EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The aim of this paper is to communicate the UN’s uniformed capability requirements in the context of the current and emerging peacekeeping environment. In recent months the Secretary-General’s Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative and the Declaration of Shared Commitments have been endorsed by 151 Member States with four expressions of support from regional organizations, demonstrating global collaboration for a set of shared commitments that will help strengthen peacekeeping, including through new and improved uniformed capabilities.

The peacekeeping partnership between the Secretariat and Member States, either as troop and police contributors or financial contributors, demands focused and coordinated efforts to provide adequate support to our peacekeepers in the field and generate the appropriate resources for the efficient delivery of our mandates. The 2019 UN Peacekeeping Ministerial, to be held on 29 March in New York, will build on the A4P Declaration of Shared Commitments and be part of the on-going effort to generate specific capabilities for UN peacekeeping to meet our evolving needs and address new challenges. Member States wishing to make new pledges at the 2019 UN Peacekeeping Ministerial should use this paper to guide planning on such pledges. Pledges of capabilities not listed in this paper are discouraged.

While many units are registered in the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS), specialized and high-performing capabilities for peacekeeping are still in short supply, particularly critical enablers, rapidly deployable capabilities, French speakers and women peacekeepers. These are also areas that many countries struggle with, and the reason partnerships for capacity-building is so vital.

The operational environment and challenges we encounter in our field missions has not changed significantly since the most recent Uniformed Capability Requirement Paper was issued in September 2018. The Secretariat is working to improve its capacity to identify medium to long-term requirements and support coordination of training and capacity-building providers. Outstanding mission-specific gaps (see page 4) as well as capabilities that will continue to be critical for the operational effectiveness of our uniformed personnel are reflected in the paper (see page 5).

Essential to the success of preparing units for deployments are the efforts Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) make to register new and confirm previous pledges in the PCRS website (pcrs.un.org). Annual pledge validation as well as close collaboration with the PCRS manager and Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell (SFGCPC) will ensure accuracy, transparency and consequently, better planning. A summary of units registered in the PCRS and deployed units is available in Annex A.

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1 This paper has been updated since the last version was issued in September 2018. It will be revised and issued on a quarterly basis to reflect changes in current and emerging requirements and new commitments made by Member States. Information is subject to change.
I. THE EVOLVING PEACEKEEPING ENVIRONMENT

The overall context in which UN peacekeepers are deployed has not experienced significant change since the last Uniformed Capability Requirements Paper in September 2018. Nevertheless, as missions advance through their life-cycle, requirements change, and at these decisive points the Secretariat and Member States must work closely to address current needs as well as anticipate future ones. With the PCRS as an organizing and planning tool, the Secretariat works to ensure the right capabilities are present at the right time and at the right place.

Operations are increasingly becoming more dynamic. With more complex mandates, and often with fewer resources, missions are expected to perform multiple, simultaneous, interdependent tasks in harsh and remote operating environments. Increased mobility, strong and secure supply chains, durable equipment and greater self-sustainability are essential. These operating conditions also impose the need for strengthened command and control, communications, situational awareness, greater interoperability between units, and more robust force protection. Missions need to communicate effectively to host populations to explain their mandates and activities, and to manage expectations of what the mission can and cannot deliver. Such outreach requires troops and police that are more proficient in the local language and able to engage effectively and safely with the local population.

These requirements have led the Secretariat to focus on the strategic generation of critical capabilities; capacity building through training and mentoring, including for mission leadership; introduction of new technologies in improving efficiency and to protect personnel and facilities; and engagement with T/PCCs to address capability shortfalls, develop interoperability, encourage a proactive mind set, as well as remove and/or pre-disclose operational caveats.

II. TRAINING AND CAPACITY BUILDING

A key focus of DPO-DOS (former DPKO-DFS) in 2018 was the implementation of the action plan resulting from the report, “Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers”. The report highlights the need for enhanced performance across the board to enhance the safety and security of peacekeepers and reduce fatalities. So far in 2018, 96 per cent of all contingent rotations were self-certified by the Member States as operationally ready, based on the requirements of the DPKO-DFS Policy on “Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement” (December 2015). However, feedback from Force Commanders, the Office for the Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership (OPSP), special investigations and conduct and discipline incidents show that not all contingents were actually operationally ready, nor trained to United Nations standards. Deployment of units that do not meet the operational standards of the United Nations is a collective concern warranting collective action for improvement. Neither the United Nations, nor Member States can afford to deploy contingents that are not ready for operations.

Training is a central requirement (but not the only requirement) for the preparation and deployment of operationally ready units. The most important pre-deployment training requirement is the need for T/PCCs to fully train their contingents in accordance with the guidance issued by the UN Secretariat, including the statement of unit requirements and the mission CONOPs, and to certify that they have done so as part of the force and police generation process. With regard to individually deployed uniformed personnel, the most important pre-deployment training requirement is to ensure that staff officers have the requisite military skills to function as staff officers at the Force (division) and Sector (brigade) level.
The Secretariat will continue to be proactive in identifying needs and matching them with the pledging countries, including through the establishment of a “light coordination mechanism” to bring together Member States that provide significant capacity-building and training support. This process has already seen targeted bilateral support delivered to five T/PCCs and will have dedicated staffing capacity devoted to it starting in 2019.

On 20 December 2018, DPO-DOS released the updated guidelines on Operational Readiness Preparation. These guidelines have been updated to reflect needs identified by Force Commanders and the “Improving Security” report. Member States that are engaged in bilateral support for TCC contingent preparation are urged to use these guidelines as they develop their training plans. Office of Military Affairs (OMA) and the Integrated Training Service (ITS) are the points of contact for questions on the guidelines.

Looking to 2019, the following support is needed to strengthen performance:

- Specific and targeted pledges of training support, delivered in T/PCC home locations, focused on training of trainers in critical unit skills such as operating in an IED environment, or counter-ambush drills. Individual skills also need enhancement – particularly with regard to staff officer duties in both core military areas and areas specific to peacekeeping. The aim of these programmes should be to build national capacity, rather than to train contingents. Recipients of these programmes should ensure that they use the support to build their own self-sustaining training capacity. ITS is the point of the contact for this issue.

- Offers to deploy mobile training teams, at national expense, into field missions to deliver targeted training or to be available to meet mission needs as they arise. Currently, the most pressing needs are in MINUSMA and the requirements focus on enhancing the military skills of contingents in order to operate in a high threat environment. ITS is the point of contact for this issue.

- The release of T/PCC personnel who have successfully participated in ITS-led training of trainers’ courses to join ITS-led training teams delivering training in missions, Entebbe or Member States. The T/PCC personnel would be required for up to two weeks and not more than twice per year. It is requested that these personnel be fully funded for travel and per diem. Member State support for these activities would expand the capacity of ITS to meet T/PCC requirements.

- Translation of various training materials into the six official languages. We prefer that Member States assume this responsibility themselves using national resources. The highest priority for translation are the Comprehensive Protection of Civilians training materials.

- Offers to host 50/50 male/female courses with all female participants being fully funded. A two-week course (UNMO or staff officer) should be preceded by a one-week female- only session which focuses on military skills and driving. Attendance should be linked to a commitment by TCCs to deploy the trained female personnel.

- Funding and dedicated slots for T/PCC officers to participate in UN-recognized national training courses.

- Assistance in the development of AMET standards and the delivery of AMET trainings, in developing a Mental Health Strategy for uniformed personnel, and in developing skill sets for Level 1 medical personnel.

- Offers to host UN courses. A priority is the continued delivery of the Core Pre-Deployment Training Material and the Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Course. Offers of support could range from the provision of training facilities through to full funding of all costs, including those of participants.
In addition to the provision of professional training for both military and police personnel, there are mission specific pre-deployment training requirements that need special attention:

- **MINUSMA**: C-IED; mine awareness; UXO awareness; first aid; French language; working with an interpreter; request for close air support from attack helicopters (forward air controllers); request for CASEVAC using utility helicopters.
- **MINUSCA**: urban operations; joint military-police operations; French language; working with an interpreter; firefighting within a camp environment; protection of civilians.
- **MONUSCO**: jungle operations, including navigation; French language; working with an interpreter.
- **UNAMID**: firefighting within a camp environment; working with an interpreter.
- **UNMISS**: working with riverine units; protection of civilians.

Member States willing to provide support to these areas are encouraged to register their pledges through the PCRS website <https://pcrs.un.org>, which now has enhanced pledging functionality for training and capacity building contributions, as well as to engage directly with ITS.²

### III. MISSION SPECIFIC UNIT GAPS

While all missions have capabilities that can and should be strengthened, only MINUSMA faces continuing gaps of formed units. Some of the gaps listed below are part of the current force requirements and are actively being generated, others stem from future projections. The below list of mission-specific critical gaps remains dynamic and will change. Member States are recommended to contact DPO’s Force Generation Service and/or Police Division for real-time updates or for more details.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Enablers</th>
<th>Aviation</th>
<th>Manoeuvre</th>
<th>Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>1 x AMET (Ménaka)</td>
<td>1 x Medium Armed Utility Helicopter Unit (Kidal)</td>
<td>1 x ISR or LRR Unit (Timbuktu; from Nov 2019) or a partner for the deployed TCC (Timbuktu); 1 x SF, QRF or LRR unit from July 2019 (Gao)</td>
<td>1 x Francophone FPU (Bamako)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 x Medium Armed Helicopter Unit (Mopti)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IV. GENERAL CAPABILITY GAPS

Despite the existing pledges in the PCRS and the engagement of Member States, some critical capability areas will require the sustained support and contributions of Member States:

- **Units which are agile and offer greater flexibility** to the missions (Rapid Deployable Units, Force Reserve Companies, Special Forces, Formed Police Units, Quick Reaction Forces and Attack Helicopters) are required for larger area domination, as authorized troop ceilings decrease. These are necessary for contributing to the provision of a secure environment for the protection of civilians, to facilitate humanitarian access and to protect themselves and mission personnel. Missions such as MONUSCO and MINUSCA have already deployed such units.

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² For updated policies and training materials, T/PCCs are requested to follow the UN Resource Hub: [http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community/training](http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community/training)
• **Peacekeeping Intelligence.** Intelligence-led operations have become more critical as UN missions expand into complex environments facing multiple threats. Military and police activity must be shaped by focused, coordinated and accurate intelligence to ensure effective operations. In the context of peacekeeping intelligence, it is critical to use human intelligence better which will require adequate recruitment and training. This will also require technologies and language capabilities that facilitate the acquisition, management, analysis and dissemination of peacekeeping intelligence to support timely decision-making within a coordinated mission-wide intelligence architecture. The following capabilities allow missions to provide this function, as well as Situational Awareness:
  o Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance units, along with specialized personnel, equipment and tools;
  o Military intelligence officers to be deployed in U2s to staff the JMACs.

• The importance of **effective enabling units** (e.g. multi-role engineers, transport, signals, aviation and medical) to the mission cannot be overstated. This has been a critical point in missions in regions with limited transportation infrastructure and scarce local resources. Improved medical care, especially night-flight capable aviation assets for CASEVAC/ MEDEVAC and mobile surgical units, is an obligation when peacekeepers are asked to operate 24 hours in high risk environments. Capable and effective engineering, transport and aviation have always been the backbone of a functioning mission and will continue to be so. Transportation units with remote self-loading and unloading capabilities and rapidly deployable engineering construction units with airfield rehabilitation expertise are some of the most recent demands. Complex environments require modern and capable signals elements that facilitate secure, interoperable communications throughout the mission area. Enabling units must be capable of protecting themselves autonomously. With the increasing number of demanding tasks, missions cannot spare infantry or FPUs to protect military enabling units.

• **Force protection** remains a top priority since our uniformed personnel face increasingly complex threats and risks. The implementation of the Action Plan to enhance the safety and security of peacekeepers and to reduce fatalities among uniformed personnel has already yielded positive results but will continue to require consistent effort on the part of T/PCCs and the Secretariat to sustain. The following gaps have been identified:
  o Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)/IED disposal/Weapons Intelligence Teams, combat engineering and combat convoy companies;
  o Advanced IED detection systems, including ground penetrating radar and hand-held explosive meters, electronic countermeasures and other alert systems linked to area or mission-wide peacekeeping intelligence resources;
  o Mine-resistant vehicles. After the revision of the Statement of Unit Requirements, MINUSMA shows a shortfall of approximately 200 mine-resistant vehicles; and
  o Indirect fire detection and warning systems integrated with bases’ C3-systems (operations centers) and increased accommodation protection measures; MONUSCO and MINUSMA could benefit from more of these assets.

• **Technology.** To ensure that peacekeeping operations are able to work safely and effectively in their evolving operating environments, the UN and Member States are seeking to modernize UN and contingent-owned force protection, survivability and duty of care systems, equipment and supporting structures. Modernization in communications, CASEVAC/ MEDEVAC, and force protection measures are some of the notable areas where the use of technology is essential.
Technology such as UAVs (MALE and UN Level 2 UAS), sense and warn systems such as counter-mortar radar alert systems, satellite imagery, visual surveillance equipment and remote sensors have become necessities for uniformed personnel to perform their tasks effectively in peacekeeping missions.

- Secure and interoperable information management and communications systems, including microwave, fibre-link and beyond line-of-sight communications;
- Aerial data and geospatial information including the near real-time sourcing and dissemination of satellite imagery. Aerial visualization, including monitoring platforms with mounted radar surveillance technology with day and night-time capability (ISR Short Take-off and Landing (STOL) fixed wing aircraft);
- Command, Control and Communications structure (C3) capable of independent mandate implementation and force protection operations at unit, sector and mission levels.

• **French-speaking troops and police**, as most peacekeepers are deployed in Francophone environments. In these missions, the United Nations lacks the capability to deploy sufficient uniformed contingents that can effectively interact with the local population, a critical element of the protection of civilians and early peacebuilding. In particular, MINUSMA still lacks a francophone FPU and MINUSCA requires more individual francophone military and police officers.

• **Gender.** In 2016, the Office of Military Affairs set two goals: i) filling at least 15 per cent of staff officer and military observer positions with women; ii) doubling the total number of police and military female peacekeepers by 2020 (to 6.4 per cent from 3.2). At UN Headquarters, DPO’s military staff is now at 21 per cent women. Achieving the goal for staff officers and military observers in the field requires nominations from Member States of suitably qualified and trained personnel. The rate has increased steadily from 6.3 per cent in July 2017 to the current rate of 12.8 per cent, with another 90 women officer appointments required to meet the 15 per cent target. This is estimated to be met early in 2019. Missions with the lowest percentage rates of female military individual personnel – and therefore the greatest need – are MINUSMA (7.6 per cent), MINUSCA (8.6 per cent) and UNIFIL (9.1 per cent).

On police, the Police Division has set the 2020 targets of filling 25 percent of UNHQ and 20 percent of field mission seconded professional posts, 22 percent individual police officers (IPOs) and 10 percent formed police units (FPUs) with women. The ratio of women has tripled within IPOs and quadrupled within FPUs since 2009. The support of Member States is crucial in nominating women within each category of personnel to ensure success in reaching our gender targets. To meet the police gender targets, another 3 female officers in UNHQ and 2 in field missions are required in professional posts, as well as an additional 1 percent in FPUs. While the target for IPOs has been reached, continued efforts are appreciated to be able to sustain it. As of December 2018, 1,333 of the 10,452 IPOs and FPUs deployed in 14 peace operations are women (12.8 percent). Women comprise 20 percent of seconded professional posts in UNHQ and 18 percent in field missions, 22 percent of IPOs and 9 percent of FPUs. 29 percent (4 of 14) heads of police components are women.

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3 The UN’s Office of Information and Communication Technology (OICT) would like to enter into agreements with Member States to access satellite imagery during times of crisis as well as explore options for standby arrangements to access experts and information from Member States’ geospatial information centers.
• **Leadership.** The men and women nominated by Member States to serve as Force Commander, Deputy Force Commander and Police Commissioner face momentous challenges in implementing ambitious mandates. As such, they must be of the highest quality in terms of relevant operational experience, training, and ethics. In addition, such leaders must have the proper mind set to successfully navigate the challenging operational and political terrain of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation. This becomes increasingly important in situations in which parties to a conflict or the host government itself do not provide full consent to the mission’s presence or freedom of action. Such qualities are no less important in the men and women chosen by Member States to serve as contingent commanders of their deployed units.

• **Staff Officers.** The ongoing selection of high caliber individual officers with the appropriate skill sets is a persistent challenge for UN peacekeeping. The UN currently deploys approximately 3,500 individual military officers in peace operations as staff officers and military experts on mission (UNMEMs). There is a continuous requirement in peacekeeping for experienced and qualified officers in the fields of, *inter alia*, military planning, UAS, C-IED, logistics, GIS and Image Analysts, defence sector reform and civil-military liaison. Work is ongoing to enhance the selection and pre-deployment training of staff officers. MINUSMA has a significant need for intelligence staff officers, but not enough officers with the education and experience required for the operational environment have been put forward by Member States.
ANNEX A
CURRENTLY PLEDGED CAPABILITIES

The PCRS is the sole entry point for Members States to commit uniformed capabilities to UN peacekeeping, the system through which the Secretariat will make its selection for deployment, and the Secretariat’s knowledge management platform for uniformed capabilities. The status of pledges in the PCRS (Level 1, Level 2, Level 3 and RDL) is shown in the table below.\(^4\) Level 1 indicates an acceptable pledge in the system. Level 2 indicates a successful AAV and the unit assessed is deemed available for a potential deployment. Level 3 indicates that the pledged capability has the contingent-owned equipment and personnel in alignment with a specific or generic UN military/police statement of requirement (SUR) and this equipment is accurately reflected in a load list. In addition, the Member State unit has agreed on a specific timeframe for readiness and the collection point and identified the port of embarkation. A unit at the RDL is ready for deployment to any UN field mission within 60 days of a formal invitation from the Secretariat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of units</th>
<th># of units in PCRS Level 1</th>
<th># of units in PCRS Level 2</th>
<th># of units in PCRS Level 3</th>
<th># of units in PCRS RDL</th>
<th>Deployed/Deploying units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Battalions</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Company/Platoon</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Force Units/groups</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Protection Company/QRF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Companies/Platoons</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining/EOD Units</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals/Medical Teams</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility Helicopter Units</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Aircraft/Helicopter Units</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Aircrafts</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Systems</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Companies/teams</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Companies/platoons</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log/Transport Companies/Units</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formed Police Units</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Guard Units</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAT</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Units</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Air Lift</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Capabilities</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>183</strong></td>
<td><strong>77</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^4\) The figures represent all pledges, including the ones prior to the December 2017 PCRS upgrade. Following the upgrade at the start of 2018, all existing PCRS pledges require re-registration. In the next quarterly paper, units not registered in the PCRS website as of that time will no longer be listed as a valid pledge.
The 2019 schedule of Assessment and Advisory Visits will be driven by ongoing and clearly identified future capability requirements, Member States interest and the Secretariat’s available resources. Priority for the conduct of AAVs will be given to Member States who have registered the following critical capabilities in the PCRS:

- Medium utility (armed and unarmed) helicopters, attack helicopters units and UAS;
- Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) units;
- Francophone units (both military and police);
- Units that have significant participation of women;
- Mobile and expeditionary infantry units; and
- Engineering Companies with specialized capabilities (C-IED / EOD/ Airfield rehabilitation).

A large and diverse number of credible pledges will improve the uniformed capabilities of UN peacekeeping operations, as well as increase the speed of future deployments. There are, however, challenges in operationalizing the pledges and reaping the benefits of an adequately prepared, equipped and committed reserve force. There is a need for Member States to register their pledges with sufficient details. 57 Member States have not fully registered their pledges and 17 have not confirmed their pledges for the current UN peacekeeping Fiscal Year (18-19). Outdated commitments made by Member States hinder strategic planning and force generation. In addition, while all pledges are welcome, pledges with caveats limiting the possible deployment location, or units not currently in demand will have lower priority for an Assessment and Advisory Visit. Finally, of the over 120 units that have been assessed through AAVs since March 2016, shortfalls and gaps have been observed in equipment and training in approximately over 30 per cent of these pledged units. The SFGCPC stands ready to assist Member States in addressing issues raised during the AAVs and requests Member States to update their units’ readiness status as it develops.

**NOTE: The PCRS web portal was upgraded at the end of 2018. All existing PCRS pledges require re-registration in the new website: https://pcrs.un.org. PCRS registration issues may be directed via email to pcrs.manager@un.org **