar with the COE manual and related issues.
Key message: preparatory activities before the assessment itself are critical for the success of the entire exercise.

The slide is quite self-explanatory however it is worth highlighting that:

• The purpose of the activities described in the slide is to make sure that the MS has organized all the phases of the assessment in line with the requirement of the SOP.
• Before starting the AOC, the FPAT will verify the following information received from the MS:
  • The AOC list of FPU personnel, particularly the identity of the FPU members, their age; years of police service (excluding years of basic police training); and the composition and organization of the FPU.
  • The AOC note of certification, particularly the identity of the FPU members who are authorized to carry non-lethal weapons or firearms other than sidearm or rifles;
  • The identity of the FPU members who are authorized to drive vehicles other than regular vehicles (these drivers have to present valid national driving licenses that qualify them to drive these categories of vehicles);
  • And receipt of the certification concerning criminal offences and violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law
  • The curriculum vitae of the FPU Commander, the Deputy Commander, the Platoon Commanders and the Section Commanders, as well as of the Operations Officer, the Liaison Officer, the Logistics Officer and the Duty Officers. In particular, the FPAT will verify the age of these officers, their years of police experience (excluding years of basic training), their rank, FPU functions performed, and periods of previous UN service (if applicable).
• The aim is also to visit the facilities where the assessment will be conducted and make sure that they are suitable to perform the assessment in line the SOP.
• Finally it is also important among the different activities described in the slide, the meeting with the FPU members as this will represent an opportunity to describe all the phases of the assessment and to answer to any questions that the participants or any other representative of the MS may ask.
Key message: the Assessment of Operational Capability comprises 5 stages covering language competency, operational interview, driving competency, weapons handling and tactical exercise.
Key message: in the FPAT, the language competency assessment is either conducted in the working language of the mission, or in English.

The language competency assessment is conducted in the working language of the PKO, generally either English or French. On an exceptional basis when the working language is not English, a minimum of 50% of the officers have to be tested in the working language while the remaining officers are tested in English. However, either the FPU Commander or the Deputy Commander will be tested in the working language of the PKO. The language competency assessment consists of three parts: the reading exercise; the report writing exercise; and the assessment of oral communication skills that is part of the operational interview (see paragraphs).

The language assessment will consist of the following phases: Reading exercise, reporting writing and operational interview.

- **Reading**: The FPU officers receive a document describing a PKO-related FPU incident. They have twenty (20) minutes to read the document and answer ten (10) questions related to the incident. The AOC instructors use a question and answer matrix to evaluate the reading exercise of the language assessment. An officer requires a minimum of seven (7) correct answers to pass the reading exercise.
- **Report writing**: The FPU officers listen to an audio recording that provides additional information on the same incident. The officers may take notes while listening. The notes may be taken in any language. The officers have thirty (30) minutes to write a comprehensive police report about the incident. The report should include and summarize all relevant facts of the incident. The spelling, grammar and style of the report will also be assessed. All written notes and reports produced by the FPU officers are collected by the FPAT at the end of the second exercise. The AOC instructors use a
standard scoring matrix to evaluate the report writing exercise of the language assessment (see Annex H). An FPU officer should demonstrate a B1 or higher level of language to pass the report writing exercise of the language assessment.

• **Operational interview:** The FPU Commander, the Deputy Commander, the Platoon Commanders and the Section Commanders, as well as the Operations Officer, Liaison Officer, the Logistics Officer, the Medical Officer, and the Duty Officers are interviewed during the AOC. The interview serves two main purposes: i) to assess the FPU officer’s oral communication skills; and ii) to assess the officer’s professional knowledge and skills and his or her knowledge of integrity standards. The interview lasts a minimum of twenty (20) minutes per officer. A MS representative may attend the interviews as an observer if the MS so desires, but will not be allowed to intervene in the interview. The computer proficiency test is no longer required as per the new FPAT/SOP.

The interview serves three main purposes:

• to assess the candidate’s oral communication skills;
• to assess the candidate’s professional experience, mission-specific skills,
• to assess the candidate’s general understanding of the core values of the United Nations.

The interview lasts a minimum of twenty (20) minutes per candidate. A MS representative may attend the interviews as a monitor if the MS so desires.

At the end of the language assessment the FPAT team leader announce the results of the test.

AOC language assessment is valid for a period of no longer than twenty-four (24) months from the date of completion of the AOC. In case of deployment to a PKO with the same official language the FPU Commander, the Deputy Commander, the Platoon Commanders and the Section Commanders, as well as the Operations Officer, the Liaison Officer, the Logistics Officer and the Duty Officers shall be tested only in their operational skills through the Operational Interview, weapons handling and shooting and tactical exercise when applicable.
### Standard Schedule of FPAT Activities

#### Driving Competency Assessment (regular vehicles)
- Handling exercise
- Announcement of results
- Road exercise
- Announcement of results

#### Weapon Handling and Shooting Assessment
- Handling exercise
- Shooting exercise (sidearm)
  - Step 1 (distance 5 meters)
  - Step 2 (distance 7 meters)
- Shooting exercise (rifle)
  - Part 1 (standing position, distance 25 meters)
  - Part 2 (kneeling or prone position, distance 30 meters)

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**Key message:** in the FPAT, the driving competency assessment includes a road exercise and the weapon handling exercise includes a shooting exercise.

**Driving assessment:**
The driving competency assessment consists of two parts: the handling exercise and the road exercise:

**Handling exercise:** The candidate must prove his or her ability to safely reverse and park a manual gear four-wheel drive vehicle on a standard driving range within five (5) minutes. A candidate who fails the handling exercise immediately receives one more chance. A candidate who fails the handling exercise twice is disqualified and shall not be admitted to the road exercise.

**Road exercise:** The candidate is expected to demonstrate his or her ability to drive safely on a predetermined route. The driving will be conducted in low traffic. The AOC instructor to make the assessment will follow the instruction detailed in the appendices 3 and 4 to Annex K of the AOC SOP.

**Weapons handling and shooting assessment**

For service in an armed PKO or SPM, a candidate must pass the handling of firearms and shooting assessment that consists of two parts: a firearm handling exercise and a shooting exercise. The two parts of the assessment should be conducted with the same type of sidearm that the MS provides to its police officers deployed to a PKO or SPM:

In the **handling exercise**, the FPU member has to demonstrate to the FPAT his or her ability to handle the sidearm safely to continue to the shooting exercise. The FPU member should safely clean the
cylinder of a revolver within one (1) minute. Alternatively, the FPU member should safely disassemble and reassemble a pistol within three (3) minutes.

The shooting exercise is conducted under the responsibility of the MS’s firearms instructor and supervised by an AOC instructor. The AOC instructor will disqualify any FPU member who fails to comply with the safety rules of the shooting range or otherwise fails to handle the sidearm safely.

The shooting exercise is carried out in two (2) steps:

- In step one, the FPU member has to shoot a total of five (5) rounds on a target of 45 cm x 45 cm from a five (5) meter distance. The sidearm, under supervision of the MS firearms instructor, must be holstered prior to and after each round is fired. There is a five (5) second time limit for each round from the holstered stage to the firing of the round. In order to proceed to step two of the shooting exercise, the FPU member has to hit the target in four (4) out of the five (5) rounds.

- In step two, the FPU member has to shoot a total of five (5) rounds on a target of 45 cm x 45 cm from a distance of seven (7) meters. The sidearm will be in the low-ready position prior to and after each round is fired. There will be a five (5) second time limit for each round to be delivered from the low-ready position to the firing of the round. During the exercise the FPU member should bring the sidearm to the shooting position on the command of the MS firearms instructor.

To pass the sidearm handling and shooting exercise, the FPU member must hit the target in at least nine (9) rounds out of the total of ten (10) rounds in both steps and demonstrate safe handling of the sidearm throughout the process. Only in case of misfire due to technical reasons beyond the FPU member’s control will he or she be given a second chance to pass the shooting assessment. The AOC instructor(s) use(s) a standard assessment matrix to evaluate the FPU member’s firearms handling and shooting skills.

An FPU member authorized to carry a rifle must meet the following handling and shooting requirements that are assessed in two parts:

- In the handling exercise, the FPU member has to demonstrate to the FPAT his or her ability to handle the rifle safely to continue to the shooting exercise. The FPU member must be able to safely disassemble and reassemble the rifle within five (5) minutes.

- The shooting exercise is conducted under the responsibility of the MS’s firearms instructor and supervised by an AOC instructor. The AOC instructor will disqualify any FPU member who fails to comply with the safety rules of the shooting range or otherwise fails to handle the rifle safely.

The shooting exercise is carried out in two (2) steps:

- In step one, the FPU member has to shoot a total of five (5) rounds in standing position from a distance of twenty-five (25) meters at a target of 45 cm x 68 cm;

- In step two, the FPU member has to shoot a total of five (5) rounds in kneeling or prone position from a distance of thirty (30) meters at a target of 45 cm x 68 cm. The AOC instructor decides in what position the exercise is conducted.

To pass the rifle handling and shooting exercise, the FPU member must hit the target in at least eight (8) out of ten (10) rounds in the two steps and demonstrate safe handling of the rifle throughout the
process. In case of misfire due to technical reasons beyond the FPU member’s control he/she will be given a second chance to pass the shooting assessment.
Key message: in the FPAT the tactical exercise assessment includes demonstrations of police techniques, public order management and realization of two tasking orders.

At the start of the AOC, the FPU Commander receives two tasking orders. On the basis of these orders, the FPU will have to develop exercises that demonstrate its police techniques in peacekeeping operations; its public order management capacity and its capacity to provide protection to United Nations personnel, United Nations facilities, local civilians, local officials and local facilities.

To assess the tactical exercise, the AOC instructors use a standard scoring matrix that evaluates the technical skills and capacities of the FPU; the operational cohesiveness of the unit; its command and control, and communication capacities; the unit’s familiarity with the equipment used; and the FPU’s respect of relevant policies, directives and procedures, particularly the directive on detention, searches and use of force, as well as relevant safety and security rules and procedures.

To pass the tactical exercise, the FPU must complete the assigned tasking orders and must meet, as a minimum, a “sufficient” score in each category of the scoring matrix. Sample of the scoring matrix can be found in the already mentioned SOP.

The part related to the inspection of equipment has been discussed earlier during the presentation.
Key message: the Assessment of Operational Capability report will be addressed to the UN Police Adviser and copied to the Member State authorities.

Following the completion of the AOC, the FPAT will compile the AOC results and the FPAT leader will prepare the AOC report to:

- Summarize the results of the assessment,
- Make recommendations about the possible deployment of the FPU,
- Provide observations on the AOC process.

At the conclusion of the FPAT visit, the FPAT will brief the FPU officers in command positions and debrief the MS authorities.

Before the actual deployment, the MS will certify the medical fitness of all FPU members.

The final report is addressed to the Police Adviser through the Chief of SRS and copied to the MS authorities.

While the FPAT leader submit a copy of the AOC report to the relevant MS authorities, he/she will also indicate areas where improvements or reinforcements are possible. In this regard in Appendix 1 to Annex N of the SOP can be found a sample cover letter from the FPAT leader to the MS authorities.

On the basis of the AOC, the DPO Police Adviser determines the overall operational readiness of the FPU and decides on its deployment in accordance with the PKO needs.
Development of Topic 5 of Lecture 2 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: The rapid deployment of self-sustainable FPUs remains one of the most critical challenge that could be properly addressed with a strong commitment from MS to take actions in the preparation of FPUs well in advance prior the call for contribution.

There are different challenges related to the deployment of FPUs. One side we have to consider that no so many countries have the capability to rapid deploy full equipped units. In most of the cases they initiate the procurement process of the COE only after the approval of the deployment of the unit. In this regard it has to be considered that the process to deploy an FPU will easily take 6/8 months. The Inter Mission Cooperation is a tool to temporarily redeploy units from one mission to another mission however this exercise presents serious limitations ( difficulties to redeploy the COE of the units to guarantee their self-sustainability, absorption capacity from the receiving mission, concurrence from MS to re-deploy to other missions as this might also have impact on the signed MOU).
Key message: generating sufficient numbers of female police officers remains one of the challenges when deploying FPUs.

Female police officers serving in FPUs are rare to find in current police/gendarmerie services. Those who meet the required profiles (years of experience/age) are not motivated to go on Missions, while attending family matters.

Mainly in view of cultural/religious/tradition issues, our larger FPU contributors have lesser percentage of female FPUs.
Key message: self-sustainment capabilities, proper maintenance of major equipment and language issues in francophone missions remain sensitive issues when deploying FPUs to peacekeeping operations.

In addition to the challenges already considered and addressed we have also to consider issues concerning the language and the level of serviceability of the COE deployed in mission area.

Language remains a challenge particularly for deployment of units in francophone missions. This is one of the reasons why we need to increase the FPU contribution from African countries.

With regard to the COE it is critical that FPUs deploy qualified and trained personnel to provide proper maintenance of the equipment. In addition it is critical that any issue regarding no-serviceable equipment is addressed to the respective MS in a timely manner to prevent that certain deficiencies affect the operational readiness of the unit. Unfortunately from field experience we noticed that in many cases MS have been informed with delay about certain issues and normally happens just when they receive the COE inspections reports....too late

Regarding training we already discussed about it, unfortunately in certain cases the pre-deployment training is not attended by all members of the FPU and/or the program is significantly reduced for different reasons.
Key message: awareness of the Mission’s environment and familiarization with the unit’s area of responsibility should be addressed as a matter of priority by the FPU commanding officer.

At mission level some of the main challenges are related to:

- Lack of in mission training or joint exercises that are not conducted due to other operational priorities or lack of coordination among the different components
- Lack of awareness about capabilities, role and tasks that can be performed by FPUs, there might be expectations that FPUs can perform tasks which definitely are beyond their means and capabilities and their mandated tasks
- Lack of awareness of the mission’s environment by FPU member.

The issue of the COE maintenance has been addressed in the previous slide.
Lecture Take Away

- The Assessment of Operational Capability must be thoroughly prepared by the PCC authorities.
- The FPAT procedures must be perfectly known by the FPU commander and staff.
- Any FPU failing the AOC will not deploy until re-trained and successfully re-assessed.
Generating a FPU
Questions

Lecture 2
Learning Outcomes

• Describe the process involved when re-hatting under UN authority a military or police unit originally deployed under a Regional Organization
• Mention the issues more often met during past re-hatting operations and suggest ways to avoid them.
Lecture Content

- Circumstances leading to re-hatting
- Re-hatting process
- Re-hatting issues and possible solutions

- Show the situation leading to re-hatting
- Describe most common issues
- Describe the process followed by the UN
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 3 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: The process of taking under UN authority, at the start of a new mandate, the MIL/POL units originally deployed with a Regional Organization under a previous mandate is called re-hatting.

Backdrop of a re-hatting operation

- A unit is deployed to a crisis area under authority of a Regional Organization (RO), operating under a UN mandate (Here the African Union – could be a different one).
- After one or several years and due planning process, UNSC decides to allow a UN operation to take over RO’s operation.

- The process of taking under UN authority, at the start of the new mandate, the MIL/POL units originally deployed with the Regional Organization is called re-hatting.

- The decision to replace a RO operation by a UN operation is a long political process that is accompanied by a planning process identical to that used for UN operations and that starts well ahead of the discussions leading to adoption of a UN SC Resolution.
• **Key message:** sufficient time for the preparation of the new UN mission must be allowed between the approval of the SCR and the start of the new mandate.

**Details of the circumstances**

• The date of the new UN mandate corresponds to the end date of the RO mandate

• Sufficient time is normally allowed between approval of the SCR and the start of the UN mandate to carry out the remainder of the planning and the FG process

• During this time there are two FG processes unfolding in parallel:
  • Standard FG process for entirely new units (= not already present on the ground with the RO Mission)
  • Re-hatting process as described below for units already present, and whose Governments have declared their intention to remain with the new mission under UN authority.
Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 3 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: a grace period will be allowed for the re-hatting units to upgrade to UN standards level.

The process follows roughly the pattern of the FG process:

Acceptance of the unit:

• **CLICK**
• Planning phase with issuance of necessary documents (SUR, CONOPS, ROE)
• **CLICK**
• Informal political discussions and agreement, both from the MS and from DPO
• If either SRPOS does not grant political agreement to retain the unit, or the TCC does not wish to remain under UN mandate, the unit will be repatriated (at Govt or RO’s expense, since the unit was not deployed by the UN).
• **CLICK**
• Technical assessment of the units on the ground by DPO/DOS to determine their level of operational readiness, ME and SS equipment.
• **CLICK**
• Formal acceptance phase, through exchange of NVs, in which DPO will mention the time frame of the grace period allowed to the P/TCCs for upgrading their units to UN standards. Time allowed depends on the importance of the gaps in the units
• In case there is no agreement on the conditions, the unit will be repatriated, as explained above.

• **No recce** since the units are already on the ground.
• **No PDV** since the units are already deployed; but a complement of AAVs may be envisioned, as well as visits to the capitals.
Key message: not meeting UN standards by the set deadline may mean cancellation of the contribution by DPO and repatriation of the unit.

Rest of the process

CLICK
- The **MOU negotiation** needs to happen, knowing that two “phased” MOUs will often be discussed:
  - **Phase A** corresponding to the equipment of the existing unit on the ground, to be used from the date of the UN mandate to the deadline for the upgrade.
  - **Phase B** corresponding to the full unit structured and equipped to UN requirements as per the SUR.

CLICK
- Further agreements will determine what, how and when some **reimbursements** will happen:
  - Rotations of personnel happening after a certain time after the start of the UN mandate (to be determined for each mission case by case) will be paid for by the UN
  - Worthless COE not accepted by the UN is usually repatriated at T/PCC’s expense (considering the UN did not deploy it)
  - New COE procured for upgrade purpose is normally deployed at UN expense

CLICK
- A COE inspection at upgrade deadline date will help determine if the unit has met UN requirements as per negotiated MOU:
  - This COE inspection based on MOU Phase B will determine the rights to reimbursement of the P/TCC / possible penalties from the deadline;
  - It will also help DPO decide whether the unit is worth keeping in the mission (most of UN requirements met, including operational readiness) or if it should be repatriated – in case of lacking equipment, important gaps etc.
• Failing to meet the deadline fixed for the upgrade may lead DPO to cancel its acceptance and decide to repatriate the unit.
• However, early repatriation is always a difficult political decision to make, and is also damageable to the mission as this unit will have to be replaced at the expense of further delays, therefore further hampering the operational capability of the mission.
Key message: during the preparation for re-hatting, the training of the new contingent to UN specifications and the certification of the unit should not be forgotten.

Last considerations

- Finally, training the new personnel for each rotation, and completing the unit certification process for each rotation should not be forgotten in the process.
- It is an important part of the operational value of the unit and is becoming more and more important with DPO and OMA (MIL units).
- The military units certification process is the subject of the next lecture in this Module.
Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 3 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: a starting UN mission will benefit from re-hatting units already present on the ground at the start of the mandate.

Before tackling the issues, it should be noted that re-hatting also has its benefits for the UN

• To have available a sizable strength already deployed on the ground at the start of the UN mandate
• Get help from existing Regional Organization command structure while setting up the UN mission
• MIL / POL units already familiar with the local environment
• Security of UN personnel can be assured due to presence of operational troops from the start.
Key message: all too often units re-hatted from Regional Organizations suffer from utter lack of knowledge about UN regulations, compounded by lack of training and equipment.

**However there are often numerous issues as well**

- Emerging T/PCCs unfamiliar with UN functioning are not prepared to work under UN command and regulations
- Units deployed with RO do not meet UN standards in size, organization, capabilities
- Units under-equipped
- Under-trained units

  - All that precedes means reduced operational value and behavioral problems on the ground.

- Insufficient equipment and getting the P/TCCs to upgrade within the allotted time frame is the greatest challenge.
- The SCR and the MS are always in a hurry to have a fully functioning mission on the ground as early as possible, with fully functional units. This is because the taking over of the mission by the UN most of the times happens in a context of crisis in the country that calls for swift action by fully operational units.
- The RO force itself is generally under the strength of the allowed UN force, and the units are very often smaller in size that the standard UN units INF Bns of 400 / 500 vs the UN INF Bn of 850.
- Also the enablers are almost always lacking with the RO missions.
• It should be noted that with EU or NATO P/TCCs the problem is generally inverse, with units that have strength, capabilities and equipment far beyond the UN requirements, which creates reimbursement problems. Then the issue for DPO is to negotiate a downsizing of the P/TCC’s capabilities and equipment.
Re-hatting Issues

Solving these issues in a timely manner by emerging P/TCCs is the greatest challenge presented by re-hatting a Regional Organization force under UN authority.

Key message: solving re-hatting issues in a timely manner is the greatest challenge for re-hatting units and P/TCCs.

- Getting new units to UN standards takes time, if only for training and equipping.
- Upgrading equipment for a whole battalion within the time frame allowed by the UN is a challenge in itself, and T/PCCs should ideally be prepared well in advance by working with DPO and DOS.
- Delays in operational capabilities are always what is killing UN operations when they start.
Possible Solutions

As is often the case in Force Generation, meeting requirements in a timely manner means working ahead of time with DPO to prepare the unit, instead of being caught unprepared at the time of the call.

Key message: for re-hatting P/TCCs, working well ahead of time with DPO is the best way to meet UN requirements in a timely manner.

• Preparation is everything; P/TCCs should not wait to be called to prepare to meet UN requirements.
Possible Solutions

Therefore is it strongly suggested that:

- Unexperienced P/TCCs seek DPO’s help and advice to prepare a unit ahead of time (see PCRS for emerging P/TCCs)
- P/TCCs engaged in a Regional Organization PKO should not wait to contact DPO, even before the UNSCR decides for a UN Mandate
- Preparing a unit that meets generic UN standards will benefit the T/PCC even in the framework of an RO PKO.

Key message: unexperienced P/TCCs should seek DPO’s help and advice well in advance to prepare for re-hatting.

- The general idea is to work in advance with DPO in order to prepare ahead of time.
- Engaging in an RO PKO a unit at UN standards means that the unit will be better equipped and prepared to handle the tasks it will receive. The unit will have better performances, the personnel will be more comfortable and better supported, the RO operation will benefit of greater efficiency and the T/PCC’s Government will get all the praise and merit!
Lecture Take Away (I)

Re-hatting a unit means:
- DPO political agreement
- Technical assessment of unit’s status in the field
- T/PCC to accept to adapt to UN standards
- Grace period allowed for adapting
- Imperative deadline for adapting…
  - … under pain of repatriation
- Training of relief contingents

• To be accepted for re-hatting is not automatic and always depends on DPO political agreement even before technical aspects are considered.
• DPO/DOS will organize a technical assessment of the units before the decision is made to accept them for re-hatting
• T/PCCs willing to stay with the UN mission must accept to adapt to UN standards if need be
• A grace period will be granted for upgrading, duration to be determined by DPO on a case by case basis depending on the local conditions and needs of the Mission.
• The deadline for re-hatting is normally imperative. Missing the deadline may mean early repatriation of the unit and replacement by another contingent.
• Training of relief contingent should not be forgotten and is of prime importance. It is fully the T/PCC’s responsibility, and should be done for each replacement contingent.
Lecture Take Away (II)

For emerging T/PCCs in particular:

• The best way to prepare for a re-hatting operation is to work in advance with DPO.
Re-hatting a Unit

Questions

Lecture 3
Learning Outcomes

• Describe the pre-deployment certification process for a military unit.
Lecture Content

• Introduction on the Policy on Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement (Military Units only)
• Certification domains
• Principles
• Procedure

• Explain
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 4 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the UN policy on Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement plans for four phases, of which the Preparation phase includes a military unit certification procedure.

- The ORAPI is a framework policy which tackles 4 phases
- ORAPI and the detailed preparation of the unit will be covered in Module G « Contingent preparation for deployment »
- The certification of the unit happens at the end of the preparation phase, before the deployment and ideally before the PDV
- This is what we are going to study hereafter.
Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 4 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the ORAPI policy covers two certification domains: Operational Preparation and Conduct & Discipline.

- The certification of the unit covers two main certification domains: Operational Preparation and Conduct and discipline
Key message: the Operational Preparation certification domain in the ORAPI policy covers the organization, equipment, training, testing, techniques and procedures of the selected unit.

- The Operational Preparation means that the TCC will certify that the unit:
  - Is organized in accordance with the SUR
  - Has the appropriate resources and equipment to fulfil its assigned tasks
  - Trained in accordance with the United Nations pre-deployment training standards and specifications.
  - Has been prepared and tested through self-evaluation and field exercises.
  - Has the capability and willingness to operate based on peacekeeping tactics, techniques and procedures, and to accomplish the UN Mission's objectives and mandate
Key message: the ORAPI policy proposes a wide range of documents that will help the TCC authorities certify its unit in the Operational Preparation domain.

- Self explanatory: the ORAPI policy document proposes a number of reference documents for the TCC to use as regards the Operational Preparation of the unit.
- We will examine them more in detail in the next module (contingent preparation for deployment), particularly the new Operational Readiness Preparation Guidelines (2016).

- CPTM: Core Pre-Deployment Training Material
- STM: Specialized Training Material

- CPTM and STM are available online at: http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community.
Key message: sexual exploitation and abuse and human rights screening are two essential aspects of the Conduct and Discipline certification domain in the ORAPI policy.

- The conduct and discipline part of the certification is partially based on the Human Rights Screening policy.
- The TCC must verify and certify:
  - That none of the members of the unit have been involved in a criminal offence, including of sexual nature or have been convicted of, or are currently under investigation or are prosecuted for any criminal offence, or any violation of international human rights law or international humanitarian law [This is directly from the Human Rights screening policy]
  - That the Government is not aware of any allegation(s) against the members of the unit that they have been involved, by act or omission, in the commission of any acts that amount to violations of international human rights law or international humanitarian law; [This is also directly from the Human Rights screening policy]
  - That the Government certifies that no unit member has been previously repatriated on disciplinary grounds or otherwise barred from participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations in connection with an act of serious misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse; [Final quote from the Human Rights screening policy]
  - That all unit members deploying to the mission have undergone the required pre-deployment training in conduct and discipline, including on sexual exploitation and abuse, which was delivered in accordance with United Nations standards [Important to note the accent put on SEA]
• Finally, Government agreement that in case it is revealed that a personnel was deployed despite the above screening / clauses, the Government would bear the full cost of the repatriation for such individuals.
Key message: the ORAPI policy proposes a wide range of documents that will help the TCC authorities certify its unit in the Conduct & Discipline domain.

- The Policy on Human Rights Screening of UN Personnel provides the framework for the corresponding screening.
- Same policy also concerns criminal offences and SEA misconduct
- Conduct & Discipline training may rely on Specialized Training Material – STM on Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Personnel @ http://research.un.org/c.php?g=636989&p=5838406
- The last part (not deploy personnel previously repatriated from other missions due to SEA misconduct) needs for the TCC to follow thoroughly the career path of its personnel. It requires a specific organization put in place by the TCC to keep track of the deployments of all of its military personnel, and of their disciplinary history.
Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 4 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the certification note applies to one unit only, is valid for one rotation of personnel and must be signed by an official authority above the unit commander level.

Three principles of the military unit certification

- The note of certification applies to an individual unit
  - Not to the whole contingent in case of several units

- The note of certification is renewed with each rotation of the personnel
  - Once a year in principle

- The certification document is to be signed by an official TCC representative prior to deployment
  - Not the unit commander
Development of Topic 4 of Lecture 4 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the self-evaluation and self-certification followed by the unit materialize in the form of a Certification Note signed by a TCC representative at a sufficient level of authority.
Key message: a template of the certification document is provided with the ORAPI policy document.

- The template of the certification document can be found at Annex E to the ORAPI Policy.
### Certification Procedure

Evaluation at least six weeks prior to deployment
- To allow sufficient time for any shortfalls to be remedied.

Document available at the time of the PDV
- OMA / Force Generation Service is in charge of collecting and managing the Certification Documents

Further rotations: TCCs should forward the signed certification through their Permanent Mission to UNHQ.
- To be done before deployment

Copy to be forwarded by UNHQ to the Mission's Force Commander

Provide a copy to the FC upon arrival in the Mission area.

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**Key message:** the evaluation of the unit must be completed at least six weeks before the deployment and the certification note must be remitted to the PDV team or forwarded to DPO through the Permanent Mission.

- TCC to evaluate its unit/personnel for certification at least six weeks prior to deployment
- The note of certification should be available at the time of the PDV for verification & collection by FGS Officer
- TCC unit commander to provide a copy to the FC upon arrival in the Mission area.
Lecture Take Away

• The Certification Process for military units is part of the UN Policy on Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement (ORAPI).
• The Certification Process is based on the principle of self-evaluation.
• Two domains are covered by the certification: Operational Preparation and Conduct & Discipline.
• The Conduct & Discipline certification domain is largely based on the UN Policy on Human Rights Screening of UN personnel.
Unit Certification
Questions
Learning Outcomes

- Learn about the gender aspects of military and police contributions in terms of defining texts, DPO and DOS policies, gender targets and pre-deployment preparation.
Lecture Content

- Landmark texts on Gender Perspective
- Gender perspective and Gender equality
- Gender organization, UNHQ and field missions
- Targets toward Gender equality
- Gender aspects of force generation.
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 5 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).

The Security Council adopted resolution (S/RES/1325) on Women and Peace and Security on 31 October 2000. The resolution reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.

Resolution 1325 urges all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspectives in all United Nations peace and security efforts. It also calls on all parties to conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, in situations of armed conflict. The resolution provides a number of important operational mandates, with implications for Member States and the entities of the United Nations system.
Key message: The DPKO and DFS Gender Forward Looking Strategy supports the various Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security (WPS agenda).

Since the approval of SCR 1325 (2000), the UN has produced a number of texts dealing with gender issues. Two of these texts may be more prominent than the others.

**UN policy for gender equality, 2011**
- The **UN Policy for Gender Equality** promotes equal rights, equal responsibilities and equal opportunities for either sex.
- In this framework, **DPO encourages the deployment of female personnel** as part of the military and police contingents.
- Experience shows that the integration of female personnel within contingents in direct contact with the local population improves the *quality of exchanges* between UN troops and the female component of the local population.
- This is particularly important within PKOs where **Sexual Exploitation and Abuse** cases occur among the population.

- **Equality between women and men (gender equality)**: refers to the *equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities* of women and men and girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will become the same but that women’s and men’s rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born male or female. **Gender equality implies that the interests, needs and priorities of both women and men are taken into consideration**, recognizing the diversity of different groups of women and men. Gender equality is not a women’s issue but should concern and
fully engage men as well as women. Equality between women and men is seen both as a human rights issue and as a precondition for, and indicator of, sustainable people-centered development.

**DPKO/DFS Gender Forward Looking Strategy**

DPO and DOS have developed a Gender Strategy which both supports the resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, and reflects the changing operating environment. The Strategy articulates the importance and objectives of gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping. It also outlines a strategic direction for the organization and offers tools to help us better support and protect women and girls where peacekeeping missions are deployed. We encourage all DPO/DOS staff to familiarize themselves with the contents of the Strategy and translate the objectives into concrete actions.
What is the Gender Perspective?

A gender perspective enables a force to take a stop and analyze how women and men are impacted differently by conflict.

At unit level:
To think and analyze how women and men have different needs.

Key message: a gender perspective needs to be included into all peacekeeping plans, policies, activities, analysis and reports.

Gender perspective: this term is used to describe the process of exposing gender-based differences in status and power, and considering how such differences shape the immediate needs, as well as the long-term interests, of women and men. In peacekeeping a gender perspective needs to be included into all plans, policies, activities, analysis and reports. Without integrating a gender perspective in peacekeeping work, it is impossible to achieve gender equality.

In a conflict area:
- Men and women experience conflict differently
- Military functions (unit) and branches (HQ) should be aware of these differences and ensure that their staff work reflects this understanding
- If you treat everyone the same you may not be helping those with different needs:

The goal is to explicitly integrate gender perspective in all policies, programs, planning and resource, management and guidance tools.
Key message: gender equality refers to the equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men.

Gender Mainstreaming is a globally accepted strategy for promoting gender equality. Mainstreaming is not an end in itself but a strategy, an approach, a means to achieve the goal of gender equality. Mainstreaming involves ensuring that gender perspectives and attention to the goal of gender equality are central to all activities - policy development, research, advocacy/dialogue, legislation, resource allocation, and planning, implementation and monitoring of programs and projects.

Equality between women and men (gender equality): refers to the equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men and girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will become the same but that women’s and men’s rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born male or female. Gender equality implies that the interests, needs and priorities of both women and men are taken into consideration, recognizing the diversity of different groups of women and men. Gender equality is not a women’s issue but should concern and fully engage men as well as women. Equality between women and men is seen both as a human rights issue and as a precondition for, and indicator of, sustainable people-centered development.
Key message: Gender equity means providing to everyone according to his/her needs.

**Equality** is providing the same thing to everyone.
**Equity** is providing to everyone according to his/her needs.

Providing the help of male peacekeepers to every villager is treating them equally. Providing the help of female peacekeepers to female villagers is treating female villagers with equality + equity.
Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 5 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: gender advisers and experts are placed at every level of the Secretariat.

The gender organization in the UN Secretariat is topped by the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Sex Violence in Conflicts (SRSG SVC). The SRSG-SVC serves as the United Nations’ spokesperson and political advocate on conflict-related sexual violence, and is the chair of the network UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict. The Office was established by Security Council resolution 1888 (2009), one in a series of resolutions which recognized the detrimental impact that sexual violence in conflict has on communities, and acknowledged that this crime undermines efforts at peace and security and rebuilding once a conflict has ended.

In DPO, the Gender Unit is located within the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (DPET). The gender policies are relayed by a Gender Expert (now funded as a G3 position) in the Police Division, and by a Military Gender Adviser in the Office of Military Affairs.
Key message: Gender advisers now exist at all levels of complex peacekeeping missions, and all military and police units should include a gender focal point.

Role of the Gender Advisers and Focal Points

- Provide advice to the Commanders and senior leadership on strategies for effective implementation of existing mandates on women, peace and security.
- Include the security priorities of both women and men in information analysis and assessment, to inform the Commander’s planning and execution in the area of operation.
- Monitor and support delivery of gender training for all military and police peacekeepers.
- Monitor and support gender-sensitive reporting activities, and the use of sex-disaggregated data to facilitate planning for military and police operations.
- Monitor and advise on how to achieve better mixed patrolling and mixed engagement teams in military observer team sites.
- Assist the Force Commander, Police Commissioner and planners in meeting local civil society and NGOs representing human rights via the civilian Gender Office.

- Each Infantry unit or FPU should include a Gender Focal Point / Gender Adviser at command level.
Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 5 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: The goal of the Police Division is to include 50% of female seconded police officers by year 2028.

- These are targets currently being discussed in DPO, the date in particular is still tentative.
Key message: the goal of the Police Division is to include 20% of female police personnel within all police components in the field.
Key message: the goal of the Office of Military Affairs is to include 25% of seconded female military officers by year 2028.

- 20% female officers in military seconded positions is the current figure as quoted by the Office of Military Affairs in August 2018.
Key message: the goal of the Office of Military Affairs is to include 7% of female personnel among the deployed formed military units.

- These are targets currently being discussed in DPO, the date in particular is still tentative.
Key message: the goal of the Office of Military Affairs is to deploy 25% of female military officers within the military observers and staff officers corps by year 2028.

- These are targets currently being discussed in DPO, the date in particular is still tentative.
- August 2018: 11%

Specific OMA initiatives:
- Women SOs and MOs may serve for 6 months (instead of 12) at no additional expense to the Member State if they have young families (children under the age of 7).
- Women Warrant Officers and Lieutenants with 8 years of experience may be nominated for SO and MO posts.
- SO and MO positions will be reallocated to TCCs that are able to fill them with women.
Key message: As of 01 January 2021 each Infantry Battalion will have to include a Female Engagement Team.

- Statements of Unit Requirement now request a Female Engagement Team (FET) as part of each Infantry Battalion.
- As of 01 Jan 2021, FETs will be compulsory for each contingent, and TCCs will not be able to deploy without them.
### Female Engagement Team (Military Contingents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patrol activities</td>
<td>as part of a mixed patrolling capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same-sex dialogue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outreach activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote awareness</td>
<td>of women's rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion initiatives</td>
<td>at the community level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and</td>
<td>evaluation of protection strategies</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Key message:** Primary role of Female Engagement Teams is to take part in mixed patrolling activities.

**FET Roles:**
- Undertake patrol activities as part of a mixed patrolling capability (Primary role).
- Engage in same-sex dialogue.
- Conduct outreach activities with women and men, girls and boys as appropriate.
- Promote an awareness of women’s rights and prevention initiatives at the community level.
- Assist in the monitoring and evaluation of protection strategies.
- Ensure prevention and protection components of the WPS mandates are operationalized.
Female Engagement Team (Infantry Battalion)

Key message: The most useful Female Engagement Teams are those which can speak the language of the local population.

There are various models for a FET and TCCs may use their own methods for establishing a mixed patrolling capability.

- The SOP on FET provides five possible models which are based on a team of women led by a Captain with a Warrant Officer or Senior Non-Commissioned Officer as second in command and 24 women soldiers based on three sections of eight.
- It is understood that some Member States already have women in their Infantry patrols and this is viewed as the ideal way of deploying mixed-patrols.
- If an Infantry unit is small it may deploy with a FET comprised of one section of eight women.
- A FET with the most utility is one that can speak the same language as the local population and can communicate with the Infantry unit they are attached to.
Gender Aspects of Force Generation

Development of Topic 4 of Lecture 5 of Module F2 of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: Peacekeeping units should deploy with a gender focal point at command level.

  - Over 2010-2012, the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and UN Women, on behalf of UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict (UN Action) developed Scenario-Based Training Modules to address Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (SBT-CRSV) to be used in the pre-deployment training by Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) which was considered as module 5 of the 2012 POC Specialized Training Materials (STM). These materials were developed based on the Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice – Addressing Conflict-related Sexual Violence, which was released by UN Women and DPKO on behalf of UN Action in 2008.
  - The CPTM / Module 2 (Mandated Tasks of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations includes lessons on Women, Peace and Security and Conflict Related Sexual Violence

- Gender training includes developing sensitivity to gender issues among the contingent members
- Any unit of some importance, particularly infantry battalions and Formed Police Units, should deploy with a gender focal point located at command level.
Key message: the preparation of the unit must take into account the practical aspects of accommodating female personnel.

In terms of Force Generation, the T/PCC willing to deploy female personnel as part of its contingent should be mindful of the following:

- Separate accommodations for female personnel
- Separate ablution sets
- Female medical personnel in Level 1 Hospitals

This means:

- Assess carefully the number of female personnel in the unit, taking future rotations into account.
- Calculate for additional accommodation items (tents, hard-wall units)
- Calculate for additional ablution sets
- No additional reimbursement for additional units deployed (Self Sustainment principles).
Lecture Take Away

• The DPKO/DFS Gender Forward Looking Strategy embodies the Women on Peace and Security agenda approved by the Security Council.
• Gender advisers or focal points are present at all levels of the UNHQ and field missions.
• A gender focal point should be deployed with every peacekeeping unit.
• Gender training must be included in the pre-deployment training of every peacekeeping unit.
Gender Perspective on Military & Police Contributions

Questions

Lecture 5
Module G: CONTINGENT PREPARATION FOR DEPLOYMENT

Find guidance inserted in the note section of each slide.
### Module Content

- Peacekeeping training overview
- UN Policy on Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement (ORAPI).
- Conduct and Discipline
- Medical preparation of the personnel
- Soldier readiness

- This module focuses on the contingent preparation for deployment.
- It is a logical follow up to module F “Force Generation Framework”.
- The first lecture on ORAPI Policy concerns only the military units, since the FPUs have their own preparation and certification process which was described in the previous module.
- The two lectures on Medical preparation for the personnel and soldier readiness are applicable to Police personnel as well.
Lecture 1
Peacekeeping Training Overview

Learning Outcomes

• Describe the training components for all PK personnel
• Explain the relation between T/PCC and the UN regarding training
• Describe the PDT architecture
• Point how and where to request support
Content

• The need to train
• Sharing the responsibility of training
• Pre-deployment training structure
• Identifying Pre-Deployment Training Requirements
• Finding training support in DPO
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 1 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: one of the reasons for the necessity of pre-deployment training lies in the serious threats directly aimed at peacekeepers in several sensitive peacekeeping operations.

Some of the reasons why training for peacekeeping is important.
One particularly important reason is the last item, which is that peacekeepers are facing new direct threats against themselves, the Mission and the civilian populations.
The blue helmets and the very visible white vehicles are not protective anymore, and the troops need to prepare for this (relatively new) situation.
Key message: the lack of pre-deployment training is cause for many problems in the peacekeeping missions, which eventually tend to hamper mandate implementation.

If for any reason, we think training is not necessary or may consider that may happen without precise planning and proper allocation of resources, let’s for a moment see what would happen to PK operations if individuals and contingents deploy without proper and responsible PDT:

- Missions would be larger to take into account under performance
- Greater costs
- More casualties, disciplinary issues, repatriations
- Slower mandate implementation, longer mission duration
- Host nation withdrawal of consent
- Better prepared contingents and individuals would do the harder jobs, leading to overuse
- Greater disconnection between TCC/PCC and the UNSC
- The credibility of the UN and the international community would be damaged
- Mission mandate **poorly or not implemented**
When pre-deployment training is properly delivered

- Contingents and individuals: prepared to operate within UN procedures quickly and more efficiently.
- Threats: identified more quickly and risk mitigation is implemented properly.
- Reputational risk: lower.
- Mission mandate: implemented properly, resources are used effectively.
- Resources: used effectively.

Key message: proper pre-deployment training increases the chances for successful implementation of the mandate.

However by contrast, if MS exercise their responsibility in full and deliver PDT properly:

- Contingents and individuals are prepared to operate within UN procedures, to understand mission processes and are able to quickly adapt to the mission operating environment.
- Resources are used effectively.
- Contingents and individuals are more able to operate safely and to face less risk.
- Reputational risk is less.
- Mission mandate is implemented properly, allocated resources are used effectively.
Key message: peacekeeping today is a global partnership of 193 member states and 123 (Dec. 2018) troop and police contributing countries.
Key message: the sheer scale and variety of actors to support turns peacekeeping training into a challenge.

Peacekeeping training, is an issue of scale, for DPO and DOS, this universe constitute an immense effort that is being addressed by a small team of 30 professionals who support the following universe of actors:

- Troop and police contributing countries
- The Peacekeeping missions
- Military, Police and civilian components
- Regional partners
- Other training institutions
- DPO and DOS services
- Etc.

Among other this is one of the reasons why T/PCCs should exercise in full their capabilities to support national and regional pre-deployment training in a coherent manner.
Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 1 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
UNGA resolution 49/37 (1994)

- Member States recognized **their responsibility** to provide training for personnel for UN peacekeeping operations.

- The UN Secretariat is to **develop training materials** and establish a range of measures to **assist** Member States.

**Key message:** GA resolution 49/37 (1994) defines the respective roles of the Secretariat and of the member states as regards training.

In this sense, I would like to bring to your attention to the UNGA Resolution 49/37, where training responsibilities of both, the T/PCCs and the Secretariat are indicated.

- Member States recognized their responsibility to provide training for personnel for UN peacekeeping operations.

- The UN Secretariat is to develop training materials and establish a range of measures to assist Member States.
UNGA resolution 49/37 (1994)

For military and police contingents

Training is a National Responsibility

Key message: The training of peacekeeping contingents is a national responsibility.
Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 1 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: peacekeeping training comprises three phases: pre-deployment training, induction training and on-going training.

In order to accomplish with this mandate, the Secretariat in consultation with T/PCCs established some conceptual and practical models which must be considered when planning contributions to PKOs.

Firstly, Peacekeeping training has three phases, which establish the responsible entity and its geographical location:

- Pre-deployment training in-country before the deployment of the unit (P/TCC responsibility);
- Induction training in-mission following the deployment (UN responsibility through the Mission);
- On-going training during the delivery of the mandate (UN responsibility through the Mission).
Key message: the pre-deployment training comprises of 4 steps: individual and collective technical training, UN training, Mission specific training, integration.

Since pre-deployment training is essentially a national responsibility, I would like to indicate that this particular phase has four important steps to be also considered when preparing new deployments or rotations.

These four steps are:

- Technical Training, individual and collective, (“green helmet training”);
- UN Training (Blue helmet training);
- Mission Specific Training
- Training to achieve integration

**Under the Step 1, Technical Training:**
All deploying personnel participate in basic technical and tactical skills training
All personnel attend to National pre-deployment requirements

**Under the Step 2, UN Training**
CPTM and corresponding STMs are delivered, containing UN mandatory pre-deployment training requirements

**Step 3, Mission Specific Training**
Commanders, staff officers and key personnel participate in mission specific training, which include CPX, SBE and TTX

**Step 4, Training to achieve integration**
Military and police contingents participate in a FTX based on mission specific modules
During this step Commanders and national authorities **evaluate the operational readiness** of the national contributions

*Let me mention with an example why this step is so important: Several times when I conducted assessments, I asked troop commanders at different levels, where did you meet your troops? And he or she mentioned, at the airport...*
Development of Topic 4 of Lecture 1 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the national peacekeeping training and the national training system must complement each other.
Key message: the pre-deployment training requirements are drawn from 3 sources: national self-evaluation, mission requirements, UN requirements.

The three areas from where planners take the elements to prepare the training plans and programmes are:

- From the mission itself, where the operational and tactical requirements are identified.
- From the UN PK Core pre-deployment training curricula (CPTM and STMs)
- From the result of national self evaluations, where military and police professional technical and tactical knowledge and skills of the just generated new deployments or rotations are measured against the committed capabilities expressed for each of these contributions.

Once these three elements are carefully considered, national planners are ready to prepare pre-deployment training plans and programmes and determine the main efforts including costs and timings.
Key message: the operational training requirements are drawn from various Mission specific documents.

From the mission analysis, operational and tactical requirements are determined.

Special consideration must be given to the:

Mission mandated tasks, where military and police units are mandated to carry out activities in two possible ways:

• In a leading role, like establishing a safe and secure environment or in the protection of civilians against physical violence,
• or in a enabling role, like supporting humanitarian actions and/or the political process, DDR, SSR, RoL, etc.

Additionally, national authorities should focus in the

Mission CONOPS, operational environment, ROE, material to be operated, the MOU and the current situation at the moment of deployment.

This will allow the unit commander to prepare his operational plans: Force protection Plan, Protection of Civilians Plan, Safe Environment Plan.
B - Technical Professional Requirements

1. National Inspector General or equivalent
2. Training and Evaluation entity
3. Capabilities self-evaluation

Initial Capabilities
Training Programme
Self-Evaluation and AAV
Self-Evaluation and PDV
Committed Capabilities

Key message: the technical professional training requirements must be drawn from an initial self-evaluation, and possibly from the recommendations of an Assessment and Advisory Visit.

The third element is to determine where individuals and more importantly military and police contingent stand at the moment of their designation and against the committed capabilities.

By national mechanism of evaluation and assessments, national authorities should determine the level of each contribution at the moment of designation or appointment and prepare the training plans and programmes according to the level of deficiencies identified to accomplish the mandated tasks.

The training program should be built accordingly and bring the unit to the desired level of performance, in time for the final self-evaluation and pre-deployment visit.

This obviously vary from rotation to rotation and constitutes the most complex portion of the pre-deployment training, which will be delivered in its step one of the technical training.
Key message: the UN produces training material adapted to every phase and step of the peacekeeping training.

To each phase and step of the peacekeeping training corresponds a different type of training package proposed by the UN:

- The Core Pre-deployment Training Material (CPTM) for UN training (mandatory);
- The Specialized Training Material for specific populations (UNMOs, UNPOL, Civilians, etc.);
- Reinforcement Training packages dealing with specific domains (SEA, Conduct & Discipline, etc.).
Key message: the UN training packages form a coherent system fitting the four steps of the pre-deployment training.

This summarizes the three training phases, the four steps of the pre-deployment training, as well as the available material.
Key message: the pre-deployment training plan is the result of the analysis of the training requirements.

Analysing the pre-deployment training requirements should lead to the building of a step-by-step training plan that include the training subjects and matters at every step, as well as the first approach of a time allocation.
Key message: the application of the training plan results in a training progression leading to the requested date of deployment of the unit.

This view shows the training progression of a unit once the pre-deployment training plan is put on a calendar taking into account the date of deployment. Such a plan and calendar should be shown to the UN team at the time of the PDV and remittance of the training certification document.
Development of Topic 5 of Lecture 1 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the Department of Policy and Training is located with DPO.

This is just a reminder, please refer to Module B “Secretariat Overview”.
Key message: within DPET / Integrated Training Service, the Member States Training Support Section is responsible for providing training support to member states.
DPO Training Service Aim

To strengthen and sustain performance by **better and more consistent training** for uniformed and civilian leaders, contingents and individuals.

Key message: the DPO Training Service supports all components of peacekeeping, uniformed and civilians, contingents and individuals.
Key message: The support provided by the Integrated Training Service encompasses the development and delivery of training material and courses, as well as provision of advice and support.

The DPO and DOS training support to T/PCCs is materialized into these three services:

- Development of standardized training packages and curricula, Training Recognition
- Delivery of customized training courses in support to Peacekeeping priority areas (Mobile Training Teams - MTTs) and Senior Mission Leaders Courses
- Advise and support on and to all PDT aspects involving uniformed peacekeeping personnel
Key message: the Integrated Training Service can help a member state develop a peacekeeping training capacity and also train his trainers.

The Training of Trainers is particularly aimed at supporting member states. Once they have developed a new program, member states can request the corresponding Training Recognition.

Mobile Training Teams led by ITS can travel to Member States and help them create the training capacity they need (IMPORTANT NOTE: the mobile training teams do not directly train the contingents). Advice can be provided to all actors involved, be it in New York, in the capitals or in the field.
Peacekeeping Training

Questions
Lecture Take Away

- Training is essential to perform in UN PKO
- Pre-deployment training is a national responsibility
- The planning of pre-deployment training must be based on self-evaluations.
- The UN Secretariat, through ITS/DPO, is responsible for providing training support to T/PCCs.
Learning Outcomes

• Describe the content and goals of the policy
• Examine the steps in the operational preparation of the contingent as described in ORAPI
• Point at guidelines and manuals supporting the implementation of ORAPI
• Make the link with the military unit’s certification process explained in Module F.
Lecture Content

- Presentation of the ORAPI
- Shaping the unit
- Preparation of the unit
- Delivery of mandate tasks
- Evaluation in the field
- Learning from the deployment
- ORAPI supporting material
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 2 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the goal of the ORAPI policy is to improve the performance of deployed military units.

- This policy provides major stakeholders, including UN Headquarters (UNHQ), Force Headquarters and Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), a description of the tangible actions required to shape, prepare, deliver and gain lessons learned when deploying military units in peacekeeping operations.
Key message: the ORAPI performance improvement cycle includes 4 phases: Shaping, Preparation, Delivery, Lessons Learned.

- The Performance Improvement Cycle is divided into four distinct phases: **Shaping, Preparation, Delivery and Learning**. Each phase contains clear procedures and measurable performance improvement criteria.
Key message: in the ORAPI policy, the Preparation phase includes a certification process and the Delivery phase includes an evaluation process.

- **Shaping** is about the long term preparation of personnel, units and equipment
- **Preparation** is the short term preparation before deployment (3 to 6 months)
- **Delivery** of mandated tasks takes place during the deployment
- **Learning** aims to make use of the lessons learned in the field to improve the performances of future contingents.

**CLICK**
- In addition the Preparation phase includes a **Certification** process. The certification process was described in details in Module F – Certification of Military units. It concerns only military units, not the FPUs which follow a specific control and validation process.

**CLICK**
- The Delivery phase includes an **Evaluation** process.
Key message: each phase of the ORAPI policy concerns the 3 domains of Personnel and Units, Equipment, Doctrine and Policy.

- Each phase (Shaping, Preparation, Delivery, Learning) concerns these three domains.
- Each phase contains clear procedures and measurable performance improvement criteria.
- As each of the 4 phases has exactly the same structure in the Policy document, we will briefly describe each phase and only the Preparation phase will be described in details.
Shaping

-development of Topic 2 of Lecture 2 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Shaping

- **Shaping is conducted by Members States** and involves in-depth training and preparation in all military unit aspects including
  - personnel, unit,
  - equipment,
  - doctrine and policy.

- **This phase includes**
  - basic military skills foundation training,
  - capability of operating in an asymmetric environment,
  - Added peacekeeping competencies.

**Key message:** Shaping is a phase conducted by the member states which involves in-depth training and preparation.

This phase of the Performance Improvement Cycle typically begins well before any military unit is designated for UN peacekeeping operations

**s regards the “Personnel” domain:**

- "Shaping" personnel (key military leaders, officers and troops) are a key dimension of the Performance Improvement Cycle. It implies preparing the mindset, knowledge, physical capability and skills of officers and military personnel intended for deployment in UN Peacekeeping Missions.
- As these "shaping" dimensions cannot be addressed at the last moment before deployment, ongoing processes, including vetting and screening of personnel primarily undertaken by Member States, can build on UNHQ standards and lessons learned from field missions.
- Shaping the unit includes thinking about the positions and roles of female personnel within the unit, which should not be limited to clerical positions.
- **Train, Populate and Sustain.** It is important that Member States train, populate and sustain units proficient in basic soldier skills, at both individual and collective levels. From this pool of military forces, units can be identified and prepared for future UN training and education
- **Educate and Train on UN Issues.** Members States are expected to prepare their personnel, especially military leaders, to have the proper peacekeeping mindset and understanding before becoming involved in UN peacekeeping operations. To this end, Member State personnel must be educated in the applicable UN rules and regulations, including relevant international legal considerations, for UN operations.
- The pre-deployment training of the contingent must contain gender awareness sessions dealing with:
• Role of female peacekeepers in the unit
• Importance of female peacekeepers in peace operations
• Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
• UNHQ will support the Member States by providing reference documents and guidance for individual and unit training and education on relevant peacekeeping topics. Additional support can be provided on a bi-lateral basis between consenting Member States.
• The Core Pre-deployment Training Material that is described later on in this module can be used with benefit right from this phase.
• Career Management. The increasingly complex and specialized nature of UN peacekeeping requires that military personnel are equipped with the necessary military and peacekeeping skills, knowledge and experience to match their rank, position and responsibilities.
• Individuals destined for senior positions and/or multiple assignments with UN peacekeeping need to be career-managed to ensure they are capable of fulfilling the demands placed upon them.
• Member States are encouraged to conduct career-management of their personnel earmarked for UN positions, supported by the UN as appropriate.
Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 2 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Preparation

- **Preparation is conducted by Members States** with the support of UNHQ and Force Headquarters usually **3 to 6 months** before deployment.
- **To assist the TCC in this phase, UNHQ sets up:**
  - AAVs
  - Recce Visits
  - PDVs
- The **Operational Readiness Preparation Guidelines and the Military Units Manuals** are meant to be used in this phase.

**Key message:** conducted by the member states, the Preparation phase should start 3 to 6 months before the deployment.

This phase of the ORAPI policy is the only one we will describe in detail in the present course. Please keep in mind that the other 3 phases have exactly the same structure.

- The Preparation phase of the Performance Improvement Cycle usually takes place 3-6 months before deployment to a specific UN mission. TCCs, UNHQ and the Force Headquarters play important roles during this part of the process.
- Based on the foundation skills established during the Shaping Phase, peacekeeping competencies can be added, shifting the emphasis to UN standards and practices while maintaining and improving basic military skills.
- The preparation phase ensures that personnel, organizations/units and equipment are operationally ready to deploy.

- To assist TCCs in this phase of their certification process, DPO/DOS arranges and conducts Assessment and Advisory Visits (AAV), Reconnaissance Visits (RV) and Pre-deployment Visits (PDV) in consultation and coordination with the TCCs.

- The **Operational Readiness Preparation Guidelines and the Military Units Manuals** are especially useful in this phase, both for the individual training and for the collective training.
- These documents should be used in conjunction with the Core Pre-deployment Training Material provided by DPO/DPET/ITS.
- We will see them more in detail at the end of the present lecture.
Key message: the evaluation and certification of the personnel is conducted by the member states and concerns all successive rotations of the contingent.

**Preparation: Personnel**

It is essential that TCCs ensure that personnel and units are trained and competent for their intended UN role. If not conducted during the Shaping Phase, personnel screening procedures and certification of units must take place during the Preparation Phase. TCCs must also ensure that pre-deployment training for personnel and units on their way to UN missions is actually conducted and recorded in accordance with national and UN requirements. If TCC personnel and/or units are to be listed in the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS), it is important that skills achieved are also recorded in the UN data base.

**Three specific points are worth noting:**

- **Develop and Train Basic and Specialized UN Skills:** For all personnel and organizations/units preparing for UN deployment; it is a TCC responsibility to develop and conduct national training programs related to basic military and UN-required skills, included gender awareness sessions.

- **Pre-Deployment Training:** Based on the individual unit’s training level, and supported by the Force Headquarters with the required mission-specific guidance (as coordinated with UNHQ), it is a TCC responsibility to plan and conduct pre-deployment training for individuals as well as units and organizations to ensure they are capable of executing mandated tasks in the mission area. Pre-deployment training is focused on mission-specific requirements and is based on programs developed by the Mission/Force Headquarters supported by the in-mission training centers (IMTCS), to include:
• The overall political and security situation in the mission area;
• Current and future role of the military component in the mission.
• Additionally, UNHQ core Pre-Deployment Training Materials, and special training materials are provided as needed and requested by the TCCs

• Evaluation: TCCs are requested to formally evaluate their military contributions, including through successive rotations, and are encouraged to certify that personnel and units are operationally ready "in all respects" to deploy and implement mandated tasks.

• The evaluation can in some cases be supported by an Assessment and Advisory Team Visit from UNHQ consisting of representatives from DPO/OMA, DOS, ITS and representation from Force Headquarters.
Key message: during the Preparation phase, DPO and DOS are always ready to advise the member states on the nature, characteristics and capabilities of the equipment to be deployed.

**Preparation: Equipment.**

- TCCs and UNHQ are responsible for ensuring that the required standard and mission-specific equipment, as specified in the Statement of Unit Requirements (SUR), the COE Manual, and where appropriate the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) are available and fielded to contingent personnel and organizations/units in a timely manner. This Topic does not address specific equipment standards as they are already specified in the COE Manual and Statement of Unit Requirements.
- During the preparation phase, all personnel and organizations/units should be equipped with national standard equipment and mission-specific equipment in accordance with the Statement of Unit Requirement, Force Requirement, Letter of Assist and MOU, as applicable.
- For all equipment, TCCs are expected to have in place effective sustainment and maintenance procedures.
- All equipment should also be prepared for deployment. This preparation includes for instance painting in UN colors.
- The TCC, supported by UNHQ, will prepare and deploy equipment in accordance with applicable TCC-UN agreements and the Status of Forces Agreement with the host state.

- While the policy mentions uniquely the responsibility of the MS regarding equipment, DPO and DOS will always be ready to advise the MS on which equipment can or must be procured, be it standard or specialized PK equipment:
• Nature
• Capabilities
• Characteristics,
• etc.
• Likewise with sustainment Plans.
Key message: upon request, the UNHQ and the FHQ can provide to the member states mission-specific and function-specific policy and guidance documents.

**Preparation: Doctrine and Policy**

Standards and doctrine must be current and relevant to the specific peacekeeping mission. Building on lessons learned, standards and doctrine must be regularly reviewed and updated by UNHQ in consultation with the Force Headquarters. To assist their preparation, TCCs can request mission-specific and function-specific documents.
Key message: the ORAPI policy provides a list of the mission-specific documents to be used by the TCC during the Preparation.

Mission-specific documents provided by the UNHQ,
- Mission plans;
- CONOPS;
- ROE; (to be used in conjunction with the Use of Force by Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Guidelines.
- Force Requirements and Statement of Unit Requirement.
- Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials and Special Training Materials (STM) from DPKO’s Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training (DPET)/Integrated Training Service (ITS).

Mission-specific documents provided by the Force Commander via UNHQ,
- OPORD;
- Force Commander's guidance, directives and intent on Protection of Civilians, Gender, Human Rights, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, etc.;
- Force Commander's mission-specific training directive;
- Mission-specific, scenario-based exercises and mission essential tasks;
- Mission/Force SOPs;
- Mission-specific training guidance.
Key message: the ORAPI policy provides a list of the function-specific documents to be used by the TCC during the Preparation.

At the functional level, UNHQ and mission handbooks, manuals and practical knowledge, e.g.:

- FHQ handbook;
- UN Infantry Battalion Manual and other relevant UN Military Unit Manual (will be discussed in more details further on);
- Use of Force by Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Guidelines, Feb. 2017) – as seen in Module C (Rules Of Engagement lecture);
- Mission-specific standards and skills.
- Mission functional level SOPs/guidance on Protection of Civilians, Gender, Human Rights, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, etc.
Key message: the certification of a military unit concerns the operational preparation and the conduct and discipline domains.

- The Preparation phase includes the unit’s certification, in two main domains, as was studied in Module F “Force Generation Framework”.

Key message: the Delivery phase of the ORAPI policy concerns the delivery of the mandated tasks in the mission area.

This phase of the Performance Improvement Cycle relates to the delivery of mandated tasks in mission areas. In this phase, Force Commanders have the main responsibility in terms of operational readiness.
Key message: the delivery phase includes an evaluation domain of which both the Force Commander and the Contingent Commanders are responsible.

The four Delivery domains

• In addition to the three domains already present in the Shaping and Preparation phase, Delivery includes a fourth domain: Evaluation

As regards Personnel:

• U7 = Training Personnel and Organizations/Units.

When arriving in the mission area, it is important that personnel and units receive mission-specific, in-mission training based on programs developed by the Mission/Force Headquarters supported by the in-mission training centers (IMTCS). This training should include three categories:

• **Induction Training:** Individual training on specialist roles and generic tasks are mandatory and should be conducted by the Force Headquarters immediately upon arrival in the mission area. Training programs should be agreed upon by the incoming entity and the training entity before deployment. Induction training should be for all levels including Force, Sector and subordinate units. Training and evaluation on matters such as conduct and discipline, Human Rights, gender awareness, POC must also be covered. If needed, induction training can be conducted outside the mission area.
• **Refresher Training:** From completion of training during the preparation phase to some time after deployment in the mission area, skills may fade or need adjusting. The Force Commander may decide to develop a refresher training program to reinforce previous individual and collective training as needed.

• **"On-the-Job" Training:** "On-the-job" and integrated training should be a normal, ongoing activity taking place at all levels, especially during rotation between units or when the Mission’s situation and mandate are evolving.

**Regarding Equipment:**

- The party responsible for maintaining major equipment, and minor equipment used for self-sustainment, will be mentioned in the SUR and confirmed in the MOU. Usually, TCC have this responsibility, NOT the FHQ or UNHQ.
- Added mention of the MOU, since it supersedes the SUR (SUR + amendments = MOU)

**Equipment:** In general, TCCs are responsible for the performance of their equipment in accordance with the Force Requirements/Statement of Unit Requirements and TCC-UN agreements. Equipment must be operational and maintained in accordance with UN regulations stipulated in the COE manual.

**Regarding Evaluation:**

- The FHQ establishes an in-mission Operational Readiness Assurance program including an evaluation process. Included in the Operational Readiness Assurance evaluation program is the vetting of incoming units.
- Force Commanders should carry out periodic operational readiness evaluations of all subordinate entities to ascertain gaps in operational needs and performance.

**Self-evaluation**

- Contingent Commanders are also expected to conduct their own operational readiness evaluations of their personnel and unit(s), reporting the details back to national authorities and informing FHQ, as appropriate.

**COE Verification process** (refer to Module D “Reimbursement Framework”)

- The COE verification process starts with inspection in the field and feeds into the MOU reimbursement process. The verification process is largely a joint effort in the field between Mission Support, the Force and the Contingent Commanders. At the Force Headquarters level, evaluations are linked to the SOP for “Force Commander’s Evaluation of Subordinate Military Entities in Peacekeeping Operations.” Other UNHQ-level inspections include, but are not limited to:
  - COE Arrival Inspections
  - COE Periodic Inspections
  - COE Operational Readiness Inspections.
Development of Topic 5 of Lecture 2 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Learning

- The goal of learning is to enable **improvement**
- The learning process concerns all domains

Key message: the learning process should inform all domains related to personnel, organization, training, equipment and doctrine of the military units.

**Learning process**

- The learning process focuses on how lessons identified are used by the different stakeholders to enable **improvement** during the shaping, preparation and delivery phases.
- The learning process should inform all domains related to personnel, units, organization, training, equipment, doctrine and policy.
Key message: the lessons learned must be incorporated in the military training process and in the pre-deployment training.

Learning domains recommendations

- It is essential that TCCs incorporate into their peacekeeping centers and national military training processes the key findings captured during the complete Performance Improvement Cycle.
- TCCs must ensure that UN pre-deployment and refresher training of individuals and units remain up-to-date and aligned with the lessons identified.
- Based on a one-year deployment, the Contingent commander or unit commander should not wait the end of his deployment to draft his after action / lessons learned report: 6 months into the deployment he has acquired enough experience to send a first version of his lessons learned, so that his designated successor has time to incorporate these lessons learned into the preparation of the relief unit. Waiting until the end of the deployment would mean that the lessons learned would be lost for the next rotation.
Key message: the ORAPI policy is supported by a set of guidelines, Manuals, SOP and training material that facilitate its implementation.

ORAPI is part of a coherent system where:

- ORAPI policy provides the framework
- The Operational Readiness Preparation guidelines define what are the minimum military skills and level of performance required to become an effective peacekeeper. They also specify a minimum pre-deployment training program to be delivered by TCCs to all units before deployment.
- The Military Units Manuals provide a reference for the pre-deployment training of various types of units. In particular they detail the tasks specific to each kind of unit and propose guidelines to the unit commander for the self evaluation of the unit.
- The Use of Force by Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Guidelines
- The Core Pre-Deployment Training Material, produced by DPET/ITS and accessible online, provides the necessary material for peacekeeper training in terms of conduct and discipline (not only, but useful in the framework of ORAPI).
- The Specialized Training Material, produced by DPET/ITS and accessible online, provides the necessary material for peacekeepers training in se series of specific domains: child protection, protection of civilians, prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel, conflict related sexual violence, etc.
- Finally, the last document is destined to the evaluation of subordinate units in the field. While it was conceived to be used by Force and Sector Commanders, it can also be useful to contingent commanders for the self evaluation of their units.
Key message: the various documents available to the TCC will facilitate the acquisition or improvement of individual and collective skills, as well as the self evaluation of the unit preceding its mandatory certification.

**Preparation : Personnel**

This is also the phase where the supporting documents and material can be used as shown here:

**CLICK**

- **Operational Readiness Preparation guidelines** for the individual and collective skills
- **Military Units manuals** for the collective specialized skills
- **Core Pre-deployment Training Material** and **Specialized Training Material** for the pre-deployment training of the personnel
- **Military units manuals** for the self evaluation of the unit.
Key message: the Operational Readiness Preparation Guidelines present the minimum individual and collective skills and level of performance required for an effective peacekeeper.

Operational Readiness Preparation Guidelines
- The preparation of soldiers and the training of units are TCC responsibilities and are conducted in accordance with national standards, requirements and regulations.
- In terms of operational preparation, the units should be prepared to fulfil their tasks under the provisions of the Mission-specific Concept of Operations, Rules of Engagement and Operations Order.
- The ORP guidelines define what are the minimum military skills and level of performance required to become an effective peacekeeper. They also specify a minimum pre-deployment training program to be delivered by TCCs to all units before deployment.

There are three annexes to the guidelines:
- **A: Minimum individual requirements before being a peacekeeper**
- **B: Pre-deployment Training for units**
- **Annex C**: The pre-deployment training curriculum builds on the already existing UN Core Pre--deployment Training Materials (CPTM) — Presented in the next slide.
Key message: the Core Pre-deployment Training Material is a complete course intended to provide all peacekeeping personnel with a shared understanding of the basic principles, guidelines and policies of UN peacekeeping to ensure that UN peacekeeping operations can function effectively in a coherent manner.

Core Pre-deployment Training Material

It is intended to provide all peacekeeping personnel (military, police and civilian) with a shared understanding of the basic principles, guidelines and policies of UN peacekeeping to ensure that UN peacekeeping operations can function effectively in a coherent manner.

There are three modules in the course, with the following content:

- **Overview of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations**
- **Mandated Tasks of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations**
- **Individual Peacekeeping Personnel**

The course is entirely accessible online:
Key message: the goal of the UN military units manuals is to formalize the capability standards of each kind of unit.

United Nations Military Manuals

There are 11 different Military Unit Manuals, plus the UNIBAM (Infantry) in 2 volumes

Goal of the manuals: to enhance the preparation, operational readiness and performance of UN Military units and to formalize capability standards.

Provide the unit Commander with the necessary guidance for planning, preparing and executing his assigned tasks.

TCCs that are new to UN peacekeeping or UN Military Engineer Units can use this Manual as a guide to build and field their own UN Military Unit

The Manuals do not address any military tactics, techniques and procedures that remain the prerogative of individual Member States

It is not the intent of the Manuals to override the national military doctrine of individual Member States or Troop Contributing Countries, nor is it their intent to impose requirements on national training, operations or structures.
All manuals accessible online on UN Force Link (same address as for the PCRS) : https://cc.unlb.org / PCRS Reference.
Key message: besides describing the employment concept, required capabilities and organization of each type of unit, the UN military manual provides the unit commander with tools helping for the training of the unit and its evaluation.

Contents of the United Nations Military Manuals

For each manual, except the UNIBAM which comes in two volumes, the content is as shown.

- **Employment Concept for the Unit**: this is in general for the type of unit. For a real deployment, there will be more mission-specific details in both the CONOPS and the SUR.
- **Capabilities and Tasks of the Unit**: this is in general for the type of unit. For a real deployment, there will be more mission-specific details in both the CONOPS and the SUR. But this will help in the collective preparation of the unit.
- **Organization of the Unit**: this again is a standard organization, that can change in the case of a real deployment. To be used in conjunction with the sample SURs provided in annex A.
- **Support for the Unit**: this tackles all kinds of support in the field: logistic, medical, self sustainment, letter of assist, wet lease, national support element, pre-deployment visit etc...
- **Training for the Unit**: this part as well as the Evaluation part which follows is directly in relation with ORAPI.
- **Evaluation of the Unit**: provides help and information for the self evaluation of the unit. To be used in conjunction with Annex D below which provides a sample evaluation check list.

Plus annexes:
• Sample Statements of Unit Requirement
• Tasking Coordination Mechanism
• Equipment Requirements
• Sample Evaluation Checklists
• References
Key message: the SOP dealing with the Evaluation of Subordinate Military Entities in Peacekeeping Operations can be a useful tool for the unit commander to prepare for the evaluation of his unit.

**Force and Sector Commander’s Evaluation of Subordinate Military Entities in Peacekeeping Operations**

- This standard operating procedure (SOP) describes a process by which Force and Sector Commanders should monitor, evaluate and improve subordinate unit performance in UN peacekeeping operations.

- While designed for Force Commanders and Sector Commanders, Annex X which deals with the evaluation of subordinate units can be useful for unit / contingent commanders to verify that they have not overlooked part of their preparation.

- Annex A describes the evaluation process
- Annex B is a Sector Headquarters Evaluation Checklist – not relevant in our case.
- Annex C is a **Subordinate Unit Evaluation Checklist**, which concerns us here. Note that the FC or Sector Cder has all latitude to amend/modify the check list to better adapt to the Mission or to the type of unit evaluated.

**The consolidated evaluation report** sent to the Office of Military Affairs should comprise a summary of the strengths and weaknesses of the different units evaluated, focusing on:

- The performance of the evaluated entity and progress made from any previous evaluations.
- Ability to perform the specific capabilities and tasks required in the evaluated entity’s
• Recommendations for the evaluated unit’s improvement, or the improvement of replacement units, including a statement of additional resources required from Sector, Force, Mission Headquarters, TCCs or UN Headquarters. Recommendations for improvement may include actions to address personnel skills and capabilities, training, manpower strength, equipment capabilities, readiness and logistical requirements.
Lecture Take Away (I)

- **Performance improvement** is a continuous cycle which comprises four phases:
  - Shaping (long term)
  - Preparation (3-6 months before deployment)
  - Delivery of mandated tasks (in-mission)
  - Learning (lessons learned process)

- The **ORAPI Policy** provides a framework for the structured preparation to deployment of initial contingents and further rotations, in a continuous cycle involving the T/PCC, the UNHQ and the Mission in the field.
Lecture Take Away (II)

The implementation of the **ORAPI Policy** is facilitated by a set of UN documents and courses:

- Operational Readiness Preparation guidelines
- Military Units Manuals
- Core Pre-deployment Training Material
- Force Commander’s SOP on the evaluation of subordinate military entities in peacekeeping operations.
ORAPI

Questions

Lecture 2

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Learning Outcomes

• Learn about the measures implemented by the UN to combat sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), particularly in peacekeeping operations.
Lecture Content

• Background. Basic SEA texts.
• Factors conducive to SEA offenses.
• Measures taken by the UN to fight SEA.
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 3 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the cases of sexual exploitation and abuse by civilian and uniformed peacekeepers in the field that were exposed in the media in the recent years have spurred the UN authorities to take drastic measures.

Conduct and discipline issues are not limited to contingent members, as they affect as well uniformed individuals and civilian personnel of all status.
Likewise, conduct and discipline issues cover a wide range of misconduct and XXXX acts. However, in this lecture we will tackle mainly the subject of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) which unfortunately has come to the front in the recent years.

One of the important and sensitive issues presently in the conduct and discipline domain relate to cases of sexual exploitation and abuse, dues to several recent or relatively recent cases that were largely publicized.
While damaging for the reputation of the United Nations, these cases are also especially disturbing when considering that the peacekeepers who should first and foremost protect the weakest among the civilian population already affected by conflicts are sometimes the ones taking advantage of that very weakness to seek and obtain sexual retribution.

Despite that texts and regulations have been in existence for more than 20 years, these facts have been ongoing for years in various missions which has pushed the Secretary General, the Security Council and finally DPO and DOS to up the ante and take constraining measures.
Key message: the UN expects that all peacekeeping personnel adhere to the highest standards of behavior and conduct themselves in a professional and disciplined manner at all times.

The UN expects that all peacekeeping personnel adhere to the highest standards of behavior and conduct themselves in a professional and disciplined manner at all times.

Main principles:

- Treat host country inhabitants with respect
Key message: the UN addresses misconduct through a three-pronged action including prevention, enforcing standards of conduct and remedial action.

The UN Standards of Conduct apply to all categories of personnel deployed in UN missions

There is a three-pronged strategy to address misconduct:
- prevention,
- enforcement of the UN Standards of Conduct, and
- remedial action

The UN is fully committed to working together with Member States to ensure that all United Nations personnel, whether civilian, police, or military are accountable for their conduct while in the service of a UN field mission.
Key message: in 2017 62 allegations of misconduct were reported against UN personnel, both civilian and uniformed.

Peacekeeping and special political missions

62 allegations were reported against personnel deployed in 10 peacekeeping missions and one political mission in 2017. Each allegation may involve one or more victims and one or more alleged perpetrators. Of those, 41 allegations involved 101 military personnel, 10 involved 23 police personnel and 11 involved 11 civilian personnel, with a total of 130 victims (21 girls and 109 women). Of the 62 allegations, 20 of them are related to sexual abuse and 42 to sexual exploitation, with 23 allegations of the total associated with paternity claims and another claim awaiting confirmation of the birth of a child.
Key message: the Conduct and Discipline Unit in DFS provides overall direction for conduct and discipline issues in peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

Conduct and Discipline Service:
- Formally established in DFS in 2007 as Conduct & Discipline Unit, based at the UN Headquarters in New York.
- Since 01 January 2019: the Conduct & Discipline Service is part of the Administrative Law Division / Office of Human Resources / DMSPC
- Provides overall direction for conduct and discipline issues in peacekeeping operations and special political missions
- Formulates policies, develops training and awareness raising activities and ensures oversight of the handling of allegations of misconduct.
- Liaises with Member States on allegations of misconduct involving their uniformed personnel.
- Advises the Under-Secretary-General (USG) and leadership on all aspects of the implementation of the three-pronged strategy of prevention, enforcement and remedial action to address misconduct.
- The Conduct and Discipline Service provides global oversight of the application of the United Nations standards of conduct for all categories of United Nations personnel. It interacts directly with officials throughout the Secretariat with delegated authority to address conduct issues, as well as with Member States in the exercise of their authority to address conduct issues.

Conduct and Discipline Teams (CDTs):
- Based in peacekeeping missions and special political missions around the world.
• Advise heads of mission on conduct and discipline issues involving all categories of personnel and address all forms of misconduct by UN personnel in field missions, including acts of sexual exploitation and abuse.
• Provide training for peacekeeping personnel on UN rules and conduct
• Receive and assess misconduct allegations and, upon determination by the Head of Mission, refer them to appropriate investigative authorities.
• Record, track and follow-up on all cases of misconduct in their mission. They coordinate assistance for victims of sexual exploitation and abuse, together with other UN partners.
Knowing the actors

- The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)
- The Office of Legal Affairs (OLA)
- The Office of Human Resources (OHR / DMSPC*)
- Member States

* DMSPC: Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance

Key message: the Office of Internal Oversight Services investigates reports of violations of UN regulations, rules and administrative issuances, including in field missions.

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) investigates reports of violations of UN regulations, rules and administrative issuances, including in field missions.
The Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) may become engaged when allegations of misconduct also raise issues of criminal accountability or privileges and immunities.
The Office of Human Resources (OHR, in DMSPC) intervenes when an allegation of misconduct against an international or national staff member is substantiated by investigation and disciplinary action has been recommended.
Member States: UN and the Member States work together to ensure that all credible allegations involving military or police personnel are investigated and that appropriate action is taken.

T/PCCs are responsible for ensuring that all uniformed personnel receive pre-deployment training, based on core training materials provided by the UN.
Member States must certify that their uniformed personnel have not previously been involved in any violation of international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or previously repatriated on disciplinary grounds or otherwise barred from participation in UN missions due to an act of serious misconduct.
### Category of personnel and misconducts

- **Staff members**: failure by a staff member to comply with his or her obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Staff Regulations and Staff Rules.
- **Uniformed personnel**: any act or omission that is a violation of UN Standards of Conduct.
- **Sexual exploitation and abuse**: constitutes serious misconduct.

### Key message: sexual exploitation and abuse constitutes serious misconduct.

For UN staff members, misconduct may arise through the failure by a staff member to comply with his or her obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Staff Regulations and Staff Rules or other relevant administrative issuances or to observe the standards of conduct expected of an international civil servant.

For UN uniformed personnel, misconduct means any act or omission that is a violation of UN Standards of Conduct, mission-specific rules and regulations or the obligations towards national and local laws and regulations in accordance with the status of forces agreement or status of mission agreement where the impact is outside the national contingent of military forces or UN mission. Misconduct is considered serious, when it includes criminal acts that result in or are likely to result in, serious loss, damage or injury to an individual or to a mission.

Sexual exploitation and abuse constitutes serious misconduct.

For personnel other than those mentioned above, misconduct is defined as per the instruments that regulate their conduct.
Key message: Sexual exploitation and sexual abuse are equally banned in the United Nations Organization.

"Physical intrusion" is understood to mean "sexual activity". “Sexual abuse” is a broad term, which includes a number of acts, including “rape”, “sexual assault”, “sex with a minor”, and “sexual activity with a minor”.

“Sexual exploitation” is a broad term, which includes a number of acts, including “transactional sex”, “solicitation of transactional sex ” and “exploitative relationship”
Key message: Category 1 cases of misconduct concern the most serious cases, including murder and sexual exploitation.
**Category 2 Cases of Misconduct**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examples of cases</th>
<th>CATEGORY 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>discrimination</td>
<td>harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sexual harassment</td>
<td>abuse of authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abusive behavior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>basic misuse of equipment or staff</td>
<td>simple theft/fraud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>infractions of regulations, rules or administrative issuances</td>
<td>traffic-related violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conduct that could bring the UN to disrepute</td>
<td>breaking curfew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contract disputes</td>
<td>basic mismanagement</td>
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**Key message:** Category 2 cases of misconduct concern less serious offenses.
1.1 It is the duty of staff members to report any breach of the Organization’s regulations and rules to the officials whose responsibility it is to take appropriate action. An individual who makes such a report in good faith has the right to be protected against retaliation.

1.2 It is also the duty of staff members to cooperate with duly authorized audits and investigations. An individual who cooperates in good faith with an audit or investigation has the right to be protected against retaliation.

1.3 Retaliation against individuals who have reported misconduct or who have cooperated with audits or investigations violates the fundamental obligation of all staff members to uphold the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity and to discharge their functions and regulate their conduct with the best interests of the Organization in view.

Key message: the UN has adopted a complete policy for protection of whistle-blowers.
Key message: the UN standards of conduct include a zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse.

The UN standards of conduct date back to 1998 and form the basis of all ulterior texts on the subjects. They are based on 3 key principles:

• Highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity
• Zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse
• Accountability of those in command and/or leadership who fail to enforce the standards of conduct
Key message: since the early 2000’s the UNSG has stated that sexual exploitation and abuse could not be tolerated and was a reason for disciplinary measures.

Original texts from last decade and before

- **Sexual exploitation.** Sexual exploitation is any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.

- **Sexual abuse.** Sexual abuse is the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.

- A specific annex ("we are UN personnel") was added as an annex to the standard MOU in year 2008 to reaffirm the UN standards of conduct, including the necessity to ban sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping operations.
Key message: recent Secretary General reports (2016, 2017) outlined strong measures destined to diminish the number of cases of sexual exploitation and abuse.

More recent texts:

**DFS transitional measures (2015)**

*Provides operational guidance on actions expected at mission level pursuant to a decision to suspend payments and suspension of duties with regard to military, police, corrections and other government provided personnel alleged to have committed an act of sexual exploitation or sexual abuse.*
Factors Conducive to SEA

Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 3 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Conducive Factors

<table>
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<th>Lack of welfare</th>
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<td>Lack of communication facilities</td>
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Key message: good living conditions for the contingents are conducive to a lesser amount of misconduct cases.

The second set of factors is the re-hatting of troops (similar situations to those observed previously for MINUSMA and the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad); the absence of pre-deployment training on standards of conduct; the excessive length of the deployment for certain contingents; the living conditions of contingents, including lack of welfare and communication facilities to stay in contact with home, and camps in proximity to and not properly separated from the local population; and a lack of discipline among some of the contingents.

The factors associated with encampments of contingents, welfare and the length of deployments can be addressed through better planning in the deployments and rotations of troops. The preparation of troops to be deployed or re-hatted will require greater attention. The Departments of Peace Operations and Operational Support have, where necessary, addressed problems of the lack of discipline by certain contingents, including through the repatriation and termination of the deployment of all military personnel from a Member State, as was recently decided for MINUSCA.

Lack of discipline among the contingent can be remedied through correct pre-deployment training of the contingent and selection and training of quality officers. Proper welfare equipment in quantity and quality will help distract the soldiers in order to refrain from committing reprehensible acts.
Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 3 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Summary of Measures

<table>
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<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Measures</th>
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| Prevention  | ➢ Comprehensive pre-deployment training  
               ➢ Awareness-raising  
               ➢ Risk assessment and mitigation  
               ➢ Vetting personnel prior deployment  
               ➢ Improve welfare and recreation |
| Response    | ➢ Improve reporting mechanism  
               ➢ Improve timeliness and quality of investigations |
| Victim support | ➢ Putting victims at the core of zero-tolerance policy  
                      ➢ Trust fund for victim assistance |
| Accountability | ➢ Ensure sanctions are proportionate to misconduct  
                       ➢ Financial accountability  
                       ➢ Responsibility for command and control |
| Transparency | ➢ Reporting (naming perpetrators) |

Key message: the measures put in place by the UN to fight SEA concern five domains: prevention, response, accountability, transparency and support to the victims.

A summary of the measures put in place by the UN leadership to combat sexual exploitation and abuse.

- **Prevention** insists on preparatory measures preceding the deployment, namely vetting of the personnel and specific training.
- **Response** implies a better reaction of the UN system-wide when credible cases are brought to the attention of the leadership; it involves faster and improved reporting procedures and faster inquiries on the part of the T/PCC.
- **Victim support** includes the creation of a dedicated trust fund to support the victims. The proceeds from financial penalties would contribute to the fund.
- **Accountability** includes dismissal and repatriation of individual or even whole units in severe cases. Financial accountability includes retaining salaries from civilian staff or MSA from experts on mission, or retaining payment of financial compensations to T/PCCs who would not react properly to a case (inquiry completed in less than 6 months, possibly in less than 3 months in serious cases). The responsibility of the contingents leadership is reaffirmed.
- **Transparency** includes exposing the perpetrators by name, in the press and on the dedicated UN website.
Key message: an e-learning programme on SEA has been created for the UN staff.

As part of the Prevention programme, an E-learning programme on sexual exploitation and abuse has been created for the UN staff.
Key message: the TCCs have the responsibility to vet their personnel, conduct proper dedicated SEA pre-deployment training and submit the related certification document to DPO 30 days before the rotation date.

The vetting through the Misconduct Tracking System of the Conduct & Discipline Service is only for prior misconduct in the service of the UN.

The T/PCC retains the responsibility of properly vetting its contingent for possible prior misconduct at national level.

The TCCs are required to submit a certification covering disciplinary and pre-deployment training aspects for all military units to be deployed / rotated in field missions no later than 30 days before the deployment or rotation of each unit.
Key message: the T/PCCs are required to play an active role in the preparation, vetting and accountability of their contingents.

The T/PCC must ensure that the contingent members have received proper SEA training before deployment. The certification document attesting of the training is to be submitted to DPO during the PDV, or 30 days before the rotation of personnel.

The Specialized Training Materials (STM) include a module on Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Personnel [http://research.un.org/stm/PSEA]

- The course aims to increase knowledge of UN policies on sexual exploitation and abuse, including prohibited behavior and the consequences and impact of sexual misconduct on personnel, field operations and host populations.
- It comprises common core lessons and assessment for all personnel and a specific additional lesson and assessment for managers and commanders.
- The online course is available in English and French.

While the vetting for possible misconduct during prior UN service is a UN responsibility, the TCC retains the responsibility to vet its personnel for prior misconduct in national service.

As part of the Accountability domain of the SEA measures, TCCs must put in place National Investigation Officers within each deployed contingent in order to speed up the inquiry taking place in case of SEA case.
Key message: TCCs are requested to include National Investigation Officers in all military units deployed to field missions.

TCCs are requested to include NIOs in all military units to be deployed to field missions.

➢ For a unit size of more than 300 personnel, two (2) NIOs are to be deployed;
➢ For a unit size between 150 and 300 personnel, one (1) NIO is to be deployed;
➢ For units smaller than 150 personnel, TCCs may opt to:
   • Incorporate one (1) NIO in the contingent,
   • Provide NIO services from another unit (of own nation) within the Mission,
   • Provide NIO services from another contingent (of own nation) within the region,
   • Provide NIO services from own nation National Support Element (NSE).

The designated NIO may fill a permanent post in the unit and double with NIO duty in case an affair starts.
This requirement will also be part of future Statements of Unit Requirement (SUR) for all contributors.

Contingent members are under the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the TCC.
Key message: Military NIOs should preferably have a background as Legal Advisers or Military Police Officers.

The job description is available in the OMA for Military NIOs (most of the skills (investigations) are part of the professional background of Police / Law Enforcement Officers.

- Where the person under investigation is a staff officer (status of contingent), the TCC is to decide if an NIO already within the mission can undertake the investigation (especially if the staff officer is of senior rank) or an NIO is required to be deployed from the home location. In this case the NIO must be able to deploy the Mission to commence investigation no later than seven (7) days after notification of requirement.
- In order to ensure that the deployment of NIOs is not the expense of other required personnel capabilities within a contingent, it is recommended that NIOs be "dual-hatted" as Personnel or Legal officers.
Key message: accountability includes the possibility of financial penalties for individuals and Governments alike, in case of inappropriate actions or response.

Financial penalties may be imposed in case of grave and documented suspicion. Measures include retaining salaries (civilian personnel), or MSA. Reimbursements to Governments may be retained if it is assessed that the Government reaction to an incident is not adapted or swift enough (inquiry not completed after 6 months).

Early repatriation may apply to individuals after completion of the inquiry. Pending completion of the inquiry the individual may be reassigned (desk job).

Whole units may be repatriated for disciplinary reasons as a result of gross or repeated acts of collective misconduct or of lack of appropriate response on the part of the Government.

The Government responsibility is also engaged through the signature, at appropriate level, of the document certifying that the contingent has received complete and adapted SEA training and has been vetted.

The responsibility of the commanding officers is engaged in case of breach of discipline.

In any case the UN’s response must be proportional to the offense.
• The UN applies a zero-tolerance policy on cases of sexual exploitation and abuse.
• The T/PCCs have the responsibility to train, prepare and vet their contingents to help curb the number of SEA cases.
• The zero-tolerance policy includes early repatriation or dismissal of units and individuals, as well as possible financial penalties on individuals and Governments.
Conduct and Discipline
Questions

Lecture 3
Learning Outcomes

• Describe various aspects of the medical preparation of the contingent
• This lecture does not tackle the preparation of a Level 1 or Level 2 Hospital for deployment, only the pre-deployment preparation of the individual personnel of the contingent.
Lecture Content

- Medical screening
- Preventive medicine
- Immunization policy
Medical Screening

Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 4 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Medical Screening

It is the responsibility of the Member States to deploy physically, mentally and emotionally fit personnel for United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Key message: the member states are responsible for the medical screening of their contingents.
Key message: most peacekeeping operations happen in a very stressful environment.

When examining members for service in a peacekeeping/special mission area, it must be kept in mind that they may be required to serve where unfamiliar diseases are endemic, where sanitation may be sub-standard and amenities few. They may be required to travel on foot and live in primitive conditions. Recreational facilities may be scarce.
Key message: during a deployment, the change of environment added to the stress will conspire to aggravate any pre-existing medical conditions.

- Personnel assigned to peacekeeping/special missions are exposed to hazardous conditions not normally associated with peacetime service. Moreover, due to a stressful and changed working environment, there is a potential of aggravation of any pre-existing medical conditions.
- Therefore, special considerations should be given to patients with a history of medical problems.
Key message: the Medical Support manual provides a complete list of medical conditions precluding participation on peacekeeping operations.

The following conditions are generally considered as precluding service in peacekeeping areas, but must be carefully assessed on an individual basis, taking into account the severity of the condition and the particular area for which the member is being examined:

- Hypertension without medication;
- Diabetes Mellitus requiring medication;
- Any known heart disease;
- Any chronic illness requiring regular medication(s);
- Any immuno-compromised condition, including AIDS;
- Known allergy to or intolerance of anti-malarial medication;
- Past history of alcohol dependence or psychiatric disease

- This is only a short list. The Medical Support Manual, Chapter 5, Annex A, gives a complete description of medical conditions precluding participation in peacekeeping operations.
Key message: the HIV status does not constitute a lack of fitness for deployment to a peacekeeping mission.

- **Pre-deployment HIV Testing**: (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) The sole medical criterion for deployment is fitness to work. HIV status does not, in itself, constitute a lack of fitness for deployment in a peacekeeping mission.
- This is the UN policy (Medical Support manual). Some P/TCCS may have different rules.
- Should a known HIV-positive individual be deployed in a United Nations mission, his/her status shall be made known to the CMO/FMO or their designate and attending doctor at the time of deployment.
Key message: AIDS, Cholera and pregnancy are conditions that must forbid deployment.

- Any individual with clinical symptoms or signs of AIDS must be repatriated to his home country once the diagnosis has been made. (Medical Support manual)
- Therefore the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome / AIDS is an immuno-compromised condition that forbids deployment
- CHOLERA as well, since the problems met by the UN in Haiti
- Pregnancy is a different case. Pregnant personnel must be detected and not deployed.
- In any case pregnant personnel will be repatriated after 5 months (Medical Support manual).
Key message: special attention should be given to the dental condition of the contingent members before deployment.

Regarding dental care...

- Dental care facilities are often scarce and difficult to get to in Mission areas.
- Acute dental affections are debilitating and can completely annihilate the operational value of a soldier / policeman.

- Therefore special attention should be given to screening the dental condition of the contingent members during the preparation phase.

- No contingent member requiring dental care should be deployed to a mission area, especially if such care is bound to require heavy interventions or follow up.
Medical screening

- Medical repatriations due to conditions acquired in the Mission shall be done at UN expense.
- Medical repatriations due to pre-existing medical, dental or psychiatric conditions shall be done at T/PCC’s expense.

Key message: medical repatriations due to pre-existing medical conditions shall be done at member state’s expense.

There is a high incidence of medical repatriations and deaths arising from the deployment of peacekeepers with chronic pre-existing diseases that preclude deployment into PKOs, as well as related consequences for morale, resources and the image and mandate of the mission.
Medical screening

Moreover...

In case injury or death should result directly from such pre-existing conditions, the UN may not be liable for any compensation to be paid for such disease, injury or death

Key message: the UN may not be liable for injuries or deaths resulting from pre-existing medical conditions.

• These circumstances would be highly detrimental to the family of the deceased contingent member and should be avoided at all costs through thorough medical screening.
Key message: list of pre-deployment medical preparations should be provided to the PDV team.

- A standard list of pre-deployment medical preparations conducted for their peacekeeping personnel should be made available to DPO by the T/PCCs.
- This shall include any clinical examinations, x-rays and laboratory tests, as well as all vaccinations administered.
- Medical screening results of individuals are not required, unless specifically requested by DPO.

- This should be completed by the end of the preparation phase (see ORAPI), and ideally provided at the time of the PDV.
- Same must be provided by the unit’s medical officer to the Mission’s Chief Medical Officer upon arrival in the mission area.
Preventive Medicine

Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 4 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: maintaining the good health of personnel deployed in a post-conflict area is a major challenge.

- Conflicts or natural disasters often have devastating effects on a country or community’s regular health system. Post-conflict zones, where peacekeeping missions are deployed, are often characterized by degraded public health infrastructure or completely collapsed health care delivery systems.
- Field missions face two major challenges: maintaining the good health of personnel deployed on the ground and preventing further degradation of public health systems.
Key message: preventive medicine can achieve significant results in terms of costs and life savings.

- Preventive medicine is one of the most important aspects of medical support in the field.
- Through effective measures, significant results can be achieved in terms of fewer workdays lost, lower morbidity rates and lower treatment costs.
Preventive Medicine

The contingent Senior Medical Officer and Medical Officers are responsible for implementing preventive medicine practices for the military contingents and personnel under their charge, starting with pre-deployment training.

Key message: implementing preventive medicine practice should start with pre-deployment training.

- The contingent SMO and medical officers are responsible for implementing preventive medicine practices for the military contingents and personnel under their charge. It is their task to monitor the immunization status of troops under their care, as well as to directly manage any required vaccination or disease prevention programme.
- This includes the distribution of anti-malarial tablets and condoms, as well as health inspections of food, water and sanitation. In addition, they are responsible for health education and medical training, which is generally conducted by medical personnel under their charge.
Key message: Preventive medicine applies to all medical and health domains.

- Preventive medicine concerns all these domains and more
Immunization policy

Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 4 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: The Division of Health Management & Occupational Safety & Health (DOS) sets the policy on the vaccination and prophylaxis requirements within a mission area.

- The Department of Operational Support / DHMOSH* sets the policy on the vaccination and prophylaxis requirements within a mission area, in line with WHO regulations.
- This is considered the minimum standard that should be observed by all TCCs/PCCs.

* DHMOSH: Division of Health Management & Occupational Safety & Health
Key message: Immunization requirements fall under one of three requirements: mandatory, recommended, standard.

Immunization requirements are divided into three categories: Mandatory, Recommended and Standard.
Key message: **mandatory vaccinations are required to meet international health regulations or national requirements stipulated by the host country for travel into the mission area.**

**Mandatory Vaccinations**
- These are vaccinations required to meet international health regulations or national requirements stipulated by the host country for travel into the mission area.
- Uniformed personnel deployed without such vaccinations may be repatriated at the port of entry at national expense, as their health will be at risk in the mission area.
- Should such personnel be required to stay, the mission must take appropriate steps to vaccinate the person and ensure that the cost of vaccination is deducted from the TCC/PCC reimbursement at source.
Key message: whenever yellow fever vaccination is mandatory, individual proofs of immunization must be made available to Medical Service upon arrival in the mission area.

- In the case of yellow fever, vaccination is required for people travelling from countries with risk of yellow fever transmission and for people travelling to mission areas with risk of yellow fever transmission.

**CLICK**
- Since the new troop costs reimbursement system has been adopted (July 2014), the cost of this vaccination is integrated in the troop costs reimbursements and therefore no separate claims need to be made.

**CLICK**
- For verification purpose, it is important that the WHO International Certificate of Vaccination or equivalent document containing the immunization details for each peacekeeper is made available to the MMS upon arrival in the mission.
Key message: cholera vaccination is now mandatory for all peacekeepers deploying to peacekeeping operations.

- Cholera vaccination is now mandatory for all peacekeepers deploying to PKOs. Mandatory cholera vaccination aims to reduce disease transmission by protecting peacekeepers from contracting cholera, and thereby also preventing them from being part of the transmission chain.
- Vaccination should be implemented in conjunction with other public health and cholera preventive activities, including health education, ensuring safe water supply and sanitation, as outlined in Chapter 16 Annex D of the Medical Support Manual: Training proposal on cholera prevention and hygiene awareness for United Nations peacekeeping and civilian personnel in the field.
Key message: individual proofs of recommended immunizations must be made available to Medical Service upon arrival in the mission area.

Recommended Vaccinations
- These are vaccinations recommended for travel to a region with certain diseases (e.g., hepatitis A, Japanese encephalitis, meningitis, etc.).
- The WHO International Certificate of Vaccination or equivalent document containing the immunization details for each peacekeeper should be made available to the MMS on arrival in the mission.
- The reimbursement of the corresponding expenses are integrated in the troop costs since July 2014, therefore no claim is to be made for specific reimbursement.
Key message: standard and childhood immunizations remain a national responsibility.

**Standard / Childhood**
- Standard childhood vaccinations including boosters are provided routinely to the general population and to military/police personnel and are not specifically required for peacekeeping (*e.g.*, diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, and poliomyelitis).
- This type of vaccination is a national responsibility.
Key message: optional vaccinations may be administered as a national requirement and will not be reimbursed by the UN.

These are not “requirements” but come in addition to the previous.

- **Optional vaccinations** are additional vaccinations that are administered as a national requirement of a troop/police contributor, but that are not mandatory for entry into the mission area under international or host country health regulations.
- These vaccinations have not been specifically recommended by the DPO/DOS (e.g., rabies, anthrax and seasonal human influenza).
- Such vaccines will not be reimbursed by the United Nations.
Key message: special case vaccinations will be either provided by the UN or reimbursed through submission of a claim for actual costs.

These are not “requirements” but come in addition to the previous.

- These are additional vaccinations or drugs that are required against new or emerging infections encountered in the mission area and are not reimbursed under previous categories (e.g., the antiviral drug Ribavirin for Lassa fever and Oseltamivir or Tamiflu for avian influenza).
- These vaccines or drugs will be provided by the United Nations, or reimbursed through the submission of claims for actual costs.
Key message: It is a national responsibility to ensure that all personnel have received the mandatory vaccinations before deployment to the mission area and that said vaccinations are properly documented.

- It is a **national responsibility (at national expense)** to ensure that all personnel have received the mandatory vaccinations before deployment to the mission area.

- The immunization status of each individual is to be properly documented for monitoring by the respective contingent Medical Officer.

- Each member of the contingent must be provided with or have in their medical record the WHO international certificate of vaccination, or its national equivalent.

- Should a multiple dose immunization regimen not be completed prior to deployment, and should the TCC/PCC facility be unable to provide subsequent doses, the United Nations will do so through a UNOE facility.

- The mission headquarters will procure the required vaccines in this instance, with the assistance of the MSS. **The United Nations will recover the cost of the above vaccines from the troop/police contributors.**
Key message: an incomplete multiple dose immunization may be completed by the UN in the field on the basis of cost recovery.

- Should a multiple dose immunization regimen not be completed prior to deployment, and should the TCC/PCC facility be unable to provide subsequent doses,

- the United Nations will do so through a UNOE facility.
- The mission headquarters will procure the required vaccines in this instance, with the assistance of the MSS.

- The United Nations will recover the cost of the above vaccines from the troop/police contributors.
Key message: deploying a contingent or individual without the UN recommended immunizations may result in the denial of entry into the mission area as well as the rejection of resulting claims or compensations.

**VERBATIM from the Medical Support Manual:**

Failure to follow United Nations recommended immunization policies may result in the denial of entry into the host country, as well as the rejection of any resulting medical claims and compensation (in case of death or permanent disability resulting from a disease for which the peacekeeper was not properly immunized).
Lecture Take Away

- The **pre-deployment medical screening** of contingent personnel should start at the Shaping phase and be completed during the Preparation phase (Ref. ORAPI policy).
- **Mandatory vaccinations** are a responsibility of the T/PCC, failure of which may lead to the non-deployment of personnel.
- **Inadequate pre-deployment medical screening** may result in early repatriation of the concerned personnel at T/PCC’s expense.
Medical Preparation
Questions
Lecture 4
Learning Outcomes

• Describe several administrative aspects of the individual preparation of the peacekeeper before deployment.
Lecture Content

- Pay and Allowances
- UN Compensations (Death and Disability)
- Life Insurance
- Passport generation
- Family Care Plan
Development of Topic 1 of Lecture 5 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: peacekeeper salaries and possible overseas service allowances are strictly a national responsibility.

Pay and allowances

- Payment of salaries or overseas allowances to contingent members is a national responsibility.
- The UN does not pay salaries to contingent members, only some limited allowances (leave allowance) as exposed in the Reimbursement Framework module.
- Troop costs are not salaries. Their redistribution to the contingent members can only be a national decision.

- Some TCCs have plans to redistribute the troop costs to their contingent members, some not. This in no way is an obligation; it can only be a national decision in which the UN does not play any role.
- Troop costs are supposed to compensate the Government for the costs incurred when training and equipping the contingent members. See Reimbursement Framework Module.
UN Compensations (Death & Disability)

Development of Topic 2 of Lecture 5 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the UN compensates the death or the permanent disability of a peacekeeper to a maximum of 77,000.00 US dollars payable to the family through the peacekeeper's Government.

In case of death or disability of a peacekeeper, the UN has special provisions for compensations:

• 77,000.00 US Dollars paid to the Government for the family in case of death (Rate since 01 July 2018)
• A % of this sum to the peacekeeper in case of permanent disability

• Refer to the Module “Reimbursement framework” for details.
• The sum is approved by the GA and might vary in the future (the UN is self-insured for these risks).
• The % of the sum paid in case of permanent disability is in direct proportion of the % of permanent disability as assessed by a specialized board.
Development of Topic 3 of Lecture 5 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Life Insurance

- UN Death & Disability compensation is a limited one-time payment
- Adapted life insurance for each Peacekeeper is therefore recommended

Key message: the subscription of an adapted life insurance contract by each peacekeeper should be encouraged by the Government.

Life Insurance

- The compensation paid by the UN in case of death or disability is only a limited one-time payment.
- Therefore the national authorities should encourage the subscription by the peacekeepers of an adapted life insurance for the benefit of the family.
Development of Topic 4 of Lecture 5 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Passport Generation

- Detaining a passport is **mandatory** for the members of military / police units deploying to a PKO.
- MEDEVAC, early repatriations, etc. are causes for travelling unaccompanied, which would require a passport.

**Key message:** every member of a police or military unit deploying to a PKO must detain a passport.

**Passport generation**

- Detaining a **passport** is mandatory for the members of military / police units deploying to a PKO.
- The passport will help avoid many issues in case the peacekeeper has to travel alone across borders (MEDEVAC, early repatriation...).
- MEDEVAC, early repatriations, are causes for travelling out of the framework of the unit, which would require a passport.
Key message: as a general rule, visas for peacekeepers are delivered graciously by the host country. In case of mandatory payment, reimbursement can be sought from the UN.

Visas

- **Visas** are normally not required from peacekeepers, or are delivered graciously by the host country upon arrival.
- In case a host country imposes the delivery of paying visas, the T/PCC may be reimbursed by the UN after deployment.
- Proofs of dues payment will have to be provided.
- (Iraq has imposed delivery of paying visas to the members of the guard units deployed with the UN mission)
  (technically the UN Guards are not peacekeepers in this case).
Family Care Plan

Development of Topic 5 of Lecture 5 of Module G of the United Nations Senior National Planners Course (UNSNPC).
Key message: the implementation by the Government of a national health care plan adapted to military or police personnel is recommended before any deployment.

Family Care Plan

• Military or police authorities should make sure that during the absence of the head of the family, all family members will be covered by a health care plan.
• The implementation of a national health care plan adapted to military / police personnel is recommended.
Lecture Take Away

- **UN compensations** in case of death or disability should be completed by national regulations to assure *protection of the families* of the deceased.
- **Salaries** of contingent members remain a national responsibility.
- **Troop costs** may be redistributed depending on national regulations, but they do not constitute a salary.
Soldier Readiness

Questions
Module H: Preparation and Execution of Transport for Deployment

Find guidance inserted in the note section of each slide.
Module Content

- Movement Control (MovCon)
- COE Deployment under UN arrangements
- COE Deployment under LOA
- Rotation of COE
- Personnel deployment under UN / LOA
- Rotation of Personnel
- Repatriation of COE, Personnel
Learning Outcomes

• Learn about Movement Control Section role and responsibilities in UN strategic transport.
• Know about the structure of Movement Control Section in UNHQ,
• Get an idea of the scale and scope of UN strategic movement operations managed by the Movement Control Section.
MOVCON, it’s basically the people responsible for all UN movements in the field, both strategic and tactical movements. They are located in the field missions and at UNHQ.
What is Movement Control?

Key message: in the UN, Movement Control is defined as the planning, routing, scheduling and control of personnel and freight movements over lines of communication.

This is the UN definition of Movement Control:

Movement Control is defined as the planning, routing, scheduling and control of personnel and freight movements over lines of communication by the organization responsible for these functions, at UNHQ, regional level (TMICC) or mission level.

At UNHQ you have a Movement Control Section (MCS), which belongs to the Logistic Division / DOS;
At SAOC Strategic Air Operation Center, which is located in Brindisi and coordinating UN long term charter B-767 (ET Airlines);
At regional level we also have the TMICC: Transport & Movements Integrated Control Centre, located in Entebbe, focused on regional activities, supporting missions in that area.

• Strategic Movement is the movement of personnel and/or their equipment between their home country’s point of origin and/or sea and airports of embarkation (SPOE/APOE), and the UN mission area of operations.

• Tactical Movement is the movement of personnel and/or their equipment from mission points of entry (i.e. air and sea ports) to destinations within a UN mission area of operations (AO). Mission level MovCon organizes and executes intra-mission (and limited inter-mission) movement of personnel and equipment.
In the MOU they talk about the point of origin (POO). So in the MOU will be mentioned the point of origin, seaport or airport of embarkation in your own country, and port of debarkation in the arrival area – and then ultimately your destination in the mission area.

It’s important because the MOU mentions the “incremental transportation factor” – so in addition to the reimbursement at the established rate, the ME will get an additional 2% reimbursement that includes the “incremental transportation factor”. So we start with the POO, getting to the final destination, and when you start going beyond a certain distance then you get the additional reimbursement “incremental transportation factor” for the transit.

You need to be able to tell, during the MOU negotiation, where your equipment is located, if you are landlocked, where your POO will be, if there is a border crossing to take into account, etc. The TCC is responsible for gathering all that equipment at the POO. If you need to transport your equipment between, for example, a training camp and the port of embarkation, the inland transportation is reimbursable by the UN. This is in the COE Manual, Chapter 4, para 21.
Key message: Strategic Movement is the movement of personnel and/or their equipment between their home country’s point of origin and the UN mission area of operations.

The difference between the strategic and tactical movement. If you’re in UNHQ you want to make arrangements for the transportation of personnel and equipment between your home country and the mission area.

3 X CLICKS
First the equipment will go by sea between the seaport of embarkation and the seaport of disembarkation, here Mombasa / Kenya.

CLICK
For the passengers, between the APOE and the mission area that would be a long haul flight going first (if destination is Eastern Congo) Entebbe, since all these flights come into Entebbe.

So that’s the strategic movement.
Key message: Tactical Movement is the movement of personnel and/or their equipment from mission points of entry to destinations within a UN mission area of operations.

Now for the tactical movement

Show Entebbe, Mombasa (off the map), Bunia as the final destination.

CLICK
From Mombasa to Bunia by road, sometimes across the lake from Masindi, but typically the commercial drivers would go by road, past Kampala and by road south of the Lake through Fort Portal border crossing into Congo, and then into Bunia.

CLICK
The passengers will come into Entebbe by commercial flight, and then from Entebbe to Bunia on a UN contracted flight

So if you’re in the mission area you will be coordinating the rotation flights with the Joint Logistics Operations Center (now Mission Support Center - MSC).
Key message: the main role of the Movement Control Section is to plan and execute strategic transport operations in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

So what is it MOVCON deals with?

- Forecasting, developing and planning is for strategic movement, at UNHQ level.
- They execute the strategic movements in a professional, timely, effective and efficient manner
- Providing a center of excellence for all Movement Control and transportation matters in support of Peacekeeping Operations
- They are the focal point for any movement or transport question you may have
- They oversee activities, issue policies, manuals, both for HQ and field
- Assisting with the recruitment, training and development of Movement Control Specialists (HQ & Field) – and International Partners.
Key message: the Movement Control Section is responsible for planning, managing and directing strategic movement operations of personnel, Contingent Owned Equipment and UN Owned Equipment.

So getting back to the strategic movement.
We do a chartered flight so we need to have 50 personnel to move at least (below 50 it’s through commercial flight) – because financially that’s more or less where we break even.
But with commercial flights there are a number of issues to deal with:
- Weapons and ammunitions primarily
- Dangerous goods
- Visas for transit locations if any.

Transportation of equipment.
- Typically we are talking about deployment and repatriation. Redeployment would be changing location within the same mission area, repatriation is going home at the end of the mission.
- As per COE Manual, the COE is expected to remain the mission area for the duration of the unit’s deployment. Transportation costs associated with maintenance or spare parts or consumables are a national responsibility (included in the wet lease rate).
  That’s the general rule for equipment deployed to a PKO.
- * It was recognized that missions may last a long time and equipment therefore will remain a long time in the mission area, especially ME. So recently there were changes and some equipment that were deployed for more than 7 years can be replaced at UN expense – we are talking of the cost of transportation of the replacement equipment, not the cost of the equipment itself. And we’ll get back to that later.
• Other items that are rotated at UN expense: aviation assets. Remember that for aviation assets we have a MOU and we have a LOA, the LOA being for the aircraft itself.

• So in the LOA the TCC will mention how many hours it will use the aircraft monthly and when they are due for maintenance – especially that deep maintenance that has to be done at home / cannot be done in the field. The LOA will say that the UN will rotate that aircraft at its expense, bringing it home and then back in the mission area.

• And then UN Owned Equipment. We do all the transportation, sometimes UN equipment is bought new and has to be shipped from the UNLB / Brindisi, sometimes shipped from existing missions, especially when starting a new mission.
Key message: the Movement Control Section is responsible for providing assistance to the T/PCCs in the preparation and execution of their strategic movements of goods and personnel.

Other MCS responsibilities include:

- Dangerous goods: not only ammos but also cleaning products, paint, compressed gases, batteries....
- We will advise but we are not professionals, they are all trained to be signatories, to receive dangerous goods, and that’s typically what happens in the mission area. So if you don’t have a trained professional in your unit you should look into that, maybe seek commercial advice in-country when preparing the unit, since you will also have to prepare the documentation for the cargo.
- Most of the time the DG will go by international carriers, so you have to comply with international regulations, IATA for air movements of IMDG for sea movements (International Maritime Dangerous Goods).

- We will assist you; we will see again at the end of the lecture the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) site
- where a lot of information is available; once your unit is officially retained for a mission we will send you a whole information package:
  - Information
  - Forms to fill out,
  - Directions and contacts for this particular mission / deployment
  - Etc.
Key message: all UN strategic movements are dealt with a team of only 9 MOVCON officers at UNHQ.

By comparison with MPS (29 officers) or FGS (21 officers) in OMA, in MOVCON there are 11 persons – 9 officers and 2 support staff.

MCS personnel hails from 10 different countries: Chief is from Canada, others are from Brazil, Latvia, Kenya, Philippines, Russia, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay & USA.
**Scale of Operations in 2017**

- **Total Overall Passenger Movements:** 224,918
  - Commercial Contracts: 42,734 (19%)
  - Troop/Police Contributing Countries (LOA): 78,721 (35%)
  - UN Aircraft: 103,462 (46%)

- **DOS/UN is the second largest mover of uniformed personnel (military and police) in the world.**

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**Key message: the United Nations are the second largest mover of uniformed personnel in the world.**

This is just to give a hint about the scale of MOVCON operations in 2017. These figures are in diminution from previous years, due to the end of the major deployments in the previous years (MINUSMA and lately MINUSCA). Also, these figures are influenced by the 12-month rotation of troops that was implemented starting in 2014, following recommendations by the Senior Advisory Group (SAG). This recommendation was meant to have troops available for a longer time in the mission area, and having a better awareness of their mission area due to the longer stay – all in the name of improved efficiency in the field.

So in 2016 they moved over 200,000 passengers

We’ll talk about letters of assist later, but you can see here that LOAs have been used for 42% of the passengers movements in 2016, noting that this is up from previous years where the % was close to 30% (LOAs can be used for aircraft, ships, personnel transport, COE transport; here we are talking personnel only, either deployment, repatriation or rotations).

Apart from commercial contracts, the other third is movement by UN aircraft; by UN aircraft we mean long-term charter aircraft like the Ethiopian B 767 managed by MOVCON UNHQ and the UN-contracted aircraft sitting in the missions areas. In West Africa we used to have a B 757 based in Liberia that we used for troops rotation, as many of these were from the region.

[The largest mover of uniformed personnel in the world is the USA].
Scale/Scope of Operations in 2017

- **Number of Dedicated Flights:** 926 *
  - Cargo (COE & UNOE): 145
  - Passengers: 781

- **Overall Cargo Movements (Air, Sea & Land):**
  - Total Moved: 254,853 m³ / 51,615 MTs
    - Sea: 126,472 m³ / 26,943 MTs**
    - Air: 96,576 m³ / 21,204 MTs
    - Land: 31,805 m³ / 3,468 MTs

  *Chartered 64 ships/shiploads to move cargo to and from missions.

**Key message:** the UN moved 52 thousand metric tons of cargo and arranged 926 flights in 2017.

In this slide we are considering strategic movements only, not taking into account the tactical flights internal to the mission.

This shows almost 926 flights of passengers and cargo in 2017 (down from 1,000 + in 2014, same reasons as for the diminution in passengers transported, previous slide).

That’s 2 to 3 flights every day, all year long.

By cargo flights (again, strategic only), we mean using IL 76, AN 124, C 130, sometimes B 747, all cargo planes used for strategic transport only.

Cargo movement by sea, air, land.

Obviously the largest number is by sea, although the difference was more obvious the previous years where the figures by sea were double the numbers by air.

And that’s because movement by sea is more cost efficient as regards cargo transportation.

Deploying a unit by air from Bangladesh to Haiti would take a 3-day round trip each time, with 9 flights that’s almost a month. By sea it would take 40 days from Dhaka to Haiti, at a cost 7 to times less.

We often do the deployment of an advance party by air, and the bulk of the unit cargo by sea (more on this later in the lecture).

Land deployment is less frequent but works well in some cases: Tanzania to MONUSCO was done that way, Chad to Northern Mali (MINUSMA) as well, or also Senegal to Mali. That’s not always possible in Africa, depending on the road network.
Key message: the cost of strategic transport to the UN in 2017 was close to 178 million US Dollars.

Overall, in 2017 we spent over 170 M$ - that was a quarter billion $ in 2014...

(Let’s note that it’s $70,000,000 less than in 2014: no deployment of a major operation in 2017...) 

This is what we moved with that sum, the biggest part being for passengers. The figures of 2014, due to major deployments, would show a part for COE that was more than 1/3 of the total.

Again these figures concern only the strategic movements.
The UNHQ Movement Control Section is responsible for forecasting, developing, planning and executing strategic movement operations of personnel, COE and UNOE to and from peacekeeping missions areas of operations.

The UNHQ Movement Control Section is responsible for assisting T/PCCs in the preparation, planning and execution of strategic movement.

Available on UN PCRS Website, the UN Field Mission Movement Control Manual contains all procedures relative to the UN strategic transport.
Learning Outcomes

• Learn about the policies governing the transport of cargo under UN arrangement.
• Learn the information requirements pertaining to cargo transport.
• Understand the planning and contracting processes governing the transport of cargo under UN arrangement.
Lecture Content

- Policy Overview and References
- Preparation, Information and Documentation Requirements
- Planning and Contracting Process and Timeline
- Execution Timeline
Key References for Deployment Planning

- **COE Manual 2017**
  - Introduction to the COE System
  - Movements of personnel and cargo, Chapter 4
- **Memorandum Of Understanding (including SUR)**
  - COE Manual, Chapter 9
- **TCC & PCC Guidelines**
- **UN PCRS website**
  - http://pcrs.un.org
- **Field Movement Control Manual**

**Key message:** the key references for deployment planning can be found in the COE Manual, T/PCC Guidelines and Field Movement Control Manual.

Key references:

- The COE Manual, 2017 edition, chapter 4, provides all basic rules concerning transportation, deployment, re-deployment, rotations.
- In the MOU, you will also find the point of origin, port of embarkation and debarkation, etc.
- SUR (Statement of Unit Requirement)
- The TCC or PCC guidelines specific to the mission should be part of the MOU (in an annex)
- The UN PCRS Website website allows you to upload information for MOVCON (load lists...) and top have access to MOVCON information regarding your shipment(s), including regular updates
- For the contingent in the field in particular, the Field Movement Control Manual is useful to have and know because it contains all the rules governing the various types of movements in the field (not only for cargo, for personnel as well).
Key message: the UN is responsible for the deployment and repatriation of the COE and personnel, including the regular rotation of personnel, as authorized in the relevant MOU.

- The United Nations is responsible for the deployment and repatriation of contingent-owned major and minor equipment, including spare parts and consumables as noted in the MOU, and including packing and crating.

- The United Nations is responsible for the deployment and repatriation (including regular rotations) of contingent personnel authorized in the MOU.

- The United Nations is responsible, on initial deployment and repatriation, for the cost of inland transportation of authorized major equipment and initial provisioning of associated spare parts from and to its agreed originating location and an agreed port of embarkation/disembarkation.

For the Major/minor equipment the rule is obvious: the UN is responsible for the deployment and repatriation.

For the spare parts, the TCC’s logisticians have to figure out what quantity of various spare parts they will need for all the unit's equipment for 6 months – so that they can be included in the shipment, since the UN will pay for the transport – and then what these spare parts will take to transport in terms of volume and weight, in order to include them in the load lists.

The latter will have an incidence on the number of sea containers the TCC needs to prepare its shipments. There are different type of the containers: TCC owned (which will be reimbursed under
MOU and for storage/other purposes, which TCC will not be paid for) and UN owned (UNOE). If it is
necessary the UN will provide sea containers for transportation, however these containers should be
returned after off-loading in the mission.

- If you get to the mission area and don’t have proper storage facility, you will want to use containers
  as storage, so it’s useful to the TCC to own at least part of them so as to use them in the mission.
- A part of them will be reimbursed by the UN as ME, (see in the MOU), so the TCC has to figure out
early how many sea containers (20 foot) it will need to ship its equipment and then to keep in the
mission area.

- For personnel as for the equipment, the UN is responsible (= will pay) for the quantities mentioned in
  the MOU (+10% as regard the ME in order to keep the ME close to 100% serviceability most of the
time – but the additional 10% is a choice of the TCC, it is not mandatory).

- What would be in the mission area and not in the MOU would be the National Support Element –
  (the rules governing the use of NSE by the member states were explained in the relevant lecture of
  module F / Force Generation). So the transport of the NSE is a national responsibility, not the UN’s.

- Inland transportation: the UN is paying for the cost of transporting ME from various locations in the
country to the point of origin as designated by the TCC.
- Packing and crating: the TCC needs to figure out what kind of material it needs to properly pack its
equipment in the containers (wood, cushioning stuff, crates) – this will be reimbursed, Please NOTE
  that packing services (necessary labor), should be provided by the P/TCC and will not be paid
/reimbursed by the UN.
**Preparation – Inland Transportation**

- UN is responsible for the cost of inland transportation of ME
  - And initial provisioning of associated spare parts
- From/to the originating location to port of embarkation/dismarkation.
- Major Equipment as per the MOU
  - Plus maximum 10% backup vehicles/generators/water storages and etc.
- Transport reimbursed as per LOA
  - Including packing and crating material
- Agreed to in advance

**Key message:** the UN is responsible for the cost of inland transportation for major equipment between the location of origin and the port of embarkation.

- Inland transportation: the UN is paying for the cost of transporting ME and initial provisioning of associated spare parts from various locations in the country to the point of origin as designated by the TCC.
- ME considered is a per the MOU, plus 10% backup COE (vehicles, generators and etc)
- Transport will be reimbursed, as well as packing and crating material.
- Packing and crating: the TCC needs to figure out what kind of material it needs to properly pack its equipment in the containers (wood, cushioning stuff, crates) – this will be reimbursed but not the necessary labor, which is to be provided by the P/TCC (Government). This has to be agreed to in advance.

- T/PCC has to figure out the need in crates and packing stuff depending on the quantity of equipment but also on the mode of shipment, in order to make sure that the content of the containers will reach destination in good shape. If it will be required the UN can provide containers (just for the transportation)

- In any case these arrangements must be agreed to in advance between the UN and the T/PCC.
Key message: the T/PCC is responsible for submitting to MOVCON, prior to any movement, the general cargo load list and the list of dangerous goods.

These are the information the UN needs to arrange the transport of a cargo.

The Cargo Load Lists with the big items: rolling stock, vehicles, containers (the total number of containers shipped, not the number of containers reimbursed as per the MOU). Weight and dimensions of the vehicles must be very clearly and precisely filled on the CLL.

Dangerous Goods (DG), as per prescriptions of the IATA (air movement) or IMDG (sea movement). Information available on the website of each organization (International Maritime Organization for the IMDG). MOVCON is also a source of information available to the T/PCCs. **DG Documentation (DG List & Declaration) must be prepared and signed by DG certified person, otherwise will not be accepted for the transportation.**

One Load List has to be done for each unit (if several deploy at the same time) and for each element of that unit (i.e. advance party and main body).

The reference is the MOU to know how many pieces of equipment / vehicles we should see on the Load Lists, but the LL is what MOVCON will be using to do the actual contracting.

UN PCRS Website is where the Load Lists should be uploaded (more on this at the end of the module).
Key message: the T/PCC is responsible for providing to MOVCON the cargo readiness date, the location of the cargo to pick up and the information pertaining to super cargo personnel, if any.

*APOE/SPOE: AirPort Of Embarkation / Sea Port Of Embarkation*

Beside the Load Lists & DG Lists, MOVCON also needs:
- The Cargo Readiness Date, for the carrier to know when he can pick up / load the cargo (Cargo Readiness Date is when the cargo is absolutely ready for pick up by the carrier, everything packed, vehicles in shipping condition, documents all correctly filled up, signed, completed).
- Origin location of the cargo (exact address, preferable sea port or airport of embarkation) so that the carrier knows where to send his asset.
- Consignor/Consignee and Point of Contact to coordinate the shipment.
- Super Cargo personnel (if required), especially for air movements, who will travel on the aircraft with the cargo; typically it’s 2-12 people (depends on the type of aircraft). In this case all SC personnel must have current passports. The information relative to the SC personnel must be provided to MOVCON in advance (for the air operator).

- Some concerns/issues: during the technical stops for the refuelling/crew rest - visa may be required for the supercargoes, moreover all the logistical arrangements (accommodation food and etc) is TCC/PCC responsibility, therefore supercargoes should have sufficient amount of cash to be able to pay for themselves.
Key message: the general cargo load list provides information on the number, volume, weight and value of the shipping containers and individual loads constituting the cargo.

General cargo Load List.

First it provides all information on the Mission, unit, APOE/SOE, SPOD or APOD, and final destination. Then the main area contains all details on the number of sea containers and individual pieces of equipment / vehicles shipped.

Information to be provided for each: quantity, dimensions, surface, volume, per unit value and total value, total sqm, total volume and total weight, total value.

The order of the items is same as in the MOU.

At this point the content of the containers is not important, and not mentioned.

Freezer containers are mentioned separately as they may need energy. These freezing containers should not be filled though, as any lack of energy during a while is going to cause the loss of the frozen goods.

These tables are available online with the formulas already in place, all there is to do is fill the individual information quantity, dimensions, value etc.
Key message: the dangerous cargo load list provides the list and quantities of all dangerous goods included in the cargo.

The next piece of information MOVCON needs is the dangerous cargo load list.

This is the UN document, not the IATA or IMDG form.

So there are the UN numbers for dangerous goods (0012 for small arms cartridges),

The class (1.4S for example) gives the level of danger of the item (compressed gas (2.2) is more dangerous than small arms ammos (1.4S))

There are vehicles as well (serials 15 to 17): all vehicles with a flammable liquid in them (gasoline, diesel) are class 9. Speaking of which, you want to ship your vehicles with tanks half full: you need to have space for expansion in the tank, but you also need to have enough fuel to drive the vehicle off the ship, and maybe out of the port area upon arrival.

That’s a bit complicated, then the T/PCC has to think about this when thinking about asking the UN to arrange the movement, versus doing it by itself under LOA.

Other documents you will need to leave the country are the custom clearance and the export clearance – especially if your country has any restriction on export of military equipment.
The TCC normally does not need to ship POL since the UN will provide. However if you have a special requirement that the UN cannot meet you will have to include it in the shipment. This is a question to ask well in advance to LD, or to the mission during the recce.
Key message: the container manifest lists the nature, quantity, weight and value of each item of goods and equipment contained in each shipping container or crate.

This is the container manifest.

This is the list of the content of each container, with the container’s own number, so there is one form for each shipping container (or freezer container if you ship any goods in it).

This particular one is loaded with dangerous goods, that would be mentioned in the DG LL – see remarks in the rightmost column.

The unit will also need to have a copy of these manifests in order to know what is in which container on arrival.
Key message: the movement planning process is initiated by MOVCON following successful completion of the AAV or PDV and of the final MOU negotiation.

As we saw in the Force Generation module, this is going to take place after a successful PDV (or sometimes AAV) has been conducted, the MOU has been finalized (if not yet signed) – and MOVCON was notified of the upcoming move (in fact MOVCON has been following the generation of that unit for a while along with Force Generation and LD).

MOVCON then sends a complete information package with everything the T/PCC needs to know at this point:

- Cargo Load List Templates
- DG Load List and Information
- Readiness to Move Confirmation
- Planned Deployment Concept (Adv Party, Main Body, etc.)
- General Movement Guidelines and Unit Responsibilities

- A MOVCON specialist may be sent to your capital at an agreed date in order to help prepare for the shipment and related documentation.

- This is the point where you need to tell MOVCON if you want to do it under a LOA, or arranged by the UN.
• So let’s assume the UN is making the arrangements.
Planning and Contracting Process

MCS develops a SOW (Scope of Works)
Procurement Division (PD) issues a Request for Proposal (RFP)

Bids/Proposals received
- Evaluation for technical/operational compliance and cost.

Headquarters Committee on Contracts reviews Bids
- If above $5 million (lowest bid, or sole bid above $2m)

Contract Award

Coordination between MCS, TCC/PCC and Contractor

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**Key message:** MOVCON can initiate the contracting process only after receiving complete and correct information from the P/TCC: load lists, dangerous cargo list, cargo readiness date and pick-up location of the shipment.

As this will be a commercial contract awarded to a commercial company, MOVCON will develop a Scope of Work and will work with Procurement Division, to go out to the UN Global Market Place.

When purported vendors will send their bids, the compliance for technical requirements will be assessed primarily (time line, dates, assets used, etc.), before assessing the commercial proposal – that is to say the cost of the operation.

The HCC review, when needed, is an internal review process for contracts above the 5 M$ threshold (2 M$ for sole bid).
HCC: Headquarters Committee on Contracts, reviews the contracting process to check that all procurement rules were complied with and that the process was fair.
That review will add some time to the process (one to two weeks) unless requested to process it in emergency.

Once the contract is awarded, MOVCON will send a coordination fax to all actors involved: P/TCC, Contractor, Mission, etc. with, among other things the final Cargo Readiness Date (= shipment ready to load, everything packed, lined up, documents all ready, everything ready for the crane to start loading). The CRD will determine everything.

Cargo readiness date is most important, as if the carrier is ending a ship in the port of origin and the cargo is not ready, penalties will be incurred if the ship has to stay for a longer time than planned,
waiting for the cargo to be ready. While this is important for a sea movement, this is all the more important for an air movement which is more costly and where the aircraft may not be as flexible as the ship and is constrained by clearances more difficult to obtain.
Key message: The P/TCC is responsible for obtaining the export clearance for his equipment. The composition of the cargo must correspond to the negotiated MOU.

The point of origin may be different for deployment and the repatriation (especially if the itinerary is shorter on repatriation).

Important to note again that the TCC/PCC responsible to obtain the export clearance, even if the UN arranges the move.

The MOVCON specialist will always be deployed to help an emerging TCC or in case of airlifting a whole unit. It can always be requested to MOVCON (they have a long term contract with a shipping company providing the specialist).

Liability is assumed by the party arranging the move – only for damages over 10% of the GFMV, as per COE Manual, in order to avoid claims for insignificant damages.

Marine cargo survey: to assess the state of the vehicles / cargo before shipping, in order to be able to deal fairly later on with any claim for damages. With a counter signature from the carrier representative. If a UN personnel is not present, the T/PCC can do this by itself – again with the carrier representative.

Self drive vs. carriage: As per the UN rules the (in a contract) vehicles can be self-driven not more than 5 km (for loading/off-loading, bridge crossing) T/PCC has to determine in advance whether its vehicles will have to be driven by the carrier personnel or by the T/PCC personnel, and to arrange accordingly to have qualified personnel available at the arrival location – or not. The MOVCON specialist, when present, can be useful here as well.
Key message: after the correct load lists have been submitted by the P/TCC, it takes 4 to 6 weeks before the transport contract can be awarded.

Here is the time line, counted in weeks.
The part in red is dotted because this could go on for months before the unit gets ready for shipment. So the information package is sent by MOVCON to the TCC once MOVCON receives the initial notification about the deployment of the unit – after a successful PDV and finalization of the MOU. Following that the work really starts for MOVCON after it has received accurate load lists from the T/PCC.

Then it takes one more week to do the bidding and go to the market, and 2 to 3 more weeks to receive offers from the vendors.
The internal process of sorting out the bids, determining the most compliant, doing the internal review by the HCC when necessary will take another two weeks until the contract is approved and awarded. That’s about four weeks total before the contract is awarded.
Key message: airlifting the COE is a command decision as the cost is 7 to 10 times more than surface shipment.

Then if we are going by air, after the contract has been awarded we need to secure the mandatory overflight and landing clearances and see how many flights are needed; depending on the number of necessary flights and the number of planes assigned to the task, it may take another 2 to 4 weeks. So that can be 7 weeks from start to finish – if everything goes as planned (it often happens that the overflight clearances take a lot of time to come, therefore delaying the whole process).
Key message: airlift of military cargo requires a number of clearances which have to be requested two to three weeks in advance of the movement.

For the airlift TCC/PCC is responsible that all cargo positioned to the airport of embarkation, custom cleared and ready for loading to an aircraft. The contractor will be responsible to load and unload the cargo to/from an aircraft.

Inland transportation from the Unit location to the Airport will be reimbursed by the UN.

It is imperative that you advise us immediately of any delay in readiness. Any change in the contract dates may have financial implications and any charges incurred, due to a delay in cargo readiness, will be recovered from the COE reimbursements.

Please note that Section 7 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (to which your Country is a signatory) provides that the United Nations (and contractors under its sole charter) is exempt from all direct taxes, customs duties and charges of a similar nature in the airport of embarkation.

In details:

- Diplomatic Clearance (DC) requests must be submitted 10-15 working days in advance of flight date and only one date change is allowed.
- Some countries (RSA, Brazil) require 25 working days in advance;
• DC requests must be accompanied with inbound and outbound pax manifest, including weapon serial number identified by pax
• Load lists for any cargo transported on passenger flights must be submitted 4 weeks in advance to obtain customs clearance;
• Special permissions /exemptions are required for the transportation of Dangerous Goods ,
• Air operators should be certified to airlift military cargo and ammunition;
• Custom & Immigration pre-clearance, visa issues in South Sudan require from 3 weeks to 9 months.
Specific Areas of Concern
(Airlift – CAR / MINUSCA)

- 1 Cargo flight a day (4 flights a week)
- No flights on Sundays
- Avoid Tuesdays & Fridays (Air France, Royal Air Maroc, Kenyan Airways etc.)
- Airport is operational by day time only
- Limited Material Handling Equipment
- Airport closure due to the civil unrest

Key message: airports in host countries often have strong limitations due to poor infrastructure and traffic congestion.

International Airports in host countries often have harsh limitations due to limited capacities, poor infrastructure, lack of qualified personnel and traffic congestion caused by the installation of a peacekeeping mission.
Key message: depending on distance between ports and final destination, sealift on average takes more time than airlift but offers more flexibility.

If we do a sealift, there is a little more variance depending on how far we’re going – and of course there is inland movement on the other side – think of MINUSCA, the ships unloading in Douala / Cameroon and then the cargo having to go by road through the border into CAR, to Bangui and on to the final destination. Specific Areas of Concern (Sea/Surface) :

- Special Transit Clearances (Message Porte in Cameroon, pre-clearance of the cargo in South Sudan, Suez & Gibraltar, Panama) may cause delays
- Douala Port operation requires 2-3 weeks (off-loading, custom clearance, GPS installation, security escort arrangements and etc).
- Border crossing also may take more than a week (custom clearance, military escort twice a week).
- Another week in Bangui for custom clearance and military escort to the final destination.
- Poor unpassable road conditions, bridges/ferry limitations;
- Rainy season;
- Road closures due to civil unrest.

Something to mention again is detention and demurrage charges. If you say to us that the cargo will be ready for shipment on such day, and the ship arrives, and the cargo is in fact not ready for collection/loading, the UN is going to pay additional charges for each day the ship is forced to stay in the port (demurrage). In this case, if the delay is caused by the P/TCC, the UN is going to come back to the member state and asked him to compensate the demurrage charges – most likely they will be deducted from the first COE reimbursement due to the Government following arrival in the mission area.
Specific Areas of Concern (Sea/Surface)

* Cargo Load List Preparation
  - Inaccurate dimensions/weights
  - Inaccurate calculations (i.e. total volume)
  - Packing List vs Cargo Load List for planning (need shipping container dimensions/weights)
  - Inaccurate information on Dangerous Cargo
  - Undeclared Dangerous Goods
  - MOVCON Specialist (UN personnel or contractors - Toll Remote Logistics or Heavyweight Air Express) will help to resolve these problems

* Weather conditions

Key message: cargo transport under UN arrangement is done “door to door”, from COE location in the TCC to the final destination in the mission.

Sea/surface deployment will be done from Door (COE location in the TCC/PCC) to Door (final destination in a mission).

TCC/PCC is required to assist with the custom & export clearance. NO transportation arrangements or any equipment are required from TCC/PCC.

Please note that Section 7 of the *Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations* (to which your Country is a signatory) provides that the United Nations (and contractors under its sole charter) is exempt from all direct taxes, customs duties and charges of a similar nature (including warfage charges).

[Warfage: a charge assessed by a shipping terminal or port when goods are moved through the location].
Key message: the transport of COE and troops within mission areas is often hampered and delayed by difficult local conditions.

Specifics of current missions:

MINUSMA:
➢ Convoy with the COE was attacked in “Green zone” with No security risks/concerns/military escort requirement.
➢ Government of Senegal delayed approval of Messages Porte /Transit permits, it caused delays with the deployment / financial penalties (vessel’s demurrage charges and trucks detention charges), moreover some COE were re-routed through Abidjan or Cotonou.
➢ Additional unofficial fees and charges in the roads.
➢ FAMA escort services becomes not reliable.

UNAMID & UNISFA:
➢ Government of Sudan (MOFA) applied following restrictions - vehicles manufactured only in 2019 can be imported to Sudan;
➢ Special regulations on the import of electronic equipment. (All radios must be disassembled, removed from vehicles & presented to the Government Authorities for verification & approval of frequencies.

UNMISS:
➢ Nothing can be deployed to South Sudan without prior approval by the Government & Custom;
➢ Import taxes (30% of the value) applied to all goods including COE & UNOE;
➢ Additional fees & Border crossing restrictions at Nimule;
➢ No weapons & ammunition allowed to be transported by surface in South Sudan, it must be airlifted
➢ Immigration pre-approval for the incoming personnel. (no changes in Passenger manifest are allowed;

MONUSCO:
➢ No military equipment & ammo can be deployed to DR Congo without prior approval by the Government & Custom;
➢ Heavy delays with transit permits (DRC, Zambia, Rwanda) and over-flight and landing clearances (DRC);
➢ Unreliable local subcontractors (DIRCO and etc)
➢ Train crash between Illebo & Kananga;
➢ Vessel General Average due to the lower level of water in Congo river.
➢ Limited navigation period (2-4 months Congo river and others).

UNDOF:
➢ No Israeli made items allowed to be imported to Lebanon & Syria.
➢ Special regulations/documentation on the import of electronic equipment.
➢ A month required for Custom clearance the Port of Beirut (2 weeks for Lebanon + 2 weeks for Syria).
MINUSCA specific challenges

- Military Cargo import & transit requests (Message Porté) required 3-4 weeks for approval by the President of Cameroon;
- Douala port operations requires 2-4 weeks (Custom Clearance, GPS, Special escort to the border);
- Delays in Garoua Bouale border crossing point; (BGFT, Military escort to Bangui etc.);
- Delays in Bangui; (BARC fees, custom clearance)
- Limited Military escort to final destination (once a week);
- Very bad road conditions (unpassable during the rainy season).
- Lack of suitable bridges and ferries to cross rivers in the remote areas.
- Resistance from local population for the deployment of UN personnel & COE to their areas. (road blockage & destruction);

Key message: cargo transport under UN arrangement is done “door to door”, from COE location in the TCC to the final destination in the mission.

Sea/surface deployment will be done from Door (COE location in the TCC/PCC) to Door (final destination in a mission).
TCC/PCC is required to assist with the custom & export clearance. NO transportation arrangements or any equipment are required from TCC/PCC.

Please note that Section 7 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (to which your Country is a signatory) provides that the United Nations (and contractors under its sole charter) is exempt from all direct taxes, customs duties and charges of a similar nature (including wharfage charges).

[Wharfage: a charge assessed by a shipping terminal or port when goods are moved through the location].

MINUSCA Challenges:
➢ Requirement for the Message Porte prior arrival of a vessel to Douala (must be approved & signed by the President of Cameroon), otherwise she will not be allowed to berth. (will cause vessel demurrage charges approx. $15,000 per day)
➢ 3-4 weeks are required for Douala port operations:
  - Custom clearance,
  - Installation of Special GPS (very limited number),
  - Gendarmerie escort arrangements,
➢ One route: Douala, Cameroon – Bangui, C.A.R. causes bottleneck at the border crossing point Garoua Bouale – Beloco.
➢ Frequent attacks on the convoys with COE & UNOE;
➢ Limited military escorts:
- to Bangui 2 times a week (Tuesday & Saturday);
- from Bangui to Bambari/Bria - once a week (Wednesday);
➢ The Bureau d’Affrètement Routier Centrafricain (BARC) watches over the strict respect of the quota of cargo between Cameroonian and Central African transporters. It should be mentioned that as per an agreement with the two countries, 60% of cargo in transit at Douala Port to the Central African Republic should be transported on Central African trucks, whereas the remaining 40% should be transported on Cameroonian trucks. However, there is a limited number of available trucks in good conditions.
➢ Additional fees in Cameroon for Bureau de Gestion du Fret Terrestre (BGFT) and BARC in C.A.R.
➢ All containers with COE & UNOE to be positioned & inspected in the Custom Yard in Bangui, it causes delays & additional charges, moreover one pistol (Jordanian FPU) was stolen.
➢ Lack of suitable bridges and ferries to cross rivers in the remote areas.
➢ Resistance from local population for the deployment of UN personnel & COE to their areas. (road blockage & destruction);
➢ Limited navigation period (2-4 months Ubanga river).
Due to the conditions of the bridge near Katanga, DR Congo the deployment of Indonesian COE to MONUSCO was heavily delayed.
Lecture Take Away

- The COE Manual and the MOVCON Manual are available on UN PCRS Website and provide all necessary information for the planning and execution of COE and passengers shipments.
- The UN is responsible for the cost of deploying and repatriating the COE and personnel.
- MOVCON needs exact information/documentation from the T/PCC to initiate the shipment contracting process: accurate Load Lists, DG Lists, cargo readiness date, initial location of the cargo, Consignor & POC to coordinate the deployment.
- The composition of the cargo must not deviate from the list of equipment jointly approved in the MOU.
Learning Outcomes

• Learn about the LOA and LOA policies
• Learn about the LOA information requirements
• Understand the LOA planning and contracting process.
• Learn about the LOA reimbursement
• Learn about the constraints attached to transport under LOA
What are advantages of the transportation on the LOA:

- Flexibility on the assets to be used, dates, cargo configuration & priority;
- Possibility to deploy/repatriate NSE delegations, spare parts, self-sustained equipment;
- All funds and resources are used for National economy;
- Media advertisement and etc.

Disadvantage - all responsibilities will be taken by T/PCC (damages, delays, extra costs and etc.)
Key message: a Letter Of Assist is a legally binding contractual document between the United Nations and a Government for provision of services to the UN.

As seen in the Module D / Reimbursements, LOAs are typically used for (non-limitative examples):
- Movement of personnel (deployment/roto/repatriation)
- Movement of COE (depl/roto/repatriation)
- Provision of military aircraft or vessels (here: BNS Osman with Indonesia Navy Sigma class corvette in Lebanon UN) to a mission.
- Provision of services to a mission by a member state; typically, a special need arises for essential equipment or services not available through normal sources of supply in the mission area. For example, a well drilling team, rehabilitation of an unpaved runway by personnel which are not part of the Force (therefore not working under a MOU).
- Only the two first examples are concerned in this lecture (Movement of personnel & equipment) – We saw the case of contribution of military aircraft previously in the force generation module.
Key message: a Letter Of Assist requires more lead time for approval than a standard commercial contract.

[As seen previously in Module D / Reimbursements]

The COE Manual / Chapter 4 disposes that a P/TCC can offer to provide certain services (transport) to the UN against compensation – or that the UN may request such services when unable to arrange them by itself. In this case this is done under a Letter Of Assist (LOA).

Further, Annex A to Chapter 4 summarizes the rules governing LOAs.

A LOA is a contracting method by which the UN arranges for special supplies or services to be provided by the TCC/PCC. LOAs are used when:

a) a special need arises for essential items or services that are not available from normal sources of supply;
b) a contingent’s country is the only logical source of supply;
c) a contingent’s COE MOU does not cover the items or services required;
d) military aircraft(s) or naval vessel(s) are contributed by a TCC/PCC; or
e) a TCC/PCC wishes to arrange for the transportation of equipment/personnel for deployment, rotation or repatriation.

DOS has the authority to issue LOAs, which must be signed by representatives of the TCC/PCC Permanent Mission and the UN prior to deployment.

A LOA is a legally binding contractual document between the United Nations and a Government. It provides the appropriate authority for procurement of services on behalf of the United Nations. It will
also specify how reimbursement will be made. Detailed information about letters of assist can be found in the Procurement Manual.

A LOA is an exception to a formal method of solicitation: no evaluation of the offer, no international competition, etc. This is also the reason why there is no formal evaluation of the assets the P/TCC is using to provide the service (whereas in a commercial contracting process, as per Procurement rules there is a mandatory technical evaluation of each offer submitted by the bidders, with a check of compliance and a comparative note attributed to each offer).

There is a need for more lead time because the internal approval process is more time consuming, especially if the LOA has to be reviewed by the HCC – Headquarters Committee on Contracts – which is the case for LOAs exceeding $ 200,000, which is very low in case of important transport of COE.
Key message: the COE Manual, Chapter 4, disposes that a T/PCC can offer to provide transportation under a Letter Of Assist instead of the UN making the necessary arrangements.

So the policy is, the T/PCC may do it if they want to do it – or if the UN is unable to do it.

When a troop/police contributor offers to provide transportation, movement will be under the terms of a Letter of Assist (LOA). UN Financial Regulations and Rules – Cooperation (ST/SGB/2013/04) In this case the rule is “Cooperation”, which is the rule that allows the UN to deal with Member States.

The LOA must be signed in advance of the deployment. Some TCCs sometimes do the movements (especially rotations) before even requesting the LOA, which is a very bad financial and budgetary practice that the Financial Controller is bound to frown over. Furthermore, the reimbursement is not guaranteed if the level of reimbursement has not been agreed to beforehand.
LOA Responsibilities

Liability for **loss or damage** during transportation is assumed by the **arranging party**

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Key message: as per COE Manual, the liability for loss or damage during transportation is assumed by the **arranging party** – i.e. the T/PCC in the case of a Letter Of Assist.

The party arranging for the transportation is responsible for any loss or damage incurred during the transit – meaning in case of a LOA, it is the responsibility of the Member State to arrange for compensation / insurance with his chosen carrier in case of damages.
Key message: the level of reimbursement of a Letter Of Assist is based on the mode of transport the UN would have used and the cost the UN would have incurred for provision of the same service.

So again it’s in the COE Manual, Chapter 4.

- The reimbursement is based on the mode of transport the UN would have used in order to meet the operational requirement

- The TCC/PCC retains the option to reject the UN’s level of reimbursement and have UN arrange

- Should the TCC/PCC reject, UN to arrange the movement, the UN will initiate its procurement and contracting activities

- Early submission of LOA requests (at least 3 months)

The market survey for COE and UN EWB quotation allows the UN to know what it would have paid to contract the same service, the way the UN would have done it; this is the reimbursement that will be proposed to the P/TCC, even if the proposal of the Government is higher. The Government may refuse the proposed reimbursement and ask the UN to arrange the movement. In this case the deployment delays will be extended, since the UN will have to start all over again after the initial market survey.

There is also room for negotiation in some cases (provision of specific services especially) whereas the amount to reimburse will be agreed to between the UN and the member State.
Because of the market survey requirement and HCC involvement, the request for LOA should be submitted well in advance – at least 8 weeks. Moreover, obtaining various clearances through diplomatic channels (because it is a move for the UN) costs more time. For air movements, overflight clearances for dangerous goods, weapons and ammos in addition to normal cargo have to be obtained from each country the plane will fly over, plus the country where the plane is registered and the country of arrival.
Key message: in the case of a movement under LOA, MOVCON will initiate a market survey upon reception of the correct load lists from the T/PCC.

And this sequence is also the same as for a UN-arranged movement, except now MOVCON has to do a market survey to see what it would cost (remember that with the LOA, the P/TCC will be reimbursed what it would have cost the UN to provide the same service).

So the T/PCC may want to do the transport with one of his Navy ships.
Key message: the information requirements are the same for the LOA arrangement as for a UN arranged movement: MOVCON must receive correct load lists and dangerous goods lists corresponding the negotiated MOU.

The required information is basically the same as for a UN-arranged movement (cf. slide and text # 23).
Key message: inaccurate load lists, undeclared dangerous goods in shipments and delay in processing overflight and landing clearances are common areas of concern when arranging transport under LOA.

Most common problems when preparing a move under LOA stem from:

- Inaccurate load lists forwarded to MOVCON, cause for delay due to need to correct the mistakes before doing a market survey
- Confusion between packing list and cargo load list
- Inaccurate dangerous goods declaration and load list, also cause for delay in processing the LOA
- Cargo readiness date not respected by T/PCC, cause for demurrage charges and delays in deployment
- Delays by host countries in processing various clearances: landing, overflight, custom.
- Refusal, by some member states, to allow UN cargo to transit through their territories (rare occurrence, but happened): necessity to contact these countries you want to drive through well before the movement.
LOA and UN Areas of Concern

Dangerous Goods in Contingent Cargo

- Dangerous Goods (DG) contained in sustainment cargo not properly handled or declared, or forbidden on PAX flights.

Key message: Most of dangerous goods are strictly forbidden to transport on passengers flights.

Same concerns:

Dangerous goods undeclared in sustainment cargo: cause for delays, customs issues, etc. Dangerous goods in passengers flights are forbidden and cause for delays / refusal to allow taking off (explosives, tear gas, TNT, grenades, sulfuric acid, pesticides, bleach, etc.). The 100 Kg allowance per passenger are for personal belongings and gear, not for sustainment cargo whose shipment remains a national responsibility, and is reimbursed under the MOU.
Key message: mishandling or bad packing of dangerous goods can be harmful to the crew, and also might cause damages to the aircraft itself.
Key message: mishandling or bad packing of dangerous goods can be harmful to the crew, and also might cause damages to the aircraft itself.
New costing methodology in effect since 4 August 2017.

- T/PCCs know immediately the level of reimbursement.
- The T/PCCs may plan better.
- Eliminate complaints about erratic market surveys.
- Transparency with T/PCCs

Key message: The new LOA costing methodology applies only to airlifting of personnel; it allows a better planning of transport for the T/PCCs.

- By a memorandum dated 08 February 2017, the ASG DFS (as DOS was called at the time) advised the ASG OCSS of the new costing methodology for reimbursement of Member States for strategic air transport services conducted under Letters of Assist. On 11 April 2017, the ASG OCSS concurred with the proposed new costing methodology.
- On 03 July 2017 a presentation was provided to all TCC/PCCs on the new costing methodology. It was followed with a fax signed by the Director LSD (as the Logistics Division was called at the time) to all Military/Police Advisors on 04 August 2017, in which they were informed that this methodology would be effective on this date.
Key message: by inputting the various factors of a transportation in the calculation sheet, the T/PCC can know immediately what the UN will reimburse for a given movement of personnel.
Key message: the distance between airports can be obtained online on Flightmanager.com.

The calculation sheet includes the necessary link to know the distance between airports.
Lecture Take Away

- A Letter Of Assist is a legally binding contractual document between the United Nations and a Government for provision of services to the UN.
- To arrange a transport under LOA, MOVCON must receive the cargo load lists and dangerous goods list in advance of the movement.
- The LOA has to be finalized between the UN and the T/PCC before any movement can take place.
- Self sustainment cargo must not be transported on passengers flights.
Learning Outcomes

• Learn about the basic rules governing rotation of COE
• Learn about exceptions applying to the rotation of COER
Lecture Content

• Policy
• Exceptions
Key message: as a standard rule the rotation or replacement of contingent owned equipment destroyed or worn out is a T/PCC responsibility.

COA Manual Chapter 4: Contingent-owned equipment brought in to a peacekeeping mission area is expected to remain for the duration that the troop/police contributor participates in that mission, and will not be rotated with contingent personnel.
Key message: by exception to the standard rule, the transportation of extra major equipment requested by the UN, or having served for at least 7 years or 50% of its useful life, can be done at UN expense under certain conditions.

COE Manual Chapter 4:

- The United Nations will be responsible only for reimbursing a troop/police contributor for transportation costs of extra equipment brought into a mission area when mutually agreed (so triggering an amendment to the existing MOU).

- Certain categories of major equipment under prolonged deployment to peacekeeping missions which are non-operable, or for which continued maintenance is not economical in the mission area, can be considered for rotation at United Nations expense at the discretion of a mission contingent-owned equipment/memorandum of understanding management review board (CMMRB) in consultation with the applicable contingent commander, on the basis of operational requirements within the mission.

- Eligible ME must have been continuously deployed for at least 7 years or 50 per cent of its estimated useful life – the basis for the “useful life” of a piece of ME is what is mentioned in the rate of reimbursements, Chapter 8, Annex A (Estimated useful life in years), which varies with each type / category of ME.

[It is the estimated useful life of a piece of ME that is used in conjunction with its GFMV to calculate the basic monthly rate of reimbursement of the ME (Monthly Dry Lease rate)]
Categories of equipment concerned: aircraft/airfield support equipment, armoured personnel carriers (tracked), armoured personnel carriers (wheeled), engineering equipment, engineering vehicles, support vehicles (commercial pattern) and, support vehicles (military pattern).

This last rule was implemented following the COE WG 2014. It was confirmed by the COE WG 2017 and the categories were expanded by recommendation of same.

Major equipment of eligible categories lost or damaged as a result of hostile action or forced abandonment will also be considered for rotation at United Nations expense (no time limit).


The CMMRB makes the recommendation, upon request from the contingent commander. The request from all PK missions will be processed by LD and submitted to the USG for decision. If the number of requested rotations exceeds the funds allotted to that particular activity for the budget year, the USG will make decisions based on priorities (based on state of the COE, mission / tasks of the concerned unit, operational situation in each PKO and so on).
Lecture Take Away

- As per COE Manual, the Contingent Owned Equipment deployed to a Mission is expected to remain for the duration of the deployment.
- Equipment destroyed or worn out is to be replaced at the T/PCC’s expense.
- The replacement equipment of certain categories of Major Equipment deployed for more than 7 years or 50% of their useful lives can be transported at UN expense under certain conditions.
Learning Outcomes

• Learn about the rules governing the deployment and rotation of contingent personnel.
• Learn about the planning, time line and execution of personnel rotations.
Lecture Content

• Policy
• Responsibilities
• TimeLine
Contingent Personnel

- Strategic movement of personnel on deployment, rotation and repatriation
- Entitlements (personal baggage)
- Rotation cycle of 1 year
- Exemptions:
  - Naval forces
  - Operational circumstances approved by USG DPO.

Key message: save for exceptions granted for operational reasons and for naval forces, the normal cycle of rotation of military and police units is of one rotation per year at UN expense. Additional rotations would be done at P/TCC expense.

Same concept as for the cargo: the deployment, repatriation or rotation of uniformed personnel to and from a UN mission is a UN responsibility. It can be arranged by the UN, or done by the Government under LOA.

The rotations of uniformed personnel, in particular, take place in the framework of the Mission Rotation Plan (MRP) established by Mission Support in collaboration with the Mission leadership, Force Commander and Police Commissioner.

The Mission Rotation Plan takes into account the operational constraints of the mission, the life of the mission, the charge of the airport used for rotations and also the availability of ground transport assets (to move personnel to and from the airport). Therefore, even if a movement is done by the T/PCC under LOA it has to be organized so as to fit in the MRP as planned.

The rotation of company-size units is usually done in one go. However the rotation of FPUs is often done in two fractions (30% - 70%) at two weeks interval, for continuity / operational reasons.

Baggage Entitlement.
- The weights authorized for individual baggage entitlement include weapon, body armor and helmet (not self sustainment cargo!!).
• Baggage entitlement is based on complete unit tour length, not an individual’s time in the mission area.

• For rotations following tours of less than 12 months, a maximum of 45 Kg (0.3 m³) per person is authorized inclusive of carry on baggage (same for initial deployment / final repatriation, when COE is deployed / repatriated).

• For rotations following a tour of 12 months or more, a maximum of 100 Kg (0.6m³) per person is authorized inclusive of carry on baggage;

• One-year rotation cycle: Senior Advisory Group recommendation, GA Resolution 67/858 dated 6 May 2013. Exceptions for naval personnel, medical personnel, aviation units (or at least the flying crew); approved by the USG DPO.
Personal Baggage Entitlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military/Police personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tour Of Duty &gt;= 12 months</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 100 kg/0.6 m³ per person of personal baggage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• (up to 4 x pieces ≤ 23 kgs each (0.5 cbm total) + 1 x hand carry ≤ 8 kgs (0.1 cbm))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tour Of Duty &lt; 12 months</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 45 kg/0.27 m³ per person of personal baggage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• (up to 2 x pieces ≤ 20 kgs each (0.22 cbm total) + 1 x hand carry ≤ 5 kgs (0.05 cbm))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key message: the entitlement to personal baggage of contingent personnel deploying to a peacekeeping operation is 100 Kg for deployments equal or superior to 12 months, and is reduced to 45 Kg if the duration of the deployment is less than 12 months.

The definition of the baggage:

Baggage is to contain personal belongings, which are defined as items of clothing and other professional items necessary to the traveler for the safe and effective accomplishment of his/her tour of duty in the mission area.

Personal effects shall not include household goods such as large appliances, furniture, televisions, stereo set, kitchen accessories, or any kind of item that is not strictly related to, and/or necessary for the job description to which the traveler in question is assigned for.

If applicable individual weapons; weapons shall be included as part of the checked baggage.

If the actual TOD of military/police personnel in a mission area is less than 12 months they are loosing their entitlement for 100 kgs, despite the second rotation was done by TCC/PCC expenses.
Transportation of additional cargo

- No cargo (other than baggage within the authorized entitlement) will be permitted on board UN chartered aircraft or accepted into a field mission on LOA aircraft without authority from this HQ.
- Should a TCC/PCC wish to utilize a rotation flight for the carriage of additional cargo, the TCC/PCC must submit a Cargo Movement Request Form (see referring fax for format or contact our offices).
- The Movement Control Section/LD will then analyze the request and liaise with the Air Operator and DPO field missions to confirm whether or not the additional cargo can be accommodated.
- Additional cargo will be accepted provided
  - the carriage is in accordance with international regulations,
  - there is space available at no added cost to the UN (or if there is additional cost the TCC/PCC agrees to pay),
  - the receiving mission can, and agrees to, handle the additional cargo.

Key message: transportation of additional cargo on board of UN chartered aircraft may only be authorized by UNHQ upon submission of a Cargo Movement Request Form.
Key message: self-sustainment cargo should not be transported on passengers rotation flights as it is a national responsibility and reimbursed under the MOU.

The Self sustainment cargo on passengers rotation flights is forbidden as it is a national responsibility and reimbursed under the MOU.
Key message: the strategic transport of the contingent personnel is almost always done by air, either by UN-arranged commercial flights or by the P/TCC under LOA.

Movements are done using a number of means: chartering planes, long term and short term, Mission aircraft, LOA, commercial tickets for groups under 50 pax (the latter done by personnel Section, not MOVCON).

**Necessary Information provided to MOVCON should Include:**
- Date of deployment or previous rotation;
- Period of deployment under MOU;
- Contingents requirement to rotate or repatriate;
- Proposed dates of rotation;
- Number of personnel to rotate or repatriate inbound and outbound;
- Number of rotations or flights proposed;
- Airport/port to be used within the Mission Area;
- Airport/port to be used outside of the Mission Area.
Key message: the main duties of the advance party is to prepare the ground for the arrival of the main body and to assist with the arrival of COE by providing support as required.

What are the P/TCC responsibilities in terms of personnel strategic movement:

- Training completed before movement – see module G “Contingent preparation before deployment”
- HR screening done
- Complete documentation; in particular:
  - For medical personnel, documents pertaining to professional qualification and certification have to be communicated to Medical Support Section 3 months in advance in order to check professional qualifications (doctors, nurses, etc.).
  - Of course the travel documents: passports current, visas if /when necessary, passengers manifest...
- Advance Party.
Whenever the deployment of an advance party has been agreed, the Contingent Advance Party will arrive 2 to 7 days prior to scheduled arrival of the COE. The Advance party usually, but not necessarily, arrives by air together with sufficient stores and equipment, including rations, water and transport to be self sufficient until the arrival of the COE. The main duties of the advance party is to prepare the ground for the arrival of the main body and to assist with the arrival of COE by providing specialist driver, security and other support as required.
When planning the rotation, the TCC should organize the rotation plan so that continuity of the mission is maintained.
• In mission movement has to be planned, whenever the location of the unit is far away from the airport of embarkation. Unit’s assets may be used when available, but movements to and from the APOE can also be arranged in advance with MOVCON / Mission.
Key message: 4 to 6 weeks are necessary for MOVCON to arrange the transport of uniformed personnel by commercial contract.

This time instead of load lists we are going to look for passenger lists: list of individuals with DOB and passport data.
And then more or less the 4 weeks necessary as see before for the cargo transport.
Key message: overflight clearances should be requested well in advance for the transport by air of uniformed personnel.

As seen previously in the case of cargo transport, it may take times to obtain all necessary overflight clearances; therefore when done by the P/TCC plenty of lead time should be allowed in order to avoid delays.
Lecture Take Away

- The rotation of contingent personnel should start to be prepared at least eight weeks in advance to the movement (3 months if done under LOA).
- It takes MOVCON 4 to 6 weeks to arrange commercial rotation flights for a contingent, and about 8 weeks to process a LOA request.
- For air movements the arranging party is responsible for obtaining the various overflight and landing clearances, which in some cases may significantly extend the delays.
Learning Outcomes

- Learn about the various functions provided by UN PCRS Link and other useful websites and who can benefit.

- UN PCRS website http://pcrs.un.org is the webpage where member states can access both the MOVCON tools and the PCRS tools.
Lecture Content

- UN PCRS Website functions
- UN PCRS Website users
- UN Policies: MOVCON Manual, COE Manual & TCC Guidelines
- Web Pages used by MOVCON
UN PCRS website [http://pcrs.un.org](http://pcrs.un.org) is the webpage where member states can access both the MOVCON tools and the PCRS tools.
UN PCRS website [http://pcrs.un.org](http://pcrs.un.org)

Three broad objectives:

**Single gateway to make pledges**
- Personnel, equipment, training

**Resource hub**
- Policy and guidance documents

**Movement Planning**
- Submission, coordination, information

**Key message:** UN PCRS Link is both a resource hub and a movement planning tool to submit documents, coordinate movements and facilitate the circulation of information between MOVCON and the P/TCC.

From the MOVCON perspective, UN PCRS Link was conceived to be a resource hub for member states preparing to deploy formed units, and as a planning, coordination and information tool both for the MOVCON officers and for the member states.
Key message: UN PCRS Link is a free-access resource hub providing copies of all documents and forms required to plan and execute strategic movements.

UN PCRS Link is a way to save time on the deployment of the unit, as regards the preparation of transport, through uploading the Load Lists vs sending them by fax, and generally exchanging information quickly between MOVCON and the P/TCC..

As regards MOVCON functions, **UN PCRS Link** is a website providing 24/7, “one stop shopping” access to MovCon information:

- **Online Planning Tool Kit** (Templates, Planning Tools)
- Consolidated **Reference Library** of Key Documents & Guidance
- Deployment timeline management tool
- Interactive **Load List uploads**
- Persistent and **consistent, clear communications** to TCC/PCCs
- Dashboard concept with **visual control systems** for deployment progress to easily spot problems (for both TCC/PCCs and UN managers)
- More **automated** method for UN to measure deployment timelines moving forward
- Additional features are being planned
Key Message: the UN PCRS website contains a folder dedicated to specific MOVCON resources.

This page contains UN resources available for TCCs / PCCs including UN Manuals, MOUs, various UN regulations and etc.
Key Message: the UN PCRS website contains all necessary MOVCON documents, templates and samples for dealing with the movement of troops, COE and dangerous goods.

This page contains MOVCON Manual, templates & samples of the required cargo and Dangerous Goods (DG) documentation for the deployment/repatriation/rotation of troops and COE
Key message: UN PSRC Website is a single gateway accessible both to the Permanent Missions and to the relevant services in the capitals.

Here are the different partners and players who can benefit from UN PCRS Website:

- OMA / Force Generation Service
- Uniformed Capabilities Support Division
- Movement Control Section
- The Permanent Mission
- The Police and Military services in the member states capital directly dealing with the deployment
- The deploying unit.
Websites used by MOVCON

• Dangerous Goods (DG) regulations /documentation in accordance with IATA and ICAO:
  – https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/cargo/dgr/Pages/index.aspx
  – https://www.iata.org/publications/store/Pages/DGR-print-manuals.aspx

• Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS):

• International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG):

Key Message: all necessary information about dangerous goods transportation can be found on the Internet, on websites used by MOVCON and in free access.

IATA The International Air Transport Association is the trade association for the world’s airlines, representing some 290 airlines or 82% of total air traffic.

ICAO. The International Civil Aviation Organization is an aviation technical body of the United Nations, provides a global forum for 193 member States to adopt and implement international aviation standards:
Websites used by MOVCON

• Air Distance Calculator:
  https://www.flightmanager.com/content/TimeDistanceForm.aspx

• Sea Distance Calculator:
  https://ddt.dataloy.com/#/login

• Vessel Finder:
  https://www.vesselfinder.com/

Key Message: exact air and sea distances for strategic transport purposes are easily calculated using Internet-based tools in free access.

Air and Sea distance calculators helps are used for the planning of the transportation. Vessel finder websites are very useful as it’s show the actual position of a vessel with UN COE or UNOE.
Lecture Take Away

- UN PCRS link [http://pcrs.un.org](http://pcrs.un.org) is a website providing 24/7 access to MovCon information relative to Strategic Movement.
- Confidential information pertaining to P/TCCs are password protected.
- The key reference documents and guidance are in free access.